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ABSTRACT 
 
The islands of Okinawa have a long history of people’s protest.  Much of this has 
been a manifestation in one way or another of Okinawa’s enforced assimilation into 
Japan and their differential treatment thereafter. However, it is only in the 
contemporary period that we find interpretations among academic and popular writers 
of a collective political movement opposing marginalisation of, and discrimination 
against, Okinawans. This is most powerfully expressed in the idea of the three ‘waves’ 
of a post-war ‘Okinawan struggle’ against the US military bases. Yet, since Okinawa’s 
annexation to Japan in 1879, differences have constantly existed among protest groups 
over the reasons for and the means by which to protest, and these have only intensified 
after the reversion to Japanese administration in 1972. 
This dissertation examines the trajectory of Okinawan protest actors, 
focusing on the development and nature of internal differences, the origin and survival 
of the idea of a united ‘Okinawan struggle’, and the implications of these factors for 
political reform agendas in Okinawa. It explains the internal differences in 
organisation, strategies and collective identities among the groups in terms of three 
major priorities in their protest. There are those protesters principally preoccupied 
with opposing the US-Japan security treaty and for whom the preservation of pacifist 
clauses of the Constitution and the utilisation of formal legal and political processes 
are paramount as a modus operandi. There are also those primarily concerned to 
protect Okinawa’s distinctive lifestyle and natural environment, as well as an 
assortment of feminist groups fundamentally opposed to the presence of US bases due 
to concerns about patriarchy and exploitation of women, fostered by militarism. In 
these last two perspectives, protest tends to be conducted much more via informal, 
network-oriented processes, and includes engagement with international civil society 
groups.   
The increasing range of protest groups derived from the expansion of these 
last two perspectives — diversifying beyond the traditional workers’ unions and  
  iv
political parties — is consistent with the ‘new social movement’ theory.  This 
theory’s emphasis on the importance of socio-economic change for the emergence of 
groups with post-materialist reform agendas and a stronger predisposition towards 
informal political processes resonates with the Okinawan experiences. However, the 
impact of this has been — especially after the reversion in 1972 — to hinder effective 
coalition building among the Okinawan protest groups and organisations, weakening 
their power to bring about political reforms, particularly towards the removal of the 
US military bases from the island. 
Crucially, though, the idea of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ has endured in the 
community of protest throughout the post-war period. Ideas about marginalisation of, 
and discrimination against, Okinawans constitute a powerful myth of an ‘Okinawan 
struggle’, which has a long history of being redefined, used and exploited differently 
by a wide range of protest actors, adjusted to their particular and historically specific 
struggles. Indeed, in the event that the US military bases were withdrawn from 
Okinawa, the ability and appeal of the myth of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ would 
therefore not necessarily expire, even if it will increasingly be joined by other protest 
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Note On Japanese Names and Spelling 
 
Japanese names are presented surname first and given name second, following the 
conventional Japanese fashion, except for the English-language quotations or 
otherwise ordered bibliographical references.  Macrons are placed to indicate all long 






ICFTU      International Confederation of Free Trade Union 
 
G.R.I.      Government  of  Ryukyu  Islands 
 
OLDP    Okinawa  Liberal  Democratic  Party 
 
OPP    Okinawa  People’s  Party 
 
OSMP    Okinawa  Socialist  Masses  Party 
 
OSP      Okinawa  Socialist  Party 
 
OTA    Okinawa  Teachers’  Association 
 
SDF    Self  Defence  Forces 
 
SCAP      Supreme Command for Allied Powers 
 
SOFA      Status of Forces Agreement 
 
USCAR     United States Civil Administration of the Ryūkyūs 
 






Ampo     US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty 
 
Fukki   Reversion   
 
Fukki-kyo    Council for the Return of Okinawa to the Home Country 
 
Kankōrō     Okinawa Pubic Office Workers’ Unions Council 
 
Kenrōkyō   Okinawa Prefectural Labour Union Committee 
 
Iken Kyōtō    Okinawa Supporting Council for the Legal Actions against 
Unconstitutionality 
 
Jichirō    All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers’ Union 
 
Kenrōkyō    Okinawa Prefectural Labour Union Committee    
 
Minsei   Democratic  Youth  League 
 
Okifuren     League of Okinawan Women’s Groups 
 
Rengō      Japanese Trade Union Confederation 
 
Sōhyō    General Council of Japanese Trade Unions 
 




Yamato    Mainland  Japan 
 
Zenchurō    All Garrison Forces Labor Union Okinawa 
Division  
 
Zengakuren    All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Government 
Association 
 
Zengunrō    All Okinawan Military Workers’ Union 
 
Zenkyōtō    All-Japan Joint Struggle Committee 
 
Zen-Oki Rōren    All Okinawan Labour Unions’ Association 
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Introduction 
 
In a society dominated by the US military presence, people in Okinawa have 
constantly protested against militarism and war.    The disproportionate concentration 
of US military bases on Okinawa — where 75 per cent of the US forces deployed in 
Japan are located, even though Okinawa accounts for just 0.6 per cent of Japan’s land 
mass — is a result not just of the US–Japan security alliance but also Japan’s 
discriminatory treatment of a minority group.  However, the presence of US 
military bases has not been the exclusive cause of Okinawans’ protest.    Subjugation 
to powerful outsiders has been a constant variable in the history of the Okinawa 
Archipelago.    Protests against the US military presence on the Okinawa Main Island 
in the post-war phase are rooted in the long struggle of the island’s people against 
marginalisation. 
In this long history of Okinawan people’s protest, diversity and internal 
differences among the protest actors have continually defined Okinawan civil society.   
‘Okinawa’ encompasses a group of multi-lingual and multi-cultural islands and 
regions, with varying degrees of socio-economic and demographic conditions. Today, 
for example, the US military bases affect regions and municipalities considerably 
differently in terms of noise, crimes, and importantly, economic benefits to the local 
economy.    There are many different ways of defining Okinawa’s predicament today; 
factors such as protesters’ occupations, assets, place of residence, gender, age and 
past experiences as activists being among those that influence this diversity.  This 
includes disagreements over, and variations of perception about, what ‘Okinawa’ 
means, vis-à-vis mainland Japan: how separate an entity ‘Okinawa’ is, from yamato.  
Inevitably, these differences are reflected in the contrasting priorities and modus 
operandi of protest.  Moreover, particularly after Okinawa reverted to Japanese 
administration in 1972, protest groups have become smaller, less affiliated to 
established political parties or workers’ unions, and their number has been increasing.   
They address increasingly different areas of social concerns that are not exclusively 
related to the marginalisation of Okinawa vis-à-vis Japan, but also engage in building   2
transnational networks and activities, especially concerning environmentalism and 
feminism.  Okinawan protest actors are becoming more and more akin to ‘new 
social movements’ prevalent in post-industrial societies.     
The theory of ‘new social movements’ is thus especially relevant to the 
Okinawan case.  Vibrant centres of protest in Okinawa are moving away from 
established leftist political parties and workers’ unions, and the means of protest are 
becoming more individual-based and concentrated on informal political activities.  
Traditional actors, namely, political parties and union activists remain a routine 
protest sector, so that we see a deepening of the divisions within the community of 
protest rather than a smooth replacement of old for new.     
The diversity and vibrancy of protest actors contribute to the perception of 
Okinawa as an interesting region in Japan, with a distinctive democratic and pacifist 
tradition.  Okinawan civil society is therefore seen to contain a deep reservoir of 
social movements derived from its rich tradition of protest.  There are apparent 
expectations that the power of Okinawans’ protest will create political change not 
only affecting US military presence in the region, but also towards a different ‘Japan’.   
In particular, the Okinawan anti-base protesters collectively attract external sympathy 
and support from academics, peace and environmental activists, feminists, and 
journalists, for staging a long-term struggle against the two superpower states, the 
US and Japan.  However, in the context of macro-level analysis of the US, Japan 
and Okinawa, the internal differences within Okinawan protest actors tend to be 
underrepresented.  From the perspectives of international and mainland Japanese 
audiences, the ‘Okinawan’ protesters are often viewed as a single, united entity.     
It is the primary concern of this dissertation not only to explore the internal 
diversity of and differences between protest groups, features that are concealed by 
the representation of a united ‘Okinawan anti-base movement’; but also to 
simultaneously ask what role the idea of a singular ‘Okinawan struggle’ or an 
‘Okinawan movement’ has played or plays.  It analyses the impact of diversity in 
the community of protest in relation to that community’s power to bring about the 
reforms aimed for by protesters, most notably the reduction and eventual removal of   3
the US military bases from Okinawa.  It also considers the implications of the 
diversification of protest actors for the utility and appeal of the idea of a singular 
‘Okinawan struggle’ — however arbitrarily interpreted — that is still prevalent 
across different sectors of the community of protest.     
The central argument is that the diversification of protest actors in Okinawa 
reflects a transformation of civil society in Okinawa towards an increasingly open, 
plural sphere with greater entry points for participation in the community of protest.  
However, a more open and vibrant civil society has not necessarily resulted in a 
greater ability to put effective pressure on the state to make political reforms to 
reduce the US military presence.    With splintered collective identities (definition of 
who ‘we’ are), repertoires of protest (reservoirs of knowledge acquired from 
experiences in protest and mutual learning) and framings (meanings attached to the 
act of protest) in the community of protest, a unified ‘Okinawan struggle’ that was 
strongly supported during the reversion movement, has become more problematic.  
The idea of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ that gives continuity and unity across different 
actors in different periods and locations may be diminishing as a basis for building 
different organisations into a coalition.  Nevertheless, the idea of an ‘Okinawan 
struggle’ is likely to survive as a myth that supports and nurtures the increasing 
plurality and chaos in Okinawan civil society.    This is because the appeal to the idea 
of marginalisation and discrimination can continue to tap into a deeply embedded 
political culture reflecting Okinawa’s particular historical experience.   
Chapter 1 reviews how anti-base popular protest in Okinawa is represented in 
the developing literature on Okinawa.  The chapter then defines concepts and 
theories of social movements relevant to the central questions of this thesis and 
useful for understanding and explaining the diversity and unity of the ‘movement’ 
and its transition over time.  The chapter particularly elaborates on the utility of 
‘new social movements theory’.  The rest of the dissertation is divided into three 
parts. 
In the following two chapters comprising Part I of this dissertation, I examine 
the historical processes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that   4
contributed to the development of a historical narrative of marginalisation: forced 
annexation to mainland Japan; delayed reforms and subsequent economic hardship; 
involvement in WWII and the Battle of Okinawa.    This exercise is important, as this 
dissertation explains this historical narrative of marginalisation as a significant — 
albeit not the only — component of the myth of an ‘Okinawan struggle’, or the 
otherwise coined notion of a continuous struggle of Okinawans as a united 
‘movement’.  This section also identifies and analyses contending perspectives on 
how to interpret these events among Okinawans; perspectives whose legacies are still 
exerting an impact today in definitions of Okinawan collective identity, as well as the 
strategy and organisation of protest.  From early on, the desire for assimilation to 
mainland Japan and the assertion of distinctiveness coexisted in Okinawa. 
Chapter 2 mainly focuses on the increasing complexity of the emerging 
Okinawan identity and associated contention, notably to what extent it should be 
‘Japanese’.  The emergence of the ‘assimilationist’ strategy in Okinawan political 
action is particularly significant, exemplified by the dominant positions in 
‘Okinawan Studies’ and Jahana Noboru’s political movement.  The assimilationist 
strategy, which seeks protection from the Japanese state, has survived in the post-war 
protest of the Okinawans in the reversion movement.    Chapter 3 discusses residents’ 
experiences in the Battle of Okinawa, which generated Okinawan-specific ‘absolute 
pacifism’.  The basic tenet of this ‘absolute pacifism’ is that the state cannot be 
trusted because when it engages in war, it subjects the lives of its people — 
especially the lives of minorities — to its own interests.  The experience of the 
Battle of Okinawa and representation of the residents’ experience constitute the basis 
of pacifism and anti-militarism in Okinawa.     
Part II (chapters 4 and 5) examines the emergence of a tradition of voluntary 
mass protest that involved the island-wide population, the rise of the ‘community of 
protest’ and the idea of the ‘Okinawan struggle’ under direct US military rule.  
Initially they emerged with the people’s protest against the US military’s land policy, 
which developed into a popular movement towards reversion to Japan.  Chapters 4 
and 5 elaborate on the first two ‘waves’ of the island-wide struggle, through which   5
various protest groups represented themselves as one ‘Okinawa’, and the concept of 
a singular ‘Okinawan struggle’ vis-à-vis US direct rule and mainland Japan.  The 
chapters focus on the period when the idea of an ‘Okinawan struggle’, referred to as 
‘the Okinawa Struggle’ (Okinawa Tōsō) provided the most powerful coalition basis.       
Chapter 4 examines the birth and growth of local political parties, workers’ 
and teachers’ unions and other actors of collective action, which created the ‘first 
wave’ island-wide struggle, that is, the 1956 Okinawans’ mass uprising against the 
US military’s forced acquisition of privately owned land.    Amongst other actors, the 
farmers’ disobedience in Ie-jima, is especially important for the legacy of a uniquely 
‘Okinawan’ non-violent pacifism immediately following the Battle of Okinawa 
experience.  The uprisings in this period demonstrated Okinawans’ ability to 
organise against the US authorities to demand changes.    After the rise and fall of the 
first-wave Okinawa Struggle, which peaked in 1956, and the financial settlement 
between the landowners and the US authorities, the reversion movement prevailed 
over the land dispute as the main agenda of the ‘All-island’ protest.     
Chapter 5 examines the development of organisation, strategy and collective 
identity in the second-wave island-wide struggle.  The Okinawan Teachers’ 
Association, political parties and workers’ unions established a coalition for 
reversion, which was a goal that dictated a unified strategy to seek assimilation.  
However, the coalition’s political agenda tended to be removed from Okinawan 
residents’ day-to-day concerns about the US bases.    The ‘assimilationist’ avenues of 
protest motivated by the ultimate goal of reversion, however, did not accommodate 
workers’ attempts of general strikes, citizens’ concerns and anti-base sentiments 
resulting from accidents and the use of nuclear weapons in the bases, and other more 
intellectual critiques against reversion.    Importantly, the organisational structure and 
collective identity of the reversion movement have survived in the ‘constitutionalist’ 
framing of anti-base protest today. 
Part III comprises three chapters, which examine the ‘low’ cycle of protest 
after the reversion, and the rise and fall of the ‘third wave’ island-wide struggle.  
The political and economic conditions in Okinawa went through significant changes   6
following reversion to Japan in 1972, and protests against the US military entered a 
quiet period.  The idea of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ — once a strong basis for 
coalition during the reversion movement — and its goal, organisation and collective 
identity had to be re-defined.  The aim of chapters 6, 7 and 8 is to explain three 
major reform orientations of protest, respectively, ‘constitutional’, ‘local’ and 
‘gender’, which can be differentiated in terms of collective identity, repertoires of 
collective action, and on interpretations of what was really at stake.     
Chapter 6 examines the process of re-defining the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ after 
the reversion, focusing on the characteristics of organisation, strategy and collective 
identity of anti-war landowners and their supporters.  The successors of the 
mainstream ‘Okinawa Struggle’ were the anti-war landowners, and their supporting 
organisations, comprised of the One-tsubo anti-war landowners, Okinawan anti-base 
political parties and workers’ unions.  They managed to re-establish an anti-base 
coalition — albeit a much weaker one than previously— based on the ‘constitutional’ 
framing of protest.  The anti-base coalition converted the ‘assimilationist’ strategy 
and collective identity of the reversion movement into a strong attachment to the 
democratic and pacifist principles of the post-war Japanese Constitution, connected 
to specific Okinawan experiences, and particularly related to the Battle of Okinawa 
and the anti-war landowners’ disobedience against the US and Japan’s violation of 
individual property rights, justified by the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty. 
Chapter 7 examines the major transformation in the community of protest that 
marks what this dissertation sees as the emergence of ‘new social movements’.  It 
focuses on the emergence of residents’ movements, as one alternative to the 
previously dominant workers’ and socialist movements.  It undertakes two case 
studies of residents’ protest against the oil refinery industry development in Kin Bay 
and the construction of the New Ishigaki Airport in Shiraho that emerged after 
reversion in 1972.  These two struggles paved the way for the ‘local’ framing of 
protest, which attaches great significance to the conservation of local marine 
resources that have provided residents’ traditional lifestyle and finds ‘Okinawan’ 
identity in unique localities within Okinawa.    What directly gave meaning to the act   7
of protest in these case studies were the life experiences in specific local contexts 
within Okinawa, which had tended to be underrepresented previously because of the 
preoccupation with integration of Okinawa to Japan during the reversion movement.   
The emergence of these residents’ movements that reflected diverse forms of life 
within Okinawa also put the idea of a single ‘Okinawan struggle’ under critical 
reconsideration by the activists in general. 
Chapter 8 focuses on the peak and the downturn period following the rise of 
the third wave ‘Okinawan Struggle’.  The contemporary community of protest is 
characterised by the co-existence of plural social movements.  Differences and 
internal divisions within the community of protest, I argue, indicate the co-existence 
of qualitatively different kinds of social movements, although they are all related in 
some way to the inequality and marginalisation related to the continuing dominance 
of US military bases on Okinawa.     
A distinctive contribution of this thesis is to understand the Okinawan protest 
actors from the perspective of changing and dynamic ‘social movements’.  This 
dissertation critically examines and analyses the people and their experiences of 
protests in Okinawa, as varieties of social movements, similar to other protest 
experiences in the world that are studied more widely and profoundly, for example, 
the civil rights movement, anti-nuclear movements and women at Greenham 
Common.  It contributes to opening the black box of ‘Okinawan protesters’ 
represented as a collective victim of an invincible US international security policy, of 
Tokyo’s political economy of compensation, and of marginalisation of a minority 
group in Japan.  It attempts to look at who the protesters are, what they want, how 
they strive to get it, and why. 
Overall, it contends that the myth of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ has survived, 
and will survive increasing diversification of protest actors and changing reform 
agendas in Okinawa because of its flexibility in being harnessed to a myriad of 
shapes and forms of campaigns against marginalisation.  This dissertation reveals 
that through the post-war period, the myth — described variously as an ‘Okinawan 
struggle’, the ‘Okinawa Struggle’, or the ‘Okinawans’ movement’ — has become less   8
rigid in the way it is incorporated into notions of collective identity or rationales for 
specific protests and organisations thereof.  Yet it is precisely this capacity of the 
myth to speak to so many different interpretations of marginalisation — involving 
different struggles and experiences at different periods in time — that means it is still 
a powerful and attractive one.  It continues to be an effective source of inspiration 
and mobilisation for divergent groups by providing strategies and ideas of protest 
derived from past experiences, and to be a source of self-expression.  Another 
attraction of the idea of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ is its ability to provide a base for 
individual struggles, from which to connect with common experiences of 
marginalisation taking place in other parts of the world, thus promoting developing 
networks with social movement actors in global civil society. 
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Chapter One 
 
Protest, Social Movements and the   
Okinawan People’s Struggle 
 
Reading Protest in Okinawa 
Following wide coverage in the media of the rape case of an Okinawan girl in 1995 
by three US Marines, an increasing number of commentaries have touched on the 
subject of local protest against the US military’s presence on the main island of 
Okinawa. Increasing work from social, historical and political studies focus on the 
factors that have given rise to contemporary local protest and political action against 
the US military and Japanese government.  Okinawa provides plenty of rich raw 
materials for studies of US neo-colonialism and imperialism in East Asia (for 
example Johnson 1999a), the devastating and parasitic forces of capitalism on 
vulnerable islands (for example McCormack 1998a), the insidious structure of 
compensation politics, under which Okinawans’ bargaining power against the heavy 
US military presence has been constantly suppressed after the 1972 reversion (for 
example George-Mulgan 1999, Johnson 2002, Yonetani 2001), contesting 
interpretations of Okinawa’s past, especially regarding war memory (Yonetani 2003, 
Nelson 2003), systematic discrimination against minorities in Japan, and the 
expressions of Okinawan identity and their political implications (for example 
Morris-Suzuki 1998, Taira 1997).    Relatively few studies, however, have focused on 
the constituent protest organisations and the relationships among them.
1   
Representation of the Homogenous and Diverse Okinawan Anti-base Movement 
Within the existing, growing literature on Okinawa, the anti-base protesters have 
received considerable attention through, amongst others, the Japan Policy Research 
                                                             
1Exceptionally, Yonetani (2001) describes some of the anti-base activities in Nago, Okinawa before 
the 2000 Kyushu-Okinawa G8 Summit.    Inoue (1999) also thoroughly studies the protest against the 
new off-shore base, which is going to be constructed after the closure of the Futenma Air Base, and its 
impacts on community life in Henoko hamlet.       10
Institute (JPRI).
2   The JPRI forum has provided significant channels through 
which the battles against continuing discrimination and marginalisation of Okinawa 
by mainland Japan are advanced by Okinawans, providing information and analyses 
for an academic and English-speaking readership on the anti-base movements in 
Okinawa.    The JPRI writings, and similarly, Hook and Siddle’s collection of essays 
on Okinawa (2003), help correct a misleading image that the local populace is 
uniformly against the US military presence, as is sometimes represented in simplified 
accounts.
3 





7, and Medoruma Shun
8 have been prominently 
represented in a JPRI article (JPRI Staff 1998b).    Furthermore, local reactions to the 
state’s attempt to consolidate the island as a security outpost have been reported 
(McCormack & Yonetani 2000).  These studies contribute to a more informed 
global audience on what is happening in Okinawa, and give shape and voice to the 
                                                             
2 JPRI is an electronically accessed journal edited by a group of scholars in the study of political 
economy and international relations of East Asia and Japan, headed by Professor Chalmers Johnson 
(see http://www.jpri.org). 
3 After the rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl in September 1995, in a typical newspaper report, ‘the 
incident has inflamed the 1 million residents of this subtropical island and sent their governor to 
Tokyo to call for closure of the massive US military bases here’ (Washington Post 20 September 
1995).  Hook and Siddle point out that ‘for some [Okinawans], the bases are a ‘good’’(2003: 4), 
referring to the landowners who gain incomes from leasing their properties to the US military, albeit 
to a much less degree than the pre-reversion period, employment opportunities that the bases provide, 
and indirect benefits to the local economy created by goods purchased by, and construction projects 
for, the US forces. 
4  Ōta Masahide is a former governor (1990–98) and emeritus professor of humanities at the 
University of the Ryukyus, and a Socialist Democratic Party member of the Upper House.  He has 
published numerous books on Okinawan history. 
5 A founding member of the Okinawan Women Act Against Military and Violence, Carolyn Francis 
first came to Japan as a missionary, and moved to Okinawa to engage in consciousness-raising 
activities on women’s rights and anti-US militarism. 
6 Miyagi Yasuhiro was born in Nago and engaged in theatrical performances in Tokyo.  In 
opposition to the construction of a new US off-shore base in Nago, he led the campaign to initiate a 
plebiscite of Nago citizens in 1997, as spokesperson for the Nago Citizens Act Against the Heliport 
Campaign, and chair of the Nago City Plebiscite Promotion Council.    Miyagi ran for mayor in 2002 
but lost to conservative incumbent Kishimoto Tateo. 
7  Professor of history at Okinawa University, Arasaki Moriteru is of Okinawan heritage, but was born 
and educated in Tokyo.  With Nakano Yoshio, Arasaki contributed to the research on Okinawan 
post-war history, particularly with (Nakano & Arasaki 1976).   As a politically active intellectual, he 
participated in the anti-CTS (Central Terminal Station) movement (discussed in chapter 6), and has 
founded and represented the One-tsubo Anti-War Landowners’ Organisation (see chapter 5), as well as 
regularly contributing articles in local newspapers. 
8 Medoruma Shun is an Okinawan writer who has also written critical commentaries on Okinawa’s 
conditions. Medoruma’s novel, Droplets, won the Akutagawa Prize in 1997.    See Medoruma 1999.     11
anti-base activities of the Okinawan activists.  In this sense, JPRI writings on 
Okinawan protests can be read as a support network in global civil society for the 
‘Okinawan protesters’ by representing their voices.     
From JPRI and other work focused on contemporary anti-base struggles of 
the Okinawans (for example Hein 2001, Inoue, Purves & Selden 1998, JPRI Staff 
1998b, McCormack & Yonetani 2000, Yonetani 2001), it is evident that there are 
increasingly diverse angles from which to protest.  There are anti-base labour 
unions and local socialist and communist parties who compose a local anti-base 
coalition.  There are anti-war landowners who refuse to contract with the US 
military, a women’s organisation stages its own anti-base protest, there has been a 
local campaign in Nago City against the relocation of the Futenma Air Base.  
Chalmers Johnson observes ‘…the protest against the American presence in Okinawa 
has deepened and gained sophistication compared with the protests of the 1950s and 
1960s’ (Johnson 1999a: 109). As such, in Okinawa, there are numerous positions and 
memberships associated with anti-base protest, which are transforming with time, 
towards ever intensifying diversity. 
However, paradoxically, representation of ‘Okinawan activists’ in the JPRI 
forum has also contributed to an image of a unified ‘Okinawan anti-base movement’.   
Individual protesters are collectively and unitarily represented in the context of 
macro-level social, economic and political structures, and international relations.  
This is the case, in particular, for the JPRI literature that represents ‘Okinawan 
protest’ on US–Japan relations in the post-Cold War era, money and politics in 
Okinawa and Japan, and the local economy’s dependence on the central 
government’s special subsidies, involving construction-oriented public works that are 
destructive to Okinawa’s natural environment, which are tied to acceptance of the US 
military presence (Johnson 1999b, 2002, JPRI Staff 1998a, 1998c, McCormack 
1998b, McCormack & Yonetani 2000, Smith 1998). 
In the framework of analysing the tripartite relationship between Okinawa, 
the US and Japan, it is inevitable that representation of differences within Okinawan 
protesters is suspended.  In additional literature to that of JPRI, Okinawan people’s   12
battles against the US and Japan have been similarly accompanied by critical 
analyses on US militarism and anachronistic colonialism in Okinawa, and the 
Japanese government’s manipulation using financial means to suppress anti-base and 
anti-military movements. 
 
Since 1995, anti-base movements in Okinawa have posed critical   
challenges to the post-cold war designs of the US and Japanese 
strategic planners, to the economic and social priorities of Okinawan 
development, and to the democratic process (Inoue et al. 1998: 85).   
Barrel and Tanaka portray ‘the Okinawan grassroots movements’ against the 
presence of US bases as a radical challenge against Tokyo: 
 
Since then things have changed… the consensus is that as far as the 
military presence is concerned — either US or Japanese — Okinawans 
have decided ‘enough is enough’ (Barrel & Tanaka 1997: 5). 
Okinawan protesters also present themselves as unified actors, in relation to the 
Japanese government and the US military.  For example, in 1995, a veteran 
anti-base activist Uehara Kōsuke (see chapters 4 and 5) noted ‘a new battle is 
beginning, in order to clear the suffering of the ‘Okinawans’ in the last 50 years’ 
(Okinawa Mondai Henshu Iinkai 1995: 41).  Allen concedes that the 
undifferentiated use of ‘Okinawa’ as a natural representation of identity, in relation to 
the issues of international politics and sovereignty is, in a sense, a ‘legitimate’ and 
‘relevant’ component of many individual Okinawan identities: ‘in opposing the 
bilateral exploitation of the prefecture, quite understandably, protesters have placed 
the concept of Okinawa at the forefront of resistance movements’ (Allen 2002: 4).  
Allen is, therefore, cautious of ‘the focus on the ‘base problem’ (kichi mondai)’ 
because it ‘elides much of the complexity that underscores the production and 
reinvention of identity within Okinawa today’ (Allen 2002: 4–5).  Puzzlingly, 
implications of the paradoxical representations of the ‘Okinawan anti-base 
movement(s)’ as a coherent, single entity, and of diversity within the ‘Okinawan 
activists’ are not explored much.  What is not explained is how the diverse 
Okinawan protest actors manage to produce an idea, outlook or substance of a 
united, coherent ‘movement’ and how it is maintained. 
Much work has been initiated that shows how, through an historical   13
micro-focus on particular issues, periods, regions, and individuals in Okinawa, 
valuable insights into the complexity of today’s protest action can be gained (for 
example Allen 2002, Amemiya 1999a, 1999b, Inoue 1999).    This work is especially 
useful for revealing the diversity which comprises ‘Okinawa’ and the dramatic social 
and political changes in post-war history contributing to this. 
In The Japan We Never Knew, David Suzuki and Keibo Ōiwa tell the stories 
of radical, eccentric and individualistic anti-war and environmentalist Japanese, 
including Okinawan, activists.  They write about individuals who betray the 
predominant — and stereotyped — sterile, homogeneous, conformist and 
economic-centred image of the Japanese people.  For example, they interviewed a 
95-year-old peace activist Ahagon Shōkō (deceased 2002), in Ie-jima, Okinawa 
(discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis), who is a farmer, Christian war survivor and 
who fought against the US military’s forced land acquisition in the 1950s. He 
projects a tireless message: ‘war is a form of madness and inhumanity that destroys 
those who wage it’ (Suzuki & Ōiwa 1996: 7).  Another Okinawan interviewed in 
this book is Chibana Shōichi, a 48-year-old ‘grocer and unlikely rebel’ (Suzuki & 
Ōiwa 1996: 22, see also Field 1993).
9  Suzuki and Ōiwa travel to remoter islands 
such as Miyako, Iriomote and Ishigaki, and learn about rituals and handicraft that 
embody different kinds of living, spirituality and harmony with nature based on ‘a 
sense of place’ passed down uniquely to each community.    This part of their journey 
reveals the dazzling internal diversity of ‘Okinawa’, which is not just the Okinawa 
Main Island.  The story of activist Yamazato Setsuko, one of the villagers in 
Shiraho hamlet in Ishigaki Island, who successfully campaigned against the 
construction of a new airport (discussed in chapter 7 of this thesis), tells that 
grassroots movements are connected differently to a unique ‘sense of place’ specific 
to each location within Okinawa. 
                                                             
9 Chibana is perhaps one of the best-known Okinawan activists, who not only burned the hinomaru 
flag to make a point that the symbol of imperialism and war was not welcome in his village, but he 
was also a former student activist who campaigned for reversion and more recently an owner of a 
property within a US military communication facility in Yomitan (see Field 1993, Chibana 1992).  
Currently, Chibana runs a hostel with his family, and serves as a guide for those who come to learn 
about the history of war and nature (in particular, the ocean) in Okinawa.   14
Although not written specifically for an academic readership, Tony Barrel 
and Rick Tanaka’s Okinawa Dreams OK (1997) provides a package of snapshots that 
covers almost every major subject that tells of Okinawan uniqueness, including 
Okinawan martial arts, food, liquor, history, military bases, traditional dance, music, 
life and the cultural attributes of remote islands apart from the Main Island.  It is 
based on interviews with US soldiers, anti-base activists, politicians, musicians, 
business leaders, hotel owners and filmmakers, and conveys the diverse and chaotic 
realities of ‘Okinawa’.     
Okinawa Dreams OK also describes the groups and factions who routinely 
conduct protests against the US military and the Japanese government 
representatives.
10  Somewhat dismissively and negatively, Barrel and Tanaka call 
these groups and factions as the ‘usual suspects’ (1997: 170–1).    The term refers to 
the numerous local trade unions, teachers’ unions, students’ organisations, political 
parties and other citizens’ groups, who regularly participate and ‘mobilise’ local 
residents to demonstrate and rally against the US bases every time there are accidents 
or controversial military exercises.  It is relatively rare that the activities of these 
groups and factions are described in the English language literature on Okinawa, 
compared to the aforementioned individual protesters.    In Okinawa Dreams OK, the 
contrast between the description of the encouraging, optimistic messages of the 
‘grassroots’ Okinawan individuals, and the unexciting and rather negative portrayal 
of the anonymous, regularly participant anti-base groups is striking. 
However, these local groups and unions have constituted the bulk of what is 
recognised as the ‘Okinawan anti-base movement’.  Although they are collectively 
described as ‘usual suspects’ by Barrel and Tanaka, these groups and factions are 
quite heterogeneous.  Since Okinawa was under the direct US military rule, long 
before 1995 when Okinawa became the centre of temporary attention, numerous 
anti-base political parties, unions and citizens’ groups were formed, and have played 
different roles in the local political activism.   
                                                             
10  Especially, the Naha Security Facility Bureau (Naha Bōei Shisetsu-kyoku) is a direct representative 
of Japanese government’s interests regarding the US bases in Okinawa.   15
The obvious problem of these regular, traditional groups and factions is that 
they are ‘somehow exclusive of the wider population’ (Barrel & Tanaka 1997: 171).  
The authors describe a scene of demonstrations and rallies conducted by these groups 
against the US Marines’ live-fire artillery exercises across a major public road near 
Camp Hansen in Kin Town.  Every time the exercise started and the road closed to 
the public, routine protest rallies were held.
11  Barrel and Tanaka found that out of 
the reported 1000 participants, 350 were schoolchildren who looked bored and 
annoyed by the cold weather.  They discovered that the children were ‘mobilised’ 
there by the teachers, who also ‘seemed ignorant of what was happening’ except for a 
small number of staff members who led the protests (Barrel & Tanaka 1997: 170).     
This conformist, highly regimented character of the protest reminds us of the 
familiar image of the stereotypical Japanese.  The description of these activists fits 
the image of ‘the stale and choreographed nature of much anti-base activism’ (Siddle 
1998: 205).     
It seems that if the movement against centralised control and bogus 
international security agendas is to have any real success in Okinawa or 
anywhere… the struggle can’t be left to the usual suspects (Barrel & 
Tanaka 1997: 171). 
The above quote describes a widely perceived problem associated with the 
traditional leading protest organisations in Okinawa today.  The style of protest 
represented by the traditional regular participants is generally not attractive to most 
locals (especially younger generations), unless they are happy to be ‘mobilised’ in a 
top-down manner.
12   Rising representations about more unconventional, rebel 
Okinawan anti-base activists should not, however, obscure the history and 
achievements, as well as problems of, the traditional Okinawan anti-base actors.  
This thesis attempts to contribute to unmasking these anonymous groups, and what 
their  trajectories  of  protest  have  been.        
In the English-language writings of Okinawan grassroots movements, 
‘women’ represent another category of Okinawan activists (for example Francis 
1999, Kirk & Okazawa-Rey 1998, Takazato 1996, 2001).    Okinawan women have a 
                                                             
11  This live firing practice has been transferred to rural regions of mainland Japan, which was decided 
by the 1996 SACO agreement (see chapter 8). 
12  This has been the author’s impression, obtained from conversations with numerous Okinawans.   16
double struggle as ‘Okinawans’ and as ‘women’.  Angst (2001) and Francis (1999) 
have shown how, following the 1995 rape, the women activists’ most burning 
concern resided in a feminist issue to do with gender violence and militarism, which 
was a qualitatively separate movement from other more prominently represented 
struggles against the US military’s invasion of Okinawan sovereignty and the 
repatriation of land to Okinawan landowners.  Yet these differences are not 
expressed as a primary concern of the Okinawan women’s group, for the strategic 
purpose of forming a unitary front against the US and Japan (Angst 2001: 249). 
However, especially recently, it is hard to consolidate the existence of a 
unitary front among different protest actors, if there is any.   Allen Nelson, a former 
US Marine and now a peace activist, frequently visits Okinawa, meets local anti-base 
and peace groups, and gives talks about his experiences in the military, of the 
Vietnam War, and about the actual war practices of the US military, in the bases 
located on Okinawa.
13    On his trip in 2002, I met Nelson at a private function where 
he gave a talk.  He was physically exhausted and had been lying down until 
immediately before the talk.    Nelson explained: 
 
When I come to Okinawa, I have an extremely busy schedule, because I 
give talks for so many different groups.  I am asked to give a talk by 
this group and that organisation and I don’t want to say no.  The 
Okinawan peace groups are so splintered.  Why can’t they all be 
together?  Personally I don’t think they will have a substantial voice 
strong enough to move the US military unless all those small different 
groups are able to come together in one united front. (Personal 
communication, February 2002) 
A still largely unexplored question about the Okinawans’ protest, especially against 
the US military bases, is why there are so many different groups, what explains their 
differences, what are their dividing lines, and how the dynamics of individual 
organisations and events sit with the representation of protest of a singular ‘Okinawa’ 
or ‘Okinawans’.    As discussed above, homogenous representation of the ‘Okinawan 
anti-base movement’ tends to leave out conflicting differences in reform agendas, 
motivations, priorities and definitions of the Okinawan predicament among the 
                                                             
13 Nelson also engages in helping African and Hispanic American children receive more education, 
and often gives talks at schools and group meetings in the US and Japan.    As a soldier, he trained in a 
US base on Okinawa (See Nelson 1999).   17
protest actors, and how they have changed over time.  Also absent is the analytical 
focus on the mechanisms, through which a ‘movement’ emerges, develops and is 
sustained.    These are the areas that this thesis attempts to explore. 
The ‘Okinawa Struggle’ 
Confirming the diversity among the Okinawan protesters explained in this chapter, in 
my two field trips to Okinawa in 1999 and 2002, I could not easily find concrete 
attempts by the activists to group all the different struggles in Okinawa into one 
‘movement’.    Like Allen first encountered in his trip, it is difficult to trace evidence 
of an ‘Okinawans’ movement’ committed to political action to demand secession 
from Japan (Allen 2002: 3).
14  Rather, my impression was that the local activists 
tended to accept, and even appeared proud of, the diversity of, and chaotic 
complexion among, different individuals and organisations engaged in protest. 
The closest I have come to the idea of ‘the Okinawa Struggle’ is the 
definition used by professor of Okinawan history and anti-war landowner Arasaki 
Moriteru.    Reflecting on the period that followed the rape case of a twelve-year-old 
schoolgirl in September 1995, Arasaki wrote, ‘temporarily, I shall refer to this phase 
of mass protest as the third wave of the Okinawa Struggle’ (Okinawa tōsō)’ (Arasaki 
2000: 39).  Arasaki (see also Johnson 2000: 52) introduces the idea that there have 
been three major ‘waves’ of mass protest in post-war Okinawan history.  The first 
wave was the period of mass protests against the US military’s land confiscations 
that reached a peak in 1956 and is remembered as the ‘all-island struggle’ 
(shimagurumi tōsō).  In the second wave of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’, from the late 
1960s to early 1970s, the protesters demanded the end of US direct rule and 
reversion to Japanese administration.  This is generally called the ‘reversion 
struggle’ (fukki tōsō).  According to Arasaki (and also Johnson 1999a: 114), the 
third wave of mass protest re-emerged following the 1995 case of a 12-year-old girl 
abducted and raped by three US soldiers, which contributed to drawing public 
attention worldwide to the dangers visited upon local populations by the foreign 
                                                             
14 Nevertheless, at a theoretical level, a group of people has been committed to the ‘Okinawa 
independence theory’ (Okinawa dokuritsu ron), expressed in a local journal Urumanesia.   18
deployment of US bases in the post-Cold War world, hitherto barely recognised in 
other parts of Japan and the world (see also Funabashi 1997, Mochizuki & O'Hanlon 
1998). 
The ‘Okinawa Struggle’ is an expression specific to the late 1960s, which was 
first used by the mainland Japanese anti-base activists.
15  Immediately before 1970, 
Okinawan activists started to use the term ‘Okinawa Struggle’ as well.    They did so 
with a proposition that, in order to overcome Okinawa’s predicament at the time, 
Okinawa’s reversion — or ‘regaining of Okinawa’ from the mainland Japanese 
perspective — was not enough, it was necessary to oppose the military bases on 
Okinawa, the US–Japan security alliance and US foreign policy in world politics 
(Arasaki Interview February 2002). 
Most significantly, Arasaki’s idea of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ — and the ‘three 
waves’ in the post-war period — attaches continuity and coherence to the protests of 
the Okinawan people.    It gives shape, and a name, to numerous and diverse events, 
and renders them as a struggle of a single group of people that has peaked three 
times.    The idea of ‘three waves’ captures the periods of intense political contention, 
which are popularly called ‘the island-wide struggles’ (shima-gurumi tōsō) in 
Okinawa, representing the time when the population put aside its differences in 
political affiliation and social status, and collectively expressed their demands.  It 
accurately conveys that in between these three peaks of protest on an island-wide 
scale, more than likely there were many smaller struggles on a daily basis.  The 
framework of ‘three waves’ provides a general timeline to assume an overall 
trajectory in which diverse Okinawan protest organisations, and alliances among 
them, have emerged, developed and waned. 
The notion of a coherent, single struggle of a single group of people that may 
be interpreted from the ‘Okinawa Struggle’, however, is more problematic.   
Arasaki’s idea of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ portrays a sense of unity and continuity 
                                                             
15 The Japanese peace activists’ main struggle was against the renewal of the Japan–US Mutual 
Security Treaty in 1970, especially among the radical New Left organisations loosely united by the 
aim of socialist revolution based on individual action (Ikeda 1997: 98, Steinhoff 1984, Takazawa 
1996: 10).   19
among different actors and struggles in post-war Okinawa, which certainly appears 
to have strong currency among Okinawans, albeit in an abstract sense.  However, 
also, the indication is that in the periods described as ‘three waves’ the differences 
among the protesters have been negotiated into a representation of one ‘Okinawan’ 
voice only three times in more than 50 years. 
This dissertation takes the position that Arasaki’s concept of the ‘Okinawa 
Struggle’ cannot be used to validate the general idea of a unified ‘movement’ of all 
Okinawan people with a strong organisational coalition and solidarity as an ethnic 
group.  Rather, this risks misrepresenting the splintered nature of the Okinawan 
community of protest.  The three ‘waves’ only represent the rare and temporary 
moments when different protesters were able to form a coalition.  A large part of 
this dissertation involves an historical examination of protest actions in Okinawa that 
critically examines a long-standing ‘Okinawa Struggle’, exploring the features and 
elements of this ‘movement’ to ascertain its political trajectory over time and its 
constituent elements.  It will be seen that under the direct US military 
administration, when the term ‘Okinawa Struggle’ was first introduced, there was 
some basis to the idea of a unified movement, or at least potential for it.    However, 
today’s emerging diverse, smaller, looser and more splintered protest groups from a 
wider range of social sectors are less inclined to form into a united coalition under 
the banner of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’. 
Arasaki continues to use the word ‘Okinawa Struggle’ as the most adequate 
term to describe ‘a comprehensive people’s movement (minshū undō) against the 
current marginalisation of Okinawans’ interests and voices, as a product of US 
military bases, the Japan–US security alliance and the US global military strategy’ 
(Arasaki, Interview, February 2002).  Yet his definition of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ 
that places emphasis on Okinawa’s structural discrimination defined in terms of the 
US–Japan security alliance should be interpreted as one among many, it by no means 
represents the perspective of every Okinawan activist. 
Importantly, nevertheless, the idea of a tradition of continuous struggles of 
the Okinawan people has survived as a myth, which enables the members of the   20
community to define, understand and legitimise their individual collective action in a 
historical context (see later).  Expressions other than the ‘Okinawa Struggle’, such 
as an ‘Okinawan movement’ (Okinawa no undō) or the ‘struggle of Okinawa’ 
(Okinawa no tatakai) are used interchangeably to describe the all-encompassing idea 
that describes the struggle of the Okinawan people.  Historical experiences of 
marginalisation and discrimination, in particular, of the Battle of Okinawa, and of 
experiences and legacy of protests such as the all-island struggles against the US 
military regime, shared by different generations, locations and sectors within 
Okinawa, are important elements of this myth. 
The growing internal diversity notwithstanding, I do not discount the 
existence of a ‘community of protest’ in Okinawa, which envelops different and 
diverse actors who share the goal of protesting against the current discriminatory 
situations in Okinawa symbolised by the US military presence.  However, this 
community is imaginary and is without a solid comprehensive organisational 
coalition or concrete shared reform agenda.  This is similar to the way that, despite 
diversity and internal differences, feminism provides an imaginary ‘community of 
struggle’ and a basis of transnational alliances of different women engaged in 
different oppressive situations (Mackie 2000: 183–4, Mohanty 1991: 83).  The 
‘community of protest’ is much less tangible than the ‘Okinawa Struggle’, the 
tentative unity expressed in the three waves of mass protest has emerged from a 
wider ‘community of protest’ that is always there, with changing participants who 
come and go.    Within this wider sphere of the community of protest, as time passes 
and internal differences intensify, the concept of a unitary ‘Okinawa Struggle’ 
becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.    Yet a ‘community of protest’ in Okinawa 
survives as a space where different issues and actors constantly try to advance their 
respective causes. 
But if the community of protest in Okinawa is becoming more diverse, what 
are the political implications of this?  Does it mean the protesters are becoming 
more, or less, effective in achieving their goals?  What is the extent and potential 
for alliances within this diverse and seemingly chaotic ‘community of protest’?  If   21
differences, divisions and conflicts among the various protest groups and actors 
within the community of protest in Okinawa are intensifying, what constitutes the 
appeal to the myth of a unitary ‘Okinawan struggle’?  In response to these 
questions, this dissertation investigates the historical dynamics between diversity and 
unity within the Okinawan ‘community of protest’. 
Rationales for Research: Why do Diversity and Unity Matter for Protest? 
Protest and Democracy 
This dissertation uses the word ‘protest’ to describe a form of political participation 
in order to exert influence or coercion on decision-making processes, particularly 
against those that are perceived to create unjust results for some or all citizens.  
Protest involves a range of methods from individual behaviours such as signing 
petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes and refusal to pay taxes, to 
dramatic mass action such as physical prevention of public functions, which may 
involve violence, and mass demonstrations.     
Okinawa is often regarded by the mainland Japanese as a rare place in Japan 
where earlier attempts to realise a democratic public sphere in post-war Japan, 
particularly in the form of protest against Ampo (Japan’s military alliance with the 
US), are still alive in the Okinawans’ anti-base protest (Personal communication with 
members of a mainland Japanese anti-Ampo group April 1999).  Debates on 
democracy in Japan among critical citizens and intellectuals tend to focus on its 
‘political culture’, that is, on Japanese individuals’ inclination and ability to actively 
participate in creating a public and civil sphere independent from the state, rather 
than on formal state institutions (Kersten 1996: 6).  Japanese left-wing citizens, 
activists and intellectuals such as Maruyama Masao, Tsurumi Shunsuke and 
Yoshimoto Takaaki and others have attempted to link Japan’s national identity and 
unique cultural traits of the nation with the creation of a new, post-war democratic 
society through political activism and protest (Kelman 2001).
16    However, 
                                                             
16  Assertion of Japan’s uniqueness through protest and participatory democracy is drastically different 
from the cultural nationalist position found in the nihonjinron literature, which denies such possibility 
through drawing on the static idea of Japanese cultural characteristics focused around conformity and 
deference to the authorities.    See for example Lawson 1999 and Yoshino 1992.   22
particularly following the renewal of the US–Japan Security Treaty (Ampo) in 1960, 
and despite widespread opposition and mass protest, ‘debates on democracy in 
post-war Japan developed as a discourse of failure’ among Japanese left-wing 
intellectuals (Kersten 1996: 8).  It is not surprising, therefore, that the remaining 
anti-Ampo activists, rather than the Okinawan activists, are the main users of the 
expression, the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ to describe anti-base protest in Okinawa. 
Johnson also describes Okinawa as an exceptional region in Japan in that it 
has a strong tradition of residents’ participation in deciding their political fate: 
‘Okinawa is the only Japanese community whose residents have fought for the 
democracy they enjoy’ (Johnson 2000: 52).  This recognition of a tradition of 
popular struggle specific to Okinawa is extremely important, and is what this thesis 
refers to as a ‘myth’.     
I do not use the word ‘myth’ in a pejorative way, to mean something that is 
simply not true.  In other words, by understanding the idea of a united, coherent 
lineage of struggles of the Okinawan people as a ‘myth’, I do not mean these 
struggles were an illusion, or never happened.    The myth of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ 
does not refer to the series of actual events that took place, but to the ways in which 
they are described and told, and re-described and re-told.
17  ‘Myth’ is to be taken 
seriously, for its powerful political effect that gives a name that summarises the long 
and complicated string of historical events into a collective memory.    The collective 
memory expressed succinctly helps motivate individuals into collective action and 
legitimises it.   
In myth are expressed the thought patterns by which a group formulates 
self-cognition and self-realisation, attains self-knowledge and 
self-confidence, explains its own source and being and that of its 
surroundings, and sometimes tries to chart its destinies. By myth man 
(sic) has lived, died and – all too often – killed (Puhvel 1987: 2). 
Myth in this thesis means a story and a narrative that resonate in the community of 
protest, which connects present action to the collective remembrance of the past of 
one group of people, that is, the ‘Okinawans’.   
                                                             
17  See Barthes 1974 (1957).   23
Talking about the myth of a united struggle helps us to understand both the 
development of diversity and pluralism, and yet also how this is concealed in a 
‘community of protest’.  In particular, this thesis highlights the diversity 
masqueraded by the narrative of unity, and oneness of all the ‘struggles’ that is at 
times exaggerated.    By conceptualising the idea of an Okinawan struggle as a myth, 
the internal differences in the community of protest become clearer.     
In the creation of the ‘myth’, interpretation and understanding of one’s own 
past is particularly important: the myth connects the contemporary activists to the 
past struggles.  For example, the residents’ direct participation in mass collective 
action that brought the end to the US military dictatorship, a return to Japanese 
administration, and the formal entitlement to the post-war Japanese Constitution and 
democracy — despite the fact that the US military presence remained, in contrast to 
what most Okinawans had wished — stand out as proud Okinawan achievements.  
The achievements of the reversion movement are a particularly crucial component of 
the myth of an Okinawan people’s struggle.    For this reason, this thesis particularly 
values the ways the past struggles are understood, in the context of ongoing protests 
in  Okinawa.    
It is outside the purpose of this dissertation to evaluate whether Okinawa is 
more democratic than mainland Japan.  Instead, the primary interest is to 
understand the implications of the diversification of protest actors for political 
participation in Okinawa and the island’s brand of democracy.  Is increased 
diversity in the community of protest contributing to a greater power of Okinawans’ 
protest to bring about the reforms that they desire, especially the reduction and 
eventual removal of the US military bases from Okinawa?    Is the ‘myth’ of a united 
struggle still important and relevant to the diverse constellation of social movements 
in today’s Okinawa? 
(Global) Civil Society 
The central questions of this dissertation require looking into the relations between 
an increasing diversity of protest actors and a more inclusive, diverse and vibrant 
civil society in Okinawa.  ‘Civil society’ is open to a range of conceptualisations.    24
Most broadly or ‘softly’ defined, it refers to ‘areas of social life — the domestic 
world, social activities, economic interchange and political interaction — which are 
organised by private or voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups 
outside of the direct control of the state’ (Held 1995: 181).    In a narrower definition, 
the emphasis is placed on the political nature of the groups, ‘which act to promote 
and defend the interests’ of individuals ‘including against the state’, and ‘a network 
of groups which structures individuals’ private lives and their pursuit of interests in 
the public sphere [but] does not constitute a civil society unless groups are able to 
pursue those interests in the political sphere’ (Gill 2000: 5–6).  The existence of 
civil society is widely regarded as a prerequisite for a democratic society,
18 as a 
potential sphere in which various ‘struggles’ against state power occur (Shaw 1994: 
649).  Through ‘economic and cultural production, household life and voluntary 
associations’ (Keanne 1988: 14–5), members in civil society must have the means to 
put ‘all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions’.     
Individuals, groups, and organisations who engage in protest against the 
Japanese government and the US military are part of an Okinawan civil society that 
fits both narrow and broad definitions explained above.  In this thesis, a civil 
society refers to a distinct public sphere where individuals ‘speak, assemble, 
associate, and reason together on matters of public concern and act in concert in 
order to influence political society and, indirectly, decision making’ (Cohen & Arato 
1992: 564).  The protest activities that Arasaki calls the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ take 
place in an Okinawan civil society.    In this dissertation, I conceptualise these protest 
actors to form a distinctive, imagined ‘community of protest’ within a civil society, 
where channels of protest other than political parties and unions are expanding. 
(Figure 1.1).     
                                                             
18  A common assumption is that the democratisation of formal state institutions is accompanied by the 
growth of a robust autonomous realm of civil society, independent from state power .   25








How to construct a public sphere separate from the state in post-war Japan 
has been debated among Japanese intellectuals (for example, see Matshushita 1996; 
von Wolferen 1994).  A philosopher and anti-war activist Kuno Osamu contributed 
to the circulation of the idea of ‘civil society’ constituted by autonomous ‘citizens’ 
(especially Kuno 1996).
19  At the peak of mass protest against the renewal of the 
US-Japan security treaty in 1960, Kuno defined ‘citizens’ as those who maintained 
independent lives from their professional occupations.  By this separation Kuno 
specifically emphasised the individuals’ independence from the control of the state 
authority, and ability to self-govern and self-regulate their own codes of activities.  
At the time, he judged that the concept had not taken root in Japan (Kuno, 1960, 
cited in Sasaki-Uemura 2001: 181-182).  On contemporary Japanese civil society, 
Pharr emphasises the state’s highly activist role in enabling or sponsoring some 
groups and associations, and constraining others (Pharr 2003).  It is a general 
observation, however, that the number, diversity and vibrancy in general of the actors 
in Japanese civil society are rising (Schwarz 2003: 8; Tsujinaka 2003).     
The focus of this thesis is the community of protest within Okinawan civil 
society, and the development in the diversity and complexity among the actors.  
Importantly for post-reversion Okinawa, Diamond stresses the significance of the 
autonomy of civil society from a ‘political society’, that is, from the party system.  
He emphasises the importance of ‘channels other than political parties for the 
                                                             
19Kuno Osamu was one of the leading intellectuals (others included Tsurumi Shunsuke and Maruyama 
Masao) who joined in the Shisō no Kagaku (Science of Thought) group, who supported grassroots 
protest against the Japanese government’s undemocratic machination to suppress opposition to Ampo.      
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articulation, aggregation, and representation of interests’ particularly for the 
relatively powerless minority deprived of institutional and organisational means to 
represent interest in the area of formal politics (Diamond 1994: 8).  The degree to 
which protest actors are independent from political parties is important for this 
thesis, in analysing qualitative differences and change in the quality of the groups 
and  organisations.    
Civil society also extends outside national boundaries.  As economic 
interdependence and human interactions across state borders increase, activities for 
social movements inevitably transgress the limit of national politics.    A greater than 
ever number of NGOs non-governmental organisations) are representing non-state 
forces in the global arena (see Della Porta & Kriesi 1999).    Falk calls this emerging 
transnational political dynamism ‘globalisation-from-below’, projected against the 
‘globalisation-from-above’ promoted by governments of big states and large-scale 
transnational business organisations (Falk 1999: 2–3).    According to Falk: 
 
The historic role of globalisation-from-below is to challenge and 
transform the negative features of globalisation-from-above, both by 
providing alternative ideological and political space to that currently 
occupied by market-oriented and statist outlooks and by offering 
resistance to the excesses and distortions that can be properly attributed 
to globalisation in its current phase. (Falk 1999: 139)
20 
Okinawa provides a location for the US military forces operating in the global arena 
as the leading force of ‘globalisation-from-above’.  The basic purpose of the US 
military stationing on Okinawa is to maintain what the Pentagon perceives as the 
stability of the regional security environment, considered necessary to ‘defend US, 
allied and friendly interests in this critical region’ (Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Region) 1998: 
10), which is unchanged today.  The US government sees that the security alliance 
                                                             
20 The meaning of ‘the field of action and thought occupied by individual and collective citizen 
initiatives of a voluntary, nonprofit character, both within states and transnationally’ is discussed in the 
expanding literature of ‘global civil society’ (Falk 1999: 138).  Such transnational political space has 
always existed, however, the meaning of ‘global civil society’ is not a return to the medieval world 
before the nation-states became the principal bodies of sovereignty, either.  States still are the most 
prominent units of authorities in the world of ‘globalisation’, transnational actors and social 
movements still need to interact most often with states.  Falk denies the intention to draw a 
bifurcated picture of the world divided between good citizens and oppressive states (1999:138).    His 
terminology nevertheless reflects a certain standpoint with which to interpret what is meant by 
‘negative features’ and ‘excess and distortions’ of the effect of globalisation.   27
between the US and Japan as the core regional security arrangement in the East 
Asia–Pacific region, which is ‘vital to the pursuit of a more open international 
economic system’ (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Region) 1995: 10).
21  The Marine troops, 
large-scale arsenals that contain nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and the 
air bases on Okinawa are part of the forward presence to be used across the globe.  
Every time the US sends its forces to a Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or a War on 
Iraq, local residents are exposed to the daily sight of military vehicles such as tanks 
and the noise of intensified air raid practices. 
Against the heightened alert from George W. Bush on global security, the 
international informal network of citizens has manifested its potential in opposing 
global militarisation.  The expansion of such networks is an example of 
‘globalisation-from-below’, most potently demonstrated by the worldwide protest 
against the US war on Iraq in February 2003.    As Cox stresses, the peace movement 
is significant as the ‘broadest basis for popular mobilisation toward an alternative 
society’, and the most promising form of challenge against state power to conduct 
war (Cox 1987: 353).    Okinawan protesters are part of this peace movement and the 
worldwide networks against global militarisation through US military outposts. 
Today, Okinawan anti-base individuals and organisations are constantly 
making efforts to connect with the global struggles against the international US 
military network, overcoming cultural and language barriers.  Some groups and 
organisations in Okinawa have steadily developed ties with overseas social 
movement organisations.  Okinawans’ integration with environmentalism and 
anti-militarist struggles related to gender and violence overseas are prominent.    The 
extent and nature of the connections of anti-base Okinawans’ activities and the 
community of protest overseas is part of this study. 
Protest and Social Movements 
Even though they are frequently described as a ‘movement’ (as in the ‘Okinawan 
                                                             
21  Moreover, the geopolitical sphere affected by this alliance has expanded from regional to global as 
expressed in the new ‘guideline’ of the US–Japan Mutual Security Pact ratified in 1999.   28
anti-base movement’), studies of protests on Okinawa in general have not made 
enough use of the existing literature on social movements and collective action.  
The main interest of this dissertation is what happens when Okinawan protests are 
understood as varieties of social movements.  For this exercise, it is necessary to 
clarify what this dissertation implies by protest and social movements. 
A variety of actors engage in protest, including those who have little access to 
decision-making power.  As Lipsky observes, ‘protest is a political resource of the 
powerless’ (Lipsky 1965: in Della Porta & Diani 1999: 168).  Through protest, the 
powerless can exert ‘indirect persuasion mediated by the mass media and by more 
powerful actors’ (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 169), such as political parties, unions, 
pressure groups and social movement organisations.  In particular, social 
movements typically rely on ‘protest (particularly at its most innovative and 
radical)’, because ‘unlike political parties and pressure groups, they have fewer 
channels through which to access decision makers’ (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 170).   
In this sense, protest entails ‘collective action
22  aimed at achieving significant social 
or personal change opposed to central institutions’ (Lofland 1985: 24). 
Whereas protest can be limited to activities against specific goals and 
grievances involving only limited members, social movements aim for ‘more 
comprehensive and fundamental changes in the social order’ (Herberle 1968: 439).  
However, protest often combines with, includes or develops into social movements, 
which is, I contend, the case of anti-base protest in Okinawa. 
A social movement is ‘a collective actor constituted by individuals who 
understand themselves to have common interests and, for at least some significant 
part of their social existence, a common identity chiefly concerned to defend or 
change society, or the relative position of the group in society’ (Scott 1990: 6).  In 
the early nineteenth century, the term was first applied to indicate the movement of 
the industrial working class, ‘which gave expression and direction to the strivings of 
the industrial proletariat toward a new social order which would abolish economic 
                                                             
22 In his study of collective action, Tilly defines collective action as ‘acting together in pursuit of 
common interests’ (Tilly 1978: 7).   29
exploitation and give the workers a chance to achieve full personality development’ 
(Herberle 1968: 438). 
Social movements are ‘composed of multiple social movement organisations 
(SMOs) that are independent entities even though they share enough beliefs with 
those other SMOs to justify conceiving all of them as a single social movement’ 
(Lofland 1996: 143).  They sometimes ‘embrace interest groups and may even 
spawn political parties, trade unions and socialist parties, for instance, can be seen as 
part of a broader labour movement’ (Heywood 1997: 266).  Therefore, a social 
movement can be composed of a diverse range of organisational types, from informal 
small groups to established political parties.    This is applicable to the community of 
protest in Okinawa, and the range of avenues of political opposition is expanding 
beyond left-wing local political parties and schoolteachers’ and other trade unions 
who have traditionally been leaders of anti-base protest.    But whether there exists a 
distinguishable social movement in Okinawa, embracing all sorts of collective actors, 
is another matter. 
It is possible to view Okinawan anti-base protest as an example of 
compensation politics in regional Japan (see George-Mulgan 2000), as dynamics 
between local protest against unwanted ‘private and public projects, including 
industrial facilities and waste repositories’ and the state’s ‘extensive compensation 
schemes’ (Lesbirel 1998).  Indeed, most conservative politicians in Okinawa 
initially participate in protest against the implementations of new military or 
industrial facilities, until obtaining satisfactory compensation or promise of 
compensation.    NIMBY (not in my backyard) politics is certainly an important part 
of Okinawan protest, especially at the local communities adjacent to the unwanted 
military and industrial public facilities. 
However, the main forces that drive anti-base protest in Okinawa have been 
much more than NIMBY politics.  It is not generally noticed that many Okinawan 
anti-base activists are consciously taking up the task of addressing humanistic 
concerns aroused by global US strategies that require military bases on Okinawa.  
Particularly after the reversion, the main motivations for joining protest activities   30
against the US military bases expanded from demanding political and economic 
concessions to expressions of environmental concerns, opposition to militarism and 
patriarchal society, and general concerns to do with peace and human rights (Yabuno 
1997).    For example, Okinawan women’s groups were engaged in local activities to 
raise consciousness about the effects of depleted uranium used in weapons, some of 
which were sent from Okinawa during the Gulf War, on new-born children and 
residents in Iraq (Author’s observation April 1999).    These women activists, as well 
as Ahagon and Chibana (Suzuki & Ōiwa 1996: 22, 60–82) oppose war, militarism 
and military bases, as they inflict pain on humans of all kinds, rather than from a 
perspective solely concerned with marginalisation of Okinawa.  The framework of 
NIMBY politics alone could not explain the dynamics of anti-base movements in 
Okinawa today that share basic concerns with ubiquitous social movements in the 
realm of global civil society, namely, peace movements, environmentalist 
movements, and women’s movements and, more broadly, identity politics from the 
perspective of a minority within Japan. 
Conceptualising the Okinawan community of protest as a collection of social 
movements provides an alternative model to the unitary representation of the 
Okinawan ‘anti-base movement’. 
Theories and Concepts of Protest and Social Movements: Which One Best 
Explains the Diversity of Okinawan Protest? 
There are several different theoretical positions from which to approach social 
movements that are useful to make sense of the diversity and internal differences 
among protest actors in the community of protest, and to explain the dynamic 
processes that can form alliances and produce an outlook of a united ‘movement’.  
This section examines some theoretical approaches and conceptual tools for 
explaining the collective action of social movements, which may provide helpful 
clues to understanding the Okinawan protest, and finding answers to the central 
questions of this dissertation. 
‘New Social Movements’ Theory 
The ‘new social movements’ theory, cultivated by mainly European researchers, and   31
the resource mobilisation theory (RMT) predominant in North America, have 
challenged the limitation of the classical tradition of the study of ‘collective 
behaviour’.    Classical sociological studies have used the term ‘collective behaviour’ 
to describe non-institutional collective behaviour which tends to be treated as a 
marginal and transitional social phenomenon.  ‘Collective behaviour’ stands for 
aberration from normal institutionalised procedures of politics, or ‘symptomatic of 
social malfunctions and/or pathology’ (Pakulski 1991: 13).
23  Collective behaviour 
is understood in terms of its anomaly, as a reaction to social tension, crisis, grievance 
and deprivation, typically described as ‘non-institutional’ as opposed to legitimate 
and part of stable institutions.
24  Collective behaviour is primarily an act outside 
these institutional contexts, and tends to be regarded as not a ‘proper object of 
analysis’ (Scott 1990: 2) 
In this mode of research, the study of social movements mainly concentrated 
on the labour movement.    Tilly (1984) explained that the development of the labour 
movement coincided with that of the modern state, particularly in the post-WWII 
welfare  state.  As  the  elite  extended  the  voting rights to male workers, party politics 
and activities associated with the formation of an industrial sector became the main 
political avenues for the labour movement to make political demands (Tilly 1984).  
On the other hand, this institutional bias made it difficult for sociological analysis to 
include political activities of social movements that did not operate within the typical 
                                                             
23  The study of collective behaviour was developed most early by Gustav LeBon’s analysis of ‘crowd 
psychology’.  See  LeBon  1960.  
24  The ‘mass society’ theory, mainly deriving from the examples of mass movements in Soviet Russia 
and Nazi Germany, also shares the view of such movements as ‘non-rational’, ‘non-institutional’ and 
‘associated with social malfunctions and pathologies’ (Pakulski 1990: 8).  The Chicago School 
scholars such as Robert Park and Herbert Blumer developed the study to focus on the dynamics 
between macro-level social change and the emergence of mass social movements, through observation 
of activities ‘aimed at producing new norms and new solidarities’ (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 5).    In 
1962, Neil Smelser explained collective behaviour in terms of the functional process that reveals the 
imbalance and contradictions of existing society, through the development and expression of ‘shared 
beliefs’ or ‘generalised beliefs’, within various kinds of groups, sects and secret societies.    Since then, 
the work of Joseph Gusfield (1963), and that of Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (1987) came to regard 
the role collective behaviour plays in social change as ‘an integral part of the normal functioning of 
society’ (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 5).  Movement mobilisation was empirically explained as a 
process of inaugurating new kinds of cultural norms and new ways of expressing identities.  The 
important achievement of the ‘collective behaviour’ approach was that it defined an important subject 
of study as a driving force of social change.  Significantly, it introduced essential components of 
collective action such as forming of organisations, the use of cultural symbols and identity 
construction in the process of explaining reaction to rapid social change.   32
model of the labour movement (Nash 2000). 
For many people, political parties as a medium of political participation have 
become less attractive, due to growing cynicism and distrust towards the organised 
and bureaucratised structure of party institutions.    Importantly, however, the greater 
cynicism towards existing institutional political parties as milieus of political 
participation has not necessarily resulted in apathy against political activities.  As 
the credibility in party politics and formal democratic representation has declined, 
interest in alternative forms of political activity has expanded.  The rise of student 
revolts, civil right movements, feminist and peace movements as well as 
environmentalist and other movements increasingly provided alternative modes of 
political participation within civil society to joining political party activities, during 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
The term ‘new social movements’ came into regular use to capture the 
momentum and the prominence of these actors whose distinguishable features 
included informality, a conscious avoidance of hierarchy and bureaucracy in 
organisational structures and decision-making, a focus on culture, lifestyle, and 
value-oriented issues, the expression of identity, and concentration of activities in the 
mass media and consciousness-raising in the social sphere, rather than through 
formal state institutions (Crook et al. 1992: 148, Nash 2000: 102–3, Scott 1990).    In 
terms of ideology, forms of collective action and agendas, the features of so-called 
new social movements have existed at least since the early nineteenth century as in 
women’s movements and nationalist movements (Calhoun 1995).  ‘New social 
movements’ are ‘new’ in terms of their late entry as legitimate areas of sociological 
research. 
The concept of a ‘new social movement’ provides a useful explanation for the 
recent change in the community of protest in  Okinawa.  New  social  movements  are 
particularly distinguished from the ‘old’ movement, that is, the labour movement of 
the industrial working class.    What Barrel and Tanaka call the ‘usual suspects’, that 
is, the local trade unions and leftist political parties that once could provide a more 
solid basis for a coalition for an Okinawans’ struggle against the state before the   33
reversion, cannot be as effective any more.  In Okinawa, the labour movement 
organisations such as left-wing political parties and trade unions have cultivated 
channels within the state institutions such as political parties, local governments and 
the judicial system. 
Interestingly, after the reversion in Okinawa, ‘residents’ movements’, a 
different type of social movement organisation became increasingly prominent.  
They placed emphasis on expressions of local identity, linking directly to social 
concerns that are globally applicable, engaging in activities using informal personal 
networks crossing national boundaries.  After the reversion, the traditional labour 
movement organisations had difficulty in defining the next stage of their ‘Okinawa 
Struggle’.  Since then, more protest actors in Okinawa have been small-scale 
organisations, distinguishable from traditional counterparts that are, in general, larger 
and based to a greater extent on hierarchical, bureaucratic organisation.    These new 
types of Okinawan actors may be understood as ‘new social movements’. 
Kurihara (1999) explains the emergence of new types of social movements in 
Japan, related to the decline of the organising power of the labour unions and 
political parties in the Japanese people’s opposition to the dominant conservative 
sector.  According to Kurihara, new social movements in Japan are heterogeneous 
and amorphous, yet can be understood in terms of three generic types: ‘citizens’ 
movements, residents’ movements and people’s movements’, although many overlap 
across them.    Kurihara understands the anti-military base movements in Okinawa as 
an example of people’s movements, characterised by marginal social positions, 
vernacular communication modes and challenging visions to the dominant social 
system (1999: 17-19).  This categorisation, though adequate, depicts Okinawan 
anti-base movements as one people’s movement, in which heterogeneous 
‘movements’  are  concealed.     
New social movements are ‘new’ because they are ‘manifestations of some 
qualitative shift in the nature of capitalist, or more generally industrial, society’ 
(Scott 1990: 7), that is, indications of change in social and economic conditions in 
late capitalist society.  Offe (1985) connects the emergence of the ‘new middle   34
classes’ and new social movements, linking the former with the rise of educational 
levels and the increase in service-sector employment in late capitalist economy.  
The characteristic of these new classes is their critique of the malaise inherent in late 
capitalist societies, particularly manifested in the environmental, anti-war and 
anti-nuclear movements.  In post-industrial societies, an ‘increasing sense of 
political obligation’ and a preference for expressive participation among the ‘young, 
educated white-collar categories’ is observed (Crook, Pakulski & Waters 1992: 
139–40), which applies in Okinawa as well.  Habermas (1981, 1987) has also 
provided accounts for the significance and democratic possibilities of new social 
movements in post-industrial society.  According to his typical account of new 
social movements, new conflicts 
 
no longer arise in the areas of material reproduction, they are no longer 
channelled through parties and organisations, and they can no longer be 
alleviated by compensations that conform to the system.  Rather, the 
new conflicts arise in areas of cultural reproduction, social integration 
and socialisation.  They are manifested in sub-institutional, 
extra-parliamentary forms of protest… In short, the new conflicts are 
not sparked by problems of distribution, but concern the grammar of 
forms of life (Habermas 1981). 
 
Inglehart (1990) has provided another way of explaining new social movements 
motivated by what he calls ‘post-materialist concerns’.  Based on extensive 
cross-cultural, national and generational surveys, he makes a general observation that 
‘post-materialist’ values contribute to the rise of new social movements.  The 
‘post-materialists’ typically belong to post-WWII generations with increased access 
to education and information on political matters, have experienced less economic 
scarcity than previous generations, and tend to place greater value on better quality 
of life that cannot be achieved in material terms, such as nature, peace and 
inter-personal relationships.  He also finds among ‘post-materialists’ higher 
participation in socially conscious activities outside political parties and other formal 
political organisations (Inglehart 1990: 391–2).  The post-materialist theory 
suggests that when society becomes more affluent people’s dominant public concerns 
are less related to demanding equal economic distribution.  Instead, other social 
concerns to do with quality of life, typically with the environment and   35
anti-militarism, become more important motivators of collective action. 
The ‘post-materialist turn’, namely, a greater focus on seemingly 
non-economic issues of the ‘new middle classes’, appears to provide a valid 
explanation for the changing dynamics of anti-base protest in Okinawa.    During the 
first- and second-‘wave’, principle concerns that drove people’s collective actions 
were directly connected to ‘materialist’ demands, such as land repatriation and base 
workers’ working conditions.  The common enemy was easier to target, that is, the 
American rule, and it was easier to form an all-encompassing coalition across 
different sectors in Okinawa against the US.  The main motivations of protest 
organisations today are still related to economic issues, particularly, opposition to the 
structural dependence on the central government’s subsidies — tied to the US 
military presence — the Okinawan economy is subjected to.     
However, particularly after the reversion, the US military has also been 
regarded as the provider of material benefits for the local economy.   There are 
obvious short-term material benefits: rent incomes for the landowners of the private 
properties used by the US military, relatively secure employment opportunities that 
the bases provide for the local population, goods and services catering for the 
military, and construction projects that the subsidised public works bring in.  
Increasingly, the focus of protest against structural economic dependence relates to 
fear of pollution, various hazards such as noise and militarism that lower the quality 
of life, and grievances towards the insufficient protection of locals’ rights against 
crimes and other hazards caused by the US military under the current Status of 
Forces  Agreement.   
Nevertheless, the concerns that drive the anti-base protests of many 
Okinawans retained ‘materialist’ dimensions.    The damage that the US bases inflict 
on health and the environment is often symptomatic of socio-economic impacts.  It 
is therefore difficult to talk about the change in what motivates protest as a clean 
transition from the ‘materialist’ to the ‘post-materialist’.  Yet, it is clear that the 
presence of ‘post-materialist’ values in much of the protest against the US bases 
today is greater than in previous decades.             36
Related to this point, a major shortcoming of the focus on macro-theory on 
social change for understanding social movements is that it is too general: ‘It does 
not take the members of social movements seriously in their own terms’ (Nash 2000: 
110).  In order to understand the points of convergence and differences among 
Okinawan protesters and their implications, it is necessary to investigate how protest 
movements have organised themselves, defined problems, what is at stake, and how 
they have conducted their collective action, and to analyse differences and 
commonalities among them. 
Melucci (1995) has emphasised that the invisible and shared definition of the 
subject of protest that gives a sense of unity among diverse and multiple actors does 
not exist from the start in a fixed and visible form, but is an end result of mutual 
interactions among protest actors in the process of collective action: ‘what was 
formerly considered a datum (the existence of the movement) is precisely that which 
needs to be explained’ (Melucci 1996: 70).  Melucci contends: ‘To understand  how 
a ‘social movement’ succeeds or fails in becoming a collective actor is therefore a 
fundamental task’ of the researcher (Melucci 1996: 80). 
Melucci has developed a ‘constructivist’ view of collective action, and the 
concept of ‘collective identity’ to capture the process in which a collective actor — 
‘we’ — is formed: collective identity is constructed through ‘an interactive and 
shared definition’ (Melucci 1989: 34) of ‘the ends of the actions’, ‘the means’, and 
‘relationships with the environment’ (Melucci 1995: 44), that is, ‘the field of 
opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place’ among the 
organisations and members concerned (Melucci 1989: 34), in the course of collective 
action.  Melucci is sympathetic to the ‘new social movements’ school, and has 
focused on the greater significance and power of cultural, non-institutional 
dimensions of collective action in contemporary technology-oriented society, which 
still tend to be excluded from the formal arenas of ‘politics’.  He emphasises the 
importance of ‘the plurality of aspects present in the collective action’ and of 
explaining the processes in which social movement actors are ‘constructed’ and ‘how 
they are combined and sustained through time’ (Melucci 1996: 70).  This focus is   37
useful for the purpose of this dissertation to analyse the process in which different 
actors are constructed in a community of protest, and how a concept of an 
‘Okinawan movement’ is formed, sustained and of fluctuating influence. 
The concept of collective identity helps understand the often invisible ways 
in which ‘Okinawa’ or ‘Okinawan’ — who is inside and outside the community of 
protest — are constructed.    It helps illuminate how being ‘Okinawan’ as a subject of 
protest is constantly redefined as the collective action unfolds, and to understand the 
internal dynamics of protest, that is, ‘interaction, negotiation, and the opposition of 
different orientations’ (Melucci 1995: 43).    Collective identity is distinguished from 
identity that is defined by objective social location, often described in essentialist 
terms of ethnicity, gender, race and nationality and other objective differences.  In 
this sense, the subject of protest is not necessarily ‘Okinawans’ that are the residents 
in a geographical region of Japan with kinship rooted in the place, although being 
from and living in Okinawa is still considered an important characteristic of the 
actor, separated from ‘outside supporters’ often in a deterministic manner.
25  
Thinking about collective identity draws attention to the ideas shared collectively 
among the subject (‘we’) of social movements on what their activities aim for, what 
is at stake, and how they should be carried out, and in what external (political, social 
and cultural) context.  The following chapters of this thesis attempt to identify the 
ways in which collective identity of protest in Okinawa is constructed.   
Understanding unity in diversity of protest in Okinawa is a question of how a unified 
‘movement’ is constructed, from diverse and multiple actors with different 
definitions of, and meanings attached to, their protest activities.  Therefore, 
collective identity provides a framework for figuring out the ‘processes’ in which 
symbols and particular knowledge construct new or recurring meanings in the public 
sphere for the political motivation of protest. 
Resource Mobilisation Theory 
Generally speaking, concepts of collective identity help in the understanding of why 
                                                             
25 Calhoun warns against ‘the social constructionist’ approach to identity that overlooks ‘the real, 
present-day political and other reasons why essentialist identities continue to be invoked and often 
deeply felt’ (1994: 14).   38
one protests.    However, as Scott points out, the ‘new social movement’ approach is 
limited in analysing the actual effects of social movement organisations in 
representing themselves, especially in the formal political sphere.  Here Resource 
Mobilisation Theory (RMT) helps in providing tools for understanding how a protest 
is conducted: the organisation and strategy of protest for drawing out desired reforms 
effectively.  This is despite the major shortcoming of RMT’s analysis that it often 
understands individual behaviour detached from the specific historical, geographical, 
social and cultural context in which ‘a movement’ was born and maintained.  
Indeed, Melucci (1989) intended to address this weakness through his work on 
collective identity. 
RMT has also challenged the classical sociological approach to ‘collective 
behaviour’, with emphasis on the rational capabilities of social movements, such as 
the calculation involved in action, goal-setting, dealing with information, strategy, 
and the ability to learn from past experiences.  Olson’s (1965) analysis of 
individuals’ decisions to join the collective activities focuses on rational aspects, 
such as calculating the costs and returns.  According to this ‘rational actor’ model, 
social movements are constantly restricted by the problem of ‘free riders’, benefiting 
from the results without paying the cost of participation.  Olson’s theory offers 
limited explanations as to why individuals take part in collective actions despite the 
unfavourable benefit of participation.    A number of RMT scholars further advanced 
the study of rational aspects of social movements particularly in participation, 
organisation, and processes of mobilisation (see for example Oberschall 1973, 
McCarthy & Zald 1977).  Zald and McCarthy, for example, have established the 
significance of professional organisations capable of attracting staff and raising 
necessary funds by gaining connections with private and government sectors, as a 
contributing factor in the expansion of social movements, which solves the 
‘free-rider’ problem inherent in collective actions pointed out by Olson (Zald & 
McCarthy 1987).   This focus on organisation illuminates aspects such as how 
organisations are established, including differential resources such as funding, staff, 
experience, and among others, connections with influential institutions inside the   39
orbit of the state. 
These aspects of RMT therefore complement the sociological and cultural 
focus of the ‘new social movements’ theory.  As Scott points out, an ‘adequate 
theory of social movements would have to recognise the problematic and effortful 
nature of mobilisation and the consequent organisational constraints’ (Scott 1990: 
109).  It addresses the organisational and institutional elements for a social 
movement to produce political effects.  The following sections discuss some of the 
RMT concepts useful for the central questions of this dissertation. 
Political Opportunity Structure 
Because protest against the US military presence in Okinawa seriously challenges 
the existing security policy the state elites wish to maintain, the difficulty in 
mobilising resources multiplies.  Tilly (1978) has explained the importance of 
social movements’ organisations and their relations with the state.  According to 
Tilly, success in achieving social movements’ goals depends on political opportunity 
structures, that is, change in the cost of collective action linked with external 
situations, especially when ‘the government suddenly becomes vulnerable’ against 
the mobilisation of collective action that challenges the state (Tilly 1978: 100–1).  
Understanding social movements requires taking into account both internal factors, 
such as resources of organisations, and external factors, that is, the environment out 
of which the collective actions are generated and unfold.  Tarrow also stresses the 
importance of political opportunity structure: ‘dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by 
affecting their expectations for success or failure’ (Tarrow 1994: 85).  Not only in 
terms of increase and decrease in participation, political opportunity structure 
explains why collective action sometimes produces unusually effective results in 
influencing the state, but at other times its momentum rapidly declines (Tarrow 1994: 
85). 
Cycles of Protest 
Closely related to political opportunities are ‘cycles of protest’ as conceptualised by 
Tarrow (see also Swidler 1986, Brand 1990).  When political opportunities are   40
favourable for the protesters to challenge the authorities, it often raises the frequency 
and intensity of collective action, innovative forms of protest increase quickly, and 
participant actors with differential resources and organisational structures interact 
more vigorously.  Cycles of protest are, in general, ‘sequences of intensified 
interaction between challengers and authorities’ (Tarrow 1994: 153).  Tarrow 
stresses interactions among protest organisations as an important factor that affects 
the fluctuation of a cycle.  Protest actions stimulate other actions by spreading new 
types of strategies, organisational structures and knowledge, which are imitated by 
other actors, and changes in popularly accepted ideas, which increase the momentum 
of protest (see also Oliver 1989).  Formation and dissolution of alliances among 
organisations and external support are key factors that affect the dynamics of protest 
during a cycle, ‘which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution’ 
(Tarrow 1994: 153), or simply decline. 
Recognising the three ‘waves’ in the history of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ 
identified by Arasaki as three cycles of protest may help understand how the 
momentum of protest has transformed over time.  This dissertation organises its 
research around those three major ‘waves’, or high points of frequency and intensity 
of interactions between the protest actors and the authorities, as well as among 
themselves. 
Importantly, the three waves vary in size, and fluctuate up and down drawing 
differently shaped curves.  In particular, the first (1956) wave was shortly followed 
by the second (1969–70), however, the second and third (1995) waves are much 
further apart.  Because the first two waves — the land struggle and the reversion 
struggle — peaked during the 27 years of direct US military rule, the series of 
individual protests shared a greater goal of demanding repatriation to Japan.  
However, the third wave, which peaked in 1995, came after a long ‘low’ period 
following Okinawa’s formal reversion in 1972.  In this extended quiet phase, 
island-wide mass demonstration was absent, however, smaller struggles continued. 
Repertoires of Collective Action 
Mutual learning and sharing strategy and knowledge play a crucial role in generating   41
a sense of unity among different organisations.  The ‘repertoire of collective 
action’, coined by Tilly (1978), refers to the accumulation of experience resulting 
from a number of collective actions shared by different organisations, through 
mutual interactions and learning.  This includes forms of collective action, such as 
how to conduct demonstrations, how to organise and what to do in a mass rally, by 
witnessing and learning through the media, ‘several varieties of strikes, petitioning, 
the organisation of pressure groups, and a few other ways of articulating grievances 
and demands’ (Tilly 1978: 152). 
An ‘Okinawan struggle’ as a ‘movement’ is often acknowledged through an 
accumulation of ‘repertoires of collective action’, throughout different periods.  
Major struggles, such as the ‘all-island’ struggle against the US land policy, the 
struggle against the US military ‘bulldozers and bayonets’ that forcefully dislocated 
the farmers from their own land, the base workers’ struggle against the 
discriminatory working environment, and a range of mass protest actions towards the 
reversion, are stories that are told and retold by the Okinawan activists.  These 
memories and stories of struggles have become a tradition remembered by 
generation after generation in the community of protest.    The audience includes, for 
example, high school students within Okinawa and mainland Japan who make 
fieldtrips to various places in Okinawa such as the Peace Memorial and remaining 
caves used during the battle of Okinawa to take refuge, in order to learn about the 
Okinawans’ war experiences.  It is part of a repertoire of collective action to 
‘educate’ others about the tradition of struggles experienced by the Okinawans, by 
keeping alive the stories excluded by the mainstream Japanese or international 
media. 
On the other hand, ‘repertoire of collective action’ also signifies differences 
among protest actors.  Depending on the activists’ experiences and definitions of 
who ‘we’ are, preferred strategies and codes of conduct in protest vary significantly.  
Repertoire is an important element of the community of protest, through which the 
actors form alliances or differentiate themselves. 
Framings of Protest   42
Melucci’s idea of collective identity is useful for identifying the processes by which 
the symbols produce meanings to construct a collective actor.  However, it falls 
short of distinguishing diverse versions of meanings attached to the protest action 
after they are produced.    In order to identify different but a recognisably generic set 
of discernable, identifiably characteristic meanings that different social movement 
organisations typically attach to collective action, I use the term ‘framings of 
protest’, applying Snow and his associates’ concept of ‘framings of collective action’ 
(Snow & Benfold 1992).  ‘Frames’, similarly to collective identity, highlight how 
collective actors look at their own activities and interpret them — dimensions to do 
with perceptions and mental work — to establish ‘meanings’ of collective action, ‘by 
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and 
sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment’ (Snow & Benfold 
1992: 137).
26  The concept of ‘collective action frames’ or ‘frames’ generates from 
the RMT school of social movements, within the rationalist and individualist 
approach, which tends to view even mental dimensions of meaning productions as 
‘resources’ for successful mobilisation and participation of a social movement.  
Snow and others’ conceptualisation of the dimensions to do with perceptions and 
meanings in the realm of culture is meant to overcome RMT’s weakness, namely, to 
treat the ‘ideas and meanings as given’, ‘detached from the ‘social productions that 
arise during the course of interactive processes’’ (Snow & Benfold 1992).    ‘Frames’ 
are also meant to bridge those dimensions related to the ideas, perceptions and 
meanings that are socially constructed, with existing RMT research areas on political 
opportunity, participation, and movement mobilisation.  Though ‘frames’ give 
certain solidity to the set of meanings attached to collective action after they are 
produced, they also allow room for examination of the ways in which frames of 
protest, once produced, are reassessed and renegotiated by the actors (Snow et al 
1986).  Combined with the focus on the process of meaning production during the 
                                                             
26 Snow et al. (1986) and Snow and Benfold (1992) have adopted the concept of ‘frame’ from 
Goffman’s (1974) same idea, ‘to denote ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals ‘to locate, 
perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large’’ (Goffman 1974: 
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construction of collective identity, that is, being ‘Okinawan’, different framings of 
anti-base protest indicate differences in interpretations of the current predicament 
and the historical background to that predicament. 
Methodology: A Combined Theoretical Approach for Okinawan Protests 
This dissertation takes an eclectic approach that draws selectively from different 
theoretical approaches to social movements reviewed above, to analyse dynamics 
and change in the post-war protests in Okinawa.  The ‘new social movements’ 
theory is particularly useful in explaining transitions in the community of protest at 
the macro-level of socio-economic change.  With major local economic change 
following reversion in 1972, quality of life, expression of local identities and gender 
relations, namely, ‘post-materialist’ agendas became a more prominent driving force 
of the Okinawans’ protests.  Individual and network-based, smaller organisations 
have become more active, autonomous actors, and have shown different strategies 
and repertories of protest from those of political parties and workers’ unions. 
Collective identity and ‘framings’ of protest help explain transitions and 
internal differences among protest actors.  As the primary reform agendas have 
changed, definitions of who ‘we’ are have been expressed differently.    In particular, 
the ‘Japanese’ identity of Okinawans has been more emphasised in some periods 
than in others, or by different actors in the same period, depending on the priority 
reform agendas of the protest actors.  The ‘constitutional’ framing of protest 
continues to define the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ in terms of a special attachment to the 
pacifist principles of the Japanese constitution, whereas environmentalists and 
feminists tend to stress the ‘Okinawan’ experiences, in connecting with the global 
struggles against gendered violence and conservation of natural resources. 
Drawing on concepts of political opportunity structure and cycles of protest, 
this dissertation maps out how alliances and coalitions have emerged to temporarily 
demonstrate what is understood as the ‘three waves’ of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ and 
which have then disintegrated into a usual, divided and chaotic state.  Furthermore, 
sharing strategies within the community of protest and mutual learning from the past 
experiences in the struggle, namely, recognising a distinctive ‘repertoire of protest’   44
supports the myth of a unitary, coherent ‘Okinawan struggle’ beyond generations. 
This thesis mainly draws on the social movement theories in English 
language.  It attempts to understand the experiences of the community of anti-US 
base protest groups in Okinawa, in the theoretical framework used to explain other 
social movements in the world.    The primary intention of this project is to make the 
Okinawan case relevant to the wider study of social movements, going beyond the 
confinement of Japanese area studies literature and an exclusively Japanese 
readership.    This, of course, does not mean that the study is irrelevant to either. 
I am also aware of the danger of overlooking what cannot be fully grasped 
using the theories and concepts explained above, that is specific about Okinawa, that 
can only be understood in the historical and local context.
27  This is why, for 
empirical analysis, this thesis draws mainly on primary and secondary materials 
written in Japanese, especially by Okinawan writers, as well as an increasing 
reservoir of useful sources written in English.  There are extensive and voluminous 
records and studies conducted on post-war protest in Okinawa.    These materials are 
still under-recognised outside the local audience, even though the recent, expanding 
studies on Okinawa in English language have started to use them.   
Primary materials used in this thesis include locally published newsletters 
issued by protest organisations, and local newspapers.  Because this thesis is mainly 
interested in the protest actors, it takes advantage of the materials written and 
published by the members of protest organisations themselves.   These materials 
were collected in local public and university libraries and archives, purchased from 
second-hand bookshops and from the offices of protest organisations and directly 
from activists in Okinawa.  Furthermore, I draw on the interviews and personal 
observations conducted and obtained during my two fieldtrips in Okinawa in 1999 
and 2002, extending for six months in total.  During these fieldtrips, I 
                                                             
27  Tomiyama is weary of talking about Okinawa in the language of post-colonialism, or understanding 
Okinawa as a ‘colony’.  This is because discussing Okinawa applying a neat, academic framework 
that is greatly external to the Okinawan reality necessarily generates a large amount of ‘refuse’ that 
cannot be done justice to.  Yet he also points out the need to describe Okinawa in negotiation with 
the all-encompassing labeling of colonialism, while resisting it at the same time (Tomiyama, 2002: 
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communicated in Japanese language with participants of protest and selectively 
conducted interviews with a wide range of activists.    I have also attended rallies and 
meetings whenever possible in order to acquire participant observations.   For 
secondary materials, I draw on writings on Okinawan post-war history, politics, 
economics and society written by Okinawan writers and those of English-speaking 
writers.    These writings are subjected to critical examination and scrutinised in light 
of other research materials. 
Conclusion 
Protest actors in contemporary studies of Okinawa are depicted on one hand as a 
unitary and promising agent for political change, on the other hand, diversity and 
differences among them are represented as an increasingly prominent character.  
Arasaki’s idea of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ and the ‘three waves’ of mass protest in the 
post-war period, if understood as the evidence of a unified, continuous struggle of all 
Okinawans, risks misrepresenting the internal differences among the protest actors, 
as well as significant change in their characters over time, especially after reversion.   
The idea of a unified, coherent ‘Okinawan struggle’, if there was any, has diminished 
as a basis of coalition building, nevertheless, an important question is how the idea of 
Okinawa’s marginalisation has continued to be exploited by everyone, regardless of 
intensifying diversity and divisions within the community of protest. 
This dissertation understands protests in Okinawa as a collection of diverse, 
conscious social movements in a civil society, rather than as an aberrational, 
spontaneous and homogeneous reaction to the US and Japanese states and military 
bases.  The concepts of ‘new social movements’, collective identity, framings of 
protest, political opportunity structure, repertoire of protest, and cycles of protest are 
central to this study.    They are drawn on to explain the dynamics and change among 
the Okinawan community of protest, and to understand the implications for civil 
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Chapter Two 
 
Okinawa’s Annexation to Japan and the Development of an 
Ambiguous Japanese Identity 
 
Introduction 
To understand what the presence of the US bases on the Okinawa Main Island today 
means to many Okinawans, Hook and Siddle explain the significance of  
 
a historical narrative of victimisation that stretches back to the days of 
the Ryūkyū Kingdom.  This dominant narrative … is punctuated with 
keywords like Ryūkyū Shobun,  sotetsu jigoku (palm-tree hell — the 
starvation period of the 1920s), tetsu no arashi (the Typhoon of Steel: 
Battle of Okinawa) and fukki (reversion).  It culminates in the kichi 
mondai (base issue) and Okinawa’s ‘unfair treatment’ at the hands of the 
central government.  The importance of this victim-centred narrative lies 
not so much in its validity or otherwise as historical ‘truth’, but in its 
utility as an ideational resource for the construction and articulation of a 
contemporary Okinawan identity politics (Hook & Siddle 2003: 11). 
Specific events in history have been constantly referred to as various forms of 
marginalisation of Okinawa and, in later years, as the struggles of Okinawans.  I call 
this a historical narrative of marginalisation and it is an important component of the 
myth of a single, continuous lineage of an ‘Okinawan struggle’.  The word 
marginalisation is used here to include not only references to Okinawans as victims 
of aggression, but to all kinds of subjection to marginal positions and denial of equal 
treatment compared to that of other parts of Japan. 
Okinawan identity as ‘Japanese’ developed out of complex processes, 
beginning with the Meiji government’s forceful abolition of the Ryūkyū kingdom in 
1872.  In the late nineteenth century, Japan rapidly transformed itself into a new 
body politic: a sovereign nation-state.  Japan absorbed the islands formerly within 
the Ryūkyū Kingdom and defined them as inside the national border, while adopting 
a discriminatory policy.  This inevitably positioned Okinawa in a binary opposition 
between ‘Japan proper’ and ‘Okinawa, Japan but not so proper’.  This chapter 
emphasises the conscious choice, made especially by Okinawan intellectuals and  
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elites, to view ‘Okinawa’ as part of Japan.  However in the long term this has 
influenced the Okinawans’ political struggle that fundamentally questions and 
challenges the policy of marginalisation by mainland Japan, which is today most 
clearly manifested in the continuing heavy existence of the US military bases. 
This chapter points out the attempts of the ‘Okinawan studies’ scholars to 
accentuate the common cultural traits between Ryūkyū and Japan, and the campaign 
for Okinawans’ political rights led by Jahana Noboru, which exemplify the 
Okinawans’ strategic assimilation to Japan for political reasons.  The language 
dispute that divided the population for and against the preservation of the distinct 
Ryūkyūan language in the early 1940s is indicative of the ambiguous coexistence of 
self-definitions of ‘Okinawans’ that emerged and became consolidated: ‘Okinawans’ 
as an integral component embraced by a greater entity, Japan, and ‘uchinanchu’ who 
are fundamentally and undeniably different from, and can never completely see 
themselves as, mainland Japanese.  This ambiguity has influenced the ‘Okinawan’ 
collective identity and the myth of an ‘Okinawan struggle’, representing the roots of 
the diverse interpretations of collective identity and purpose behind Okinawans’ 
protest in later periods. 
Ryūkyū Shobun  
Archaeological studies have found Okinawan inhabitants had cultural and human 
exchanges with Kyūshū since the yayoi period,
1  and linguistic affinity is traced 
between the ancient Ryūkyūan and Japanese languages (Pearson 1996).  The period 
in the history of Ryūkyū (Okinawa) before being taken over by the Satsuma domain, 
a powerful local lord based in southwest Kyushu, is known as the Early Ryūkyū (Ko-
Ryūkyū) period.  The Ryūkyū kingdom remained outside of Japan in terms of 
political control, before the Satsuma invasion in 1609.  However, Ryūkyū was 
subjected under superior powers: China and Satsuma. and indirectly, Tokugawa 
Japan.
2   Together with Korea, Vietnam and Burma, Ryūkyū was one of China’s 
                                                             
1 The yayoi period ‘began between 500 BC and 300 BC, and persisted until 300 AD’ (Pearson 1969: 
41). 
2 On this subject, see, in particular, (Smits 1999: 15-49, Takara 1993, 1998)   
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tributary states.
3   In East Asia, the tributary system formed a different kind of 
international order from that of the sovereign states established earliest in Europe.  
The centre of this order was hegemonic China.
4  It is important to note that Ryūkyū’s 
direct tributary relations with China were separately shaped from mainland Japan; 
the special ties in the form of distinguishable Chinese cultural influence and customs 
have been a source of contemporary Okinawan identity that marks difference from 
mainland Japan. 
In 1609, Satsuma soldiers, mainly from the Shimazu family, invaded and 
took over the Ryūkyū kingdom.  At this point, Ryūkyū became a colony of the 
Satsuma domain, but not a formal part of Japan.  Satsuma’s control over Ryūkyū was 
much harsher than that of China’s, which hardly interfered with Ryūkyū’s domestic 
affairs.  The Ryūkyū kings had to pay onerous taxes to Satsuma, which were 
confiscated by local authorities who were dominated by the Shuri court, the royal 
court of the Ryūkyū kingdom.
5  Thus, people in Ryūkyū were doubly subjugated by 
Shuri and Shimazu.
6   Satsuma promoted the impression that Ryūkyū was an 
‘ethnically different’ country from them, not only to exploit Ryūkyū’s trading rights 
with China, but also to demonstrate their strength by colonising a people of 
supposedly different ethnicity.  Under Satsuma’s rule, Ryūkyū was neither a direct 
part of Japan nor China; however, the independent status of a kingdom was only 
decorative. 
                                                             
3 Since the formal tributary relationship was established with Ming China at the end of the 14
th 
century, the Ryūkyū kings engaged in formal tributary trades with China, formed relations with Korea 
and mainland Japan, and engaged in trading activities with other regions in Asia ranging through The 
Philippines, Malacca, Java to Bengal (Kerr 1958: 126-9, also see Takara 1993).  By the early 15
th 
century, the Chūzan king (a city state in the central region) unified the main island (Okinawa honto), 
and the Shuri court in Naha placed military and administrative outposts in other groups of islands in 
the Ryūkyū archipelago (Amami, Yaeyama and Miyako regions) under its control, with similar 
tributary relations to China’s, though Shuri’s rule of those remote islands was far more oppressive.  
The kingdom as a trading outpost in the southern seas thrived during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries (Kerr 1958: 124). 
4 Ryūkyū was one of the smaller and weaker states under China’s political sphere of influence, but it 
was allowed to keep its autonomy.  In exchange, Ryūkyū paid tribute to Chinese political sovereignty 
by adjusting to Chinese customs and culture, by sending ships regularly to China with gifts, and by 
being enthroned by the Chinese emperor’s missions. The Ryūkyū kings obtained considerable wealth 
from trade with China, which was the basis of their political power. 
5 There was not enough food to meet domestic demand by the Ryūkyūans, who had to import rice 
from Satsuma (Higa, Shimota & Shinzato 1997 [1963]: 84-85). 
6 Tax burden on the residents in remote islands was greater than on Okinawa Main Island, known as 
the poll tax that continued to dominate islanders’ lives until the late 19
th century.  
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Before Commodore Perry forced Tokugawa to open ports to US ships, Perry 
had visited the Ryūkyū kingdom and signed a compact in 1854 (Kerr 1958: 335).  
The Meiji restoration followed, reviving the ancient political authority of the 
emperor as the sovereign body of the new nation (Beasley 1990: 54-55).
   During the 
Meiji restoration, the Shōgun office was abolished, and the feudal lords submitted 
their autonomous domains (han) to the emperor.  The Meiji government introduced 
numerous social and political reforms, replacing han with prefectures (ken).  In the 
late nineteenth century, Japan started to expand its territory overseas, whilst 
protecting itself from being colonised by Western imperial powers.  The future status 
of the Ryūkyū kingdom became a serious subject of deliberation among the Meiji 
leaders.  
Due to drastic reforms, the financial condition of the Meiji government was 
not able to provide the remote islands with public services such as police, military 
and education.   Also, completely incorporating Ryūkyū into Japanese territory 
involved the risk of producing a diplomatic conflict with China.  Moreover, the 
opposition to accepting the Ryukuans as Japanese was made by quite a few leaders 
such as Okuma Shigenobu and Kido Takayoshi, who mentioned that the Ryūkyū 
people were ethnically different from the Japanese (Oguma 1998: 20–1).  In 1872, as 
an interim solution, the Japanese government made Ryūkyū into a han (when there 
were no han left in mainland Japan) attached to Kagoshima prefecture (former 
Satsuma han).
7  However, by the 1870s, the Meiji government became more aware 
of Ryūkyū as a strategic fortress in East Asia owing to its proximity to China, Korea, 
Southeast Asia, and to other islands in the Pacific (Oguma 1998: 21).
8 
Perceptions about the Japanese national cultural boundaries did not 
consolidate overnight: Japan had modelled itself after China and assumed a morally 
and culturally central position described as ‘ka’ vis-à-vis the barbarian peripheries ‘i’, 
                                                             
7  The king of Ryūkyū  han was added to the newly established Japanese aristocratic group, or 
‘peerage’, together with other previous feudal lords in mainland Japan (Oguma 1998: 19, Taira 1997: 
154).  Some of the government elite, especially in the parliament, were opposed to granting the 
Ryūkyūans, who were ‘aliens’, an equal level of nobility with other Japanese (Ōta 1972: 87). 
8 On the northern front, Japan constantly had engaged in disputes with Russia over their national 
borders, and in 1869, Ezo, also known as Ainu Moshiri (Land of the Ainu), was taken under Japan’s 
control and given a new name, ‘Hokkaido’ (North Sea District).  
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which referred to the Ryūkyūans, the Ainus and Ogasawara islands (Morris-Suzuki 
1996: 50).  Instead of ‘the frontier as a single, unequivocal line marking the 
boundary between one nation and another’, the dominant image of the boundary of 
‘Japan’ was closer to ‘a series of frontiers marking gradually increasing degrees of 
difference’ (Morris-Suzuki 1996: 54). 
In the Ka–I view of Japanese ‘nationhood’, Ryūkyū was not only furthest 
from Tokyo geographically but also culturally.  It was therefore not quite domestic or 
foreign but ambiguous.  However, this view ceased to be dominant among the Meiji 
elites who came to see that the world order was transforming into one composed of 
capitalist economies and sovereign nation-states with clear geographical boundaries.  
By the late nineteenth century, Japan was positioned at the periphery of this new 
kind of international order, and was threatened by foreign colonial expansion in the 
region if its ‘domestic’ border was left undecided.  There was a pressing need to face 
a  new conceptual orthodoxy of international relations with a clearly defined 
territorial border backed by substantial military power. 
In 1871, a fishing vessel drifted from Miyako Island, a southwestern island of 
Ryūkyū.  It landed on the Taiwanese shore, and 54 of the 66 crew members were 
slaughtered by the indigenous Taiwanese.  This incident opened a pathway for Japan 
to annex Ryūkyū (Smits 1999: 144). The Japanese government seized this 
opportunity to send troops and a punitive expedition to Taiwan in 1874.  At the time, 
nevertheless, Japan was still militarily much weaker than the European and North 
American states, and was not confident enough to provoke any further conflicts with 
China or any other powers through illegitimate military aggression.
9  With British 
mediation, the incident was settled with a treaty between China and Japan.  The most 
effective way for the Japanese government to justify the aggression to the Chinese 
representatives and the British mediators was to argue that the victims from Miyako 
Island were officially ‘Japanese people’, and that Ryūkyū was part of Japanese 
territory.  Driven by strategic imperatives, the government inserted a sentence in the 
                                                             
9 China  and  Ryūkyū initially judged that the incident had been already settled between them, 
following the ‘rules and procedures’ of their well-established amicable relations.  As far as they were 
concerned, Japan had no direct relevance to the matter (Taira 1997: 155).  
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treaty document regarding Ryūkyū people as ‘Japanese’ (Oguma 1998: 25–6). 
While settling this incident, in October 1872, Japan’s foreign minister gave 
the Ryūkyūan envoys an emperor’s order to create the Domain of Ryūkyū (Ryūkyū 
han ) and to make King Sho Tai domain king (han-ō), to which the Ryūkyūans 
‘could do nothing but express gratitude’ (Smits 1999: 144).  In 1879, a dispatch from 
the Meiji government brought in 400 soldiers and 160 police officers to formally 
abolish the Ryūkyū kingdom.  The King, Sho Tai, was captured and forced to live in 
Tokyo.  This action was called the Ryūkyū Shobun, which ended the Ryūkyū 
kingdom. 
China made an official protest to Japan for its assault on Ryūkyū’s diplomatic 
rights, which the Japanese government practically ignored.  Chinese rule over 
Ryūkyū had for a long time been little more than nominal, and the ownership of 
Ryūkyū, a group of small islands, was hardly vital for the Qing dynasty, itself deeply 
concerned about foreign aggression.  Nevertheless, China’s biggest concern was that 
the annexation of Ryūkyū would assist Japan’s military advance towards Korea and 
Taiwan.  Therefore, China and Japan engaged in prolonged diplomatic negotiations 
over its takeover of Ryūkyū, with US President Grant as a mediator (Smits 1999: 
146).  Hundreds of former aristocrats and samurai fled to China.  These people 
formed a group called the kōdōkai, headed by a former Ryūkyū prince, and engaged 
in petition activities in order to bring about the restoration of the old order of the 
Ryūkyū kingdom.  The group ‘garnered 72,767 signatures, and a delegation of nine 
went to Tokyo to present their proposal to Interior Minister Matsukata, who rejected 
it immediately’ (Smits 1999: 149). 
During negotiation with China over the status of Okinawa after Ryūkyū 
Shobun, the Japanese government offered to cut off Miyako and Yaeyama islands 
from Okinawa prefecture, and to give them to China in exchange for the most 
favoured nation status in trade, equivalent to that enjoyed by European and American 
powers.
10  This plan to divide Okinawa, Ōta Masahide
11 argues, encapsulates what 
                                                             
10 China rejected this plan, because of its reluctance to award Japan equal privileges with the Western 
powers. 
11 See note 1 in chapter 1.  
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Okinawa essentially has become for Japan since the Ryūkyū Shobun: a pawn that 
can be dispensed with whenever necessary for the survival of the state (Ōta 1972: 
115).  Ōta stresses that the Japanese authority took advantage of the marginalised 
positions of Miyako and Yaeyama within Okinawa, where people had been 
oppressed with the onerous poll tax by the Ryūkyū authorities in Shuri (located in 
Naha today, on Okinawa Main Island).  In this sense, Miyako and Yaeyama’s 
position vis-à-vis central Okinawa paralleled that of Okinawa’s vis-à-vis mainland 
Japan, and still does. 
Becoming ‘Japanese’: 1880–1945 
The Assimilation Policy 
Between Ryūkyū Shobun and WWII, the Meiji state implemented Japanese 
administration by sending mainland Japanese officers to Okinawa.  All pre-war 
governors of Okinawa were from outside the prefecture assigned by the central 
government; opportunities for employment in public offices, the police force, schools 
and local business were closed to most Okinawans.  The members of the former 
ruling class in Ryūkyū society feared that their privileges and social power were 
being dismantled, and were fiercely opposed to the political changes, as 
demonstrated by the Kōdōkai.  The Japanese state attempted to appease the former 
ruling class, by preserving an old institutional and legal framework (called the 
‘preserving old customs’ policy), which deliberately delayed the introduction of new 
political institutions and reforms (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 Delayed institutional reforms in Okinawa 
Source: Higa, Shimota and Shinsato. Okinawa. Iwanami, Tokyo, 1963 
The delay of political and social reform compared to elsewhere in Japan was 
allegedly based on the ‘low level of civil maturity’ of the Okinawan public (Morris-
 Japan  Okinawa 
Land Tax Reform  1873  1899–1903 
Abolition of Han System  1871  1879 
Introduction of Municipal System   1879  1908 
Establishment of Prefecture System  1879  1909 
Military Conscription  1872  1898 
Prefectural Assembly Election  1890  1909 
Parliamentary Election   1890  1912  
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Suzuki 1998: 27–8).  The logic the government used was that modern institutions 
guaranteeing more civil rights would be introduced when the Okinawans were 
considered sufficiently assimilated.  Morris-Suzuki points out that Japan’s dealings 
with the Ryūkyūans (and the Ainu and Ogasawarans) were framed by a view that 
equated the spatial distance of these places from the mainland (naichi) to lower 
stages of civilisation (bunmei):
12   
So the vision of a world made up of concentric circles, where 
foreignness increased the farther one moved from the centre, came to be 
replaced by a vision of a single nation where ‘development’ and 
‘modernity’ diminished the farther one moved from the capital toward 
the geographic extremities (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 29).  
That is, geographically isolated Okinawa was considered to be in a stage of 
civilisation lower than central Japan.
13  The status of the Ryūkyūans vis-à-vis Japan 
became a point of debate among anthropologists, archaeologists and other scholars 
(Siddle 1998, Yonetani 2000).  However, Siddle notes that in contrast with the Ainu 
inhabitants, who ‘remained completely outside history’, scholars tended to see 
Ryūkyūans were on their way to becoming Japanese (Siddle 1998: 125, Tomiyama 
1998).  The assimilation policy in Okinawa was underpinned by the view that 
Okinawa-specific cultural artefacts embodied backwardness.  This extended through 
a range of manners of dress, lifestyle matters such as young people’s beach parties 
(moashibi), male hairstyle (kata-kashira), and female hand tattoos (hajichi). 
Meiji was the period, particularly in the 1880s, when nationalism based on 
collective worship of the emperor as a divine being was steadily being formed.   
Multiple organisations and ideologues contributed to proselytising the idea of a 
unified nation, with the emperor at the top of the entire hierarchy, through all kinds 
of social networks (See Fujitani 1998, Gluck 1985).  Education was one of the most 
                                                             
12 Morris-Suzuki refers to Fukuzawa Yukichi’s (famous theorist and educationist in the late 19
th 
century) notion of civilisation as involving ‘successive stages of development’ (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 
24), starting from the state of closest affinity to nature, progressing to the achievement of freedom 
from natural restriction by way of technology and production (Fukuzawa 1997 [1875]). 
13 Smits refers to Anderson’s account of nationalism (Anderson 1991, Duara 1995) in explaining the 
development of nationalism in Japan in the Meiji period and the role played by the ‘spatial and 
temporary imagining’, that is, integration of distant communities beyond immediate human contacts 
into a Japanese nation.  This placed Ryūkyū at the tail end of cultural progress in the scale of ‘linear 
and progressive’ advancement of the time (Smits 1999: 151).  
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effective vehicles, together with newly introduced rituals, the construction of shrines, 
increased publications, and community events.  The ‘emperor-centred moral 
education (kominka)’ was introduced across the newly acquired Japanese territories 
and colonies (Christy 1993: 608).  In contrast to the much-delayed political and 
social reform, the new education system with the strongest emphasis on nationalism 
was introduced to Okinawa.
14   The government campaigned for the use of the 
Japanese language — the Tokyo dialect was adopted as the official ‘national 
standard’ — instead of the distinct Okinawan language and dialect.  During this 
period, the government opened ‘Japanese conversation schools’ (using Tokyo 
dialect) all over Okinawa, just as there are ‘English conversation schools’ 
everywhere in Japan today (Oguma 1997: 35). 
The most important signifier of assimilation was how much Okinawans 
adjusted to the notion of becoming ‘the emperor’s people’.  The new educational 
system placed most value on the importance of turning ‘Japanese’ and ‘the emperor’s 
people’ over any other practical kinds of knowledge.  The greatest effort was put into 
raising primary education enrolments.  When standard Japanese was introduced in 
Okinawa initially, for the majority of Okinawans speaking Japanese was not 
considered a particularly useful social skill because most people spoke the local 
dialect in the late nineteenth century.  However, it took only a generation for the new 
educational policies to take effect in Okinawa.  In 1907, 93 per cent of Okinawan 
children were enrolled in primary schools (Oguma 1998: 39). 
The ‘preserving old customs’ policy had a significant impact on the local 
economy.  The new land-tax system obliged farmers to own land and pay tax in cash, 
not in kind.  As a result, sugar farming was widely introduced to meet the tax 
demands, which the farmers quickly became dependent on.  After the turn of the 
century, many farmers converted rice paddies and sweet-potato fields into cane 
fields, obtaining immediate cash to buy food and household products.  However, 
most of the goods were made in mainland Japan, brought in by the old merchants — 
including the royal Shō family — who preserved exclusive commercial trading rights 
                                                             
14 Portraits of the emperor were distributed in Okinawan schools first (Oguma 1998: 38).  
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with mainland Japan and dominated the Okinawan market.  This hindered the growth 
of a local industry sector and promoted an over-dependence on small-scale sugar 
farming.
15  Thus, before World War I, under the ‘preserving old customs’ policy, 
Tomiyama argues that the Okinawan economy had developed its structural 
vulnerability (1997: 77–8). 
After World War I, the price of sugar fell on a worldwide scale to devastating 
levels.  Many farmers were forced to sell their lands, or their children as future 
servants, to a handful of rich landowners.
16  In the 1920s, Okinawan peasants faced a 
severe famine described as ‘a palm-tree hell’ (sotetsu jigoku) because many died 
eating the starch taken from wild-grown cycad (sotetsu) palms, which is fatally 
poisonous if not processed extremely carefully.  As Tomiyama explains, the 
vulnerability of the Okinawan sugar farmers to the price fall was due to the ‘preserve 
the old customs’ policy: the persistence of oligarchic domination of the local market 
by a small expatriate commercial class truncated the locals’ commerce. 
Manufacturing activities had not benefited from the boost in the sugar price before 
the crisis either.  Moreover, the government put in place no protective policy — with 
tariffs and subsidies as were common in the European countries — for Okinawa 
against the low sugar price in the world economy.  On the contrary, Japanese imports 
of cheaper sugar from Java doubled (Tomiyama 1997: 76-82).  The palm-tree hell, in 
this sense, symbolises the unfair protection given to the Okinawans’ welfare, 
therefore, a notable example of Okinawans’ marginalisation. 
Okinawans’ Responses to Assimilation 
Cut off from the embrace of the religious and moral order centred around China, it 
took a long time for a ‘Ryūkyū’ or ‘Okinawan’ identity to develop.  In the late 
nineteenth century, after annexation, although Okinawa was brought under Japanese 
administrative control, Okinawans predominantly lived as members of smaller 
communities, namely, villages called magiri, where they were born, worked and 
                                                             
15 Unlike in Taiwan, cost-effective plantation-style sugar farming was not implemented in Okinawa 
(Tomiyama 1997: 80). 
16 These wealthy landowners became eligible voters, constituting a very limited part of the population 
who paid more than 5 yen tax.  
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died, without seeing the world beyond it.  The idea of a separate Okinawa or Ryūkyū 
as a nation based on common distinguishable attributes such as geographical 
coherence, history, culture and language developed much later (Siddle 1998: 124).  
Geographical diffusion and linguistic differences extending across islands remote 
from Okinawa Main Island contributed to this, as well as class divides among the 
population. 
Military conscription was introduced in 1898, preceding other reforms. 
Socially influential local figures such as schoolteachers and Ryūkyū Shimpō 
journalists promoted Okinawan participation in the military;
17 they saw it necessary 
to entitle Okinawans to equal political rights and reforms as the mainland Japanese 
(Yoshiwara 196–7).  On the other hand, many Okinawans  refused or escaped 
conscription by fleeing to remote islands or to China,
18  migrating overseas, or 
pretending to be ill or disabled.  This happened also to mainland Japanese people, 
especially in rural communities.  In Okinawa, nevertheless, refusing to join the 
Japanese military had quite different meanings: most Okinawans could not speak 
fluent standard Japanese and were still attached to Qing China (Yoshiwara 1973: 
201).  Even though Okinawan soldiers had been educated with an overwhelming 
emphasis on loyalty to the emperor and in the standard Japanese language, they faced 
discrimination within the military.  Many Okinawan soldiers tried to prove they were 
‘Japanese’ by dedicating themselves to combat activities, often at the expense of 
their own lives (Arakawa 1973: 190, Shinjo 1998: 172).
19  The local elite severely 
attacked conscription avoidance, especially in the Ryūkyū Shimpō  columns and 
articles (Yoshiwara 1973: 196–7, also see Ōta 1967: chapter 2).  The conscription 
issue is a window to the contesting perspectives on assimilation and reluctance to it, 
which divided the population. 
As a major consequence of the devastating poverty and famine caused by the 
                                                             
17 Significantly, primary school teachers were recruited for six-week service in 1896, before other 
sectors of the population (Shinjo 1998: 1972). 
18 Between 1898 and 1915, 774 were prosecuted (including jail sentences) for avoiding conscription 
(Yoshiwara 1973: 198). 
19 Out of some 2,000 Okinawan soldiers, 205 died in the Japan-Russo war.  Ryūkyū Shimpō appraised 
this as a proof of Okinawans’ loyalty and courage (Yoshiwara 1973: 197).  
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sugar price, thousands of Okinawans went to mainland Japan and emigrated 
overseas, especially to Hawaii and South America in search of jobs and cash 
incomes, which was promoted by government policy as a solution to the economic 
crisis.  Thousands of Okinawans moved to mainland Japan as factory workers in the 
chemical and other manufacturing and textile industries (Tomiyama 1997: 94-98).  In 
mainland Japan, Okinawans were called ‘Ryūkyū-jin’ and similar names by other 
Japanese, and faced all sorts of discrimination, similarly but somewhat differently 
from, for example, Koreans in mainland Japan.  Experience of discrimination 
contributed to the construction of an ‘Okinawan’ identity based on marginalisation, 
that bound everyone together, who were hitherto contained in respective 
communities within Okinawa and very much separated from each other, vis-à-vis 
mainland Japan (yamato or naichi).  
Tomiyama (1997) has conducted research on Okinawans’ emigration into 
Osaka as labourers following the sugar price fall in the 1920s, and the Kansai 
Okinawans’ Organisation (Kansai Okinawa Kenjin-kai).  Tomiyama maintains that 
the Kenjin-kai, established by the Okinawan emigrants, was engaged in ‘a social 
movement’: the organisation’s main activities were to provide general pastoral care 
for, and to facilitate mutual communications among, the Okinawans who came to 
live in the area, which included finding accommodation and work.  However, it also 
behaved like a labour union by promoting the interests of workers from Okinawa, 
especially in the areas of work conditions and labour rights.  Initially, the Kenjin-kai 
encouraged self-expression of members as ‘uchinanchu’ (Okinawans), that is, the 
pride in being ‘Okinawan’, in their interaction with other Japanese.  The subject of 
Kenjin-kai, in other words, members’ definition of who ‘we’ were, was expressed in 
terms of the unique attributes of ‘being Okinawans’.  However, as Okinawans’ 
labourers’ difficulties were explained in terms of discrimination — being from 
Okinawa determined where to live and work, and qualities of living and working 
conditions (group employment for Okinawans, segregated dormitory rooms, different 
meals and schedules for Okinawans etc.) — the main mission of Kenjin-kai shifted 
towards eliminating discrimination against Okinawans in workplaces, by  
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encouraging them to become ‘competent workers’ and rewarding those who did.   
Tomiyama points out that the yardstick of ‘competent workers’ was the extent to 
which Okinawan workers eliminated the characters and features of their own 
‘Okinawanness’, in order to become more ‘Japanese’. 
What did it mean to ‘become Japanese’?  According to Tomiyama’s research, 
it meant ‘correcting’ physical aspects of lifestyle that are associated with being 
‘Okinawan’: namely, clothes, hygienic practices, ‘flocking’ among themselves apart 
from other Japanese, tendency to stay up late, enjoying Okinawan music, dramas and 
dancing, and amongst others, speaking in Okinawan dialect.  On the other hand, 
obedience was rewarded as a positive ‘Okinawan’ attribute for promoting 
Okinawans’ Japanisation, which was also understood as a process of ‘awakening into 
a class consciousness’ (Tomiyama 1997: 167).  ‘Becoming Japanese’ for Okinawans 
in this period in Osaka required such punishing physical and emotional self-
discipline.  In the 1930s, the self-correcting effort of the assimilation-oriented 
Okinawans developed into a so-called ‘life improvement movement’ (Seikatsu 
Kaizen Undo) among migrants from Okinawa in Japan in general. 
Nevertheless, Tomiyama stresses the gap between the elite Okinawans who 
eagerly advocated Japanisation and other non-elite Okinawans who remained silent; 
many Okinawans quietly carried their animosity towards the dominant degradation 
of Okinawan cultural characteristics, which surfaced occasionally, for example, in an 
episode of female Okinawan workers at a spinning mill making fun of factory 
managers with a familiar folk song, described as ‘the Okinawan kimigayo’ (Japan’s 
national anthem) (Higa 1988 cited in Tomiyama 1997: 150-151). 
The ‘House of the Peoples’ incident at the Fifth Industrial Exhibition in 
Osaka in 1903 shows how an increasing number of Okinawans were eager to see 
themselves as ‘proper Japanese’, distinguishing themselves from ‘other Asians’, 
through exposure to the new educational system. 
…a man with a whip presided over a display of Koreans, Ainu, 
Taiwanese aborigines, and two Okinawan women  … .Okinawan 
newspapers reacted to the display with rage, claiming that lining up 
Okinawans with primitives and inferior ethnic groups was a slur against  
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the Okinawans, who were ‘real Japanese’ (Christy 1993: 608). 
The strong reaction of the Okinawan public to this ‘incident’ suggests the possibility 
that Okinawan identity was not only constructed by authoritative enforcement from 
above, but also by themselves, in favour of their new position within the modern and 
powerful Japanese state.  The prominent members of the former aristocratic class 
argued for the urgent need to adjust to the new Japanese rule, in order to maximize 
Okinawans’ interests through assimilation with mainland Japan.  Ōta Chōfu, for 
example, an Okinawan elite of an aristocratic descendant, who started a local 
newspaper, Ryūkyū Shimpo (with Okinawa Times, one of the two widely read local 
papers today in Okinawa), represented those who eagerly promoted the benefit of 
becoming like the Japanese, and even preached to imitate their sneezing (Ryūkyū 
Shimpo 24 September 1917 quoted in Ōta 1972: 122).
20   
Jahana Noboru’s ‘People’s Rights Movement’ 
As more people slowly started to realise the existence of more powerful political 
authorities than the Shuri royal court or the local Okinawan government, voluntary 
political activism began to take place (Arakawa 1973: 105).  The first protest 
movement of the farmers since the Ryūkyū ‘Disposal’ was organised in Miyako 
Island in 1893 against the local officers and aristocrats who were still benefiting 
from the Ryūkyūan custom of poll tax still imposed on the farmers in Miyako and 
Yaeyama.  The Japanese government’s policy to preserve the old customs in 
Okinawa in order to appease the pro-Chinese former ruling class included the 
preservation of the three-hundred-year-old poll tax system in these remote islands.  
Therefore, even after the end of the Ryūkyū kingdom, the poll tax obligated each 
person to pay punishing duties each year to produce rice, traditional hand-woven 
fabric and other products as well as labour service for the local officials.  The leaders 
of the farmers’ protest were Gusukuma Seian from Naha and Nakamura Jissaku from 
Niigata in mainland Japan, who were staying in Miyako for other purposes.  The 
slave-like lives of Miyako farmers infuriated these two outsiders, who influenced the 
                                                             
20 However, Ōta should not be understood as simply ‘assimilationist’.  Hiyane (1996) points out that 
the greatest goal of Ōta was to establish awareness for Okinawa’s independent history, and his 
advocacy for assimilation was meant to be secondary to this greater role.   
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locals into directly appealing to the Japanese government.  They sent a delegation to 
Tokyo, to lobby the Parliament members and the newspapers, appealing to end the 
poll tax and introduce a land tax system in remote islands (for details see Arakawa 
1973: 119–58).  In the end, even though the new land tax system continued to burden 
the farmers, the movement was successful and the poll tax was abolished (Arakawa 
1973: 158, Yoshiwara 1973: 113). 
Closer to the local government on Okinawa Island, a similar strategy of 
directly appealing to the state government to reform the oppressive local policy was 
taken by the ‘People’s Rights’ movement led by an agronomist, Jahana Noboru.  In 
comparison to the Miyako protest, nevertheless, Jahana’s movement created much 
more serious disputes among Okinawans, in terms of how to understand the 
implications for later struggles in Okinawa.  Jahana has been one of the most idolised 
historical figures in Okinawa for his achievement in becoming a high-profile local 
government bureaucrat from a peasant background, for his battles with Governor 
Narahara and the conservative group of former aristocrats influential in the local 
government, and for his isolation and tragic death from mental illness (Ōsato 1969, 
Smits 2002). 
Jahana was born a farmers’ son in Kochinda village in southern Okinawa in 
1865, and was selected as the only one with a rural background of the first five 
government-funded Okinawan university students to study in Tokyo with other sons 
of aristocrats, including Ōta Chōfu, founder of the local newspaper, Ryūkyū Shimpo.  
The villagers made Jahana a local hero and a symbol of hard work for the village.  In 
Tokyo Jahana majored in agriculture, in particular, fertilising in sugar farming.   
Returning to Okinawa, he became a high-rank officer in charge of agricultural issues 
in the local administration of a mainland Japanese governor, which again was an 
unprecedented achievement for someone with a non-aristocratic background.   
Ōsato’s biography of Jahana, Gijin Jahana Noboru Den (Jahana Noboru, a 
righteous man), first published in 1938, was influential in creating a heroic image of 
Jahana as representative of the peasant class, as well as someone who worked hard 
and died for the political rights of the Okinawan people, battling against the  
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aristocratic oligarchy in the local government and Narahara, a demonised governor 
(1892–1908) from Kagoshima.  Narahara had strong connections with the central 
government, and ‘ruled with such a firm hand that he earned the nickname “King of 
Ryūkyū”’ (Smits 2002: 103).  However, Jahana resigned the position in 1898 after 
severe disagreements with Narahara’s plan to privatise traditional communal forests 
in northern Okinawa, called somayama, to be distributed to the unemployed former 
lower officials of the Ryūkyū court who were economically struggling.  Yoshiwara 
(1973: 41–66), in line with Ōsato’s story, explains that the somoyama development 
allowed Narahara and his aristocratic acolytes to gain more wealth, depriving 
peasants of essential resources such as timber and water resources, to which Jahana 
was opposed and advocated peasant ownership instead.  This image of Jahana as 
guardian of the peasants has, however, been disputed by Arakawa (1996: 204-206), 
who argues that the historical records more strongly suggest Jahana was initially the 
promoter of the somayama cultivation with Narahara, and the land issue was not his 
main concern.  In Arakawa’s view (1996: 207), Jahana was no longer acting as a 
‘peasant’s son’ by this time, and his primary concern was overcoming the class-
oriented old regime with extremely limited room for promoting someone like him, 
degraded as a commoner, up the social ladder.  This was the reason why he resigned 
from his post, and his ultimate goal was his battle, not only with Narahara, but also 
with a group of other conservative local bureaucrats of Ryūkyūan aristocratic 
descent, including Ōta Chōfu, who had once been sent to Tokyo with Jahana to 
study, and leader of Kōdōkai (Smits 2002: 106). 
Kōdōkai led an anachronistic movement that petitioned the Parliament in 
Tokyo to bring back the last Ryūkyūan king, Sho Tai, as Governor, which quickly 
failed.  Consequently, the members concentrated on enhancing power in local 
politics by forming an alliance with the Narahara administration, and Ōta became an 
advocate of promoting assimilation and the Okinawan identity as ‘proper Japanese’.  
Jahana opposed the Kōdōkai from the vantage point of a non-aristocratic local elite, 
then made enemies with the conservative alliance of Narahara and the former 
Kōdōkai members and, eventually, became isolated in the local government and  
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resigned in December 1898.  However, in November 1898, Jahana was elected one 
of the directors of the Okinawa Agricultural Bank, which was a public bank set up in 
each prefecture, and Jahana had contributed to its establishment while in the post.  At 
the same time, Jahana and his colleagues made trips to Tokyo to appeal for 
Narahara’s resignation and land reform in Okinawa to Diet members, in particular, 
gaining the sympathy of Home Minister Itagaki Taisuke (Isa 1998: 192).  In January 
1899, Jahana formed the Okinawa Club in Tokyo with several young colleagues 
similarly from peasant families, and published a journal, Okinawa Jiron, in which he 
criticised the domination of social privilege in Okinawan society by Narahara and his 
local aristocratic allies.  On the other hand, Ōta Chōfu, who worked as a reporter for 
Ryūkyū Shimpo, also constantly attacked Jahana’s movement in his newspaper. 
In Feburary in Tokyo, Jahana and another Okinawa Club member, Uema 
Kōsuke, submitted a petition to the Lower House to introduce suffrage to allow 
Okinawans to elect representatives to the Diet.  In Okinawa, delayed introduction of 
suffrage, like delayed land reform, was one of the central government’s attempts to 
preserve the interests of the former Ryūkyūan class.  The conservative elites were 
opposed to the election of Okinawan delegates to the Diet, which would lead to 
fundamental political and social change that favoured merit-based promotion to 
powerful positions, and to the fear of the former ruling class members of losing their 
inherited positions of influence.  Jahana and his colleagues realised that participation 
in national politics and having access to power in the central government were 
important in order to remove Narahara and the old conservatives’ domination in 
Okinawa.
21  Jahana’s movement is often referred to as an ‘Okinawan version’ of the 
Liberty and People’s Rights movement that was burgeoning in mainland Japan in the 
1880s involving Ishizuka Shoko and others (Smits 2002: 107). 
However, their political campaign yielded disappointing results for the 
Okinawa Club members.  The Lower House decided to introduce the election of two 
Diet members from Okinawa by issuing an Imperial Edict ‘when the time arrives’; 
                                                             
21 In January 1899, Jahana became a member of the Japanese political party, Kenseito (Constitutional 
Political Party) (Isa 1998: 336).  
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however, it was postponed indefinitely, even though Okinawa’s political 
participation had been agreed upon in the Lower House in 1899, as a result of the 
direct lobbying of Jahana’s group.  Parliamentary elections commenced formally in 
1912 in Okinawa, by which time only two members, as opposed to five from other 
prefectures, were to be elected from Okinawa.  Furthermore, the Miyako and 
Yaeyama regions were excluded from national elections until 1919.
22 
In March 1900, Jahana proposed an increase in rural representatives to 
counter the domination of Narahara and his allies in the Bank and, as a result, was 
removed from the director’s position at the Okinawa Agricultural Bank.  Some of his 
Okinawa Club members switched sides to co-operate with the conservatives (Ōsato 
1969: 225-6).  This incident made Jahana more isolated than ever.  Unable to find 
employment because of Narahara’s influence, he no longer had a place in Okinawa.  
Jahana died at the age of 43 in 1908. 
Jahana is often regarded as the pioneer of modern Okinawans’ struggles 
against discrimination and resistance and of protest by later Okinawan leftist 
activists.  An Okinawan citizens’ newsletter, Okinawa Minken (Okinawan Liberty 
and People’s Rights), which was launched in 1977, interpreted Jahana and his legacy 
of the Okinawa Liberty and People’s Rights movement as the origin of the ‘Okinawa 
Struggle (Okinawa tōsō)’, and connected with various contemporary protests that 
concerned the Okinawan activists at the time: opposition to kimigayo,
23 the Kin Bay 
anti-oil refinery movement, boycotting the Self Defense Force job advertising in 
Okinawa, protest against US military training, and opposition to the New Ishigaki 
Airport (Isa 1998: 253). 
Arakawa, however, in his article written in 1970 (reprinted in 1996), strongly 
criticised the view that regards Jahana as the ‘origin of the Okinawa Struggle’, 
expressed by, for example, Kohazu Eikou, editor of the Okinawa Minken newsletter 
                                                             
22 The reasons for excluding Okinawa from the self-government procedure that existed in other parts 
of Japan, and from national elections, are unclear.  Parliamentary discussion on this topic was 
suppressed by other agendas that were considered more urgent, such as diplomatic concerns.  Ōta 
argues that this case is an example of the traditional discriminatory treatment against Okinawa, which 
has been a consistent feature in Japanese politics until today (Ōta 1996a: 189–190). 
23 Many Okinawans oppose the use of Kimigayo, the national anthem during Imperial Japan, which 
has still been sung at official ceremonies, and became formally a national anthem in May 1999.  
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(Kohazu 1971 cited in Arakawa 1996: 207).  Kohazu describes Jahana as the pioneer 
of ‘the Okinawa Struggle’, which, according to Arakawa, revealed the common 
strategy of Jahana’s movement and the reversion movement: the protest strategy to 
overcome predicaments by way of integrating with the state, mentally and 
institutionally.  In my view, Arakawa’s criticism of the interpretation of Jahana’s 
struggle as pioneering the Okinawa Struggle is also directed at the personification of 
Jahana’s struggle as the struggle of ‘Okinawans’ in general. 
Chapter 5 will examine Arakawa’s point further, in relation to the critique 
against the strategy, organisation and collective identity of the reversion movement.  
A famous Japanese writer, Oe Kenzaburo, during his sojourn in Okinawa in 1969–
70, observed at the time, ‘the image of Jahana Noboru was revived, which in turn re-
defined the outline and shades of the Okinawans’ reversion movement to the 
Homeland’ (cited in Ōsato 1996: 623).  Isa comments that only a few articles on 
Jahana were published each year until 1968.  However, the number increased to 16 in 
1969, 20 in 1970, and 38 in 1971, reflecting the heightening public concern towards 
the reversion, the reversion movement and what it meant to Okinawans.  However, 
by the late 1990s, only low levels of interest in Jahana were demonstrated (Isa 1998: 
252–4,  Ōsato 1996).  The high level of interest in Jahana during the reversion 
movement period indicated the strengthened collective identity of a ‘movement’ of 
the Okinawan people, drawing on Jahana as a symbolic figure of oppression.  
Nevertheless, significantly, Arakawa’s strong discomfort reveals that the 
construction of this collective identity was a subject of dispute in the community of 
protest, even when interest in Jahana was at its peak in 1970. 
Smits provides an important analysis in English, which regards Jahana’s 
struggle in terms of Okinawa’s ambiguous relations with Japan, as well as the 
ambiguity of Japan itself as a nation in the late nineteenth century.  Importantly, 
Smits also points out that Jahana’s struggle, far from being an all-encompassing 
‘Okinawan’ movement, was a struggle against class divisions within Okinawan 
society (2002: 112).  His isolation was mainly due to his conflict with members of 
the former aristocratic elite, who stuck to the old Ryūkyūan social order.    
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Furthermore, Jahana’s progressive movement was almost detached from the rest of 
the society.  The Okinawan People’s Rights movement was basically a local elite’s 
movement, that had knowledge of, and access to, the academic and political world on 
the mainland.  In this sense, Jahana’s ‘Okinawa Struggle’ was isolated from the 
ordinary mass Okinawan population, for example, the farmers in Okinawan villages 
where he had his roots (Arakawa 1996: 207). 
In the contemporary context, it should be stressed that evaluation of Jahana’s 
movement continues to constitute an important point of dispute over institutional 
integration with the state for political reform, as a strategy of protest.  Arakawa 
(1973, 1996, 2000) has most fiercely expressed his opposition to the strategy of 
institutionally integrating with the body politic of Japan, which gives priority to 
achieving integration in equal terms with mainland Japan.  Furthermore, some of the 
anti-base organisations and protest groups today struggle to reach the general public, 
that is, to politically involve non-affiliated citizens in their collective action.   
Identifying with Jahana’s movement as the ‘pioneer of the Okinawa Struggle’ may 
have ramifications for the contemporary protest actors, by repeating similar isolation 
from the mass members of the Okinawan society.  
‘Okinawan Studies’ 
In the post-annexation period, ‘Okinawan Studies’ (Okinawa gaku) played an 
important role in promoting the idea of Okinawa as part of Japan, by exploring 
commonalities between Japan and Ryūkyū in ancient records of local literature and 
culture.  Meiji Japanese scholars, including anthropologists such as Tashiro Antei, 
Torii Ryūzō and Tsuboi Shōgorō (see Yonetani 2000), and later, Iha Fuyu, 
contributed to the concept of Ryūkyūans as ethnically an integral part of Japan, with 
evidence of remaining Japanese ancient elements in Ryūkyūan society (Siddle 1998: 
124–5, also see Tomiyama 1998).  Since the early twentieth century, Okinawan 
intellectuals including Iha Fuyu, Higashionna Kanjun, and Nakahara Zenchū 
contributed to the research on Okinawan indigenous cultural history and literature, 
represented most notably by the study of the Omoro sōshi, a collection of local folk  
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verses written during the Early Ryūkyū period.
24  Iha Fuyu, often referred to as the 
‘father of Okinawan Studies’,
25 emphasised the common heritage of the Okinawan 
and Japanese languages, which locates his argument in line with Haneji and 
Ginowan’s Nichiryū dōso ron.
26 
However, the political standpoint of Iha was often contradictory, and 
indicative of the internal differences in defining collective identity in today’s anti-
base protest on Okinawa.  Iha’s work basically supported the Okinawans’ 
evolutionary path of ‘becoming Japanese’.  However, he developed a strong 
commitment to establishing a clear sense of Okinawa being one united entity, which 
had yet to be developed at the end of the nineteenth century.  Iha contributed to 
constructing what Oguma calls the emergence of ‘Okinawan nationalism’, 
transcending internal regional differences (Oguma 1998: 293). 
However, in his study of Ryūkyū’s linguistic, historical and cultural ancestry, 
Iha could not be free from an ulterior mission to promote the interest of Okinawans 
in general, by stressing the ‘same’ elements between Ryūkyū and Japan.  Yonetani 
(2000: 17) explains that the expression of Ryūkyūan identity in terms of 
homogeneity with Japan was infused with what she calls a ‘politics of sameness’, 
since the underlying intent was to minimise discrimination of Okinawa based on 
distinctiveness from mainland Japan; interpreted as rationalisation for further 
discrimination.  Nevertheless, the argument of ‘sameness’ left considerable room for 
interpretation in terms of Ryūkyū’s distinctiveness (Yonetani 2000: 31).  Tomiyama 
(1998: 170) emphasises that Iha was on ‘the quest for ‘a common ancestor’ as a third 
category that is neither “Japanese” nor “Ryūkyūan”’, which preserves ‘dissimilarity’, 
that is, Ryūkyū’s uniqueness, on which he based ‘Okinawan’ identity.
27  In his later 
works, he positioned Ryūkyū amongst other ‘southern islanders’ including 
                                                             
24 Okinawan studies as a field is analysed in detail in numorous works (Hiyane 1981, 1996, Hokama 
2002, Kano 1993, Kinjo & Takara 1984, in English Siddle 1998, Tomiyama 1998, Yonetani 2000) 
25 For example Iha 1942, 1974-76. 
26 Ryūkyūan pro-Japanese politicians such as Haneji Choshu in 1673 and Giwan Chōhō in the 1870s 
had insisted on the common ancestry of Ryūkyū and mainland Japan (Nichiryū dōso ron).  Linguistic 
exploration made by a British scholar, Basil Hall Chamberlain, in the late 19
th century backed this 
perspective (Siddle 1998: 125). 
27 Iha was strongly influenced by Torii’s research regarding this emphasis.  For relations between 
Torii and Iha’s works, see Tomiyama 1998.   
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indigenous Taiwanese, Malays and the Ainu
28  and also pointed out the mainland 
Japanese ancestral connection with the ‘southern islanders’, emphasising the 
‘sameness’ there (Iha 1974–6: vol. 11).  However, he attempted to establish 
‘Okinawa’ as a unique entity within ‘the pluralist vision of the Japanese state’, which 
consisted of many nations and peoples in Asia (Siddle 1998: 126).
29  Through his 
work, Iha attempted to provide ‘evidence of Ryūkyūan cultural achievements upon 
which a sense of local pride could be based’ (Christy 1993: 624), that is, his wish 
was to establish a strong sense of a ‘Ryūkyūan’ subject, to be carried by the 
generations to come in modern Okinawa. 
Influential as Iha’s work and his arguments were in Okinawan studies, Iha’s 
version of ‘Ryūkyūan’ identity did not necessarily amount to a general consensus 
among Okinawan analysts.  Shimabukuro Zenpatsu (1888–1953), an intellectual who 
came after Iha, called attention to the ‘ethnic self-perception’ of the people 
themselves. 
Ordinary Ryūkyūans call mainland Japanese people ‘yamatonchu’ 
(yamato people) and differentiate them from ‘uchinanchu’ (Ryūkyūans).  
This sense of distinction has existed since early Meiji.  Isn’t it sensible to 
think Ryūkyūans are quite intimately connected to the yamato people, 
but nevertheless belong to a different ethnicity? (Yakabi 1998: 121) 
Giving credit to Iha and others’ ‘scientific’ approach to the question of ‘Okinawan’ 
identity based on ‘objective’ findings from a wide range of academic research in 
anthropology, linguistics, ethnology, religion and history, Shimabukuro stressed the 
importance of the ‘subjective’ element, that is, what ordinary locals normally felt and 
perceived about who they were (Yakabi 1998: 122).  Shimabukuro’s argument 
highlights the difficulty in forming a consensus among critical local intellectuals and 
activists regarding the self-definition of ‘Okinawans’, which continues today: 
 
… despite the rhetoric of many anti-base activists and the emotional power 
of their message, Okinawans are not themselves united in their 
understanding of the past and have not succeeded in forging a ‘nation’ in 
Okinawa … [T]hese divisions are a continuation of an older discourse on 
                                                             
28  However, in his earlier work, Iha distinguished Ryūkyūans from the Ainu and the indigenous 
Taiwanese in that the latter two were described as ‘peoples’ whereas Ryūkyū was a ‘nation’ 
(Tomiyama 1998: 171). 
29 See ‘Ko-Ryūkyū no Seiji’ (1922) in Iha 1974–6: vol.1.  
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colonialism and modernisation, identity and history, that stretches back to 
the early days of Okinawa Prefecture (Siddle 1998: 133). 
Defining ‘Ryūkyū’ as a nation through a sense of an historical ‘Ryūkyūan’ subject 
was Iha’s major achievement.  However, the emergence of an ‘Okinawan’ identity 
within Japan was such that it perpetuated the endless possibility of contention, in 
terms of how Okinawa is separate from, or an integral part of, yamato.  Importantly, 
the increasing tendency of defining ‘Ryūkyū’ and ‘Okinawan’ identity within the 
framework of a dichotomous contrast with mainland Japan (i.e. non-Okinawan 
Japan, expressed as yamato) had become prominent by the early twentieth century. 
The Linguistic Debate 
Japanese folk scholars such as Yanagita Kunio and Origuchi Shinobu also argued 
what they considered as essential Japaneseness resided in Okinawan religious 
practices, dialect, music and crafts.  Representation of Okinawan culture as the 
archaic and primitive version of Japan, however, was not agreeable to many local 
Okinawans, especially the elite, who felt the need to overcome political exclusion 
within Japan at a time of imperialist nation-building and modernisation. 
A linguistic debate in 1940 indicates that the necessity for integration into the 
nation, in the era leading up to the Pacific War, was a contentious concern among 
Okinawans.  Yanagi Muneyoshi attacked the language standardisation policy and the 
extreme measures it involved.  When Okinawan-specific vocabulary or dialect 
slipped out of their mouth, children were given a hogen-fuda (dialect sign) to hang 
from their neck as a punishment until they found another classmate who made the 
same mistake.  As a founder of the Folk Art Association, Yanagi urged Okinawans to 
be proud of Okinawan characteristics, not only their language but also traditional 
Ryūkyūan dress and architecture.  Yanagi was ‘a nationalist seeking to forge a 
Japanese identity from the diversity of regional cultures which could be found within 
the Japanese empire’ (Clarke 1997: 193).
30  Yanagi’s view on Okinawa reflects his 
cultural-nationalist concern that rapid modernisation and Westernisation were stifling 
the variety of ascetic and spiritual characteristics that resided in regional cultures, 
                                                             
30 He often clashed with political authority for his criticism of the oppression of local language, art 
and culture, not only in Okinawa, but also in Korea, Taiwan and northern Japan (Clarke 1997: 194).  
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which he thought should constitute a Japanese identity. 
Yanagi’s opinion, expressed at a symposium, developed into a nation-wide 
debate involving Okinawan and mainland newspapers.  The locals were 
predominantly opposed to Yanagi’s idea.  They thought his view was that of an 
outsider, or of a romantic tourist who did not comprehend many Okinawans’ 
understanding of assimilation as something that would assist them to overcome 
economic hardship and discrimination.  Some locals supported Yanagi’s position, but 
they were outnumbered (Clarke 1997: 194–5).  Representation of Okinawan culture 
as the archaic and primitive version of Japan was not agreeable to the local 
Okinawans, especially the elite.  As in other places in Japan, social pressure for 
sacrificing individual interests to the state’s military activities was growing, and the 
myth of the divine emperor was being strengthened.  The pressure to assimilate with 
Japan, at least partly, explains the tragedy of the battle of Okinawa in 1945, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the pre-WWII period since Okinawa’s annexation.   
Many Okinawans came to actively accept the need to overcome their ‘backwardness’ 
as perceived in the context of the new special and temporal imagining of the 
Japanese nation.  The ‘assimilationist’ orientation of the Okinawans, which emerged 
in this period, was later expressed more aggressively by the reversion movement in 
the 1950s and 1960s (Tomiyama 1997: 270).  Even after reversion to Japan, this 
orientation has influenced the content and strategy of protest, especially in seeking 
entitlement to the Japanese Constitution (Arakawa 1996b). 
Nevertheless, the idea of Okinawa as a separate entity from Japan with 
unique ‘Okinawan’ denominators was gradually emerging.  To what extent 
Okinawans should assimilate into Japan remains a source of disagreement among 
Okinawans.  Self-perception of ‘Okinawa’ as distinct from mainland Japan continues 
to provide an important fissuring point amongst the actors of contemporary political 
struggle in Okinawa today.  The contention over defining ‘Okinawa’ dates back to 
the historical development of the Okinawan subject, as evidenced by the writers  
   71
examined in this chapter. 
This dissertation suggests, nevertheless, that insofar as discrimination, 
disadvantages and hardships in this period were explained as a result of being 
‘Okinawan’ — different from Japanese — they contributed to the development of a 
historical narrative of Okinawa’s marginalisation.  These are deep historical roots to 
the myth of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ against marginalisation that different actors 
within the community of protest can tap into.  Jahana’s struggle for equal political 
rights, in particular, was important in forming the early part of the myth of the 
‘Okinawan struggle’.   72
Chapter Three 
 
The Battle of Okinawa and ‘Okinawan Pacifism’ 
 
Introduction 
The Battle of Okinawa, recalled by the US military as the ‘bloodiest battle in the 
Pacific’, took place in 1945, and killed at least one quarter of the local population.  It 
is one of the most important events in Okinawan history.  Most Okinawan survivors’ 
lives were severely interrupted in one way or another by losing members of family, 
houses, and having to relocate where they lived after the battle. 
This chapter examines how the war experience — the most powerfully 
inscribed component of the Okinawan narrative of marginalisation — has been 
converted into political action and contemporary protest against the US military 
bases.  The ‘Okinawan’ brand of pacifism derived from the residents’ experience in 
the Battle of Okinawa has been a significant source of collective identity, and has 
helped develop the idea of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ or the general notion of a 
continuous, singular ‘movement’. 
In the Okinawan community of protest, social movements towards ‘correct’ 
representation of the residents’ experiences in the Battle through ‘peace guides’ and 
war site tourism have been a simultaneous expression of anti-base protest in the 
contemporary context.  This chapter points out that, for many local activists, the 
issue of representing history and protest against the US bases have been 
synonymous. 
However, strategically, organisationally and in terms of reform agendas, 
these struggles have nevertheless been separate.  When discussed in the context of 
the critique of the Ministry of Education’s and other authorities’ attempts to conceal 
or downplay Japan’s past atrocities towards minority citizens (in Okinawa) in WWII, 
the ‘Okinawan’ anti-war messages have merged with the pacifist post-war 
Constitution and mainstream post-war anti-militarism in Japan.  That is, the   73
Okinawan and Japanese experiences in WWII as ‘victims’ are combined into a 
qualitatively similar anti-war message for ‘peace’, connected to similar reform 
agendas, to those addressed by the Japanese left.  Yet, the political activism that 
derives from the Okinawans’ experience in the Battle of Okinawa cannot be 
contained in a sub-compartment of a larger framework of the Japanese peace 
movement.  In the Okinawan community of protest, the citizens’ efforts to represent 
the experience of the Battle of Okinawa in certain ways has always been related to 
the historical struggle of the Okinawan people against other forms of 
marginalisation: in particular, the continuing subjection to the dominant military 
presence.  However, residents’ experience in the Battle of Okinawa has not quite 
functioned as a basis of an organisational coalition for the all-encompassing 
struggles of ‘Okinawans’ against all forms of marginalisation. 
Nevertheless, a distinctive Okinawan version of pacifism, derived from 
civilians’ experience in the Battle, has been a source of inspiration for anti-war and 
anti-base messages and collective action, if not an organisational basis of a unified 
coalition.  It is the presence of a ‘myth’ of one continuous struggle against various 
forms of marginalisation that links the ‘Okinawan’ version of pacifism to the present 
opposition to the US bases in Okinawa.  The Battle of Okinawa offers significant 
clues to what constitutes the idea of a unified struggle of the Okinawan people, 
which continues to be valid and convincing, for the locals. 
This chapter first examines the activities of the ‘peace guides’ against 
suppression of residents’ perspectives on the Battle of Okinawa, particularly on the 
cruelty and aggression of the Japanese military, directed at unarmed residents.  The 
second section reviews the residents’ experiences, as represented commonly in the 
community of protest.  The third section examines specific examples of Okinawan 
peace movements: challenging the idea of ‘collective suicides’ and preserving 
audiovisual records on what the Battle of Okinawa was really like.  The fourth 
section analyses the ‘absolute pacifism’ as a ‘framing’ of protest, and what makes it 
uniquely ‘Okinawan’.  It then examines the implications of the recent debate on the 
alteration of the new Peace Memorial displays, for Okinawan-specific pacifism and   74
its potential for a unified coalition among different protest actors and for the coherent 
struggles of ‘Okinawans’. 
‘Peace Guides’ 
War memorials and old battle sites from the 1945 warfare concentrated in the 
southern region are publicly treated as important historical and cultural assets in 
Okinawa.  The Okinawan tourist industry, non-government organisations and 
municipal governments provide special tours for groups and individuals travelling to 
Okinawa from outside to learn about the only ground battle on Japanese territory in 
WWII.  Often called the ‘peace study (heiwa gakushū) tours’, these educational tours 
involve taking participant groups on buses to selected areas of the Battle of Okinawa 
including bomb shelter remains, battlefields, war memorials, and stories of people’s 
lives under fire related to particular war sites. 
These tours are promoted by the Okinawan prefectural government, 
particularly after the construction of the new Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial 
Museum (Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan) in 1999, and are organised by non-government 
organisations including the Okinawa Prefecture Tourist Volunteer Guides’ Society 
(Okinawa Ken Kankō Borantia Gaido Tomo no Kai)
1, and also by some government 
organisations such as the Okinawa Foundation (Okinawa Kyōkai)
2 and the Naha City 
Council.  The ‘peace guides’ are mostly volunteers or workers at the City Council; 
targeted visitors include secondary schools who choose Okinawa as a school 
excursion destination,
3 workplace unions and citizens’ groups with a strong interest 
in war and other social issues. 
War site tourism in Okinawa has gone through significant transformations to 
take its current shape.  Itokazu Keiko is a respected anti-war figure in the Okinawan 
community of protest, and member of the Socialist Mass Party, a popular local 
                                                             
1 The Okinawa Prefecture Tourist Volunteer Guides’ Society (Okinawa Ken Kankō Borantia Gaido 
Tomo no Kai) was founded by the Okinawa Convention and Visitors’ Bureau, an organisation 
engaged in research activities related to marketing tourism in Okinawa. 
2 The Okinawa Foundation (Okinawa Kyōkai) is under the auspices of the Japanese government (the 
Cabinet Office).  Until 1972, it was formally known as the Southern Brethren Support Society (Nanpō 
Dōhō Engokai), formed in mainland Japan in support of Okinawa’s repatriation to Japan.  
3 According to a local newspaper article, some 130,000 students on average visit Okinawa in a year 
(Ryūkyū Shimpo 25 May 2001).   75
political party with a general anti-war, anti-base policy.  She was a pioneer ‘peace 
guide’ before being elected as the only female member of the Prefectural Assembly 
in 1992.  Since 1966, Itokazu had worked for a tourist bus company as a ‘bus guide’, 
working on buses wearing a uniform and holding a microphone, giving tourists 
explanations and stories related to the war remains.  At the time, it was a standard 
practice of the bus companies in Okinawa that organised tours for Japanese tourists 
to deliver stories with emphases on heroic deaths of the mainland soldiers in the 
battle sites concentrated in southern Okinawa. 
When Itokazu’s mother died, for the first time she heard from her aunts about 
her mother’s experience in the Battle of Okinawa.  When evacuating to the northern 
region to escape gunfire, Itokazu’s late mother lost her two small children from 
malnutrition, lost her sanity and held her dead son’s body for days.  Itokazu, born in 
1947, remembered her mother only as a cheerful person; she never talked about war, 
like many other war survivors.  It was then that she started to question the ways in 
which battle sites and war memorials were presented at tourist destinations in 
Okinawa.  Itokazu’s feeling was backed up by emerging local critical voices in the 
late 1980s, against suppressed and insufficient recognition given to the civilian 
Okinawans’ experiences in the Battle.  In the early 1980s, Monbushō (Ministry of 
Education, Science and Culture) removed from history textbooks the part that 
described Japanese soldiers’ atrocities directed at Okinawan residents together with 
other cases of Japan’s aggression towards civilians in Asia, including the Nanking 
Massacre during WWII.  Since criticism amplified towards the revisionist 
falsification of Japanese history books, Okinawan and mainland Japanese critics had 
publicly called for recognition of cruelties imposed on the Okinawan residents by the 
Japanese military (see Taira 1998). 
Such criticism was also directed at the local ‘bus guides’ for glorifying 
mainland Japanese soldiers and local residents’ deaths in the Battle, without 
addressing the responsibility of the state.  At one of the local discussion groups, she 
gained support from Ishihara Masaie, history professor at the Okinawa International 
University, who had been working on residents-centred history of the Battle.  Itokazu   76
and her colleagues started a study group on Okinawan residents’ experiences and the 
Japanese military’s behaviour, and staged a campaign to change Okinawan war site 
tourism.  This included battles with the bus companies by introducing stories of 
Okinawan residents, Korean forced labourers and also ‘comfort women’ in the 
Battle.
4 
Since 1992, Itokazu has been a member of the Prefectural Assembly (in 2003 
in her third term), and one of two representatives of the Okinawan Women Act 
against Military and Violence, a local women’s protest organisation against the US 
bases (see chapter 8).  Her political platform centres around peace, environmental 
protection and women’s rights (Barrel & Tanaka 1997: 10–5).  Being a peace activist 
and an opponent to the military bases is accepted in the community of Okinawa as a 
natural combination of political positions that does not require explanation. 
The Okinawa Peace Network is a non-governmental association of volunteer 
‘peace guides’.  Its approximately 180 members share a common interest in learning 
and promoting education on residents’ experiences in the Battle of Okinawa.  The 
main activities of the members are operating as ‘peace guides’, holding talk sessions 
on war experiences given by survivors, and other activities related to preserving 
historical assets such as war remains (An Okinawa Peace Network member, 
Interview, February 2002).  According to one of the oldest members, Kawamitsu 
Akihiro, the Network is a very loose association, with a wide range of members’ 
social status, age, gender, occupation and political and ideological views, which it 
makes no effort to influence or survey.
5  However, the minimal guideline of the 
Network is ‘not to glorify “voluntary” deaths for the victory of Japan as courageous 
or honourable.  We do not endorse views that romanticise the aestheticism of 
civilians’ deaths, for example, those in the Himeyuri Troop,
6 which we sometimes 
encounter’ (Kawamitsu, Interview, February 2002). 
                                                             
4See her website, http://www5a.biglobe.ne.jp/~keiko-i/index.html 
5   Kawamitsu says when the Network was formed in the early 1990s, most members were 
schoolteachers, but nowadays, members who are ‘mothers’ seem to constitute a conspicuous portion 
(Interview, February 2002). 
6Himeyuri (Princess Lily) Troops were one of the schoolgirl troops who worked during the Battle as 
‘field nurses’, who died tragically in the Battle and are commemorated in a museum, Himeyuri Peace 
Memorial (Himeryuri Heiwa Kinenkan), specially dedicated to them.  They are perhaps the most   77
Within the circle of ‘peace guides’ and people concerned with the Battle of 
Okinawa today, there is a strong determination to reveal, learn and educate people 
about the Okinawan residents’ experiences in the Battle, against glorification of war, 
referred to as ‘Yasukunification’ by the Okinawa Peace Network, after the famous 
shrine for the war dead in Tokyo (Figal 2001).  This has resulted from a social 
movement since the early 1980s, staged by Okinawans like Itokazu and her 
colleagues, which was helped by the growing criticism in mainland Japan against the 
Japanese government on the textbook debate, which worked as a political 
opportunity.  Since then, greater efforts have been made by local historians, war 
survivors and their families to record stories that place emphases on the Okinawan 
citizens’ experiences.  The former administration under Ōta Masahide (1990–98) — 
also a significant historian of Okinawa — was dedicated to a ‘peace promotion 
policy’, highlighted by the construction of a monument located on Mabuni Hill, 
called the Cornerstone of Peace (Heiwa no Ishiji), which shows the names of 
casualties in the battles, of all nationalities (Figal 1997, 2001).  Descriptions of the 
Battle of Okinawa below follow the general story lines of the volunteer ‘peace 
guides’, local historians, and especially Ōta and other anti-base and peace activists. 
Okinawan Residents in the Battle of Okinawa 
After the US forces crushed the Japanese navy in the battles of the Coral Sea and 
Midway in May and June 1942, the US applied a strategy of ‘island-hopping’, which 
concentrated the total forces of the army, navy and in the air, to corner and destroy 
Japanese forces, to ‘seize small island targets, which could then be used as bases to 
cover the next similar advance’ (Beasley 1990: 209).  In response, the Japanese 
military started to enhance their air forces all over the Okinawa islands and Taiwan.  
Local farmlands and residences were turned into airfields, and residents had to 
provide labour for base construction. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
famous war victims in Japan, widely publicised by a film, the Tower of Himeyuri (Himeyuri no tō) 
remade in 1982.  On victimisation of the Himeyuri Troop, and its replication in the rape case of a 12-
year-old girl in 1995, see Angst (2002).   78
The overseas settlers were among the first Okinawan war casualties in 
WWII.
7  In 1942, the South Sea Islands were severely attacked by the US forces.  A 
considerable number of civilians, including many Okinawans, were killed directly by 
the Japanese soldiers, or forced to commit suicide by the Japanese military 
authorities, before being captured by the enemy.  More than 12,000 Okinawans died 
in the South Sea Island colonies.  In August 1943, Tsushima-maru, a ship with 1,700 
people on board, including 800 schoolchildren, which left Naha port to evacuate 
from possible US air attacks, was sunk by a US submarine near Amami Island, and 
killed 1,500.  This remains a particularly tragic event in the local history.
8  
 In March 
1944, the 32nd Okinawa Defense Troop was established to defend the Southwest 
Islands (Nansei Shoto) of Japan, including Okinawa.  In July, combat soldiers were 
brought into this region from mainland Japan, and local houses, schools and 
community centres were occupied by the military and turned into barracks.  In 
October, US B-29 planes raided and burned down 90 per cent of Naha City.
9  
George Kerr summarises Japan’s policy on Okinawa immediately before the 
US landing: 
 
Tokyo gave little thought to the civil economy on distant Okinawa and 
did virtually nothing to prepare it for the crisis of invasion … Okinawa 
retained importance only as a potential field of battle, a distant border 
area in which the oncoming enemy could be checked, pinned down, and 
ultimately destroyed (Kerr 1958: 466). 
The point Kerr makes is that the safety of Okinawa was given low priority from the 
beginning.
10  For the civilian political leaders in mainland Japan, the mission of the 
Okinawan Defense Troops was to delay, if not to stop completely, the allied advance 
towards Japan.  Consistently throughout the event, extremely little attention was paid 
to the defence of Okinawa itself, and there was no agreed preparation made between 
the military and the civilian leaders in Tokyo on the overall combat strategy to be 
                                                             
7 In the 1930s, Okinawans were encouraged to move to new Japanese colonies in Manchuria and the 
South Sea Islands (Mariana, Palau, Caroline and Marshall). 
8 Many other ships had been sunk before this particular incident, but the military kept those incidents 
secret from Okinawans (Shinjo 1997: 203). 
9 This October air raid forced 60,000 Okinawans to flee to Kyūshū, and 20,000 to Taiwan, before 
March 1945 (Shinjo 1997: 203). 
10 See Ōta 1996: 77.   79
adopted in the case of a US landing.  Japanese troops on Okinawa were composed of 
no more than about 86,400 soldiers and 10,000 sailors from the mainland, plus 
locally recruited Okinawan adults and middle-school children, who received no more 
than instant combat training and very primitive weapons.  Meanwhile, 548,000 US 
soldiers in 1,500 warships landed on the tiny Kerama Islands on 26 March 1945 (the 
total population of Okinawa was 450,000 at that time) (Map 3.1). 
 
Map 3.1  Kerama Islands (Richard J. Pearson, Archaeology of the Ryūkyū Islands, University of 
Hawaii Press, 1969: 15) 
 
One of the most tragic aspects of the Battle that is emphasised in local stories of the 
Okinawan ‘peace guides’ and anti-base activists is the forced mass suicides.  The 
Japanese military commanders and the imperial education had indoctrinated the non-
combatant citizens to end their lives ‘bravely’, rather than being captured by the 
enemy.  In the small islands of Kerama, the imperial education and assimilation 
policies had ensured that the virtue of self-sacrifice had prevailed.  In Tokashiki 
Island and Zamami Island, in the Kerama Islands, only a small fraction of Japanese 
forces were deployed.  The local Japanese troop leaders ordered about 700 islanders 
to commit suicide ‘with determination, so that the combat activities of the troops 
would not be disturbed by the non-combatants’ (Ōta 1996: 92).  The villagers 
accepted the order, and killed their own family and village members, and themselves, 
using household objects such as axes, razors, hoes, rat poisons and wooden rods.  
However, Ōta argues that in retrospect the suicides were unnecessary, considering 
the leaders and core members of the Japanese troops survived, and surrendered to the 
US soldiers after the villagers died (Ōta 1996: 96).  Most villagers believed dying for 
the emperor and the state was the right thing to do; the residents believed they would 
be raped and killed if caught by the US soldiers.  A member of the Okinawan   80
Women Act Against Military and Violence, Miyagi Harumi, writes that in Zamami 
Island soldiers had told the residents their ‘hero stories’ (buyūden) of raping and 
killing in the Chinese battlefields (Miyagi 2000: 146–7).  Similar individual and 
group suicides took place in other parts of the islands of Okinawa. 
On 1 April, Americans landed on the Okinawa Main Island.  Central and 
southern regions of Okinawa Island turned into a combat zone, but only 30,000 
people managed to flee to the northern region. The majority of the 450,000 
population were left behind and were caught in the middle of the face-to-face combat 
zone where the American and Japanese soldiers were fighting.  The residents, a 
majority of them females and adolescents, were seriously engaged in combat training 
with bamboo sticks picked from the surrounding islands immediately prior to the US 
landing (Ōta 1996: 83, 86). 
As the American raids intensified, bullets destroyed almost everything on the 
earth, an experience remembered as the ‘typhoon of steel’.  The residents took refuge 
inside family tombs,
11 and in natural or emergency caves (gama) that they had dug in 
between their farming and construction obligations.  Some accommodated more than 
a thousand people, and were also used as hospitals.  In May, the Japanese forces 
were reduced by 80 per cent, and the officers and soldiers desperately escaped into 
these caves and tombs.  The officers usually occupied the least dangerous and most 
comfortable areas inside; scarce food was kept and cooked for them; many residents 
were assigned tiny areas next to the entrance, and were exposed to the explosives and 
fire attacks of the US soldiers.  It was common for non-combatant residents to be 
refused entry into the emergency caves and left to die in the middle of US 
machinegun and bomb attacks.  Concerned that the Americans would locate the 
caves by hearing them, soldiers immediately killed crying children with their swords, 
or ordered the parents to stifle children under three. 
 
Many Okinawans believed that it would be safer to stay close to the 
soldiers, and remained on the central-southern Okinawa Island.  They 
were wrong.  ‘Okinawa Defense Troops’ looted, raped and killed 
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ordinary people whom they were supposed to be defending.  The 
residents soon came to see the Japanese soldiers as a much greater threat 
than the enemy US soldiers (Oshiro 1998: 479). 
Contrary to the image of barbaric rapists spread by the Japanese war propaganda, Ōta 
recalls the US forces’ well-planned rescue activities to provide the local non-
combatant residents with safety, materials for surviving and equipment to maintain 
basic hygiene.  US wartime policies towards non-combatants did save thousands of 
residents’ lives, out of an interest in controlling the residents and in managing the 
islands congenially to their strategic advantage (Ōta 1996: 106). 
Because of the lack of agricultural land and rapid population growth, 
Okinawans had been dependent on imported foodstuff from other parts of Japan 
before the war.  Since all the ships were taken by the military and used for military 
purposes, and sea transportation was blocked, food was desperately short.
12  In this 
critical situation, when everyone was starving, the Japanese military staff had free 
access to food.  They ordered the residents to provide what small amount they had, 
such as brown sugar saved for emergencies.  Thus, a significant number of the non-
combatant population helplessly died of malnutrition and malaria.  This time, deaths 
from eating poisonous sotetsu palm tree extract were too common to shock anyone 
(Ōta 1997: 50–1).  The military also justified the need to provide for the sexual needs 
of the soldiers.  Some of the officers took ‘comfort women’ into the caves with them.  
The military set up as many as 130 official brothels (‘comfort stations’) all over the 
archipelago.  Local Okinawan women were recruited, and approximately 1,000 
Korean women were transported by sea, to be subjected to violence and sexual 
slavery (Takazato 1998). 
While encouraging and forcing residents to commit mass suicides to prove 
loyalty to the emperor, the Japanese soldiers saw that Okinawans were essentially 
different from the Japanese, hence, inclined to be disloyal.  There were a 
considerable number of returnees from emigration to Hawaii, South America, and 
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early in the morning, and in the fields, farming, until midnight.  After the US attacks commenced in 
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other places, which added to the perception that the Okinawan population contained 
‘non-Japanese’ elements.
13   After the US landing, the Japanese Defense Troops 
announced that the use of any language other than standard Japanese was banned and 
communication in Okinawan language would be regarded as spying and punished 
accordingly (Ōta 1996: 179).  Mainland soldiers and officers privately and officially 
executed many local civilians for ‘spying activities’ without solid evidence. 
After Japan surrendered on 15 August in the mainland, the Japanese naval 
forces also executed several locally conscripted soldiers as spies for simply 
suggesting their wills to stop futile attempts to fight further.  In most cases, all the 
family members of the soldiers, including infants, were suddenly attacked and killed.  
The ‘spies’ in many cases were locals who were caught and released by US soldiers.  
The Japanese soldiers shot them from behind when they surrendered to the 
Americans (Ōta 1996: 127–30).
14   These stories are important reminder that the 
Okinawans had to fulfil their obligations as ‘Japanese’, but were never fully trusted 
or protected as such. 
The most common view is that the Battle of Okinawa commenced on 1 April 
1945, when US troops landed on Okinawa Main Island, and ended on 23 June with 
the suicides of the commanding officers of the Japanese defending army.  By setting 
the dates this way, Ōta argues that important events that happened before and after 
the supposed beginning and end of the Battle are overlooked.  ‘Collective suicides’ 
of the residents in the Kerama islands, and resident killing in Kume Island, both 
instigated by Japanese military personnel, happened, respectively, after the US 
landings on 26 March and 26 June.  Until 7 September, desperate resistance against 
the US forces by the armed Japanese and local officers, soldiers and local non-
                                                             
13 Ishii Torao, a commander assigned to Okinawa, described the Okinawan general public in a 1934 
military document addressed to a mainland army officer: ‘obedient and tame reflecting the tropical 
upbringing, but lacking in independent characters, therefore, not to be expected to devote their lives to 
defend the state’ (Ōta 1996: 60–1). 
14 In one such incident on Kume Island in June 1945, a post office clerk was executed as a spy, for 
being captured by the US troops and carrying the Americans’ letter, that recommended capitulation, to 
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combatant citizens continued (Ōta 2000: 13–5).  The Battle of Okinawa killed more 
than 147,959 Okinawans,
15 nearly a third of the whole Okinawan population. 
The Battle of Okinawa: the Cornerstone of the ‘Okinawan Struggle’? 
Challenging the Idea of ‘Collective Suicide’ 
As the ‘bus guide’ Itokazu Keiko encountered, the ‘screening’ of Japanese school 
history textbooks by Monbushō in the early 1980s caused a dispute about the 
textbook description of Japanese soldiers’ aggression towards Okinawan civilians.  
The ‘screening’ initially invited protests from the Republic of Korea and the People’s 
Republic of China for deleting and modifying descriptions of Japan’s invasions and 
aggressions against civilians during WWII.
16  Then, the dispute encompassed many 
Okinawan members of the community, because Monbushō also ‘screened’ 
descriptions of Japanese behaviour during the Battle of Okinawa, significantly 
reducing the number of civilian deaths, and removed references to residents 
murdered by Japanese troops.  Historian Ienaga Saburo took the Monbushō’s 
screening of his history textbook to court.
17  With regards to Okinawa, he made a 
point that the textbooks should make clear that the collective suicides of the civilians 
were imposed by the military (Taira 1999: 39–40).  The local newspaper Okinawa 
Times featured this debate on the front page on 4 July 1982, and the Okinawan 
Teachers’ Union and other citizens’ groups, as well as the Village Assembly of 
Kitanakagusuku village in central Okinawa, made a protest statement against 
Monbushō (Arasaki 1992: 184). 
The ways in which ‘collective suicides’ were depicted was controversial, and 
perhaps the most frustrating and painful topic for the war survivors and families of 
                                                             
15 The figure is the number of identified casualties engraved on the Cornerstone of Peace in Mabuni 
Hill (Okinawa Heiwa Network 1998 [1997]: 60–1). 
16 Monbushō proposed (but did not enforced, due to claims from other countries) following changes 
with regards to these countries: agitation for Korean independence following the 1910 annexation by 
Japan be described as ‘rioting’; that the movement of the Japanese army into the Asian continent in 
the 1930s be described as an ‘advance’ rather than an ‘invasion’; and that in accounts of the 1937 
episode known in the West as the Rape of Nanking, when Japanese forces entered that city and 
200,000 to 300,000 Chinese women, children and POWs were left dead, the event be described as an 
effect of the ‘confusion’ of the times and the casualty figures be reduced (Field 1993: 62–3). 
17Since 1965, Ienaga filed three lawsuits.  The first suit was settled as late as in 1993: the Supreme 
Court judged in favour of the constitutionality of the state’s textbook screening (Nozaki & Inokuchi 
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war casualties on Okinawa.  Taira explains that using the word jiketsu (suicide) for 
civilians’ collective suicides distorts the meaning of it.  As opposed to the word 
jisatsu, which is normally used for ‘suicide’, ‘to call someone’s suicide jiketsu is to 
honour and glorify the person who had the extraordinary courage to kill himself or 
herself in this manner’ (Taira 1999: 42).  Descriptions endorsed by Monbushō 
choose to separate the death by suicide from other forms of civilian deaths, 
particularly from murders committed by the military.  Monbushō insisted on 
collective jiketsu ‘being added to any description of the Battle of Okinawa’ (Taira 
1999: 44).  This way, the state’s culpability of imposing deaths is smoke-screened by 
the volunteer act of ‘nobility’ and bravery of jiketsu, making ‘civilian deaths 
comparable to military death’ (Field 1993: 63).   Field emphasises, ‘the civilian 
atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese army and the collective suicide committed by 
Okinawan civilians are inseparable’ (1993: 66).
18   
It has been common among Okinawan war survivors not to wish to talk about 
the sufferings they experienced during the Battle.  Caution towards their experience 
being distorted and misrepresented partly explains their reluctance (Taira 1998: 2).  
The reasons for their silence were complex: not only out of consideration for those 
who were victimised, but also for the deep psychological wounds of those who 
unwillingly killed their families, believing in the need for the (forced) suicides to 
avoid being captured by the enemy.  However, the textbook dispute contributed to 
the rise in the early 1980s of citizens’ movements in Okinawan civil society to 
investigate, record and publicise ‘residents’ experiences in the Battle. 
In 1983, Chibana Shōichi, a villager of Yomitan, for the first time conducted 
in-depth research on the case of a collective ‘compulsory suicide’ that happened in 
Chibichiri gama in Yomitan village, based on the stories of the survivors.  Villagers 
and families of the dead knew what happened in the gama, but the topic had been 
                                                             
18 Field heard the stories of the survivors: 
Not only did Japanese soldiers drive Okinawans from their shelters into certain 
death, suffocate their crying babies, and kill those who had already surrendered and 
were then sent back by Americans to persuade their fellows to do the same; their 
presence both explicitly and tacitly prompted episodes of Okinawan collective 
suicide (Field 1993: 63).   85
taboo in the village ‘because everyone knew that talking about it would hurt 
someone’ (Chibana 1988: 140–1).  Chibana, born after the war, a mainland Japanese 
writer Shimojima Tetsurō, and the representative of the Chibichirigama Bereaved 
Families’ Association, Higa Heishin, could break the silence among Yomitan 
survivors, because none of them lost direct members of their family in the event 
(Chibana 1988: 140–1).
19   Chibana received more than 500 visitors to the gama in 
one month in 1988, and revived the event of ‘compulsory suicide’ that happened 
(Chibana 1988: 144). 
Chibana, at the time a supermarket owner, also burnt the hinomaru flag at the 
Annual Sports’ Event in 1987 held in Yomitan village, in protest against the pressure 
exerted on the villagers to use the flag for the event, ignoring the sentiment of the 
villagers (Field 1993).  The villagers’ silence on the subject of ‘compulsory 
collective suicide’ was in the background of the 1987 flag burning incident.   
Particularly, many in Asian regions invaded and occupied by the Japanese military 
have considered the hinomaru flag the symbol of war, invasion and murder of the 
Japanese Empire.  For Okinawans, too, Chibana explains, the flag represents the old 
Japanese Army and the Emperor’s (Hirohito’s) military, which forced the Battle of 
Okinawa on the people (Chibana 1988: 181).  He was a student activist before the 
reversion, and is an anti-war landowner, who has been demanding the return of an 
inherited private property inside a US communication facility in Yomitan.  Chibana 
has engaged in multi-faceted protest: the ‘peace guide’ activity; the campaign against 
the hinomaru flag; and against the US military bases, which in his life naturally 
appear to converge into one struggle: the ‘Okinawan struggle’. 
The One Foot Movement (Okinawa Historical Film Society) 
In 1983, even after 11 years since reversion to Japan, Nakamura Fumiko recalls, the 
survivors ‘firmly kept their silence about their own experience’ (Nakamura Fumiko, 
Interview, February 2002).  Nakamura is Secretary General of the Okinawa 
Historical Film Society, a citizens’ group that has been engaged in raising funds and 
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Minoru, in which a whole village was involved, completed in 1987 (Chibana 1988: 144–7).   86
purchasing film records of Okinawan residents in the Battle, recorded by US 
photographers from the National Archive in Washington, D.C., in order to revive and 
maintain the image of the Battle of Okinawa, with an anti-war message. 
The Okinawa Historical Film Society has an office on the fourth floor of a 
tiny building in a back street of the central district of Naha, which is full of films, 
books and videotapes.  It has only one part-time worker who attends to phone and 
media inquiries.  Nakamura, an eloquent and vibrant 88-year-old retired 
schoolteacher,
20  says the movement started as a general campaign to promote 
retelling and recording of the memories of what the Okinawan war survivor residents 
experienced in the Battle of Okinawa before they pass away. 
The group was formed on 8 December 1983.  Nakamura says, ‘8 December is 
a very important day for our group.  Very few Okinawan children know the date of 
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, of which the Battle of Okinawa was a consequence 
of (Interview, February 2002).  Nakamura was vice president of the Okinawan 
Women’s Association, affiliated to the Japanese Women’s Association.  At its 
Annual General Meeting, held in Naha in December 1983, the Japanese Women’s 
Association announced an official support for the Okinawan Historical Film Society 
and its campaign of recording WWII survivors’ war experiences.  The Film Society 
has only 12–13 members, all of whom are on the executive committee today; most of 
them are prominent members of the Okinawan community, including the president of 
the local newspaper, Okinawa Times, university professors such as Ōta, Miyagi 
Etsujiro, Aniya Masaaki and Ishihara Masaie, and Fukuchi Hiroaki, who has been 
the leader of the Okinawa Human Rights Council (see chapter 4), as well as other 
long-time members of the Society such as folk singer Oshiro Shinya. 
The idea of purchasing US footages came from former exchange students and 
local academics who returned from US universities and had learned about the large 
collection of film records of the Battle stored in Washington.  Younger members in 
Okinawa in the Naha City Workers’ Union and the Okinawa Teachers’ Union 
contributed to the work involved in the establishment of the Society.  Nakasone 
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Seizen, a well-known witness of the Battle as a chaperon of the Himeyuri Troops, 
was selected as representative of the Society.  The Society sent Ōta Masahide and 
Miyagi Etsujiro to the US National Archive in May 1984 to choose the footages.  
The Japanese name of the Society, ‘One Foot Movement Organisation’ (Ichi Fiito 
Undō no Kai), was inspired by the ‘Ten Feet Movement’, a campaign in Hiroshima 
that similarly purchased footages from the US.  But in Okinawa, Nakamura says, ‘the 
film records were to become the asset of all Okinawans, so we named it One Foot 
purchased by every Okinawan, including a small child, for one hundred yen’ 
(Interview, February 2002). 
In May 1984, the film arrived from the US.  The Society showed the footages 
with no sound or narration at the Naha Citizens’ Hall immediately.  Despite the 
heavy storm and rain, the room was full and the audience was pushed out into the 
corridor.  Many elderly people — who would have known the war, but normally 
never say anything on the topic — were riveted to the screen, and Nakamura still 
remembers the eerie atmosphere in the room.  Films arrived one after another from 
the US.  Consequently, more than five million yen was raised and after the first 
movie was made with narration, there was no need to raise funds because the 
videotapes sold explosively and interest even came from the US military stationed on 
Okinawa (Interview, February 2002).   
The Okinawa-specific expression, ‘Life is Treasure’ (Nuchi du Takara), 
today summarises the anti-war and anti-base connection between life, war and 
peace.
21  The fact that Nakamura was a schoolteacher for forty years is important.  
Not only have schoolteachers been the leaders of ‘peace education’ (Heiwa 
Gakushū) in Okinawan schools; they also led the reversion movement as well as the 
anti-war and anti-base movements in post-war Okinawa (see chapter 4).  Most 
Okinawan schoolteachers, like their Japanese counterparts, supported Japan’s war, 
and taught pupils to be loyal, patriotic and cooperative with the war effort.   
Nakamura herself recalls, ‘As a teacher I was responsible for instructing the children 
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to respect and honour the country and the Emperor … I regret to this day that I had to 
say such things’ (Keyso 2000: 39).  Nakamura says, after she went back to teaching 
when the war finished, nobody looked after her children so she had to teach with her 
baby on her back, and on her way back home she had to find food in the field.  It was 
hard days of surviving but when she thought about the children who died in the war, 
and the thought that they would never come back struck her like an arrow, with a 
feeling of remorse for encouraging them to die for the country.  Many teachers 
throughout Japan share the same regret for encouraging dying for the state and 
victory, Nakamura believes.  Then she explained the Japanese Teachers’ Union’s 
pacifist slogan, ‘We would never send another child to a battlefield’, and that Article 
9 in the post-war Japanese Constitution was the most important element of her post-
war anti-militarism (Interview, February 2002). 
The Okinawa Historical Film Society’s activities have contributed to 
establishing a milestone for the peace movements in Okinawa, which is the ‘desire 
for peace, with action’ (Nakamura, Interview, Feburary 2002).  The main strategy is 
telling the stories of atrocity and hardships caused by war, which is supposed to 
naturally lead to the idea that war must be avoided under all circumstances; 
therefore, the US or any military bases cannot be accepted in Okinawa.  Chibana also 
believes that resurrection of the gama stories and construction of the statue will help 
the viewers realise that in the event of war, the first sufferers are the powerless, such 
as children and older people, and that war cannot be repeated ever again (Chibana 
1988: 144).  These peace activists’ practices are grounded in the assumption that, at 
least for most people, it is natural to think this way. 
The Okinawa Historical Film Society’s role is not to directly oppose any 
particular US military bases; however, the organisation is very closely associated 
with the anti-base community of protest in Okinawa.  Some Historical Film Society 
members are also members of other anti-war and anti-base groups such as the One-
tsubo Anti-War Landowners’ Organisation (formed in the same year as the Society, 
see chapter 6).  Furthermore, the Society is one of 34 anti-war and anti-base citizens’ 
(non-party, non-union) organisations that joined the Citizens’ Council for Peace   89
(Heiwa Shimin Renrakukai), formed in October 1999 in the lead-up to the 2000 G8 
Summit, in opposition to the central government’s scheme to relocate Futenma Air 
Station on Okinawa (http://www.jca.apc.org/heiwa-sr/jp/nani.html).
22  The nominal 
participation of the Film Society in the group of anti-relocation organisations is 
mainly symbolic and has very little practical influence on the reform agenda.   
Nevertheless, the matter-of-fact integration between struggles about the present and 
the past indicates that the Battle of Okinawa does provide a potential frame of protest 
and a substance of unity among the different protest actors. 
‘Absolute Pacifism’ as a Framing of Protest 
If the Okinawans had not experienced the Battle of Okinawa, the meanings 
associated with the act of anti-base protest would have been quite different.   
Residents’ experiences in the Battle of Okinawa have been an ideological resource 
for the political action.  The Battle of Okinawa gives reasons behind the resistance 
and meaning to the protest action against the bases, the war machinery of the 
contemporary period.  The Battle also represents what makes anti-base protest in 
Okinawa a social movement, rather than a NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) opposition 
to hazardous facilities that nobody wants to live near. 
Many local activists’ recollections and statements on the Battle of Okinawa 
presented in local newspapers, anti-war literature, and in works of arts displayed, for 
example, in the Sakima Museum in Futenma
23 , are simultaneously protest 
expressions against the US military bases on Okinawa.   Miyagi Yasuhiro, a leading 
figure of the protest movement against the construction of a new sea-based US base 
on the east coast of Nago City, reflects on the Battle and his political action:  
 
My mother raised my brother and I running a small daily necessity shop 
and a tempura shop.  Only in her 20s at the time, she survived the Battle 
of Okinawa and the difficult days after the war holding my brother in her 
arms.  Soon to turn 70, my mother has always avoided showing her 
political position to society because of her small business.  But she does 
                                                             
22 Nakamura is one of the representatives of this coalition, together with other prominent and regular 
activists such as Arasaki Moriteru, Sakihara Seishū and Taira Osamu (one-tsubo landowners). 
23 Sakima Museum is located adjacent to the Futenma Air Base.  The museum was built on private 
property owned by Sakima Michio, who demanded the US return his property for the museum 
construction, which eventuated in November 1994 (Ikehara, Chibana, Sakima & Matayoshi 1996, 
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not hesitate to express publicly her absolute opposition to making 
another base in Okinawa.  Okinawan survivors like my mother all make 
fun of themselves as being the leftover of the warship bombardments in 
the Battle.  After these people go, Okinawa is bound to change.  I don’t 
know in a good way or otherwise.  But as long as they are alive, I am 
determined to do what I can do with them, to stop the pathways to war 
[my emphasis] (Miyagi 1999). 
The Battle of Okinawa punctuates and articulates meanings to protest against war 
and further war preparation and, therefore, the existence of US bases (or any military 
bases and war equipment) on Okinawan Island.  I call this ‘absolute pacifism’, which 
has been a strong basis of Okinawan pacifism, which most Okinawans can more or 
less relate to. 
As discussed in chapter 1, a ‘frame’ of collective action gives specific 
meaning to the act of protest, by locating, perceiving, identifying, and labelling 
‘events within their life space or the world at large’ (Goffman 1974: 21, cited in 
Snow & Benford 1992: 137), thereby giving specific meaning to the act of protest.  
Actors of protest are also ‘actively engaged in the production and maintenance of 
meaning’ of collective action’ (Snow & Benford 1992: 136).  It is possible to 
understand the discourses of the Battle of Okinawa operating as a ‘frame’ of protest 
that embodies the core driving force of anti-war collective action.  In this sense, 
memory of the residents’ experience in the Battle of Okinawa works as a gathering 
point: it contains an essence that conjures up a sense of ‘Okinawa’ as a unitary entity 
among different kinds of Okinawans.  The following section looks further into this 
‘absolute pacifism’. 
Relevance of ‘Absolute Pacifism’ to the ‘Okinawan’ struggle  
‘Absolute pacifism’ as a framing of collective action represents a perspective based 
on residents’ experience in the Battle of Okinawa: the military does not protect 
ordinary people.  The stories in the battlefield stress that the state’s military, contrary 
to protecting its people, not only disregarded, but also actively violated the lives and 
security of ordinary residents in an attempt to secure victory.  This applies to any 
military of any states, even to Okinawans who participated in Japan’s warfare, which 
is the second element in the ‘absolute pacifism’.  Nakamura, for example, stresses 
the death of June Arakawa, an American of Okinawan descent, hit in Pearl Harbour   91
by a stray shot from the US forces that responded to the Japanese attack.  She says, 
‘We emphasise that war kills you whichever side you are on, either your enemy or 
your country would kill or harm you. Therefore, war itself needs to be avoided’ 
(Interview, February 2002).  ‘Absolute pacifism’ entails a rejection of the state and 
its military as the protector of the people, as well as heeding to the possibility that 
Okinawans themselves can turn into aggressors or war culprits. 
Instead of the privileging of Okinawans’ experiences as victims, it is part of the 
Okinawan version of ‘absolute pacifism’ to address the pain of being the ‘aggressor’ 
as that of killing one’s own child in a cave.  For the Okinawan peace activists, it has 
been a long-term theme to resist pacifism solely based on victimisation.  Many 
Okinawans were willing to, and did, participate in Japan’s military expansion and 
atrocities, all the more so because they wished to overcome the position of being 
‘second-class Japanese’ (Ōta 1996: 133–46).  Self-criticism against victimisation, 
refusal of war from an aggressor’s perspective and determination not to repeat the 
aggression have turned into significant characteristics of Okinawan pacifism: it also 
enables the pacifism based on the experience of the Battle of Okinawa to be applied 
against war in other places. 
Nevertheless, it is inevitable that emphasis on the horrendous experience as 
victims of war often dominates the critical attitude against the state, and rejection of 
the state as the protector of the people.  This parallels the Japanese people’s war 
experience as victims, which has been the cornerstone of post-war Japanese 
discourse of ‘peace’, most outstandingly in the mass murders by the US atomic 
bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Dower 1999: 198–9, Orr 2001).  Indeed, 
Japanese nationalism in the post-war period has encompassed principles of 
democracy and peace, ‘given’ by the American Occupation, written in the 1947 
Japanese Constitution (Dower 1999).  Not only has this version of nationalist 
pacifism effectively covered up the state’s responsibility for causing war and 
conducting invasions, it also had an effect of playing down the hardships Japan’s war 
inflicted on non-Japanese civilians, including the forced labour and ‘comfort 
women’ brought from Korea and other colonies, and on civilians and colonial   92
subjects in Okinawa, effectively removed from the mainstream memory of Japan’s 
war (Hein & Selden 1997, McCormack, 2001, Yoneyama 1999).  Ienaga’s lawsuits 
on textbook screening ‘resonated with the voices of war victims in China, Korea, and 
other Asian countries’ (Nozaki & Inokuchi 2000: 120), as well as the mainland 
Japanese critics. 
Viewed in this way, Okinawans’ protest against the revisionist representation 
of history can be understood as not unique to Okinawa.  Hein points out, ‘poor 
farmers throughout Japan’s mountain villages’ experienced similar ‘aggressive 
programs of linguistic and cultural assimilation’ as well as ‘great casualties in the 
war’ (2001: 34).  Okinawan pacifism may well be (a minor) part of mainland 
Japanese pacifism, with its spiritual centres in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which Figal 
(2001) describes as ‘Hiroshima–Nagasakification’ using the Okinawa Peace 
Network’s terminology.
24  Describing Okinawans’ experience as that of all Japanese 
in WWII writ large also ‘de-Okinawises’ the residents’ experience of the Battle of 
Okinawa. 
What then, is uniquely ‘Okinawan’ about the experience?  According to 
Arasaki, the reason why Okinawans should revisit the Battle of Okinawa is, ‘though 
it may sound like a simplification and may create misunderstanding [representing 
Okinawans’ experience in the Battle] [my emphasis], it is a method of anti-base 
struggle’ (Arasaki 1994: 17).  Protest against the still-dominant presence of the US 
bases is suggested here as the major component of the unique Okinawan brand of 
pacifism.  Figal also notes: 
At least in Okinawan public discourse, to engage in the history and 
memorialisation of the battle is — whether intended or not — to engage 
in (the politics of) peace promotion.  These politics inevitably raise the 
issue of US bases regardless of one’s position on them….  And this in 
turn has everything to do with past, present and future relations between 
Okinawa and the central Japanese government that has presided over a 
history of invasion, annexation, subordination, devastation and 
occupation of the Ryūkyū Islands (2001: 65).   
                                                             
24 However, the Peace Network mainly uses this term to describe the commercialised, superficial type 
of tourism seen in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, which is a path that the peace tourism in Okinawa aspires 
to avoid (Figal 2001: 45).   93
It is not a coincidence that the destinations of ‘peace education tours’ organised by 
the Okinawa Peace Network include major US military bases, such as the Kadena 
Air Base (albeit viewed only from outside the fences and guarded gates) together 
with the Battle remains.
25 
But the question is whether this unique, critical aspect of ‘Okinawan’ 
pacifism connected to the present and future of the US bases manifests itself in the 
strategic and organisational context of protest.  However, Arasaki shows hesitation 
(see italics in his quote) about directly identifying the two struggles.  This hesitation, 
perhaps shared in the community of protest, reflects the feeling that so far, 
Okinawans’ experience in the Battle of Okinawa has not been combined effectively 
with the opposition to the US military bases.  The Battle of Okinawa might have 
been the most vital event that characterises the historical narrative of marginalisation, 
but is certainly not to be separated from other important events, for instance, the 
residents’ battle against US land acquisition in the 1950s.  What makes ‘Okinawan 
pacifism’ distinctive is the emphasis on the continuity from what Okinawans 
experienced during the Battle to the current political battles, in particular, the protest 
against the US military presence. 
The ‘Peace Memorial Museum’ Debate  
The controversy over the new Peace Memorial Museum was a significant challenge 
that put Okinawan pacifism to the test.  Several months into the new prefectural 
government’s inauguration, Okinawan Governor Inamine and two Deputy Governors 
ordered the manufacturers to remove and change a significant number of historical 
materials prepared for display at the new opening of the Okinawa Prefectural Peace 
Memorial Museum, planned in March 2001, a project inherited from the Ōta 
administration.  Originally, for example, the local supervisory committee responsible 
for the Museum display included a diorama of a Japanese soldier directing a rifle at 
                                                             
25 A typical itinerary of a peace education course designed for high school students includes visiting 
major caves (such as Itokazugō, Garabigō and Chibichirigama), where civilians and soldiers were 
accommodated away from the US attacks; the Cornerstone of Peace; the Okinawa Peace Memorial 
Museum; the Himeyuri Peace Memorial Museum; the Shuri Castle; Kakazu Hill (a major battle site); 
the Kadena Air Station and Torii Station (US bases).  At these sites, war survivors and anti-war 
landowners give talks to the participants (Okinawa Heiwa Network 1998: 153).   94
an Okinawan family in the cave, and a soldier forcing a wounded resident to drink 
poisoned milk to commit suicide.  The rifle was removed from the soldier’s hands, 
and the soldier with milk entirely disappeared.  Also, original captions that 
specifically indicated the aggression of the Japanese military towards civilians were 
changed, for example, from ‘an old woman slaughtered by the Japanese military’ to 
‘an old female casualty’ (Okinawa Times, Evening Edition 3 October 1999). 
The Okinawan dispute over the 1999 Peace Museum issue is often discussed 
in the context of the ongoing controversy in Japan to do with justification of war 
through glorifying self-sacrifice and death, as well as debate on representation of 
Japanese aggression and atrocity directed at civilians (Angst 1997, Figal 2001, Hein 
& Selden 2000, Yonetani 2000b).  Since 1996, some LDP highly-ranked members 
had shown their commitment to the ‘revisionist history’ movement, which criticises 
representing wrongs committed by the Japanese state and military, labelled as 
‘prejudiced’ and ‘masochistic’ (See McCormack 2000).  In 1996, at other peace 
museums elsewhere in Japan, in particular, in Osaka, Kanagawa, Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima, there was pressure from the nationalist-revisionists — represented by 
right-wing organisations such as the Japan Conference (nihon kaigi) and 
conservative politicians including former Prime Minister Hashimoto — on exhibiting 
materials that show cruel Japanese military war conduct in the Asia-Pacific, 
particularly related to the Nanking massacre and ‘comfort women’ (Nakakita 2000: 
233–4).  Nakakita refers to the ‘Peace Memorial Museum’ controversy in Okinawa 
in the context of a ‘national’ debate, to do with the ‘historical revisionist’ movement 
(Nakakita 2000: 234).  Within the framework of a nation-wide controversy, the 
Okinawan Peace Museum issue tends to be represented as a sideshow of the 
mainland Japanese issue.  
However, in the Okinawan community of protest, the Museum issue caused 
an internal dispute to do with changing attitudes towards war among the Okinawan 
population.  Yakabi points out there were more than 50 articles on the Okinawan 
Peace Memorial Museum controversy in the two local newspapers in Okinawa, 
which indicated the significance with which the Okinawans regarded this issue, as   95
opposed to only a few in the mainland Japanese media (Yakabi 1999: 18).  The 
Governor and Deputies’ censorship offended the passion shared by many Okinawans 
towards ensuring the residents’ experiences in the Battle were properly represented.  
This passion towards preserving residents’ experience of the Japanese state and its 
military’s aggression and cruelty towards its own citizens, which developed into an 
opposition to all acts of war, has been understood as a uniquely Okinawan feature, an 
important ingredient of ‘absolute pacifism’.  In this sense, the Museum issue in the 
local context significantly challenged the collective identity of the Okinawan 
community of protest. 
The Museum issue revealed that some Okinawans were willing to adjust this 
‘Okinawan spirit’ to more economic-centred, ‘realistic’ priorities.  The Okinawan 
prefectural government’s secret alterations of the Museum displays demonstrated 
that ‘peace’ can be presented from a quite conservative political orientation (Ishihara 
2000, Yonetani 2000).  Governor Inamine stressed that there were a number of valid 
ways in which the reality of war can be perceived, interpreted or represented, 
including that which does not offend the general Japanese public and the LDP 
(Yonetani 2000: 163). The pro-alteration local LDP representatives in the 
Parliamentary Assembly stressed the need to present the image of Okinawa as 
‘positive and bright’ (Yonetani 2000: 158), that is, an image that can attract tourists 
from the mainland, and suggests greater economic-related promises.  The ‘Okinawan 
spirit for peace’, ‘since the ‘Golden Age of Trade’ (from the fourteenth to the 
sixteenth century) when men from the tiny Kingdom of Ryūkyū travelled without 
weapons, armed only with words, consideration, and good nature…’ (Figal 2001: 
41–2), can be used as a catch phrase to advertise Okinawa as an appealing 
destination, without any critical political manifestations against the current state’s 
security policy.  This internal dispute indicates the structural change in Okinawa 
after more than 27 years since reversion in 1972, where the population born after the 
reversion outnumbers the war survivors, for whom the emotional connection to 
memories of the Battle are increasingly indirect and abstract (Okamato & Yakabi 
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Furthermore, in Okinawa, protest against Inamine’s conduct on this issue 
was, at the same time, protest against his policy to ‘butter up’ the Japanese 
government and the LDP.  Elected in place of Ōta Masahide in November 1998, the 
priority of Governor Inamine and his administration, supported by the LDP, had been 
clearly to keep the economic link with the mainland Japanese intact.  In April 1999, 
Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, to everyone’s surprise, selected Okinawa and Kyushu 
as the host of the G8 Summit Meeting in 2000; amongst others, Nago City, the 
preferred location where the alternative Marine Corps Air Station to Futenma was to 
be constructed, which had been announced by the US and Japan as the main venue.  
This selection was generally accepted as a scheme of the Japanese government to 
humour the Okinawans and the prefectural government into accepting the new Air 
Station, which was veneered with the rhetoric of Obuchi’s ‘passionate compassion’ 
towards Okinawa.  Consequently in December 1999, Nago mayor Kishimoto 
officially accepted the heliport construction in Nago.  Inamine admitted, although not 
having directly ordered changing the contents, he had ‘communicated his concern’ 
with exhibiting the facts of cruelty and aggression on civilians that could be 
interpreted as ‘anti-Japanese’ (Okinawa Times 6 October 1999), expecting a rush of 
visitors from overseas and mainland Japan, before and after the Summit (Okinawa 
Times 7 October 1999).  Okamato comments that the Museum issue was a 
consequence of Okinawa’s long-term, continuous dependence for economic survival 
on public works provided by the central government (dialogue with Yakabi in 
Okamato & Yakabi 2000: 20). 
During the 1998 election campaign for the position of Okinawan Governor, 
the major competing point was Inamine’s ‘realistic’ policy to negotiate the economic 
regeneration policy with the central government, by accepting the construction of an 
alternative to the Futenma Air Station in Nago.  Inamine and the LDP supporters 
attacked  Ōta for mismanaging relations with the central government with his 
oppositional stance regarding the Futenma relocation with the prefecture, which was 
linked to the economic downturn due to the reduction in the state’s economic 
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on.  The anti-base community in Okinawa almost unilaterally supported the 
incumbent candidate Ōta who opposed the alternative base construction in Okinawa.  
In the midst of severe economic recession, however, the Okinawan general public 
chose Inamine in the hope of more public works and economic regeneration 
programs for the local economy.   
Thus, at the time, the obvious — but indirect — background political agenda 
was the construction of a new US military base on the east coast of Nago.  Iha 
Yoichi, a member of the Okinawan Prefectural Assembly and mayor of Ginowan 
City since 2003, spearheaded the accusations against the Inamine administration by 
making opposition statements at the Assembly.  Iha was a member of Yui no Kai, 
made up of three Assembly members not affiliated to political parties.  On the 
second day of the Assembly Meeting on 4 October, the oppositional parties (the 
Japan Communist Party, the Japan Social Democratic Party, Komeito, and the 
Okinawa Socialist Mass Party, Yui no Kai and other independent members) 
boycotted the meeting in protest against Inamine’s ‘false’ explanations on the 
alteration of displays made to the Assembly earlier, which denied his direction and 
influence.  Inamine finally admitted, apologised for, and disclosed the content of 
alterations and the way in which they were made (Okinawa Times 6 October 1999). 
The protest action at the Prefectural Assembly, and the controversy itself, 
demonstrated that the ‘Okinawan spirit for peace’ is at least shared among different 
groups and organisations in the community of protest against militarism in Okinawa.  
However, apart from the collective boycott at the Prefectural Assembly, local 
political parties (JCP, JSDP, Komeitō, OSMP), workers’ unions (such as 
Kenshokurō, the Okinawa Peace Centre), and other peace organisations (including 
the Historical Film Society and the Okinawa Peace Network), engaged in protest 
activities separately.  A member of the Okinawan Women Act against Military and 
Violence recalled: 
When the Museum opened in April, we held a protest rally in front of the 
Prefectural Hall.  Other organisations (for example, the Okinawa Peace 
Centre) did the same, but on their own.  Organisations in Okinawa, in   98
general, do not mingle with each other.  They protest on their own, 
separately, according to their own schedule (Interview March 2002). 
Even though the Museum issue was intertwined with the base issue, a coalition that 
effectively addresses both issues remained to be seen.  Nor did the Museum debate 
become a political opportunity to turn around the base relocation issue.  The 
unanimous opposition across the community of protest to Governor Inamine’s 
alteration of the Peace Museum displays did not translate into strengthening an 
effective, united coalition against the Futenma relocation to Nago.  Inamine was re-
elected as Governor in 2002 despite the Museum blunder that upset the community.  
As will be discussed in chapter 8, the local political debate on the base issue has been 
reduced to a matter of tolerating an unwanted heliport, in return for more public 
works to boost the sluggish local economy.  In comparison, ‘absolute pacifism’, 
identified with the experience in the Battle of Okinawa — although most Okinawans 
can relate to it — is increasingly detached from the politics of Futenma relocation.  
The construction of a new US military base became more and more firmly contained 
in the small community of Nago city, away from the concern of the Okinawan 
general public.  This does not deny, however, that for those Okinawans who oppose 
the construction of the new heliport, direct and indirect associations with the 
personal experiences in the Battle of Okinawa continue to be a sentimental reason 
why they protest. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the Okinawans’ residents’ perspective on the Battle of 
Okinawa, represented in the community of protest, and its political implications for 
the contemporary base issue.  The chapter concludes that different organisations and 
activists in Okinawa inside the community of protest who oppose war, the military 
and the bases share the Okinawan brand of ‘absolute pacifism’ derived from the war 
experience.  This is the backbone of the historical narrative of Okinawan 
marginalisation in the post-war period.  In the context of the continuous struggle of 
an ‘Okinawan’ people against marginalisation, this Okinawan pacifism gives 
meaning to the struggle and, at the same time, defines collective identity: who ‘we’   99
are.  The relevance of representing and preserving residents’ experience in the Battle 
of Okinawa for the anti-base protest is self-evident for the Okinawan organisations 
and individuals engaged in such collective action. 
However, outside the Okinawan community of protest, the reform agenda of 
Okinawan pacifism is merged with that of mainland Japanese pacifism and aversion 
to war, in which Okinawan experience plays a partial role.  Furthermore, struggles 
for ‘correct’ representation of history and protest against the US bases are conducted 
by different organisations and involve separate activities.  This chapter argues that 
Okinawan pacifism based on experiences in the Battle of Okinawa is not capable of 
providing a unified coalition among different protest actors, for the coherent struggle 
of ‘Okinawans’ and, even less, among the general Okinawan population.   
Nevertheless, the Battle of Okinawa is still important because it spiritually connects 
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Chapter Four 
 
The First-Wave ‘Okinawan Struggle’:   
The Land Struggle (tochi tōsō) 
 
Introduction 
Barely ten years after the Battle of Okinawa, the US military threatened residents’ 
livelihoods yet again with bulldozers, tanks and soldiers.  Their forceful confiscation 
of privately owned properties for military base construction and training was added to 
the Okinawan historical narrative of marginalisation.  Local residents started to 
organise protest actions against the US military, and gave rise to what Arasaki 
describes as the first-wave ‘Okinawa Struggle’.  This cycle of protest is popularly 
known as the ‘all-island struggle’ (shimagurumi toso), and is constantly recalled as the 
earliest, and perhaps the most powerful, evidence of the locals’ ability to wage united 
collective action against the authorities.  The all-island struggle contributed 
significantly to the myth of a struggle of the Okinawan people as a united, single 
entity. 
This chapter examines the rise and fall of the ‘first-wave’ Okinawa Struggle, 
and its significance for the myth of an ‘Okinawan’ movement.  The first-wave 
island-wide struggle was a formative period of a self-conscious ‘Okinawan’ collective 
identity of protest, and its exploitation by protest groups.  In fact, the unity and power 
demonstrated by the first-wave mass protest was perhaps the greatest ever in post-war 
Okinawan history.  This chapter asks, why, even if temporarily, different political 
parties, unions, and other organisations were able to act united as ‘Okinawans’ 
vis-à-vis the US military, forming a coalition that banded together different actors, and 
the reason why the coalition was not sustained. 
First, it examines the local political organisations under the US military 
administration: political parties, workers’ unions, landowners’ organisation, teachers’ 
organisations.  Secondly, it focuses on the process of the emergence of the reversion 
movement among the progressive party members, workers and teachers, in particular,   102
after the San Francisco Peace Treaty separated Okinawa from Japan and subjected it to 
indefinite US military administration without entitlement to constitutional rights.  
Thirdly, it examines the US military’s forceful land acquisition and land policy that 
ignored local land rights, and the emergence of landowners’ organisations and 
collective action, especially the farmers’ struggle on Ie-jima.  Then it examines how 
actors across all sectors managed to form a temporary coalition to fight against the 
draconian US land policy, including the conservative sector, which left a long-lasting 
legacy of an island-wide struggle of a united ‘Okinawan’ people. 
Organising for Resistance: Teachers, the Communist Party, Landowners, 
Farmers and Workers   
Okinawa after the Battle:Liberation’, Independence or Colony of the US military? 
Since the Battle of Okinawa, the islands of Okinawa were placed under direct US 
military administration, based on US Military Directive No.1, issued by Admiral 
Nimitz on the US landing on the Kerama Islands on 26 March 1945.  As early as 
1945, US President Roosevelt and surrounding government staff were in agreement 
that ‘the United States should preserve its ‘national security interests’ by indefinitely 
controlling key islands in the Pacific’, and to take ‘the full power of arming them and 
using them to protect the peace and ourselves during any war that may come’, and ‘a 
definition of trusteeships or mandates’ of these islands would be necessary at a Peace 
Conference in San Francisco (Dower 1971 [1969]: 155–6).  However, Okinawa was 
outside the US trusteeship for Micronesia passed by the United Nations in 1947 and, as 
the result of Japan’s defeat, needed clear definition by the peace treaty.  Negotiation 
for a peace treaty started early, nevertheless, it was a lengthy process.
1 
                                                             
1 This was partly because of the disagreements between the US State Department and military officers,  
on how to formalise US rule over Okinawa to maximise US security interests, in consideration of the 
developing Cold War.  The State Department recommended the international trusteeship of Okinawa 
under the United Nations charter rather than unilateral occupation (Miyazato 2000: 45), which would be 
more agreeable to the Soviet Union and China.  However, Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), and George Kennan, who headed the Policy Planning Staff 
and an advocate of the ‘containment’ policy towards the Soviet Union, fiercely criticised this view.  
MacArthur defined Okinawa as crucial for US air and amphibious capabilities in the Pacific defence 
cordon (Miyazato 2000: 27), which included Hawaii, Guam, Micronesia and The Philippines (Dower 
1971[1969]: 161).  Kennan also enthusiastically stressed the strategic importance of the US military 
force deployed on Okinawa for the Cold War security formula.  Moreover, with frequent labour strikes 
and continuing economic crises and the potential major influence of communism in Japan, the US 
military presence was justified to deter political instability (Eldridge 1999: 165).   103
The US military accommodated in makeshift tents the Okinawan people who 
survived the Battle and the returnees who had evacuated to mainland Japan.  There 
was no operating local administration representing the Okinawan population.   
Nevertheless, when the Navy was in charge of the military government in Okinawa 
initially, there was a degree of positive attitude on the US side to respect the will of the 
Okinawan people in political representation (Kano 1987: 69–71).  On 15 August 
1945, the day Hirohito made the official surrender, the military summoned 128 
Okinawans from 39 concentration camps all over Okinawa Main Island, to hold the 
first session of the Okinawans’ Consultative Assembly (Okinawajin Shijunkai) that 
existed until April 1946.  This Assembly was a transitory consultation body to be 
responsible for the US military government’s queries on local affairs,
2 for planning 
future central political institutions for local residents, and communicating locals’ 
requests to the military (Asato 2001: 74).  However, basically, the US military’s 
administration in Okinawa was arbitrary and highly authoritarian: Navy commander 
Watkins famously compared the Okinawan local autonomy to that of a mouse, only 
given to the extent that the cat (the US military government) allows (Kano 1987: 69).  
From July 1947, a division of the US Army took over the administration, which 
called itself RYCOM (Ryūkyū Command). 
Amidst ruins and rubbles, confusion and uncertainty in the aftermath of the 
Battle, local residents started to form political organisations.  In 1947, the Okinawa 
People’s Party (OPP) and the conservative Okinawa Democratic League were formed 
in July,
3 and the Okinawa Socialist Party followed in October (Warner 1995: 60).  
The OPP was a communist party with Marxist-Leninist ideas and links with the Japan 
Communist Party (JCP), and the major target of US control and punishment.  Its party 
members were mainly workers, farmers and intellectuals.  In the immediate post-war 
years, Okinawa’s independence from Japan, as a republic under the guardianship of 
the US or UN trusteeship, was seriously considered a viable option.  At its Fifth 
                                                             
2 Their tasks included looking after daily affairs such as provision of food rations, school matters, 
residential registration and the removal of residents from camps. 
3 In December 1949, the OPP had 200 members, whereas the Okinawa Democratic League had 2,000 
(Nakano 1969: 64).     104
General Conference, the Japanese Communist Party issued a ‘Message to Celebrate 
the Independence of the Okinawan People’, which hailed the end of Japan’s colonial 
domination over Okinawans as a ‘democratic revolution’.  This message defined the 
US occupation force as a ‘liberation force’.
4  At the OPP commencement ceremony, 
the Party expressed its gratitude to the US military, described as a ‘liberating force’ 
from Japanese colonial rule (Nakano 1969: 64).  Major local political parties 
including the Okinawa Democratic League, the Okinawa People’s Party, the Okinawa 
Socialist Party, and the Miyako Socialist Party in Miyako Island, initially supported 
Okinawa’s independence (Oguma 1998: 483–9). 
However, as the reality of the military administration sank in, the 
independence of Okinawa relying on the goodwill of the US tutelage quickly became 
less popular as an option.  The US military administration started to tighten control 
over various civil and political rights of the residents and restricted their activities.  In 
August 1948, the locals who worked for the Naha Military Port stopped coming to 
work because of the demanding labour and low pay.  In response, RYCOM closed the 
community grocery stores and threatened to stop the residents’ food ration, which 
worsened the already serious material shortage.  Following this incident, the military 
government issued a directive to introduce a criminal law, which restricted 
publications, travel, after-hours activities and the use of hinomaru flags without 
permission (Gabe 1996: 95–6).  The OPP members organised the waterside workers 
and protests against RYCOM for stopping the food rations.  They also used speeches 
and local small meetings in different villages and towns to organise residents into 
opposition (Okinawa Henkan Domei 1969: 67). 
The food ration incident strengthened the locals’ demand for elected 
legislatures and governors (Nakano 1969: 26–7).  In August 1948, RYCOM 
consulted with SCAP,
5 in response to the strong wish of the locals, on a plan to 
introduce local autonomy in Okinawa, to set up a constitution, and organise a federal 
                                                             
4 The ‘Celebration Message for the Independence of the Okinawan People’ was published in 1946 in 
Akahata, 20, 6 March (Arasaki 1969: 40–1). 
5 Miyazato quotes ‘Rycom to SCAP, August 6, 1948, RG 407 Ryūkyū Command, Box 879’ (Miyazato 
2000: 40).   105
government with four elected legislatures, governors and local governments 
representing each Guntō (groups of islands), namely, Okinawa, Yaeyama, Amami and 
Miyako.  According to the report from RYCOM to SCAP, the Okinawans displayed 
strong interest in the ongoing democratisation in mainland Japan and discontent with 
the absence of the same processes in Okinawa (Miyazato 2000: 32).  Basically, SCAP 
agreed with the limited and gradual introduction of elections, in order to prevent the 
locals’ discontent and communist influence, which was already detected in Okinawa 
(Miyazato 2000: 35). 
While the peace treaty was yet to be formalised,
6 Okinawa’s uncertain status 
as a territory, neither part of Japan or the US — and its future as a nation — gradually 
became a major topic of Okinawan public debate.  For example, the conservative 
Okinawan Democratic League members, who advocated independence, expected US 
patronage for economic benefits.  Arasaki points out that there had been alternative 
attempts to seek autonomy, such as the suggestions made by the OPP before 1950 to 
request compensation from the Japanese government for war losses, and to draft a 
constitution just for the ‘Ryūkyūans’.
7 
Hiyane points out that the US civil administration was inherently vulnerable to 
legitimacy crises in ruling people who were culturally, economically and socially 
foreign (Hiyane 1982: 281).  The US administration applied a ‘cultural policy’ to 
separate Okinawans from the mainland Japanese and revived the pre-modern title 
‘Ryūkyū’ and ‘the Ryūkyūs’ instead of ‘Okinawa’.  It promoted traditional Ryūkyūan 
culture, such as local cloth-making, theatre arts and pottery, through government 
publications such as Konnichi no Ryūkyū and Shurei no Hikari (Kano 1987: 176).
8, in 
order to separate the Okinawan identity from mainland Japan.  However, an option of 
                                                             
6 Conditions of the Peace Treaty and the process of separating Okinawa from Japan are studied in detail 
in (Eldridge 2001, Miyazato 2000, Watanabe 1970). 
7 These ideas were expressed in Senaga Kamejiro’s essays in the local newspaper Uruma Shimpo and 
journal Jinmin Bunka (Arasaki 1976: 39). 
8 Articles in Konnichi no Ryūkyū were dominated by material issues in order to divert Okinawans’ 
interests from political activism against US military rule and toward ‘pragmatic’ and ‘constructive’ 
issues related to re-constructing the local economy under the existing political framework.  These 
official publications were an advertising vehicle, for the Okinawan audience, of the US efforts such as 
construction projects and economic aid, as well as American-inspired ‘democratisation’ ideals (Kano 
1987, 166–99).   106
‘self-determination’ was hardly ever explored, and was too easily replaced by the goal 
of reversion (Arasaki 1976: 40–2).  Why was this the case? 
As the locals’ grievance against the dictatorial US military administration 
increased, the aspiration for independence came to be interpreted as a ‘mistake’ in the 
community of protest (Arasaki 1976: 38).  In the immediate post-war days, Gabe 
explains that ‘ethnic pride’ was emerging among Okinawans under US rule, which 
was a complex mixture of ‘aversion to war following the Battle of Okinawa, and 
consciousness towards their rights, against the US draconian policies, especially on 
the locals’ rights to their land’ (Gabe 1969: 42–3).  Okinawan ‘ethnic pride’ was at 
the heart of the public debate on where Okinawa should go; however, independence 
ceased to appeal to most politically involved Okinawans as a feasible option.  Instead, 
dominant opinion was in favour of overcoming ‘foreign’ military rule by returning to 
Japan: reversion to Japan came to appear as a hopeful option to turn around the 
predicament and improve the conditions of everyday life.  ‘Okinawans’ defined as 
‘Japanese’ — always a contentious element of Okinawan collective identity since the 
late nineteenth century — became much more amplified and dominant in the protest 
against US authorities and the campaign for reversion.  The dominance of the new 
goal of reverting to Japan as the ‘home country’ was such that it overtook and silenced 
a debate on Okinawa’s self-determination.
9 
Burgeoning Public Debates for Reversion 
In the aftermath of war, the US military government placed extremely low priority on 
education of Okinawan children (Warner 1995: 52).  Okinawan schoolteachers, 
under the US administration, continued to educate children as if they were ‘Japanese’.  
They continued the pre-war educational emphasis on the development of Okinawan 
pupils as Japanese citizens.  Destroyed in the Battle, there were almost no school 
buildings, books and other essential materials such as paper and pencils.  Teachers 
gathered children on the beaches and taught by writing on the sand, under the trees, 
                                                             
9   Tomiyama associates this point with his research on the self-censorship against asserting 
Okinawan-specific attributes among the Okinawan migrants in mainland Japan in the 1930s (Tomiyama 
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and in the tents and barracks provided by the US military, using textbooks picked up 
from bomb shelters in the battlefields (Yara 1968: 16). 
In the process of establishing a new school system, the teachers formed 
teachers’ organisations, which started to engage in the political campaign for 
Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.  The first teachers’ organisation, the Okinawa 
Federation of Education (Okinawa Kyōiku Rengōkai), was formed in February 1947.  
An increasing number of Okinawan teachers were also involved in local politics.  
More than 80 local assembly members were teachers in the late 1940s.  An OSMP 
member and teacher, Taira Kōichi,
10 for example, became mayor of Nishihara village, 
teachers likewise became mayors in other villages and cities such as Nakagusuku, 
Shuri and Chinen (Yara 1968: 19–21). 
From early on, schoolteachers were the strongest advocates for Okinawa’s 
return to Japan.  In February 1950, Senaga Kamejiro, Chair of OPP, articulated his 
party’s policy to aim for ‘racial self-determination’ and democracy, and argued that 
‘Ryūkyūans’
11 were Japanese, and they should return to Japan (Okinawa Jinminto 
1985 in Nakachi 1996: 34).  However, it was the Okinawa Socialist Mass Party 
(OSMP) that most vocally appealed to the reversion supporters, in particular, to the 
schoolteachers (Nakano 1969: 36).  After the elections in September 1950, Taira 
Tatsuo became the first Governor of Okinawa Guntō.  In Amami and Yaeyama 
Guntō, residents also elected governors and members of parliament who were 
reversion advocates. 
Taira Tatsuo immediately established the OSMP and, from the start, stressed 
the party goal of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.  In February 1951, the Okinawa 
Guntō Assembly held a meeting specifically on Okinawans’ future.  The new 
conservative Republican Party spoke for independence, the Socialist Party for a US 
trusteeship, and the OPP and the OSMP argued for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. In 
March, the Assembly made a resolution by majority expressing agreement on the 
                                                             
10 Taira was one of the founders of the Okinawa Socialist Mass Party, a member of the Ryūkyū 
Legislature and Prefectural Assembly for 26 years, and a Governor of Okinawa from 1976–78. 
11 In this period, ‘the Ryūkyūs’ and ‘Okinawa’ appeared to have been used interchangeably among the 
residents, perhaps mainly because the US military administration abolished ‘Okinawa’ during Japanese 
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members’ will for reversion (Nakano 1969: 70).  In April 1951, the OPP and OSMP 
formed a coalition for reversion, called the Preparatory Council for Promoting 
Reversion (Nihon Fukki Sokushin Kiseikai). 
The Preparatory Council was formed with the specific aim to collect signatures 
from the Okinawans older than twenty, to endorse Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.  
Taira Tatsuo, Chair of the OSMP and Governor of the Guntō administration, was the 
leader of this project.  He depended on the younger OPP and OSMP members, public 
servants who worked for the Guntō administration, and community youth groups 
(seinenkai) for the physical work, to do rounds from door to door every day and night.  
The collected signatures totalled 276,677, about 72.1 per cent of the Okinawan adult 
population (Toma 1987: 394–5).  The labour-intensive work of collecting signatures 
was established as one of the earliest repertoires of collective action among the OSMP, 
OPP, youth groups and other organisations in the community of protest, which 
continues today. 
With this mission accomplished, the Preparatory Council dissolved.  On 
September 1951, the Guntō Assembly sent the list of signatures to the San Francisco 
Peace Conference, addressed to US Ambassador Dulles and Prime Minister Yoshida 
(Nakano 1969: 72).  The signatures did not affect the contents of the Treaty itself.  
However, the signature collecting marked an important consensus towards reversion 
among the population, eliminating the ‘independence’ and ‘trusteeship’ option (Tōma 
1987: 395). 
The San Francisco Peace Treaty (28 April, 1952)  
At the San Francisco Conference in 1951, a peace treaty was signed, defining the US 
‘right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction 
over the territory and inhabitants of these islands’, while recognising Japan’s ‘residual 
sovereignty’, came into effect on 28 April 1952.  The US–Japan Security Treaty, 
signed simultaneously with the peace treaty, assured the rights of the US forces ‘to be 
stationed all the time in and about Japan’, ‘to contribute to the security of Japan against 
armed attack from without (Article 1, US–Japan Security Treaty)’.
12  President 
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Eisenhower proclaimed in his State of the Union Message, ‘The Ryūkyū Islands will 
be held for an indefinite period’ (Warner 1995: 96). 
Thus, Okinawa was separated formally and indefinitely from Japan.  In the 
community of protest, the great impact of this day (28 April), marked as a ‘day of 
humiliation’ is important to  the historical narrative of marginalisation of the 
Okinawan people.  The day, on which the peace treaty became effective, has also 
been remembered as the second Ryūkyū shobun, that is, another ‘punishment’ of 
Okinawa by Japan.  A legacy of the ‘day of humiliation’ is that Okinawa was deserted 
as an expendable pawn, for the sake of yamato’s survival and independence.  This day 
punctuates the start of a new period in the lineage of the collective struggle of the 
Okinawan people — the idea of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ — mainly characterised by 
the residents’ efforts to realise Okinawa’s repatriation to Japan.  On this day, every 
year, in the community of protest, it has become customary to hold protest rallies and 
meetings (Arasaki 1995: 27–8). 
Indicating the importance of this day, the original text of the ‘Emperor’s 
message’, which conveyed the Showa Emperor’s (Hirohito) view on post-war 
Okinawa’s status, caused controversy in Okinawa when it was discovered in 1979 at 
the US National Archive.  This ‘message’ was originally handed in September 1947 
from Hirohito’s aide, Terasaki Hidenari, to the US Chief of Diplomatic Section, 
William Sebald.  In this message, Hirohito expressed to MacArthur his concern for a 
potential communist threat, domestic instability and Japan’s vulnerability in the 
international security environment, and his preference for the US occupation of 
Okinawa as a ‘long-term lease … with sovereignty reserved to Japan’ (Taira 1997: 
158).  The Emperor’s message provided the base for a scheme whereby Okinawa 
nominally stayed ‘Japanese’ but practically allowed access to the islands to meet US 
security needs.  In Okinawa, the discovery of this message caused a turmoil for it 
proved that the Emperor encouraged the US occupation of Okinawa in order to protect 
mainland Japan against the threat of the Soviet Union and to maintain Japan’s ‘social 
                                                                                                                                                                        
of the necessity of continuing US power and the right to administer the ‘remaining’ Ryūkyū Islands ‘so 
long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East’ (US Department of State Bulletin 1954: 17 
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stability’ (Arashiro 1997: 225), in the same fashion that the Emperor went ahead with 
the Battle of Okinawa as a means to delay anticipated ground battles in mainland 
Japan.  It stimulated ill feeling against the Emperor for ‘sacrificing Okinawa’ to the 
US in order to escape being punished in the Tokyo Trials for his wartime crimes.
13 
Based on the records of negotiation processes between the Japanese and US 
diplomats and ministers, Eldridge (1999, 2001) points out the inadequacy of this view.  
According to Eldridge, under the circumstances, the Japanese leaders made their best 
effort to retain Okinawa, and to maximise the possibility of regaining it as part of 
Japan (Eldridge 1999, 2001).
14  This point, however, should not be interpreted that the 
peace treaty did not contribute to creating the post-war Okinawan predicament.  As 
Eldridge’s book title suggests (The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: 
Okinawa in post-war US–Japan relations 1945–1952), the arrangement made 
between the US and Japan in 1952 did create the origin of the problem that still exists: 
Okinawa is still discriminated against, with its burden of US military presence, which 
originates from the bilateral security alliance solidified at this time. 
For understanding Okinawans’ protests, rather than focusing on the Japanese 
state’s leaders’ sincerity towards maintaining sovereignty over Okinawa, it is more 
relevant to read Eldridge’s study as indicative of the double-edged implications of the 
‘day of humiliation’.  For the campaigners for reversion, the importance placed on the 
‘day of humiliation’ emphasises the unfair treatment of Okinawa as an expendable 
part of Japan.  This emphasis was an expression of Okinawa’s collective desire for 
repatriation to Japan.  The focus on treatment of Okinawa as an expendable part of 
Japan on 28 April 1952, is an expression of the value attached to Okinawa’s complete 
assimilation to Japan as a desirable collective political destination.  The significance 
placed on this day rationalised the campaign for reversion, or any sort of collective 
action demanding rights and equal treatment as ‘Japanese’.  On the other hand, the 
Okinawans’ claim for integration to, and protection from, the ‘home country’ may 
                                                             
13 The Emperor’s involvement in the secret territorial deal was against the new Constitution issued in 
May 1947.  The Constitution defines the role of the Emperor as ‘symbolic’, and does not allow him the 
right to make political decisions (Aniya Arakaki et al. 1996: 64–5). 
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have set a course for further marginalisation.  Eldridge’s work demonstrates how 
prepared the Japanese and US leaders appear to have been to respond to the 
Okinawans’ sentimental affiliation to Japan, nurtured out of the, at times, painful 
process of assimilation since the late nineteenth century.  It should be noted that 
political ‘reversion’ is not the same as ‘assimilation’ in cultural and emotional terms.  
Namely, it would be quite reasonable to want a political reversion without supporting 
the loss of Okinawan cultural distinctiveness.  However, during the height of 
reversion campaign, those who supported the political goal of reversion tended to also 
support the importance of cultural assimilation to Japan, as seen in the teachers’ 
enthusiasm to educate Okinawan children as ‘Japanese’.  As long as the hope for 
reversion was attractive to the Okinawans, there was room for negotiation by the 
Japanese government to make necessary arrangements for maintaining the US bases in 
the islands, as was proved by the reversion in 1972. 
Whether strategically sound or not in retrospect, it is significant to note that the 
painful amputation of Okinawa from Japan on 28 April 1952 left another influential 
legacy in the historical narrative of Okinawa’s marginalisation.  Among others, the 
most hurtful effect of this day was the exclusion of Okinawa from the entitlement to 
constitutional democracy, freedom of expression, local autonomy, gender equality, 
protection of basic human rights and, over all, renouncement of war, stipulated in the 
new Japanese Constitution.  Okinawans were placed outside the ‘peace clause’ of the 
new Constitution that renounced ‘war as a sovereign right of the nation’ forever 
(Article 9).
15  The Japanese public supported the peace clause of the Constitution out 
of their experience of hardships during and after the war, but the legacy of 28 April 
reminded Okinawans, who were among the most devastatingly damaged and 
exhausted by the war, that they were excluded from enjoying what would have seemed 
a ‘positive’ post-war change. 
                                                             
15 Introduced by General Douglas MacArthur, this clause became a problem for Japanese conservatives 
and for the US regional security planners for it became an obstacle for Japan to contribute military 
forces in the Cold War regional security order.
  However, the peace clause survived, supported by the 
general public in Japan weary of war and militarism, and by the neighbourhood countries invaded by 
Japan during the Pacific War.       112
Emergence of the Okinawan Labour Movement 
By 1949, a consensus had been reached ‘within the US government’ on the vital 
importance of Okinawa as a US security outpost, in the advent of the Cold War 
(Eldridge 2001: 233).  In the autumn of 1949, the State Department and Congress 
approved the allocation of a $58 million US federal budget for base construction on 
Okinawa (Dower 1971: 193).  After the commencement of the Korean War, 
construction companies, about half of which were from mainland Japan, were looking 
for business opportunities in building US base facilities on Okinawa.  These 
companies employed local labour and workers from Amami Island, who immigrated 
in search of jobs.  Exploitation of local labour was an essential factor in the 
construction of US military bases in such a short period.  More than 250 workers at a 
time were accommodated in big buildings, which was described as a ‘pigsty’ 
(butagoya) by the locals.  The barracks were built directly on the ground without 
floorboards, with leaky roofs and no basic facilities such as bathrooms (Nagumo 1996: 
30, Senaga 1959: 244).  Local workers had to pay for the accommodation, food and 
maid services,
16 and received little wages after these deductions, which were often 
suspended arbitrarily.  In 1952 and 1953, road workers and construction workers 
went on a series of strikes, demanding improvement of basic conditions such as decent 
accommodation and payment of suspended wages.  In June 1952 local road workers 
went on strike against the Nihon Road Company (Nihon Doro Gaisha), a subsidiary 
company of the Shimizu Construction Company (Shimizu Kensetsu), and in 1953 at a 
macadamisation site in Motobu (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 65). 
As soon as the strikes were publicised in newspapers, the issue of labour 
exploitation attracted strong empathy from the Okinawan public.  In public places, 
including public baths, barbershops and pubs, people discussed the conditions of the 
workers: ‘They are treated like domestic animals’, ‘How much money do they make, I 
wonder?’ ‘There’s no toilets and at night they can’t sleep because of the mosquitos’, 
‘We must save the workers from the pigsty!’, ‘Let the workers breathe fresh air!’  
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however, had no organisational representation.  In Senaga’s (1959) accounts of Okinawan workers, 
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(Senaga 1959: 246–7).  The construction companies took advantage of Okinawan 
labour that was unprotected by legal restrictions on low wages and poor working 
conditions.  The Okinawan workers attributed their predicament to the non-existence 
of legal means to protect them (Nakachi 1996: 68).  If they became ‘Japanese’ the 
Okinawan workers could receive more than twice as much wages than they did at the 
time. 
For the Okinawan general public, life in mainland Japan under the new 
Constitution, which guaranteed the protection of basic human rights including labour 
rights, became a source of envy.  The poor working conditions of many Okinawans 
were combined with poverty, unemployment and overpopulation with significantly 
decreased arable land surface taken by the military.  Most families were struggling to 
make ends meet, subjected to low wages and long working hours.  Importantly, the 
post-war ‘democratisation’ and ‘peace’ principles of the new Japanese Constitution 
transformed the image of Japan from that of an imperialist, militarist and authoritarian 
state before and during WWII to a democratic and de-militarised post-war society.  
Much of the Okinawans’ request for reversion was associated with the right to benefit 
from the mainland Japanese rapid economic recovery and improved material 
conditions, a welfare system and labour legislation. On Okinawa’s first May Day in 
1952, the participants issued a statement requesting immediate reversion to Japan, as 
well as legislation to protect basic labour rights (Oguma 1998: 502–6).  
It was the OPP and OSMP parliamentarians who commenced the campaign for 
basic labour legislation.  In November 1952, despite a USCAR warning, the GRI 
legislature passed bills to establish three labour-related laws, namely, the Labour 
Union Law, the Labour Standard Law and the Labour Relations Regulations Law.  
These laws, in mainland Japan, had been implemented by SCAP as part of the 
post-war social reform during the occupation.  The protagonists argued that the 
Okinawans deserved the same rights as the mainland Japanese to form a labour union 
and to collective bargaining.
17   
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into rejecting the legislation.  Nevertheless, waterside workers and G.R.I. public servants formed their 
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Against the emerging locals’ demand for labour rights, USCAR issued 
Ordinance No. 116, which stipulated that the three labour laws that passed the G.R.I. 
legislature would not apply to workers employed by the military bases.  Moreover, 
Ordinance No. 145 made it an obligation to obtain permission from USCAR to form a 
union and obtain recognition for the union executives.  The abolition of these 
ordinances became one of the most important goals for the workers, especially the 
Okinawan workers employed by the US bases.  The labour movement grew into the 
most active of political sectors in 1950s Okinawa, and the organisations that emerged 
from the workers’ struggle spread all over Okinawa. 
Emergence of the Okinawan Teachers’ Campaign for Reversion 
After the Preparatory Council for Promoting Reversion dissolved, the schoolteachers 
formed the central organisational force that led the campaign for reversion.  In 1951, 
the Okinawan Principals’ Organisation (Kōchōkai) made a resolution to request 
Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.  One of the principals read a Ryūkyūan poem, which 
received a standing ovation: ‘Mushika America, nuchikandon ariba, uchina 
mangatami/ yamato watara’ (‘If America does not listen to our request, let’s carry 
Okinawa on our shoulders and move across to yamato’) (Yara 1968: 28). 
The Okinawa Federation of Education reorganised itself into the Okinawa 
Teachers’ Association (OTA) in 1952.  Yara Chōbyō, a former chemistry teacher, 
was a pioneer of the re-construction of education in post-war Okinawa, and Chair of 
the Okinawa Teachers’ Association.  When he served as Chief of the Education and 
Cultural Affairs of the Okinawa Guntō government, Yara travelled to the mainland for 
funding and consciousness raising about the poor educational conditions in Okinawa.  
As the material differences between the Okinawan and mainland education 
environment became obvious, including teachers’ salaries, Yara was convinced 
reversion was necessary.  Yara, Kyan Shinei and other members who travelled to the 
mainland for ‘educational field trips’ stressed how ‘rapidly the education system was 
changing in mainland Japan, and that Okinawa is lagging behind’ (Yara 1968: 27).  
                                                                                                                                                                        
attracting more than 1,000 workers, the OPP and OSMP members and some Ryūkyū University 
students.  Encouraged by these events, for the second time the legislature passed the three labour laws 
and the Chief Executive signed for their enactment in October 1953 (Nakachi 1996: 69).   115
Local principals and the Okinawa Guntō  government Educational Section jointly 
requested USCAR to permit Okinawan teachers’ travel to participate in training 
programmes in the mainland (Yara 1968: 26–7).  Yara and his OTA colleagues thus 
came to be regarded as the main instigators of the reversion movement on the 
education front, which enabled them to mobilise schoolchildren and parents into their 
campaign for reversion. 
In January 1953, OTA formed the Okinawa Islands Reversion to the Home 
Country Preparatory Council (Okinawashoto Sokoku Fukki Kiseikai), together with 
the Youth Group Council, the Parents’ Association, and the Women’s Association.  
The Council declined membership of the pro-reversion political parties, such as the 
OPP and OSMP, in order to avoid being recognised as a political movement by the 
US authorities.    The Association’s strategy was not to offend the US administration, 
by staying away from being ideologically associated with the political parties, 
especially the OPP (Oguma 1998: 560–1).  Indeed, the teachers involved in the 
reversion movement were mainly driven by educational concerns.  The only 
vaguely ideological characteristic that the teachers showed was their frequent 
argument that the Okinawans were originally Japanese, and they should have the 
right to be educated as Japanese.  Even then, the Preparatory Council could not 
sustain their activities under the draconian US policies against any activities connected 
to the reversion movement, before engaging in any substantial activities.
  The US 
authorities rejected Yara’s passport to travel to Japan in 1954, which prohibited him 
from going to the mainland to collect school reconstruction aid, and paralysed the 
Preparatory Council.  
Alongside the growth of the Okinawans’ campaign for reversion, authoritarian 
control over Okinawa was strengthened in the early 1950s, and upgraded further with 
the introduction of a High Commissioner.  As of 15 December 1950, the military 
government changed its name to the US Civil Administration of the Ryūkyū Islands 
(USCAR).
18  In April 1952 a central government representing the locals, called the 
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Government of the Ryūkyū Islands — G.R.I., (Ryūkyū Gyōseifu) —was created in the 
Legislative Plaza in Naha, and USCAR appointed Higa Shuhei its Chief Executive.  
The elected Legislature (Rippōin) and the Judicial Branch, with the G.R.I., constituted 
the central government representing the Okinawan residents, within the USCAR veto 
power.  Locally elected four Guntō (Okinawa, Amami, Yaeyama and Miyako) 
governments were abolished. 
In January 1953, USCAR announced the deferral of public elections of 
Okinawan Governors indefinitely and in the meantime USCAR would appoint Chief 
Executives.  The local government’s function was limited to administrations 
following US military directives, proclamations and ordinances, which were above the 
authority of any local government institutions (Miyazato 2000: 63–5, Warner, 1995: 
87).  Furthermore, US President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10713, which 
introduced the post of High Commissioner in the Ryūkyūs, starting with Major 
General James Moore in July 1957 (Nakachi 1996: 93).  Until 1972, six High 
Commissioners were conferred almost omnipotent rights over administration of 
Okinawa, which authorised them to ‘force elected officials from office, block G.R.I. 
legislation, and overrule the judgments of its courts’ (Rabson 1989: 16).  The aim of 
this order was to confine to one person the power to make decisions on any kind of 
military, legislative, judiciary system and administrative affairs.
19 
Bulldozers and Bayonets: Forceful US Acquisition of Privately Owned Land 
Farmers and Landowners Organise for Land 
While residents were accommodated in the concentration camps, the US had occupied 
45,000 acres of land for base construction.  The areas occupied by the US Forces 
were mostly farmlands, the military required flat, spacious land surfaces, which were 
scarce on Okinawa Island and crucial for local agriculture.  Particularly in the central 
region of Okinawa Island, many residents never returned to their old homes that had 
been separated by US fences and barbed wire (Arasaki 1995: 23).  No compensation 
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was made for former landowners: the US military government at this stage regarded 
Okinawans as ‘the enemy’ (Warner 1995: 47), and the land thus acquired was 
considered American property.
20  The US military staff basically viewed Okinawa as 
justly acquired at the sacrifice and casualties of American youth in the Battle of 
Okinawa. 
As the Cold War took clearer shape with the 1949 revolution and 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, new Deputy Governor Major 
General Sheets renewed the administration policy in Okinawa, with priority placed on 
speeding up military base construction in Okinawa.  From the newly constructed US 
bases in Okinawa, B-29s were already raiding North Korea, contributing to the Korean 
War that started in 1950 (Miyazato 2000: 49).  The US authorities defended the 
legitimacy of military land acquisition vis-à-vis the Okinawan residents by stressing 
the strategic importance of Okinawa’s location for defending regional security against 
the communist bloc.
21 
On the other hand, in central Okinawa, where the US land acquisition of 
private properties was most common, those who lost their land to the military started 
to form an organisation to demand rent payments.
22  The Ryūkyū Legislature 
summoned mayors from twelve villages to discuss the military land issue, whereupon 
it was decided to form a land committee in each village, and integrated the committees 
all over the island into one interest group, Tochiren (Tochi Rengokai, the Landowners’ 
Union) in June 1953.  The aim of Tochiren was ‘an amicable settlement of the land 
dispute’ (Hiyane 1982: 267–8).  It lobbied the US military for landowners’ interests, 
and was the central force of the 1950s’ land struggle, it has continued to represent 
landowners to the present, from the perspective of preserving existing landowners’ 
rent incomes. 
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(Watanabe 1970: 36). 
21 From 1952 on, nevertheless, when the US administration of Okinawa was formalised, USCAR 
regarded land acquisition as a legal activity that required private contracts (Arasaki 1995: 27).  The 
price of land estimated by the Army for 3.3m
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22 In November 1951, a landowner, Kuwae Chōkō, placed an advertisement in the Okinawa Times to 
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With the USCAR Ordinance 109 on land acquisition issued in April 1953, the 
US military conducted further land expropriation.  Within ten days from the issue of 
Ordinance 109, armed soldiers and bulldozers entered, flattening farmlands and 
houses in Aja and Mekaru hamlets in Mawashi village, followed by the use of tanks 
and tear gas in Gushi hamlet in Oroku village (Arasaki 1995: 39).  In these regions 
that were severely destroyed by the Battle of Okinawa, the local farmers were trying to 
reconstruct their livelihoods with what was left after the war. 
Farmers, therefore, were the most desperate protest actors against the forced 
US land acquisition.  In the small islands of Okinawa, people, especially farmers, 
traditionally stayed in one place for many generations.  For many Okinawans, Ōta 
argues, land is something that was inherited from fathers to sons, not an object of 
speculation or investment (Ōta 1996: 141–2).  Particularly after virtually everything 
was destroyed in the Battle, land inherited from ancestors was the only asset they 
could rely on, and agriculture was the most substantive source of income.  The 
residents’ slogan, ‘Kane wa Ittoki, Tochi wa Mannen’ (Money is temporary, land is 
permanent), seen all over Okinawa Island during the forced US land acquisitions, 
expressed the farmers’ ‘unlimited attachment to land’ (Arasaki 1976: 136) and, also, 
how insufficient the US compensations were.  Against the resistant landowners, the 
US military did not hesitate to use force to obtain  de facto land access.  In the 
community of protest, the US military bulldozers and soldiers armed with firearms and 
bayonets are identified with the painful memory of land acquisition.  Images of 
bulldozers and bayonets vis-à-vis the desperate and helpless farmers symbolise 
another significant event in the historical narrative of marginalisation of ‘Okinawa’. 
One of the US military’s most ruthless takeovers happened in Isahama.  
Anticipating the forced acquisition of their hamlet, farmers formed the Isahama 
Landowners’ Committee against Military Acquisition (Isahama Gunyochi Taisaku 
Iinkai) (Okinawa Times Sha 1997: 230–1).  According to a former resident, 
85-year-old Tazato Tomoyasu, Isahama hamlet in Ginowan village in central Okinawa 
provided abundant water and used to have good rice paddies (Okinawa Times Sha 
1997: 230).  In July 1955, the local council told the farmers to evacuate the paddy   119
fields because of the danger of infection from mosquito spawning.  Predicting 
Isahama was targeted for the next forced US land acquisition, hundreds and thousands 
of supporters from all over the island came to ‘protect’ the farmers in Isahama from the 
US Forces.  Kokuba Kotaro, a former OPP member who was supporting the Isahama 
farmers’ struggle, recalls:  
 
At around 3am, when most supporters of the resistance had gone home, 
there were only 200–300 hamlet residents left.  Slowly, one after another, 
bulldozers with their headlights off and military trucks filled with armed 
soldiers entered the hamlet.  Off the coast, I could hear the sound of 
pipelines being connected to a military vessel to drain in the sand and 
water taken from the ocean.  It was just like war.  At dawn, all the 
supporters helplessly watched the paddy fields being destroyed by soldiers 
across barbed wires.  Farmers were still inside the last 32 houses, but 
were finally dragged out at gunpoint.  The bulldozers went over and 
flattened the houses, timbers and roof tiles of the houses were collected to 
be discarded in the ocean.  Women were screaming at this sight, and I 
could not help my tears (quoted in Arasaki 1995: 63–5). 
 
The Isahama farmers were relocated to the highland areas about ten kilometres away, 
where it was impossible to continue farming.  Many of them moved to the Yaeyama 
region and, with some mediation of the US military, overseas to Latin America 
(Arasaki 1995: 65).  These emigrants’ new  lives were often extremely difficult, trying 
to make livelihoods out of often barren and uncultivated land in foreign countries, and 
many of them returned to Okinawa.
23  Others who lost their land commonly found 
jobs in the US military bases (Nagumo 1996: 28).  Isahama symbolised the 
Okinawans’ tragedy caused by US land acquisition, which Arasaki analyses, 
‘definitely contributed to sparking the all-island struggle’ (Arasaki 1995: 65), what he 
calls the first-wave ‘Okinawa Struggle’. 
Ie-jima: The Legendary Farmers’ Struggle 
The farmers’ struggle on Ie Island (Ie-jima) was another legendary struggle against 
forced US land acquisition, which also sparked the rise of the ‘first wave’ island-wide 
mass protest in the mid-1950s.  The Ie-jima farmers demonstrated their capability of 
collective action and of making political demands.  The following description and 
analysis of the Ie-jima land struggle is mainly derived from the records and memoires 
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of an Ie-jima resident and peace activist, Ahagon Shōkō,
24 who died in May 2002.  
Because of his publications, personality and continuation of activities to promote 
peace and anti-militarism, the legend of the Ie-jima farmers’ struggle has almost been 
equated singularly with that of Ahagon, who is among the most respected figures in 
the community of protest.  The Ie-jima Struggle influenced the anti-base protest on 
Okinawa Mainland and attracted sympathy from mainland Japan. 
Ie-jima is a small island (23 square kilometres) located only nine kilometres 
northwest of Okinawa Island (Map 4.1).  It has a relatively flat land surface, suited for 
both farming and military purposes, such as shooting ranges and airfields.  Ie-jima 
was among the most severely destroyed areas in the Battle of Okinawa when the US 
Forces conducted some of the bloodiest raids, which killed about 1,500 villagers out of 
a population of 7,500, as well as 2,000 Japanese soldiers and 800 Americans.  About 
100 households in Maja before the war were reduced to 75.  After the Japanese Army 
surrendered, in the Maja District, the villagers were moved around many times to other 
islands and returned to their homes in March 1947. The residents tried to put the past 
behind and concentrate on farming (Ahagon 1973: 16–7). 
 
Map 4.1 Ie Island (Richard J. Pearson, Archaeology of the Ryūkyū Islands, University of Hawaii Press, 
1969: 15) 
 
Ahagon recalled that the farmers were so naïve and ignorant that they believed if they 
co-operated with the US military the Americans would help the villagers recover from 
                                                             
24 Ahagon was, on record, born in 1901 in Motobu village on Okinawa.  He was a farmer, but not by 
any means a typical peasant figure.  Ahagon became a Christian at 17.  Being a farmer did not appeal 
to him: he wished to receive an education but his family did not have the money to send him to school.  
In the period when many Okinawans were encouraged by the government to migrate overseas during 
the post-WWI depression years, Ahagon spent ten years in Cuba and Peru, still hoping to make money 
for studying one day.  He worked for a sugar farm and as a barber but the wages were too low to save 
even to return to Okinawa.  He returned at the age of 32, moved to Ie-jima, started a small community 
shop, and bought a block of land in Maja hamlet.   121
the war.
25  The US military took full advantage of the isolation and ignorance of the 
farmers.  In July 1953, a US inspector first came to the island and asked the residents 
to fill in some survey forms and sign them.  Later the farmers found that they had 
signed contract documents for evacuation.    A US missile practice range was built, and 
the US Forces told them that the evacuees (four households at the time) would receive 
plenty of compensation and could continue normal farming.  However, the amount of 
compensation was startlingly low.
26  As soon as the missile practice started, the 
farmers’ crops and fields were damaged and farming became impossible, for which no 
compensation was provided.  In September 1954, a US inspector announced further 
land acquisition and a plan to evacuate 152 households and land within a 5,000 feet 
radius from the planned military site where Maja and Nishizaki Districts were located.  
Finally the farmers realised they had been deceived (Ahagon 1973: 23). 
The Maja and Nishizaki villagers gathered and discussed what to do.  The 
residents’ meetings provided individual villagers opportunities to express opinions 
and confirm their collective will.  They realised that part of the problem was they had 
no knowledge about the unilaterally issued USCAR ordinances and decrees related to 
land acquisition, such as Ordinance 109. 
For many farmers, the choice was either land or death.  At the meeting, 
everyone agreed, ‘if we are taken away from our land, we will only die like fish 
taken out of water’ (Ahagon 1973: 33).  A Maja farmer, Namizato Seiji, said his 
family could not drink tea or smoke anymore because the military dug a hole in the 
middle of his field.  He said when the winter came, ‘I will stand up against the 
bullets’.    Another villager, Chinen Kokichi, said that the farmers could not afford to 
be intimidated by bullets, otherwise entire families in the communities would starve 
to death. 
                                                             
25 Maja farmers were first glad it was the Americans, not the Japanese who won the war.  The Japanese 
soldiers treated Ie-jima residents with contempt killed them and subjected them to harsh labour during 
the war.  ‘We were reminded of American democracy and Lincoln by the US delegates who visited 
Ie-jima who seemed much more generous and civilised than they had been taught before the war’ 
(Ahagon 1973: 21). 
26 Generally, the amount paid by the US was only 2–3 per cent of average revenue gained from growing 
crops (Arasaki 1995: 56).   122
Communications with other farmers, who were going through similar ordeals 
of land acquisition, such as in Isahama and Oroku hamlets, encouraged the Ie-jima 
farmers.  They gathered, talked and read out poems to each other about their common 
experiences and exchanged knowledge on how to negotiate effectively, such as 
writing petition letters.  ‘Interactions with other farmers gave us confidence and made 
us even more solidly determined to hang on to our land’ (Ahagon 1973: 81–2). 
The farmers continuously negotiated with the military, USCAR, G.R.I., the 
Legislature, and Tochiren staff in Naha.  In October 1954, about 80 farmers, the 
mayor and Ie village council members travelled to Naha, and made direct petitions to 
the US authority not to evacuate the villagers.
  At the negotiation table, the USCAR 
officers responded to the mayor’s petition that they recognised the difficulties 
villagers were going through, and until further clarification, villagers were allowed to 
work on their farms as usual.  The mayor told other villagers ‘the USCAR and the Air 
Force basically allowed us to maintain our farms and houses.  Perhaps the Air Force 
is searching for an alternative site’. This sounded like a triumph to the villagers 
(Ahagon 1973: 35–40).  However, they were deceived again.  Within a month, 
military staff visited Ie-jima for a land survey.  The statement of petition the farmers 
sent to the US Forces was still left inside a desk at a G.R.I. office, not even translated 
into English.   Ahagon recalls, ‘local staff hardly knew anything about the Ie-jima land 
acquisition, obviously they were worried that their jobs were at risk if they showed any 
sympathy to the farmers’ (Ahagon 1973: 26).   However, the farmers kept appealing to 
the local G.R.I. staff, including US-appointed Chief Executive Higa Shuhei, and elite 
Tochiren members, about the situation. 
The farmers felt a psychological and socio-economic difference from other 
Okinawans, including city-dwelling landowners, and those who worked for the US 
administration.  At their meetings, Ahagon observed,  
 
the office workers in Naha and Tochiren landowners were all dressed in 
suits and ties, just like the Americans, whereas we were mostly barefoot, 
wore old secondhand, over-sized clothes obtained from US soldiers, and 
women had their hair tied with old tea towels (Ahagon 1973: 34). 
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G.R.I. Chief Executive Higa advised the Ie village mayor to solely trust the land 
dispute to G.R.I., and not to consult with any political parties, because it would 
complicate the problem and delay the solution (Ahagon 1973: 40).  Higa’s words 
indicated the already evident division between the pro-US locals and the ‘progressive’ 
political parties, such as the OPP and OSMP, which was not fully understood by the 
Ie-jima farmers at this stage.  In the early stage of the struggle, the farmers were 
isolated, without connections or co-operative relations with political parties or other 
organisations representing common interests. 
In January 1955, 15 Maja households were ordered to evacuate.
   The 
negotiations with the US military had significantly reduced the number, from 152 
households in Maja and Nishizaki.  The military shifted half of the training range 
from land to water.  ‘This was the result of our persistent negotiation and pleading, in 
retrospect’ (Ahagon 1973: 66).  At around 8am, 11 March 1955, three large landing 
vessels suddenly appeared off the east coast of Ie-jima.
27  On 14 March, the bulldozers 
entered Maja, and ran over  
 
the sweet potatoes, peanuts, sugar cane and pine trees that we had carefully grown.  Our 
houses, furniture and water tanks, which were so crucial for survival were covered by 
soil.  Soldiers took helpless people outside, and set some houses on fire.  Namizato 
Seiji, the owner of one of the 13 destroyed houses, pleaded to stop in front of the 
bulldozers, but the soldiers beat him up, arrested him and sent him to the military prison.  
Soldiers took sick children outside and picked up the owners of the houses, grabbed 
their arms and forced them to receive some cash (Ahagon 1973: 89–91). 
 
Maja villagers started suwarikomi (sitting-in) ‘though we did not know such a word at 
the time’, in the G.R.I. corridor, requesting the payment of living allowances (Ahagon 
1973: 98).  After the local police tried to remove them, the villagers all went to the 
police headquarters and blocked all the paths to the building.  The military allowed 
the farmers to work on their farm outside training hours, that is, in the early mornings, 
evenings and on Sundays, the G.R.I. agreed to pay minimal allowances lower than that 
of a prisoner’s. 
                                                             
27 An estimated 300 armed soldiers with military vehicles, tear gas and stretchers surrounded the area.  
Tents and telephone systems were set up. The residents thought WW III had started.  The military gave 
the mayor a notice, which ordered the evacuation of 15 households, and warned that individuals who 
attempted to get in the way would be arrested. (Ahagon 1973: 87).   124
The US missile practice range had been built next to Maja hamlet, and the 
farming areas were inside the military fence (Map 4.2).   
 
Map 4.2 Maja Hamlet (Ahagon Shōkō, The Island Where People Live, Christian Conference of Asia 
Communications, 1989: i) 
 
The land the US Forces designated as a substitute was mostly filled with fine stones, 
and it was impossible to grow anything.  A total of 75 Maja villagers’ houses and 
farmland, including Ahagon’s house, were moved to 13 tents in an open field.  In the 
tents, residents suffered from heat, lack of drinking water, and water seeping from the 
ground.  Famine and poisonous snakes constantly threatened the people, and 87 per 
cent of them became ill (Ahagon 1973: 92, Ahagon 1989: 22).  The military   125
government stopped paying living allowances because the farmers kept lobbying 
against the land acquisition in Naha by appealing to other military landowners. 
The Maja farmers wrote a letter addressed to ‘Bokoku no Minasama’ (‘people 
in the home country’) about their predicament and asked for support, which was 
published in Asahi Shinbun.
28   The farmers emphasised their ‘blood connection’ with 
the Japanese in letters, speeches at rallies and petitions.
  Leaflets and pamphlets 
contained sentences such as, ‘there is no doubt that we are Japanese.  We cannot put 
up with iminzoku shihai (foreign domination) any more, and wish to return to Japan as 
soon as possible…We ask for support from the Japanese government to make the 
Americans pay back the damage we suffered…We deserve the same right for a 
peaceful life and humane treatment as the Japanese’(quoted in Arasaki 1969: 99–101).  
In 1969, Arasaki describes this strategy as a ‘weakness’ of the Ie-jima struggle 
(Arasaki 1969: 90).  However, as he writes elsewhere (for example 1976: 142), at 
the time, Ie-jima farmers and Okinawans in general felt isolated from the rest of the 
world under US military authoritarianism, and sympathy from the mainland 
population was the only hope. 
When two Maja women died of starvation, leaving behind ten children, the 
farmers decided to become beggars at a district meeting in July 1956.  About 20–30 
villagers, including some children, who were fit enough to travel went on a ‘beggars’ 
march’ (kojiki kōshin) across Okinawa Island from Kunigami in the north to Itoman in 
the south.  Their first objective was not only to obtain food and money, but also to tell 
people about the US Forces’ treatment of the Ie-jima people.  The farmers carried a 
flag that showed a summary of their predicament.  They made speeches and read 
Ryuka (Ryūkyūan poetry)
29 to people in the street, and obtained food and money.  
The march effectively publicised the Ie-jima struggle and generated compassion in the 
Okinawan public (Ahagon 1973: 130–2). 
                                                             
28 Asahi Shinbun, 3 February 1955. They also wrote to mainland citizens’ organisations such as Jiyu 
Jinken Kyokai (Freedom and Human Rights Association), Nihon Seinendan Kyogikai, (Japan Youth 
Group Association) (Ahagon 1973: 106). 
29 Ahagon tape-recorded the Ryuka read by elderly Maja women in the tents, in order to play them to the 
people who might visit Ie-jima later from mainland Japan.   126
In this period, the US administration jailed many trade unionists and political 
activists (such as Senaga Kamejiro, the founder of the OPP), and all forms of 
publication were censored.  Perhaps because the farmers did not attack the Americans 
and only talked about what happened, neither the military nor the police prohibited 
their activities.  Children in the march attracted greater compassion, and often police 
officers and American soldiers secretly made contributions, asking bystanders to hand 
them to the farmers (Ahagon 1973: 130–2).  The beggars’ march was a tactic that 
avoided being labelled and suppressed as ‘anti-Americanism’ and ‘communism’ at the 
time (Arasaki 1995: 54).  It was also a tactic to inculcate popular interest in the US 
land policy across Okinawa Island (Arasaki 1995: 55). 
Maja farmers stressed they relied on non-violent negotiations, and that they 
were not associated with either communism or anti-Americanism.  The farmers 
declared a ‘Code of Regulations for Petition Activities’ on 23 November 1954 at a 
Maja and Nishizaki District meeting with the basic principles of non-violence and 
politeness.
30  The farmers mainly resorted to non-violent forms of protest such as 
pleading and begging, because they knew that as long as the farmers did not resort to 
violence the military could not hurt them..
31  This was also because their struggle had 
no supporting organisations, newspapers, or witnesses.  In an isolated, tiny island like 
Ie-jima, there was no other alternative to protect their livelihoods from the US Forces 
(Ahagon 1973: 54).
  At negotiations, the farmers often made it clear that they had no 
intention to obstruct the American military and its missions.  They focused on 
arguing for a need to cultivate to survive, and stressed their intention to co-operate 
better with the Americans (Ahagon 1973: 59). 
                                                             
30 The Code of Regulation reads as follows: ‘Do not be anti-American, do not be angry or criticise, do 
not talk too much, never lie, always be truthful, sit down when having a meeting, do not bring farming 
tools when having a meeting, never put your hands above your ears, do not shout, speak calmly, 
negotiate according to morality and humanitarian and religious values (these are beyond US decrees and 
orders), never be afraid of the military, we are superior to the military people, and we should be ready to 
guide them to the right way, stick to these rules to the end’ (Ahagon 1973: 50–1).  Being a Christian, 
Ahagon frequently used the word ‘God’ and borrowed expressions from the Bible. 
31 The farmers surrounded the inspectors and prohibited land surveys, shed tears and begged, ‘Please, 
stop.  Please.’  Some gave inspectors eggs from the village as a gift, which successfully hindered the 
job.  Newspapers described these actions as ‘farmers’ violence toward land survey’ (Arasaki 1995: 47).   127
US explosives and armed soldiers frequently killed residents collecting scrap 
metal around the bases for a living,
32 and missile practice and air training injured and 
killed several villagers, at least, every year during the intensifying military operations 
for the Vietnam War.  More than 50 Maja villagers out of the population of 380 were 
arrested and jailed since 1955 (Ahagon 1998 [1992]: 32).
33  The military tried to 
regulate farmers to carry permits, but the farmers rejected this, because they 
considered themselves owners of the areas.  The US forces burned the farmers’ crops 
and forests within fenced areas (Arasaki 1995: 53–5).  The military put signs on 
fences saying, ‘Ryūkyūans Not Allowed’, the farmers took them off and put up their 
own signs that said, ‘Landowners Only’.  Because of these endless daily scuffles the 
US made a policy of mokunin kōsakuchi (‘overlooked farming area’), to allow farmers 
to work, as long as they did not prohibit military activities.  Mokunin kōsakuchi is a 
scheme agreed between the military and the farmer landowners, common in many US 
military bases to the present. 
Other communities in Okinawa, such as Isahama and Oroku hamlets, and later, 
in Konbu hamlet in Gushikawa village,
 34 engaged in similar struggles for land against 
the US military, mostly forced into desperate material conditions and/or emigration.  
The land struggle was primarily a struggle for survival, not about political principles 
or ideologies.  Only in retrospect, in his later book, Inochikoso Takara: Okinawa 
Hansen no Kokoro (1992 [1998]), Ahagon points out that ‘ absolute pacifism’ 
predicated on the experiences in the Battle of Okinawa was at the heart of the Ie-jima 
version of Okinawan anti-militarism, cultivated in, and communicated from, Ie-jima.  
The Ie-jima struggle exemplifies the most desperate and powerful people’s collective 
                                                             
32 Two male residents, aged 28 and 38, were killed when they were dismantling old US air force 
explosives to obtain scrap metal in 1959.  The victims’ families relied on incomes from selling US 
scrap materials, after their land was taken (Kamei 1999). 
33 This figure was included in the petition made in 1973 by the Ie Village Assembly, against the US use 
of defoliants. 
34 Since December 1965, 38 landowners in Konbu hamlet in Gushikawa village started their land 
struggle after the owners received notification of land acquisition from the US Forces. The Gushikawa 
Village Assembly made an opposition statement against the acquisition in February 1966, and the 
landowners formed the Konbu Land Protection Society (Konbu Tochi o Mamoru Kai), and built a 
‘struggle hut’ (toso goya), where the landowners and supporters guarded their properties (Gushikawa 
Shiyakusho 1970: 908–10).   128
action.  Ahagon was an influential figure, who significantly contributed to creating a 
legendary status of the Ie-jima struggle in the community of protest. 
The First-Wave ‘Okinawa Struggle’ 
In the community of protest on Okinawa Main Island, the landowners’ right to 
privately owned land against US land acquisition was the most pressing issue.  
Exceptionally in the history of post-war Okinawan protest, both conservative and 
progressive local political parties and the Ryūkyū Legislature (Rippo-in) joined forces 
in generating the island-wide land struggle.  The conservative Okinawa Democratic 
League and the communist Okinawa People’s Party (OPP, Jinminto) first requested 
the US military government to pay rent to the landowners of occupied properties 
(Uruma Shinpo 11 May 1950).  In November 1952, out of the ‘necessity to protect 
their basic human right to live’, the Ryūkyū Legislature opposed the forceful 
evacuation and supported residents’ resistance action (Hiyane 1982: 270).  In April 
1954, the Legislature passed a resolution called the ‘four principles for land 
protection’: 1) no lump sum rent payment, 2) adequate compensation for the land 
already confiscated, 3) indemnity payments for forced land acquisition, 4) no further, 
additional land acquisition.  The recovery of landowners’ rights was a priority for 
most political parties, along with reversion to Japan. 
However, because any act that objected to the American land policies was 
labelled as ‘communist’ and gave the US administration justification for persecution, 
the opposition forces limited their demands to refusing lump sum payments and 
opposing forced land acquisition, in order to protect minimal land rights.  Apart from 
those of the OPP members, the mainstream discourses of the land struggle in the early 
1950s avoided criticising the existence of US military bases in Okinawa itself, or the 
US–Japan security alliance (Oguma 1998: 511). 
In March 1954, USCAR announced a plan to obtain permanent leases of the 
properties needed by the US Forces with lump sum rent payments made to individual 
private landowners at the rate arbitrarily set by the US military
35, which virtually 
                                                             
35 The rent rate was set by the US military at 6 per cent of land value, for a duration of 16 years (Arasaki 
1995: 31).   129
meant purchasing permanent land leases once and for all.  This announcement 
alarmed the Okinawan landowners and the general public.  In April, all the Ryūkyū 
Legislature members expressed support for ‘the four principles for land protection’.
36  
The land committee members appointed by USCAR, the G.R.I., the Ryūkyū 
Legislature, and the Mayors’ Council formed the Four Group Coalition (yonsha-kyo) 
in order to demand the US authorities accept ‘the four principles’.  The ‘four 
principles’ functioned as a slogan of the opposition to US land policy for all political 
sectors.   The four principles, furthermore, provided a clear guideline for the residents’ 
demands and opposition activities. 
Importantly, there were differences among the locals’ reasons for opposing US 
land acquisition.  The landowners who were more inclined to economic maximisation 
and politically pro-US, such as the Okinawan Liberal Party members and Tochiren 
members, accepted the US lump sum payment policy and military land lease, which 
eventually destroyed the all-island coalition against land acquisition.  Their main 
concern was to extract maximum profit by negotiating effectively with the US Forces.  
In contrast, the OPP and OSMP members opposed land acquisition, in order to block 
‘the entrenchment of US colonialism in Okinawa’ (Arasaki 1976: 135).  The slogan 
that land rights should not be given up for money appealed to the interests and 
sentiments of the Okinawan farmers.  The political division on the land issue among 
the locals suggested that the special value attached to land that was particularly strong 
among farmers was not necessarily shared by all Okinawans.  However, the four 
principles were agreeable to all sectors of the Okinawan polity, including the 
conservatives and, therefore, the land struggle became an ‘island-wide’ struggle. 
Nevertheless, USCAR refused to change its policy of lump sum payment and 
permanent purchase.
37  In June 1956 the US House Armed Services Committee in 
                                                             
36 Arasaki infers the Liberal Party and the core members of Tochiren, which had formed a pro-US, 
conservative political grouping at the time, supported the ‘four principles’ in order to gain bargaining 
power against the US to maximise the amount of rent (Arasaki 1976: 137). 
37 In June 1955, USCAR permitted the Four Group Coalition to send a delegation to Washington to 
appeal for a governmental assessment.  Arasaki infers that USCAR permitted this travel because it 
regarded the issue as strictly economic, thus unrelated to potentially dangerous communist thoughts, as 
well as to induce early settlement of the land issue by US interference (Arasaki 1995: 33, Arasaki 1976: 
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Washington sent a delegation to Okinawa to conduct a two-day inspection on the land 
problem, and issued the ‘Price Report’ on 9 June.  The Price Report reconfirmed the 
adequacy of the permanent lease of military land, lump sum payment of rent by the 
US, and the need for additional land acquisition.
38   This both disappointed and 
infuriated the Okinawan public.  On 15 June, the G.R.I. and the Legislature members 
and mayors quit their positions in protest (Miyazato 1966: 99).  Within two weeks, an 
estimated 160,000 to 200,000 local residents joined residents’ rallies held in 56 cities, 
towns and villages (the population of Okinawa then was about 800,000).  The rallies 
were an expression of the residents’ rejection of the Price Report and their 
determination to protect the ‘four principles’.  In Koza City, 50,000 residents joined 
the rallies, and 100,000 in Naha.  Students from the University of the Ryūkyūs, and 
other Okinawan students enrolled in universities in mainland Japan who were in 
Okinawa for summer holidays, demonstrated by yelling slogans in chorus 
(Sprechchor) — ‘Yankees Go Home’ — with placards carrying anti-US messages 
(Arasaki 1969: 135–7), which became a traditional style of mass demonstration in the 
community of protest. 
The 19 June issue of Okinawa Times reported, ‘Okinawa is burning, 
determined to defend the ‘four principles’.  Okinawans’ perseverance for a decade 
finally exploded’ (quoted in Miyazato 1966: 100). The Four Group Coalition 
developed into the Communication Council (Renraku Kyogikai, Renkyo), with 16 
other citizens’ groups.
39    The OTA and Tochiren were particularly active in 
galvanising people into joining demonstrations and rallies through using their 
networks in schools and land committees located in each community (Arasaki 1976: 
157, Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 83–4).  The 1956 protest involved all political forces, 
even US-appointed Chief Executive Higa Shuhei, albeit temporarily. 
                                                             
38 The Report justified the long-term necessity of securing the US bases on Okinawa for 1) allowing 
nuclear deployment (this was impossible in Japan because of its constitutional refusal to retain nuclear 
weapons), 2) for containing communism and, 3) for preventing regional warfare across East and 
Southeast Asia. 
39 These groups included the OTA, the Youth Group Association, the Women’s Association, the 
Parents’ Association, the OSMP, the OPP, the Okinawa Liberal Party, the Chamber of Commerce, the 
Mayors’ Union and Tochiren.   131
Growing Voices for Reversion 
Importantly, Okinawans’ ‘ethnic pride’ against foreign domination (iminzoku shihai) 
underpinned the discourses of the land struggle.  The first-wave Okinawa Struggle 
was definitely combined with the political campaign for reversion.  Statements in 
residents’ rallies and organisations identified protecting land rights on Okinawa with 
protecting the integrity of Japanese territory from US encroachment.
40  The statement 
produced at the Naha anti-Price Report rally argued that reversion was necessary to 
solve the land dispute, the protest against the US administration was conceptualised as 
a struggle for ethnic self-determination (Nakano 1969: 191).  The land struggle gave 
an outlet to the emerging claim for Okinawan ethnic self-determination, defined as 
re-integration into Japan as the home country. 
The land dispute also generated a greater degree of sympathy for Okinawans’ 
hardship among the mainland Japanese public, which was until then almost 
non-existent, except from Okinawa-jin Renmei (the Okinawans’ Association).
41  In 
June 1956 a delegate from the Four Group Coalition was sent to Tokyo to discuss the 
land issue with Japanese government officials.  The delegate explained that their 
struggle was ‘for protecting our own land, but at the same time, for protecting 
Japanese territory’ (Hiyane 1982: 283).  For the first time since the peace treaty, a 
major mainland Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, covered the US land acquisition 
with ‘bulldozers and bayonets’, exploitation of Okinawan labour, and deprivation of 
Okinawans’ basic human rights under the US military administration in a series of 
articles starting from 13 January 1955.  After Asahi Shimbun requested the 
government to take action to protect Okinawa, many Okinawans felt they ‘gained a 
million supporters’, and ‘a beam of light entered in the Dark Age’ (Arasaki 1976: 
139–40). 
                                                             
40 For example, in the statement of the general meeting of Tochiren on 14 June, 1956 (Arasaki 1969: 
111–2). 
41 Okinawa-jin Renmei (Okinawans’Association, later called Okinawa Kenjin-kai), a network of 
mainland residents of Okinawan origins, aimed to help Okinawans recover from war devastation and 
build democracy and reconstruction of Okinawa.  Okinawa-jin Renmei criticised the Japanese 
government for deserting Okinawa, and sent a request to General MacArthur for support (Arasaki 1969: 
24).    132
About 10,000 Japanese political party and trade union members came to a rally 
in Osaka and proclaimed their support for the four principles, Okinawa’s reversion and 
protection of Okinawa as a part of Japanese territory.  A similar rally was held in 
Tokyo.  The participants of those rallies included more than 40 political parties and 
unions, including the most powerful Liberal Democratic Party (Hiyane 1982: 286).  
During the year 1955, political parties, trade unions and citizens’ organisations in 
mainland Japan almost unilaterally supported Okinawa’s reversion to Japan 
(Watanabe 1970: 109–19).  The LDP, which was the main party, began to take firm 
action to promote Okinawa’s reversion to its advantage.
42  The common argument 
was that Okinawa was part of national territory that was lost in WWII, together with 
other islands such as the Chishima and Ogasawara Islands, and should be recovered 
(Watanabe 1970: 111–6).
43  However, Japanese government officials, such as Prime 
Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, expressed concern that the 
US–Japan relationship would be spoiled if the land dispute turned into an 
‘anti-American movement’, which involved the question of returning Okinawa to 
Japan (Hiyane 1982: 284).  The Japanese government carefully avoided reference to 
the validity of Article 3 of the peace treaty, on the status of Okinawa, and simply 
conveyed to the US government the residents’ petition to respect their land rights 
(Nakano 1969: 194–5). 
Decline of the ‘First Wave’ Okinawa Struggle 
In July 1956, solidarity among the anti-land acquisition coalition started to crumble.  
The point of division was over the coalition’s strategy: whether to limit the land 
dispute to protection of private property or to develop it into a greater demand for a 
political solution.  The Four Group Coalition had expanded to the Five Group 
                                                             
42 Watanabe (1970: 142) explains, although there were disagreements on the future status of the US 
military bases on the island, many mainland Japanese conservative politicians and business leaders 
supported Okinawa’s reversion.  Within the conservative ruling Liberal Democratic Party, there were 
opinions which stressed the strategic significance of maintaining US military capacity on Okinawa, and 
more moderate advocates for ‘scaling down’ the base facilities to the level comparable to bases on the 
mainland (Watanabe 1970: 133) 
43The nationalistic Democratic Party and the right-wing division of the Socialist Party particularly 
promoted this argument.  In this process, however, the LDP members were determined to keep the 
reversion issue separate from the influence of the JSP and JCP, and from the rising anti-American or 
anti-Ampo (US–Japan security alliance) movements (Watanabe 1970: 125). 
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Coalition joined by the League of Town, Village and City Council Chairs.  Higa, 
Chief Executive of G.R.I. and the conservative Okinawa Liberal Party (OLP) 
members, which developed from the Okinawa Democratic League and the Republican 
Party and was the dominant party in the Legislature, disagreed with the 
Communication Council, which aspired to build a new political body representing the 
Okinawan population with elected legislative, administrative and judiciary 
institutions, instead of the G.R.I. and Ryūkyū Legislature under the US administration 
after the staff all resigned.  However, the conservative sector expressed insecurity 
about discarding US-appointed political institutions (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 86–7).  
Chief Executive Higa, who was the leader of the OLP, cancelled his earlier decision to 
resign and argued that the Five Group Coalition should not be anything more than a 
mediating institution between the US military and the residents.  Other OLP 
members, who formed the majority of the Legislature and the G.R.I., followed this 
decision.  Furthermore, Naha mayor Tōma Jūgō commented, ‘Not all residents are 
opposed to the US lump sum payment policy’ in an interview with a US television 
station.  Tōma represented the interests of those landowners suffering economically, 
and willing to receive rent all at once on the condition that they retained nominal 
property rights.  Subsequent to the defection of the OLP members, the 
Communication Council became the Land Council (tochikyō), and replaced the Five 
Group Coalition.  Yara Chōbyō from the Okinawa Teachers’ Association became the 
leader of this coalition and Ahagon Shokō, representing farmers of Ie-jima, became 
Deputy Chair. 
USCAR indicated that it was prepared to switch to direct rule, and to abolish 
any institutions run by locals if the local administrative staff resigned.  Moreover, the 
US military prohibited soldiers and families from entering civil districts in central 
Okinawa where the economy was dependent on American clientele, such as bars and 
shops.  This ‘off limits’ policy inflicted severe economic damage especially on the 
local communities in central Okinawa.  As a result, the Koza City mayor resigned 
from the Five Group Coalition.  It was a tactic on the part of USCAR to divide the 
island-wide coalition (Miyazato 1966: 101–2).   134
At the same time, the US administration announced the suspension of 
university funding to suppress the protest activities of the University of the Ryūkyūs 
students.  USCAR proclaimed the ‘off limits’ policy would be continued unless the 
University of the Ryūkyūs took proper action to punish and control its ‘communist’ 
students, to which the University executives responded by dismissing five students 
and suspending another student.
44  Pressure on the University of the Ryūkyūs turned 
into an effective instrument to settle the land dispute for US authorities (Arasaki 1969: 
136).  The Land Council was dissolved after only eight months, and the OTA, the 
OPP and other central reversion protagonist organisations receded from the land 
dispute.  The land struggle no longer included all social sectors.  It was reduced to an 
economic dispute among individual landowners, a majority of them Tochiren 
members, local land committees and the US military. 
In April 1958, USCAR suspended the lump sum payment policy, which 
significantly improved the terms of contracts, if the landowners would accept their 
land being used by the US military.  In May, six members, mainly concerned with 
landowners’ economic rights,
45 were sent to the US federal government, for the land 
dispute settlement.  Before their departure, Minren (a new political faction made up 
of the Naha divisions of the OSMP and OPP) members strongly opposed to signing the 
land contract with the US, which would legitimise US domination of Okinawa and 
national (Japanese) territory.  However, the delegates agreed with the new contract 
terms for land leases in Washington
46.  As a matter of fact, landowners were allowed 
to request lump sum payment of ten years rent and many did, which signalled the 
                                                             
44 The board of executives issued a statement: 
The University Board and Chancellery rejects Communism based on Article 14 of the University clause 
of the Ryūkyū Education Law, and follows the instructions of the US as the protector of the free world 
against the Communist threat in the Orient.  We regret the behaviour of our students who conducted 
anti-US demonstrations and their offence inflicted on all the Americans and the US staff stationed in the 
Ryūkyūs.   The University is responsible for the demonstrations against the US, the founder and the 
financial source of the University… and hereby bans students from joining any activities on or off 
campus without permission (Okinawa Times 11 August, 1956 quoted in Miyazato 1966: 103). 
45 The delegates included the Chief Executive, Chair of the OLP, Chair of the Legislature, the 
Landowners’ representative, a local council representative, and a judiciary officer (Miyazato 1966: 
130). 
46 With twice as much rent, paid yearly, and renewed every five years (Arasaki 1995: 36, Miyazato 
1966: 130–1). 
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miserable defeat of the ‘four principles’ (Ahagon 1973: 160–1).  Thus, most 
landowners accepted contracts with the US military, and many of them started 
receiving every year amounts of money they had never imagined.  For example, 
Ie-jima farmers also signed lease contracts with the military and received lump sum 
payments.  But Ahagon and others, mainly from Maja, refused to sign leases, and 
lived on farming and compensation from the US military for land use (not based on 
contracts).  These Maja farmers became the earliest non-contract landowners, later 
called ‘anti-war landowners’ (see chapter 5). 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the unity of the coalition was based on the ‘materialist’ concern for 
regaining land as a means of livelihood, combined with ‘ethnic pride’ pitted against 
the high-handed, racist US rule and, importantly, aversion to war and militarism.  
The peace treaty and the US military’s ignorance of residents’ land rights made most 
Okinawans insecure about their political and economic future.  Indeed, since the ‘day 
of humiliation’ — the San Francisco Peace Treaty (28 April, 1952) — separated 
Okinawa from Japanese administration, the pendulum of ambiguous Okinawans’ 
identity moved towards assimilation to Japan.  This ‘ethnic pride’ resulted in an 
‘all-island’ protest against the US military, which led to an assurance of rent incomes 
for the landowners.  This ‘all-island’ struggle provides important evidence of the 
locals’ capability to achieve political change and has founded the myth of an 
‘Okinawan’ movement. 
However, the ‘all-island’ coalition soon collapsed, due to differences among 
conservative and progressive parties and unions’ ideas about how best to go about 
Okinawa’s reversion: whether it should entail cooperation with the US military or 
opposition to it.  After the all-island struggle peaked in 1956, and the economic 
settlement was made, differences among local groups and organisations resurfaced 
and the temporary coalition dissolved. 
Collective actions during the cycle of protest contributed organisationally to 
constructing the idea of a united ‘Okinawan’ movement, setting precedents for future 
struggles.  Political organisations such as the OPP, OSMP, OTA, and Tochiren   136
established themselves, and became major leaders in political activism in the 
community of protest.  Strategies and styles of collective action such as signature 
collection, demonstrating and chanting slogans in chorus, and non-violence have 
become part of the traditional repertoire in the Okinawan community of protest. 
The farmers’ protest on Ie Island (Ie-jima) was especially important, for it left 
a legacy of an ‘Okinawans’ struggle’ against marginalisation, rooted in ‘absolute 
pacifism’ and the principle of non-violence.  Experience in the Battle of Okinawa, 
and aversion to war derived from it, was something that everyone could relate to.  It 
was the deeply emotional rejection of the military and war, as well as the daily 
humiliation and misery of being subjected to foreign rule and, especially, economic 
hardship that motivated locals’ protest against the US military in this period. 
However, this popular emotion directly based on surviving war — ‘reversion 
nationalism’ — did not precisely operate as a dominant framing of protest, or as a 
basis for a coalition.  This gave rise to a strong ‘nationalist’ orientation against the 
‘foreign’ military administration, which contributed to building a coalition for the next 
cycle of protest, all-inclusively called the ‘reversion movement’.  Reversion — rather 
than Okinawan ‘absolute pacifism’ or aversion to war — became the new basis for a 
political coalition. 
Despite these internal differences and detachment of public sentiment and 
‘reversion nationalism’, the ‘first-wave’ Okinawa Struggle indeed laid the foundation 
for the idea of a post-war ‘Okinawan’ movement against marginalisation.  The 
memory of this land struggle, the ‘all-island’ mass protests and a political coalition 
encompassing the conservative and progressive organisations, has survived as 
evidence of Okinawans as unified protest actors, and the myth of an ‘Okinawan 
struggle’.   137
Chapter Five 
 




The island-wide mass protests for land that peaked in 1956 are the foundation of the 
myth of an ‘Okinawan’ struggle in the post-war period.  The following wave of the 
‘Okinawa Struggle’, namely, the ‘second wave’ that peaked with the attempted 
general strike in 1969, entrenched further the idea of ‘Okinawans’ as a united entity 
of protest against the historical narrative of marginalisation.  The main theme of this 
cycle of protest was the campaign for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.  Together, the 
first and the second waves of the Okinawa Struggle represented the rare and crucial 
moments in which the community of protest claimed coherence and unity, which this 
dissertation understands as a myth of an ‘Okinawan’ struggle. 
This chapter focuses on how the ‘second wave’ — comprehensively referred 
to as the ‘reversion movement’ — contributed to the formation of the myth.   
Organisationally, the goal of reversion provided the basis for a ‘progressive’ 
(kakushin) coalition, which encompassed all the progressive organisations.
1   This 
coalition became the lynchpin of the unitary ‘Okinawan’ movement.  Nevertheless, 
this chapter also points out how tenuous this unity was, by highlighting crucial 
internal divisions within the progressive coalition. 
The first section examines what constituted the ‘reversion movement’: 
organisations, development of collective identity, and the framing of protest.   
Specifically, it examines how political parties, trade unions, the teachers’ and other 
organisations, including the unionised base workers, formed a coalition under an 
umbrella organisation called the Okinawa Prefecture Council for Reversion to the 
Home Country (fukki-kyo).  In particular, the idea of ‘reversion nationalism’ was 
                                                             
1 I use ‘progressive’ as opposed to ‘conservative’, to describe a political character to pursue political 
and social change, rather than maintaining status quo.   138
important for the collective identity and framing of the reversion movement.  The 
second section focuses on a series of collective actions that entailed the Council’s 
organisation and mobilisation in the Okinawan community of protest.  Importantly, 
the Council’s strategy pursued solidarity and conformity with the Japanese leftist 
movement and the government, as well as political confrontation with the US 
authorities and the pro-US Okinawan Liberal Party. 
The third section examines the areas of citizens’ concerns that the progressive 
coalition could not address properly — fear and frustration of living near the bases 
during the Vietnam War and, also, ambiguous feelings towards the implications of 
reversion, which was sharply addressed by the rising intellectual challenge to 
‘reversion nationalism’.  The fourth section examines the growing difficulty in 
sustaining the status of the progressive coalition as the centre of a united ‘movement’ 
of Okinawans around the slogan of ‘reversion nationalism’.  The failure of the 1969 
general strike and the violent eruption of the 1970 Koza riot, which occurred outside 
the structures of the organised parties and unions, was a powerful expression of 
popular grievances and frustrations which had been excluded from the agendas of the 
Council, parties and unions. 
The Making of the Second-Wave ‘Okinawan Struggle’ 
Birth of a Progressive Coalition 
Political Parties 
Until the mid-1960s, both the US administration and the Okinawan activists assumed 
that reversion of Okinawa would mean the removal of the American bases.  At the 
time, the control over civil administration of Okinawa was an assurance for the US 
forces of their complete right to freely use the island as a security depot (Gabe 2000: 
50).
2  The US authorities regarded the Okinawans’ campaign to demand reversion as 
an attempt to upset the security of the region, and were thus identified with 
cooperation with ‘Communism’. 
                                                             
2 In May 1954 Deputy Governor General David Ogden commented that if the Okinawan wished to 
return to Japanese administration, US forces would completely withdraw from the Far East, leaving 
Japan vulnerable to the communist threat.  Therefore, Okinawans, as loyal Japanese citizens, could 
not want reversion (cited in Oguma 1998: 513).   139
Similarly, for local anti-US activists, Okinawa’s reversion to Japan meant 
withdrawal of the US military forces from Okinawa.  A student activist during the 
1960s, Irei Takashi mentioned that he and his colleagues conceptualised Okinawa’s 
reversion to Japan as a ‘revolution’, they saw that the heart of Okinawa’s suffering 
was oppression based on class and ethnicity (cited in Arakawa & Arasaki 1985: 51).  
Political ideas to justify the reversion were derived from the mainland Japanese left-
wing activists, especially those of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) (Arakawa & 
Arasaki 1985: 52).
3   
The US authorities were aware of the connection between the JCP and the 
OPP.
4  The Okinawa Times editorial noted that the impromptu speeches of the OPP 
members held all over the island in various local communities had been extremely 
popular: the audience responded with clapping and cheering the OPP speakers for 
attacking the US military’s authoritarian rule, ‘saying what the people dare not 
express in words’ (Okinawa Times date unspecified 1954 cited in American Consular 
Unit 1955: 1).  However, public support for the OPP grew weaker as the US 
authorities made ‘abundantly clear that support of the OPP would entail the 
displeasure of the American authorities and consequent economic losses for the 
people or communities involved’ (American Consular Unit 1955: 1).
5 
The US authorities had created substantial local pro-US political forces, 
through supporting the establishment of the conservative Ryūkyū Liberal Party, and 
made every effort to marginalise the opposition anti-US parties such as the OPP and 
                                                             
3 The JCP, which had celebrated Okinawa’s independence from Japan immediately after Japan’s war 
defeat (see chapter 4), drastically changed its position and defined Okinawa’s return to Japan as ‘the 
inseparable and highly important part of the liberation of the Japanese people from American 
imperialism’, it was the only mainland Japanese political party to demand that the US bases be 
withdrawn from the island (Watanabe 1970: 117). 
4 Upon the US State Department’s request, the American Consular Unit obtained the translation of 
Heiwa to Dokuritsu no tame ni (For peace and independence) No. 349,  April 1, 1954, which was 
‘published by the Japanese Communist Party as a directive for Communist anti-American activities on 
Okinawa’ (American Consular Unit 1955: 3). 
5 An editorial of the Okinawa Times wrote, ‘It is not wrong for the People’s Party to take active part in 
the activities directed for benefiting the property-less masses.  But if that party should, with revolution 
by violence as its ultimate goal, agitate the proletariat masses with the view to bring them under its 
control in order to mobilise them for radical political or economic struggles, that party can only be 
called a communistic party that intends to make the proletariat masses into Communists, however 
tactfully that party may camouflage its colour.’  ‘It is only too evident that such communistic activities 
can not be permitted in the US, which is adamantly opposed to Communism, nor in Okinawa which is 
under her administration’ (Okinawa Times 7 November 1954 cited in American Consular Unit 1955: 
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OSMP.  With USCAR sponsorship and major OSMP members’ defection, the 
Liberal Party replaced the OSMP as the main party at the Legislature.  Since 1952, 
the G.R.I. Chief Executives were appointed from Liberal Party members.  The US 
military applied draconian policies to a wide range of public activities, especially 
against those who requested public election of Chief Executives of the G.R.I. and 
reversion.  In March 1953, after a by-election for a Legislature seat in central 
Okinawa, upon the Liberal Party’s request, USCAR interfered and cancelled the 
election of an OSMP candidate, Tengan Chokō, to replace him with a Liberal Party 
candidate.  After this so-called ‘Tengan incident’, OPP members and some ex-OSMP 
members formed the ‘Committee for the Struggle against Colonialism’ in protest 
against US manipulation of party politics, which USCAR ordered to dissolve, 
‘without any room for discussion or questions’, on the grounds that its name 
suggested hostile propaganda against the US military (Gabe 1969: 55).  In 
accordance with this hardline US stance, the Liberal Party deleted the reversion from 
its policy platform (Gabe 1969: 56). 
In another episode known as the ‘OPP incident’ (Jinmintō jiken), the OPP 
leader Senaga Kamejirō and Tomigusuku village mayor Matayoshi Ichirō were 
arrested and jailed in October 1954, for harbouring blacklisted communist activists 
from Amami Island.
6  After his term in jail, Senaga won the Naha mayoral election in 
1956 and became the first ‘red mayor’.  USCAR threatened the Senaga 
administration by freezing Naha City’s finance from the Ryūkyū Bank and subsidies 
from the US, which jeopardised public works and other local industries.  In 1957, 
USCAR implemented a change of law so that a simple majority vote at a city 
assembly could dismiss a mayor from office.  As a result, Senaga lost his office.  
Based on the ordinance that banned candidates with criminal records from public 
office, Senaga could not stand for re-election either.   
The highhanded US interference in politics aroused public criticism, and 
temporary support for the opposition parties.  A group of Senaga supporters from the 
                                                             
6 At the time, the US authorities watched and tried to move back people who came from Amami in 
Okinawa Main Island. For details, see (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 70–2).     141
OPP, the Naha Division of the OSMP, and independent Naha City Assembly 
members formed Minren (the Protection of Democracy Communication Council).  
Minren was a coalition mainly made of the OPP and some radical OSMP members 
especially based in Naha, which aimed for reversion, a solution of the land dispute 
and other military-related issues on behalf of the residents, and opposed the US and 
the Liberal Party’s political manoeuvring.  In the following Naha City Assembly 
election, and the mayoral election, Minren candidates won the majority of votes over 
those of the leading Liberal Party.
7  The public supported Minren with enthusiasm 
for its potential to speak for the residents against the arbitrary US rule, particularly 
against expanding US military facilities and additional land acquisition. 
Minren was nevertheless too internally split to form a coalition of progressive 
parties.  A Naha mayoral candidate, Kaneshi Saichi, and his followers resigned after 
criticising the dominance of the OPP ‘sectarianism’ within Minren, and formed a 
new party, the Okinawa Socialist Party (OSP), which was affiliated with the Japan 
Socialist Party.
 8  A positive reading of the rise and fall of Minren was that it was a 
process for the subsequent coalition building among progressive political 
organisations for the reversion campaign, but on the other hand, it indicated the 
characteristic and persistent susceptibility of the progressive forces to internal 
divisions.  Tonaki maintains that the progressive political parties did not reward the 
public’s support.  Their energies were diverted towards internal conflicts, and they 
concentrated too much on winning elections (Tonaki 1969: 124).  Meanwhile, the US 
forces announced the deployment of Nike Hawks in Okinawan bases in 1957, raising 
fears among the public of additional forced land acquisition by the military. 
Workers’ Unions 
Fledgling labour unionism and political activism against the US military 
administration developed into a major political force that played a significant role in 
                                                             
7 In the 1958 Legislature election, five Minren members were elected as opposed to seven from the 
Liberal Party, nine from the OSMP and 21 independents (Miyazato 1966: 119). 
8 For the Naha mayoral election in 1958, Minren conflicted severely with the non-Minren OSMP 
members over choosing candidates.  The OPP and Minren chair Senaga demanded the OSMP agree 
with a Minren candidate, Kaneshi Saichi.  In the end, Kaneshi was elected over the OSMP candidate, 
Taira Tatsuo, who was supported by the Liberal Party, which schemed to marginalise Minren (Nakano 
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the reversion movement.  Nevertheless, the primary agenda of the workers’ unions 
was to overcome poverty and to improve workers’ conditions, and they were also 
susceptible to internal divisions, which prohibited the formation of a united front. 
Uehara Kōsuke, one of the oldest base worker activists, first started working 
on the base in 1951.  He recalls that racism and human rights abuses against 
Okinawans ruled the workplaces in the military: for example, racially segregated 
toilets, Okinawan workers banned from coffee shops, and no protection from 
unjustified dismissals for Okinawans (Uehara 1982: 41).  From around 1960, Uehara 
and his workmates held discussion groups called ‘the military labour issues study 
group’ after working hours, in preparation for the establishment of a union (for 
details see Uehara 1982).  In 1960, US High Commissioner Ken Booth indicated in a 
letter to Howard Robinson, head of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) Okinawa office, that USCAR intended to legalise Okinawans’ trade 
unions, as long as they concentrated on economic matters and stayed away from 
political activities (Nagumo 1996: 49–50).  In 1960, Robinson approached Uehara 
and advised that union activities of the Okinawan base workers were possible, 
despite the existence of Ordinance No. 116 (Uehara 1982: 49–53)
9   
The engineering division in Zukeran, which Uehara was part of, announced 
the establishment of a union with 1,600 members in September 1960.  The USCAR 
and ICFTU representatives gave their blessings to the new union.  However, the US 
                                                             
9 Robinson gave speeches and lectures at various meetings and promised the ICFTU would lobby 
against possible US retaliation against union workers.  The conservative ICFTU (Kokusai Jiyū Rōren, 
based in Brussels), played an advisory role for USCAR, in order to help smooth state-labour relations 
that facilitate US military rule on the island.  In 1956, in order to investigate local labour conditions 
and laws, and conditions related to Okinawan workers’ basic human rights, the ICFTU sent six 
delegates to Okinawa.  In particular, the ICFTU report submitted to Brussels headquarters criticised 
Ordinance No. 116, which banned military workers’ collective action.  The report also revealed 
problematic facts about the Okinawan local labour conditions, such as the racist wage scale, according 
to which significantly lower wages for the same job were paid to the Okinawans (Table 5.1), and 
urged USCAR to improve the wages and working conditions of Okinawan labour in general (Nagumo 
1996: 38–41, Uehara 1982: 16–24). 
 
Table 5.1 Racist wage scale in June 1956 (Senaga, Kamejirō, Okinawa kara no Hōkoku (A Report 
from Okinawa), Iwanami 1956, 156) 
  Minimal Hourly Pay  Highest Hourly Pay 
US Workers   $1.20  $6.52 
Philippine Workers  $0.52  $3.77 
Japanese Workers  $0.83  $1.03 
Okinawan Workers  $0.10  $0.36 
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authority had rejected the authorisation of another smaller union made up of the 
workers of the Zukeran Motor Pool Repair Section (Maehara 2000: 48–9).  Thus, 
Okinawan base workers were also prone to internal divisions.
10  However, leader 
Uehara initiated the merging of six different smaller unions within the base 
employees into one military base workers’ Union League (zengunrōren) in June 
1961, involving 2,638 members, about ten per cent of the entire base worker 
population (Uehara 1982: 77).
11  This organisation developed into a bigger union, 
Zengunrō (All-Okinawan Military Workers’ Union) in July 1963 (Uehara 1982: 66).
  
In June 1961, 30 Okinawan labour unions and their 6,700 members 
established  Zen Oki Rōren  (All-Okinawan Labour Unions’ Association).   
Subsequently, Zen Oki Rōren effectively organised strikes in support of pay rises.  It 
also boycotted the submission of the list of union executives to USCAR, in order to 
sabotage Ordinance 145, which obligated the submission of union membership and 
executive lists, with support from the ICFTU.  USCAR and the business sector 
expected Zen Oki Rōren to be a moderate, non-political organisation (Nagumo 1996: 
51–3).  However, together with Zengunrō, it participated in political campaigns for 
the reversion and the public election of the G.R.I. Chief Executive, anti-nuclear base 
rallies and anti-Vietnam protest. 
Furthermore,  Zen Oki Rōren was under the influence of the OPP.  The 
members who were close to the ICFTU were wary of Zen Oki Rōren’s affiliation 
with the OPP, and resigned in order to establish a new league of unions, Okinawa 
Ken Rōdo Kumiai Kyōgikai (Ken Rōkyō) (Okinawa Prefectural Labour Union 
Committee), in 1964.  The division among Okinawan unionised labour echoed the 
                                                             
10 In mainland Japan, the ICFTU had a strong influence on labour unions since the US Occupation, 
especially on excluding the Communist Party’s (in Okinawa, the OPP’s) influence in the labour 
movement.  The relationship with the ICFTU constantly created a source of controversy among union 
members.  Those who promoted ICFTU membership valued the organisation’s lobbying power with 
the US authorities, and the opponents — often those affiliated to the Communist Party — criticised 
ICFTU policy of drawing its members away from staging ‘class struggles’ autonomous of the state 
(Maehara 2000: 35-37).  Zengunro also joined the conservative ICFTU, after some internal 
controversy.
   
11 The small Union office in Urasoe village only had one full-time female worker, helped by union 
executives who had finished their main work.  Uehara notes that as well as the poor public transport 
and few affordable automobiles, the mental and physical work involved was enormous, which strained 
the members’ family life (Uehara 1982: 77).   144
mainland Japanese division between the socialists and communist party members 
(Tōma 1987: 412).  Even though workers’ unions were internally divided, and also 
tended to place priority on their specific economic agendas, together with the 
political parties they became leading actors in local political activism against the US. 
Apart from demanding paid leave, bonus payments and superannuation, 
Zengunrō consistently used the slogan, ‘promote the reversion’, despite some 
controversies among the workers about antagonising the US forces (Uehara 1982: 
94–5).  In fact, engagement in anti-US or anti-base collective action was tantamount 
to endangering employment for the Zengunrō workers.  However, base workers were 
highly motivated to join in political activities, partly because they constantly 
witnessed actual US military operations at work.  The Vietnam War especially raised 
the base workers’ ambivalence about their position to contribute to the US war and 
killing through their jobs on base.  At the 1965 annual meeting, Zengunrō decided to 
protest against Ordinance 116, and, at the same time, formally joined the Okinawa 
Prefecture Council for Reversion to the Home Country.   
In May 1965, 22 tugboat sailors at the Naha Military Port were ordered to sail 
to Vietnam.  Zengunrō requested the newspapers, the G.R.I. and the local legislature 
and other citizens’ organisations to support its opposition to this order.  The main 
and opposition party representatives and the G.R.I. Chief Executive jointly requested 
the US authorities not send any Okinawans to Vietnam.  The US military reacted 
promptly to the concerted, firm collective action of the union, political parties and 
local citizens’ political institution, and cancelled the order (Uehara 1982: 143–4).  
The Okinawan base workers, who constituted 30 per cent of the working population, 
were among the keenest to organise popular resistance against the US military 
administration, war and militarism, and behind the campaign for reversion. 
The Council for Reversion 
On 28 April 1960, the Okinawa Prefecture Council for Reversion to the Home 
Country (the Council, Okinawa-ken Sokoku Fukki Kyougikai, Fukki-kyo) was 
established, initiated by the OTA, Okinawa Prefecture Youth Group Council 
(Okinawa-ken Seinen Kyōgikai, Oki Sei-Kyō), and the Council for the Okinawa   145
Pubic Office Workers’ Unions Council (Okinawa Kankōchō Rōdō Kumiai Kyōgikai, 
kankorō).  The three left-wing local political parties (OPP, OSMP and OSP) also 
joined the coalition, as core organisations.  The Council was established as an 
umbrella organisation that encompassed political parties, workers’ unions and 
several other citizens’ organisations.
12   
Despite a series of offers of negotiation, the Liberal Party refused 
membership of the coalition.  The Liberal Party employed a ‘gradual method’ for 
reversion, placing priority on ‘practical’ unification with Japan, for example, in 
business areas.  The Liberal Party members rejected association with any political 
‘struggle’ or ‘resistance’ against the US.  Hence, an all-island coalition of both 
conservative and progressive political organisations in the land struggle did not 
materialise, and the Council came to represent only the politically progressive 
coalition in Okinawa (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 116–7).  The Council struggled 
financially initially: the Secretary General of the Council worked for two years 
without getting paid.  Only in 1966, the Council was able to employ a person as full-
time staff (Tōma 1987: 406).  However, the number of member organisations 
increased each year.  In 1965, there were 52 member organisations (Sokoku Fukki 
Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 1348–9).   
‘Reversion Nationalism’ 
The ‘Day of Humiliation’: 4.28 and the Boat Rallies with the Japanese Activists  
The opening ceremony of the Council was held on 28 April, the anniversary of the 
date in 1952 when the peace treaty legalised the separation of Okinawa from Japan.  
The Council regarded ‘4.28’ as the day of humiliation, and the most important date 
of the year for the reversion activists.  The day marked the implementation of Article 
3 of the peace treaty, which the Council rendered invalid on the grounds that 
Okinawans were never consulted on its acceptance (Asato et al 1971: 53).   
On 28 April each year, the reversionists held annual ‘offshore boat rallies’ 
                                                             
12 Other member organisations included the League of Okinawan Women’s Groups, (Okinawa Fujin 
Rengōkai,  Okifuren),  Jichirō Okinawa Branch, Okinawa Children’s Protection Society (Okinawa 
Kodomo o Mamorukai), Okinawa Liberty Society (Okinawa Jiyū Kyōkai), Okinawa Waterside 
Workers’ Union (Okinawa Kōwan Rōdō Kumiai), Okinawa Textile Workers’ Union (Okinawa Sen-i 
Rōdō Kumiai), and the Okinawan Traffic Workers’ Union (Zen Okinawa Kōtsū Rōdō Kumiai).   146
from 1961 until Okinawa’s reversion.  Every year, Okinawan members got on a boat, 
sailed off north towards yamato, and met with their counterparts from mainland 
Japan, who departed from Yoron Island, and shook hands overboard, on the 27 
degree line (longitude), which was the border that separated mainland Japanese and 
Okinawan territories.
13   One of the participants (a schoolteacher) recalls, ‘My 
passport has been cancelled twelve times, and I thought I could never go to the 
mainland.  When I crossed the 27-degree line, without a passport, I could not help 
my tears’ (Tōma 1987: 411).  The ‘offshore boat rallies’ provided the opportunity to 
build solidarity, in a tactile sense, with mainland Japanese left-wing activists, who 
incorporated the reversion of Okinawa into their protest movements against the US–
Japan security treaty. 
Okinawan activists were developing solidarity with Japanese anti-war 
political parties and union members who interpreted ‘retrieving’ Okinawa as part of 
the battle against US military imperialism.  It was the Japanese anti- Ampo activists 
who originally used the term ‘Okinawa Struggle’ (Okinawa tōsō). 
The Council imported important styles of protest from mainland Japanese 
activists.  At the end of rallies and big gatherings, since April 1961, the Council 
members had chanted ‘ganbarō!’ (Never give up!) three times, raising their fists 
(Tōma 1987: 405).  This ritual was taken from the mainland Japanese labour unions’ 
custom, originated from the Miike struggle in Kyushu, against the closing of a coal 
mine in 1959–60 (Maehara 2000: 42).  The tradition of chanting ‘ganbarō’ (ganbarō 
sanshō) three times at the end of rallies is still practised today in the community of 
protest, not only by parties and unions, but also by community-based organisations. 
As the Okinawan activists deepened their affiliation with the mainland 
Japanese leftist organisation members, divisions amongst the mainland Japanese 
organisations affected the Okinawan coalition too, especially in the form of divisions 
between the OPP and socialist members.  In 1964, for example, the OPP followed 
the JCP-affiliated decision in mainland Japan to conduct a march towards Okinawa, 
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411).    147
starting on 28 April and finishing at the offshore boat rally planned for 15 August, 
the Japanese anniversary of the end of WWII.  On 28 April, separately from the OPP, 
the OSMP and OSP members held a boat rally as usual, co-operating with the 
mainland Japanese organisation affiliated to the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP)(Tōma 
1987: 412–3).  This split collective action reflected the internal difference over how 
to conceptualise the Okinawans’ struggle for reversion: whether to regard it as part 
of the ‘Japanese’ anti-US struggle or to see it as primarily an ‘Okinawan’ struggle, 
placing emphasis on 28 April, rather than 15 August, which was a date that had little 
to do with the end of the war in Okinawa (see chapter 3).  The difference indicates 
that the OPP, compared to the OSP and OSMP, more readily complied with the 
synchronised activities of the mainland Japanese organisations. 
‘Reversion Nationalism’ 
Amongst the most eager to promote Okinawa’s identification with ‘Japan’ were the 
schoolteachers, who significantly contributed to proselytising ‘reversion 
nationalism’.  The OTA played a particularly central role in the Council.
14  The OTA 
lobbied for the ‘right to educate students as Japanese nationals’, which offended 
USCAR cultural policy which regarded the islanders as ‘Ryūkyūan’ and not 
‘Japanese’.  The OTA’s strategy was to emphasise kinship, as well as historical and 
emotional connections with Japan, thereby attracting the support of the Ministry of 
Education and conservative politicians in Tokyo.
15  Schoolteachers encouraged using 
the hinomaru flags and the kimigayo song, which was controversial in light of the 
Okinawan teachers’ regret about promoting imperial education before the Battle of 
Okinawa (see chapter 3).  In the early 1960s, schools introduced enhanced training of 
speech in standard Japanese: teachers promoted the ‘correct use of the Japanese 
language’, often using corporal punishment against the use of the Okinawan dialect 
                                                             
14 The Preparatory Council for Reversion dissolved after USCAR cancelled the OTA leaders’ (Yara 
and Kyan Shinei’s) passports on their way to receive school reconstruction funding in Tokyo. The 
Chair of the Preparatory Council, Yara, resigned his position after being pressured to stop his 
reversion activities by the civil Administrator of USCAR, General Charles Bromley (Tōma 1987: 
403). 
15 The diary of Prime Minister Satō Eisaku contains descriptions of the patron-client relationships 
developed between Satō and Yara.  See (Satō 1997: Vols 3 & 4)   148
(Takara 1995: 157–8).
16  The Okinawan teachers’ reversion campaign that relied on 
the emotional attachment to mainland Japan appealed widely to the Okinawan 
public.  Oguma argues this was partly because of the persistence of cultural 
assimilation in the pre-war period.  Considering the efforts and hardships Okinawans 
went through in order to assimilate with Japan since the late nineteenth century 
(Oguma 1998: 498),
17 the ‘natural’ attachment to Japan could not easily be removed 
by US military rule. 
For other communism-inspired Okinawan activists, the reversion movement 
was part of a class (kaikyū tōsō), anti-colonialist and anti-capitalist struggle, as well 
as an ethnic and nationalist movement.  The members of left-wing political parties 
and trade unions and students’ groups embraced the ‘progressive’ nationalism 
developed in post-occupation Japan and in the process of the anti-Ampo struggle (See 
Packard 1966).  In mainland Japan, the JCP party line in the early 1960s stressed the 
importance of the struggle of ‘the Japanese people’ against US economic and 
military domination.  The JCP, above all, attacked Ampo as the embodiment of US 
colonisation of Japan, of which the direct rule of Okinawa was a blatant aspect.  
Nationalism was thus conceptualised as the basis of self-determination and de-
colonisation, similar to that which had developed in former colonised countries in 
Asia and Africa.  The JCP regarded both Japan and Okinawa as colonised by the US, 
and contended that the reversion of Okinawa meant overcoming the national division 
in Japan that was enforced after WWII.  In other words, nationalism underpinned the 
JCP’s request for Okinawa’s reversion, as much as it did for the conservatives 
(Oguma 1998: 524–5, Packard 1966).  The ‘Okinawa Struggle’ for reversion, from 
the mainland Japanese perspective, was the ‘retrieval’ (dakkan) of Okinawa. 
On the other hand, the OPP members and other communism-inspired 
Okinawans, as well as the OTA schoolteachers, were particularly keen to call 
mainland Japan sokoku (home country).  They saw the most important agenda as 
ethnic integration with mainland Japan, which was a measure to overcome US 
                                                             
16 In the reversion campaign, the physical dimensions involved in diminishing ‘Okinawan-ness’ to 
become Japanese, which Tomiyama (1997[1990]) stressed, were resurrected. 
17 On pre-war assimilation, see chapter 2.   149
colonialism and capitalist invasion.
18  Okinawa’s reversion to Japan was understood 
as an important part of the re-unification of a divided nation, and Japan’s de-
colonisation and complete independence from US occupation.  A vague idea that it 
was ‘natural’ for the Okinawans to return to the home country (described in terms 
such as sokoku or bokoku) prevailed among the political left and right and the non-
affiliated.  This idea, importantly, was consistent with the nationalism supported by 
conservative politicians in mainland Japan, who also considered maintaining the US 
military presence in Okinawa crucial for the US–Japan security alliance.  
These two versions of nationalism, despite their difference, merged into 
‘reversion nationalism’, which appealed to both progressive activists and the wider 
general public who did not identify with any particular political ideology.  Under the 
direct rule of the US military officers, who were ‘foreigners’ to them who spoke a 
different language, the Okinawans’ emotional closeness to yamato was amplified. 
‘Reversion nationalism’ was a very important framing of collective action 
that defined the collective identity of the reversion movement, that is, who ‘we’ 
were.  Opposition to Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was the crux of 
‘reversion nationalism’.  The ‘reversion nationalist’ perspective integrates opposition 
to the US military bases with opposition to the validity of Article 3.  According to 
the ‘reversion nationalists’, the problem was Okinawa’s status without a home 
country, the solution was to become ‘Japanese’ citizens with entitlement to the 
Constitution. 
Choppy Waves: Collective Actions for Reversion 
The Unbearable Lightness of Okinawan Human Rights: Crimes and Accidents  
In September 1955, a US soldier kidnapped, raped and murdered a six-year-old girl, 
whose mutilated body was found discarded in a bush in Kadena village, near the 
major US Air Force Base (usually called ‘the Yumiko-chan incident’ after the name 
of the victim).  The US court martial delivered a death sentence, but the prisoner 
returned to the US, which made it difficult for the Okinawan public to follow up the 
                                                             
18In this process, the capitalist invasion from mainland Japan to Okinawa, as was happening in the 
sugar industry, was ignored (Mori 1963). 
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consequent procedure of the sentence.
19  In less than a week, another US soldier 
raped a child.  Violence directed towards the local populace by US military staff, 
especially rape, revealed the crudest aspect of the power relations between the 
occupiers and the occupied.
20 
These two incidents, particularly the Yumiko-chan incident, have a special 
significance in the history of violence perpetrated by the US military staff in 
Okinawa (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 82, Okinawa Times Sha 1997: 226).  Molasky 
(1999) observes that in both the Japanese and Okinawan literature during the US 
occupation period the humiliation and helplessness of the occupied towards the 
occupiers was expressed most directly by the invasion of ‘the female body’.  In this 
sense, ‘no single act, not even murder, surpasses rape in its ability to dramatise the 
fear and humiliation of life under foreign occupation’ (Molasky 1999: 51).
21  Angst 
(2001) explains that ‘the violation of the girl’s virginal body’ of young victims in 
Okinawan history ‘is equated with the violation of the Okinawan body politic’ 
(Angst 2001: 252).  In the case of the collective death of the Himeyuri victims in the 
Battle of Okinawa (see chapter 3), it was the Japanese soldiers who violated the 
Okinawan body politic, whereas the Yumiko-chan incident represented the entire 
‘Okinawan’ body politic that was victimised by the power of the US forces and their 
direct administration. 
Traffic accidents were another reminder of the lightness that the US military 
attached to the locals’ lives and right to safety.  A high school history teacher, 
Arashiro Toshiaki, at the age of 5 lost his father in March 1956.  His father was run 
over by a car driven by an American soldier, who was subsequently arrested by the 
US military police.  The local police and G.R.I. courts did not have the right to arrest 
or judge criminals who belonged to the military, except for limited cases of red-
handed crimes (even then, the local police had to immediately hand the cases over to 
                                                             
19 Eventually, the sentence of the US sergeant was reduced to 45 years of imprisonment (Okinawa 
Times Sha 1996: 23).   
20 A novel, Cocktail Party, by Oshiro Tatsuhiro depicts the process in which a rape incident broke the 
charade of a ‘good relationship’ between the US military and local residents, and brought the 
powerlessness of the local residents to the surface (See Molasky 1999, Rabson 1989).  
21 The Yumiko-chan incident was recalled again in September 1995, when the rape of a twelve-year-
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the US military police).  The US military courts handled the cases, and the ultimate 
say on all sentences of American citizens rested with the High Commissioner 
(Ryūkyū Shimpo Sha 1968: 137).  The verdict of Arashiro’s father’s case was, like 
many similar cases, ‘not guilty’ (Okinawa Mondai Henshū Iinkai 1995: 71–2).
22  
Victims (if they survived) and their families had to keep their anger to themselves.  
In case of common crimes against local residents, such as destruction of objects 
(cars, houses etc.), non-payments in restaurants, bars and taxis, and beating and 
muggings, the local police and residents had no ability to follow up the cases 
(Ryūkyū Shimpo Sha 1968: 138).  The lack of rigorous prosecution processes made 
the local residents’ rights vulnerable to violation.  The extraterritoriality of the 
crimes and incidents caused by the US military members involving local residents 
was the most humiliating aspect of the foreign military’s domination.  Arashiro 
considers that the US military looked down on the Okinawan residents, and it was 
natural that the residents wished reversion to Japan, the Japanese ‘peace 
Constitution’, and a peaceful life without military bases (Okinawa Mondai Henshū 
Iinkai 1995: 72)
 23  
Along with the traffic accident caused by the US marine in 1963 that killed a 
local male child (discussed further below), the brutality of the 1955 Yumiko-chan 
incident provided powerful symbols of the humiliation of all ‘Okinawans’ in post-
war Okinawan history.  Irei, who was a student activist who campaigned for 
reversion, recalls the time of the Yumiko-chan incident: 
 
In tears, my university friends and I discussed that these incidents were 
evidence of racial insult.  I was convinced that these crimes would never 
disappear unless we (the Okinawans) recover our human rights as Japanese 
guaranteed by the constitution (Irei 1983: 82).   
 
The mass protest held against US crimes after the Yumiko-chan incident marked the 
                                                             
22 Arashiro became a teacher, following in the footstep of his schoolteachers who were engaged in the 
reversion movement.  In 1981, the Japanese government paid his grandmother compensation of 
Y891,880 (approximately $7,432).  Arashiro used this money to write a textbook on the history of 
Okinawa for high school students, which was published in 1997 (see Arashiro 1997, Okinawa Mondai 
Henshū Iinkai 1995: 72). 
23 Crimes committed by US citizens reported to the Legislature were 981 cases in 1961, 1,078 in 1962, 
1,131 in 1963, 973 in 1964, 1,003 in 1965, 1,407 in 1966 (Ryūkyū Shimpo Sha 1968: 138).    152
earliest Okinawan Citizens’ Rally (kenmin taikai) (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 83), 
which became part of the repertoire of collective action in the Okinawan community 
of protest.  Together with the Ryūkyū Legislature’s protest statement, the Okinawan 
Citizens’ Rally demonstrated the collective interpretation of the incident as a 
symbolic humiliation of all ‘Okinawans’. 
In mainland Japan very little was known about the realities of the US 
military’s administration in Okinawa: the Japanese government disconnected itself 
from the matter, just as the government and the people in the US knew little 
(Miyazato 1966: 91).
24  Again, it was the international organisation members from 
overseas that inspired the locals into organising against human rights abuses by the 
US military.  In 1961, an activist US citizen and Executive Secretary of the 
International League for Human Rights, Roger Baldwin, and missionary Harold 
Rickard made trips to Okinawa and met with Ahagon Shōkō and other Iejima 
farmers (Ahagon 1989: 136), and the victims of the 1959 Ishikawa City US Air 
Force jet plane crash incident, in which a jet fighter during a training flight crashed 
on the Miyanomori Primary School, killing 17 and injuring 121 people (the pilot 
escaped via a parachute).  Okinawan residents retained this incident as a very sad 
memory. It impressed upon them how little weight was attached to the lives of 
civilians who resided around the military bases (Fukuchi 1999: 77).
25  Baldwin made 
speeches to the locals, stressing the idea that protection of human rights was 
something that needed to be earned through a fight, and the need for a humanitarian 
                                                             
24   In January  1955  Asahi Shinbun reported the League’s investigation of Okinawans’ sufferings, 
including how Okinawan farmers lost their land by force, a minimal wage based on a racist scale for 
Okinawan workers (See Table 5.1), and the suppression of communists and political activities of 
reversion.  The articles informed the mainland Japanese about deprivation of Okinawans’ basic human 
rights under the US military administration in a series of articles (Asahi Shinbun 13, 14, 15 & 16 
January 1955).
24  The Asahi report opened up discussion among the mainland Japanese: a famous 
writer, Ishikawa Tatsuzō, argued for ‘standing up for our brethren Okinawans’ (Asahi Shinbun 14 
January 1955), which encouraged the isolated Okinawans and their land struggle and reversion 
campaign (see chapter 4).  In this climate, mainland Japanese residents originally from Okinawa 
formed an LDP-sponsored organisation, Nampō D ōhō Engokai (the Southern Brethren Support 
Society), established in November 1956 to facilitate economic aid to Okinawa.  
   
25 Space does not allow fully describing the tragedy of this incident.  The plane crashed at 10:20am 
when the schoolchildren were about to have a milk break.  The school burned down quickly.  A 
survivor teacher saw some children’s limbs burned off, and the skin of others peeled off by the fuel 
from the plane.  Survivors suffered from various post-traumatic syndromes such as amnesia, 
miscarriage and shock.  Families of the victims are still having difficulty coming to terms with the 
incident (Okinawa Gunyōchi Iken Soshō Shien Kenmin Kyoto Kaigi 1998).    153
organisation among the locals (Fukuchi 1999: 77–8).
   
An OTA member and former schoolteacher, Fukuchi Hiroaki, was among 
those who were influenced by Baldwin’s speech and became convinced that a 
voluntary citizens’ organisation was necessary, in order to put pressure on the state 
authorities.  In April 1961, together with more than 300 citizens, Fukuchi instigated 
the establishment of an organisation, the Okinawa Human Rights Association 
(Okinawa Jinken Kyōkai), in order to campaign for raising awareness on Okinawan 
residents’ rights to safety, freedom and private property.  Prominent Okinawan civil 
society leaders, such as Yara Chōbyō, chair of the OTA, Oyadomari Hidetaka, head 
of an Okinawan attorneys’ association, and chief editors of two major local 
newspapers, Ryūkyū Shimpo and Okinawa Times became the executive members of 
the Association.  The Association intentionally excluded any affiliations with 
political parties to limit ideological influence and obtain support from diverse sectors 
in society (Nakano 1969: 356), in line with Baldwin’s advice to detach human rights 
issues from political, especially communist, orientation (Watanabe 1970: 140). 
The inauguration statement of the Okinawa Human Rights Association in 
February 1961 clearly recognised the existence and lineage of the struggle of the 
‘Okinawans’ as one people: ‘In Okinawa, pioneers’ efforts to protect human rights 
existed in Meiji as exemplified by the freedom and rights movement of Jahana 
Noboru’ (Nakano 1969: 356) 
26Furthermore, it stated the Okinawans’ strong wish to 
be under the Japanese Constitution:  
 
After WWII the Japanese Constitution clearly stipulated the eternally 
inviolable nature of basic human rights.  Unfortunately, because the 
political administration of Okinawa was taken over by the US Occupation 
forces, the Okinawan people have been unable to benefit from the 
Constitution (Nakano, 1969: 356). 
In February 1963, a speeding US marine drove a military truck into a pedestrian 
crossing, ran over and killed a thirteen-year-old schoolboy.  This is called the 
Kokuba-kun incident, after the boy’s name.  The marine and witnesses saw the boy 
crossing on a green light.  However, the US court martial accepted the marine’s 
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claim that it was impossible to see the traffic light because of the strong sunlight, and 
acquitted the marine.  The verdict of this case deeply upset the schoolteachers and 
families in the communities around Naha.  The Human Rights Association issued a 
protest statement to the Marines, and with the OTA and parents’ associations, held 
an Okinawan Citizens’ Rally (kenmin taikai), in which 3,000 participated against the 
verdict (Nakano 1969: 487). 
The Struggle for the Public Election of Chief Executives  
During the 1960s, the Council for Reversion and its member organisations engaged 
in a number of collective actions in radical, energetic, and at times violent ways, in 
particular, on partisan agendas against the conservative Liberal Party backed by the 
US military.  The Council focused on petitions and demonstrations over a range of 
issues to do with promoting Okinawa’s reversion: abolishing USCAR ordinances and 
special orders, implementation of Japanese laws, freedom of raising the hinomaru 
flag and of travelling to the mainland, public election of the G.R.I. Chief Executives, 
and sending Okinawan representatives to the Japanese Diet (Nakano & Arasaki 
1976: 117).  The Council also opposed USCAR’s intrusion into judicial processes, 
which vetoed verdicts made by a local judge with regards to a case on setting fish 
prices, and another case on the result of a Legislature election result for a Miyako 
seat in 1965 (Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 1077–86).
27  Some of these 
collective actions resulted in desired reforms, in particular, the US authorities’ 
approval of the appeal for the first public election of the Chief Executive, eventually 
held in 1968.  The progressive organisations and their members who acted in concert 
under the vestige of the Council for Reversion maintained reversion as the ultimate 
goal.  ‘Reversion nationalism’ continued to be the dominant framing of protest under 
which collective action was conducted.  Importantly, the struggle for reversion 
entailed extensive records of mobilisations, which enabled the progressive coalition 
to establish its position in Okinawan civil society as a major political force. 
The nomination system of Chief Executives by the US authority highlighted 
                                                             
27 This incident is called ‘the trial transportation issue’ (saiban isō mondai).  USCAR explained the 
reason for the intrusion by arguing the two verdicts made by the local judge were severely 
disadvantageous to the US national interest.   155
the lack of democratic political processes in Okinawa.  In 1962, the new Okinawa 
policy of US President John F. Kennedy made the High Commissioner’s 
appointment of the G.R.I. Chief Executives formal (Kyoko Nihō Tōsōshi Henshū 
Iinkai 1998: 158–9)
28.  The small electoral system set up by the US administration 
favoured the pro-US Liberal Party in the Legislature as opposed to the divided 
opposition parties, and only the Liberal Party leaders could be appointed as Chief 
Executive (Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 130).
29  Protesting the Chief 
Executive nomination system and demanding public elections were among the 
Council for Reversion’s main agendas. 
On 29 October 1964, when the Liberal Party’s Matsuoka Seiho was about to 
be nominated Chief Executive at the Ryūkyū Legislature Special Meeting, some 
2,000 intruders destroyed the front door and entered the Legislature building.  The 
intruders were a ‘petition troop’ organised by the Council, and were eventually 
removed by riot police.  Frightened Liberal Party members escaped the building and 
the nomination was postponed (Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai, 1982: 1010).  
Furthermore, the Council organised three mass rallies on 26 June, 1 and 27 October, 
calling for autonomy and the Chief Executives’ public election.  The rally in June 
was held in three places: Naha (in front of the Legislature building), Miyako (Taira) 
and Yaeyama (Ishigaki).  About 50,000 participated in Naha, 2,000 in Miyako and 
1,000 in Yaeyama.
30   In addition, the Council launched a massive door-to-door 
signature collection campaign (Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 199–201).  
Especially effective was the petition of a volunteer group of five influential local 
figures,
31 which USCAR officials had to take seriously (Tōma 1987: 451–3).  
In 1968, US President Johnson approved the public election of the Chief 
                                                             
28 Leaders of the main party were nominated.  Until then, according to the US presidential order in 
June 1957, the Legislature Chair had nominated the Chief Executives. 
29In principle, however, both conservative and progressive parties agreed on the need to demand the 
public election of Chief Executives in future (Tōma 1987: 416). 
30 Similarly, the Council organised subsidiary rallies in five places (Itoman, Nago, Ishigaki, Taira and 
Koza) before the October rally in Naha (Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinka, 1982: 199–200). 
31 The members included presidents of the Okinawa Times and Ryūkyū Shimpō, the chair of OTA, 
Dean of Science of the Ryūkyū University and Chair of the mayors’ association.  OTA member and 
Okinawa Human Rights Association’s Fukuchi Hiroaki planned and requested these figures to 
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Executive position.  The Council claimed the Chief Executive election struggle as a 
victory for ‘democratic forces’ for autonomy, and one of the major achievements of 
the Council (Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 459–60).  The election of 
the first Chief Executive in the same year was fought between the conservative 
Liberal candidate, Nishime Junji,
32  arguing for the economic-oriented coexistence 
policy with the US military, and Yara Chōbyō, leader of the OTA and Council for 
Reversion, supported by the left-wing member parties, unions and organisations who 
campaigned for the immediate and unconditional reversion of Okinawa to Japan.  In 
1968, Yara was elected new Chief Executive, winning over 230,000 votes.  Yara 
attributes the victory to the strength of the coalition’s unity and also support from the 
mainland Japanese mayors and governors from Yokohama, Kyoto and Tokyo (Yara 
1986: 20–1). 
Satō’s Okinawa Visit 
In 1965, the US ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer, advised the US State 
Department of the need to return Okinawa’s administration to Japan, in order to 
stabilise the US–Japan relationship.  Despite opposition from the military and the 
Defense Department, the State Department took Reischauer’s advice seriously and 
discussed the possibility and conditions for Okinawa’s reversion (Gabe 2000: 57–
62).
33  By the mid-1960s, the US and Japanese governments engaged in diplomatic 
negotiations in order to terminate the US military’s civil administration over 
Okinawa, while strengthening US military rights to freely deploy and use their forces 
on the island.
34  Deployment of the US forces on Japanese territory became part of 
Japan’s responsibility essential for the maintenance of the alliance, which was 
positively undertaken by the LDP government.  This sufficiently allowed the 
                                                             
32 The Liberal Party changed its name to the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party in December 1967 
(Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 179). 
33 In return, Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara clarified that the assurance of US rights to freely 
use the existing US bases in Okinawa was necessary for the US to give up exclusive political 
administration of the island (Gabe 2000: 62). 
34 When the previous Japan–US Security Treaty was ratified in 1951, Japan was regarded as a former 
enemy, and the assumption of an equal and trusting relationship between the two powers was absent.  
Therefore, the US military deemed it absolutely necessary to control civil administration of Okinawa 
to warrant liberal US military operations on the island (Gabe 2000: 50).  Articles V and VI of the 
1960 Mutual Security Treaty clearly stated Japan’s responsibility to provide US security depots, and 
the US commitment to assist should Japan face external attack or threat (Smith 1999: 69).   157
USforces to use Okinawa, without the responsibility of civil administration of the 
island (Kōno 1994, Tanaka 1997: chapter 7).  
On 19 August 1965, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku visited Okinawa,
35 raising 
hope for Okinawa’s reversion.  Satō had been a protagonist for reversion from a 
strong nationalist perspective. .  The Okinawan reversionists’ request and the head of 
state’s statement seemed to have coincided.  The schoolteachers ‘mobilised’ 
Okinawan children to welcome the Prime Minister on the streets, holding hinomaru 
flags, expressing ‘reversion nationalism’.  Most of the locals welcomed Satō for 
promoting reversion and increased governmental economic subsidies to the islands. 
However, reflecting the locals’ animosity against the use of Okinawa as a 
launching pad for Vietnam, much of the protest was directed against Satō’s support 
for the Vietnam War.  The OTA and other Council members also held a protest rally 
against the Prime Minister at Naha High School, which attracted 150,000 
participants, demanding an immediate reversion and expressing protest against the 
use of Okinawa for raiding Vietnam (Nakano & Arasaki 1970: 22).  The Council 
organised a large-scale sit-in along Route 1, between kokusai dōri (a main street in 
Naha City) and the Tōkyū hotel, where the Prime Minister was staying,
36 to hand 
Satō a petition.
37   However, the Council’s plan for a controlled demonstration 
resulted in an uncontrolled and chaotic zig-zag demonstration of 20,000 people, 
which stopped traffic completely.  The local police force clashed with the 
demonstrators, which resulted in unprecedented violence, and five demonstrators 
were arrested.  The demonstrators failed to communicate with Satō, who avoided the 
demonstrators and escaped to another hotel arranged by the US military.   
Nevertheless, the executive committee of the Council considered the mass 
                                                             
35 Satō was only the third Japanese Prime Minister to visit Okinawa, after Itō Hirobumi and Tōjō 
Hideki.  It was at this visit that he uttered the famous line, ‘Japan’s post-war never ends, unless 
Okinawa’s reversion is achieved’ at Naha Airport (Nakano & Arasaki 1970: 18). 
36 In the pre-reversion era, Route 1 was designed as a purely military road and was functioning as the 
most important pathway across the island with US military vehicles transporting goods and people en 
route to military operations and trainings for Vietnam.  The traffic hazard created by the 
demonstration caused serious inconvenience and the authorities’ retalitation was severe.  Today this 
road is called Route 58. 
37 The petition demanded the abolishment of Article 3 of the peace treaty, the removal of nuclear 
weapons from Okinawa, locals’ autonomy including a public election of the Chief Executive, and 
protection of human rights (Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 236–7)   158
demonstration as a ‘success’ for being able to convey to the Prime Minister the 
Okinawans’ ‘greatest wish’ for reversion (Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 
265). 
The Struggle Against the Education Bill 
Another major violent clash between the riot police and Council members occurred 
on 24 February 1967 at the Legislature.  The Okinawa Liberal Party and the G.R.I. 
Education Department attempted to introduce two education-related laws.  This 
legislation aimed to improve working conditions and rewards for public servants in 
education accordance with mainland legal standards and, importantly, to restrict the 
rights of schoolteachers to engage in collective strikes, political actions and 
performance evaluation.
38  On the day the Legislature was to pass this bill, about 
15,000 protesters, including various workers’ union members and taxi drivers, came 
to the Legislature, and a hunger strike of 24 schoolteachers followed.  All the OTA 
schoolteachers took voluntary annual leave from schools.  As a result, the two 
education bills were formally discarded in April 1967, which upset the Okinawan 
Liberal Party members so much that the Liberal Legislature Chair and members were 
‘trembling with anger’ (Tōma 1987: 449). 
This ‘Two Laws on Education (kyōkō nihō) Struggle’, led by the usually pro-
reversion schoolteachers, was exceptional in that it opposed a bill that aimed at 
assimilating with the mainland Japanese education system.  The struggle was the 
progressive coalition’s battle against the conservative political sectors in Okinawa 
and the US administration.  In Okinawa, the Two Laws on Education Struggle, 
together with the violent ‘Legislature incident’ against the Chief Executive 
nomination and the demonstration against Satō, represented a vibrant protest culture 
in Okinawa that is unimaginable today. This struggle is recalled with pride among 
Okinawan activists, which was published in a book, Kyōkō Nihō Tōsōshi (History of 
the Two Laws on Education Struggle), by the Okinawa Teachers’ Union (1998).  
Through this series of struggles, the Council member organisations, particularly the 
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OTA, established themselves as the progressive Okinawan political sector, 
equivalent to the mainland Japanese teachers’ union, Nikkyōso.
39  However, in the 
process of this struggle, the progressive party and unions’ energy was distracted from 
the protest against the military bases (Gabe 1969: 298). 
Reversion is not Enough: the Critics 
Discordance with the Mainland Japanese Anti-Ampo Struggle 
The US–Japan Security Treaty,  originally ratified in combination with the 1952 
peace treaty, was renewed in 1960.  The new name, the ‘Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America’, still in 
effect today, suggested a greater ‘mutuality’, that is, equal sharing of duties, between 
the two powers in comparison with the former treaty.
40  As the new US foreign policy 
required Japan to increase Japanese military contributions, the anti-Ampo mainland 
JSP activists expressed qualms against including Okinawa and Ogasawara in Japan’s 
defence ‘responsibility’, to prevent Japan from being dragged into warfare involving 
US forces in these regions.  Nakano and Arasaki explain that the controversy 
reminded the Okinawans of the peculiar mainland Japanese attitudes towards 
Okinawa, which cut the marginal islands off when their own security was 
endangered.  The debate enhanced the Okinawans’ disappointment with expectation 
towards Japan as ‘home country’, and negatively affected the sense of solidarity with 
the Japanese protesters.  The distance between the Okinawan and mainland Japanese 
anti-military protests diminished the credibility of ‘reversion nationalism’ predicated 
on the ethnic re-integration slogan (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 115–7).
41   
By the time Satō visited Okinawa, it had become increasingly obvious that 
reversion of Okinawa would not remove the military presence.  ‘Reversion 
                                                             
39 The struggle followed a preceding struggle on educational laws in mainland Japan by the Japan 
Teachers’ Union (Nikkyōso), against the introduction of an evaluation system of school teachers 
(Kyoko Nihō Tōsōshi Henshū Iinkai 1998: 98). 
40 This presumed ‘equality’ is controversial.  Article VI of the treaty specifies Japan’s duty to provide 
for the US bases within its territory, although US responsibility to protect Japan’s security is not 
specified as a duty of the US in the treaty (Gabe 2000: 14–8). 
41   Furthermore, mainland Japanese anti-Ampo organisations, such as the Stop Ampo National 
Committee (Ampo Soshi Kokumin Kaigi), did not suggest any joint collective action with the 
Okinawan anti-base activists when the US Congress passed the construction of a Mace B missile base 
in Okinawa in 1960.  The Ryūkyū Legislature made a protest statement (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 
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nationalism’ increasingly appeared to have been co-opted by the Japanese 
government’s security policy: to secure the existence of the bases on the island 
through placating the Okinawans through fulfilling their long-cherished wish for 
reversion.  By the mid-1960s, ‘reversion nationalism’ came to lose attraction to many 
critical Okinawans. 
Nevertheless, the ‘progressive’ coalition in Okinawa furthered co-ordination 
— or assimilation — with mainland Japanese strategies and organisational structure.  
As the B-52 flights and US troops from Okinawa stirred anti-Vietnam protests in 
mainland Japan (Havens 1987: 77), Japanese activists’ opposition to the US attacks 
on Vietnam from Okinawa integrated with Okinawan activists’ campaign.  For 
example, the Council’s large-scale, organised and unorganised demonstrations 
echoed the mainland Japanese styles of anti-Vietnam mass demonstrations against 
Satō, led by leftist organisations, such as JSP, JCP and labour unions under Sōhyō 
(Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai, General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) and 
Dōmei (Zen Nihon Rōdō S ōdōmei, Japan Confederation of Labour), as well as 
students’ organisations and Beheiren (Betonamu ni Heiwa o! Shimin Rengō, 
Citizens’ Federation for Peace in Vietnam).  The process in which Okinawan 
activists’ organisationally and strategically assimilated with the major Japanese 
political organisations, however, belied the crucial distance between the ‘Okinawa 
Struggle’ — interpreted from the mainland Japanese perspective — and the 
Okinawan struggle from the locals’ point of view. 
In the 1960s, the three issues that were of particular concern for Okinawan 
residents were the US extraterritoriality provision for crimes and accidents 
committed against locals, suspected but unconfirmed existence of nuclear weapons 
in the bases on the island, including stopovers by nuclear submarines at Naha 
Military Port
42, and perhaps most symbolically, the deployment of B-52s in Okinawa, 
flying over to attack Vietnam (Rabson 1989: 20).  The crux of the residents’ 
humiliation, inconveniences and threats to their safety, remained the presence of the 
US military bases that occupied one-fifth of the island.  Furthermore, what made 
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Okinawan sentiment towards the US military distinctive was, again, the experience 
of the Battle of Okinawa.  The Council’s strategy to promote integration with 
mainland Japanese organisations parted further from the ambivalence among 
Okinawans towards ‘reversion nationalism’. 
Influence of the Vietnam War 
Meanwhile, the Vietnam War had turned Okinawa Island into a much more intensely 
militarised environment.  The sight and explosive noise of B-52s flying from 
Okinawa to attack North Vietnam every day reminded the residents of the Battle of 
Okinawa.  Anti-militarism among the Okinawan public derived from the direct 
reaction to the war they experienced, still fresh from two decades before (Kishimoto 
1969: 203).  Kishimoto warned that the Okinawans’ enthusiastic aversion to war — 
or ‘absolute pacifism’ — derived from victim mentality, which if passive in 
character, was susceptible to transforming itself into an uncritical, emotional 
attachment to the ‘home country’, Japan (1969: 204).  Kishimoto pointed out that in 
the early 1960s, the campaign for reversion was confused with opposition to war and 
the US military presence.  However, the Vietnam War forced many Okinawans to re-
consider their ‘absolute pacifism’.  A new type of consciousness surfaced, which 
stressed Okinawa’s position as an aggressor because they contributed to America’s 
war, which was also supported by Japan.  A 45-year-old male farmer in Koza City 
wrote to the Okinawa Times in August 1965:  
 
It is understandable that we (Okinawans) have a big victim mentality 
considering the pressure from the US and Japan …[However,] Okinawa 
provides the United States the bases, and co-operates with the US forces.  
Does it not make Okinawa the oppressor of the Vietnamese people? … It 
is important that we should realise that we are not victims now, but are 
contributing to the sufferings of other Asians.  Otherwise, I do not feel it is 
possible to find a true path to reversion and peace (Nakano & Arasaki 
1970: 34). 
The self-perception of Okinawans as victims was tempered by a realisation that in 
the context of war, anyone including Okinawans, could turn into aggressors.  This 
strengthened their aversion to imposing the same pain and killing, as they 
experienced in the Battle of Okinawa, on other ‘Asians’.  The burgeoning criticism   162
against self-victimisation was shared with the mainland Japanese anti-war activists 
and intellectuals, represented by the individual-based Beheiren movement, whose 
influence had been growing throughout Japan.
43 
Kishimoto Tateo, current Nago mayor who approved the construction of an 
alternative heliport to the US Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station, in his 1969 essay 
warned against the ‘victim mentality’ that the tragic experience of the Battle of 
Okinawa tended to represent.  In his view, stories of aggression and cruelty of the 
mainland Japanese soldiers toward the Okinawan residents that projected ‘Okinawa’ 
as victim and yamato as aggressor obscured the nature of war that could turn anyone, 
including themselves, into committing the same brutality and inhumanity.   
Kishimoto then argued that protest against the military presence, that is, the anti-US 
base movement in Okinawa, was insufficient if this perspective was excluded 
(Kishimoto 1969: 204).  However, three decades after Kishimoto wrote this article, 
his current political position perhaps indicates his failure to find a way to protest 
without drawing on the victim mentality.  In 1999, when Kishimoto formally 
approved the heliport in Nago, a local editor of a community entertainment magazine 
in Naha, in her 30s and who grew up in southeastern Okinawa Main Island, 
commented: 
 
When I was growing up, I heard about the horror of the Battle of Okinawa 
all the time, from adults around me, not only my parents and grandmother, 
but also schoolteachers, and women and men in our neighbourhood.  Their 
vivid and raw descriptions of war were frightening, they made you think, 
war, at all costs, must be avoided.  The general message of the Okinawans 
— and some thinking mainland Japanese people, too — would be that 
there is no just war and no war can be justified.  But, here, we cannot 
avoid asking, ‘Okinawa, too, with Japan, went to war, to that terrifying, 
frightening war of invasion, didn’t it?’ (Personal communication August 
1999) 
The last point she made represents self-criticism that has repeatedly come out in the 
                                                             
43 Oda Makoto, a leading figure of Beheiren, wrote:  
Realistically speaking, we are all guilty of complicity in the Vietnam War.  We must recognise that 
each of us is among the perpetrators.  In my opinion, this is why we must conduct our opposition 
movement all the more forcefully.  But to put it less practically and more in terms of basic 
principles, if we don’t take a clear position against the war and seek peace here and now, perhaps 
the hand [holding the gun] will be ours one day.  To the extent that we don’'t firmly nail down our 
basic principles as individuals, perhaps we will have to fire the bullet on orders from the state (Oda, 
1967: postscript, cited in Havens, 1987: 120).   163
internal debates in Okinawan civil society in the last thirty years or more, particularly 
during the Vietnam War. 
By the mid-1960s, Okinawan anti-militarism was increasingly inclined to 
stress opposition to generic war and military bases against the Japanese 
government’s support of America’s war.  This re-defined anti-militarism forced 
many Okinawans to reconsider reversion to Japan, which supported the war, as a 
comprehensive solution to their problems.  Thus, ‘reversion nationalism’ — and the 
Council’s strategy and collective action predicated on it — was brought under 
critical scrutiny.  For example, members of the Ryūkyū University Study Group of 
Marxism (Ryūkyū Daigaku Marukusu Kenkyu-kai) focused on the problem of 
Okinawan re-integration into the Japanese capitalist order.  The Group pointed out 
that the Japanese capitalist economy was the main beneficiary from the new Ampo 
and the US military forces placed in Okinawa in their economic expansion in 
Southeast Asia.  The Group discontinued their affiliation with the OPP in 1960, and 
publicly criticised the nationalism-oriented reversion movement.  In May 1965, 
reacting to the intensification of the Vietnam War, these students formed the Anti-
War Students’ Congress (Hansen Gakusei Kaigi).  The 2 July 1965 statement of the 
Congress at a general meeting declared: 
 
Our struggle against the US imperialist invasion of Vietnam requires 
international solidarity with workers all over the world, including 
American workers, who protest against militarism … Nationalist-inspired 
anti-Americanism in Okinawa, with the slogan ‘Go Home Yanks’, is not 
adequate to sustain our international anti-militarist struggle (cited in 
Arasaki 1969: 210).
44 
The critical version of ‘absolute pacifism’ raised scepticism towards emotional 
attachment to the nationalist symbols and slogans, interpreted as pathways to 
                                                             
44In this meeting, the students expressed their support for a US Army soldier, Lieutenant Richard 
Stink, who was suspended by the military for his refusal to go to South Vietnam because the ‘Vietnam 
War is not worth losing one soldier’s life’..  A few days later, some students handed leaflets titled 
‘Oppose Vietnam War: To Create a Movement for Peace’, written in English, to the US soldiers in 
Koza City (Arasaki 1969: 211).  Most US soldiers tore up and threw away the leaflets.  However, an 
anecdote tells that one or two African-American soldiers gave back a dollar note, which encouraged 
the students (Nakano & Arasaki 1970: 36–7).  This anti-militarist Okinawan repertoire of protest, ‘not 
to alienate the foreigners with slogans like ‘Yankee go home’ but instead to reach out to those who 
had doubts about the war’ (Havens 1987: 123) transferred to the mainland anti-war activists in Japan 
such as Beheiren members.  Some Beheiren members ‘began distributing leaflets to American sailors 
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inevitable future co-operation with the state and its war.  It was becoming clear that 
opposition to the existence of US military bases, predicated on critical ‘absolute 
pacifism’ and anti-militarism, was growing apart from the ‘reversion nationalism’ 
that was employed by the Council. 
‘Anti-Reversionism’ (Han Fukki) 
As the Okinawans’ struggle went through different phases, the collective identity of 
the anti-base movement also was in transformation.  Collective identity influenced 
the goals, strategies, and organisations of the anti-base movement by generalising 
within the protest community ‘an interactive and shared definition produced by 
several individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as 
the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place’ (Melucci 
1989: 34). 
Existential assumptions about Okinawa’s position vis-à-vis Japan were 
particularly important for the collective identity of protest during the cycle of protest 
understood as the ‘reversion movement’.  Up to the mid-1960s, the dominant 
definition of ‘Okinawa-jin’  (an Okinawan) emphasised the Okinawans’ sameness 
with the ‘Japanese’.  Expressions of Okinawan distinctiveness from, and criticism of, 
the mainland Japanese (for example, Japan’s war responsibility) were suppressed, 
together with the enthusiastic attachment to the hinomaru flag and promotion of 
standardised Japanese language, by the Council demonstrators and schoolteachers 
(Takara 1995: 157–8).  However, since the intensification of the Vietnam War, 
criticism of ‘reversion nationalism’ started to come from intellectuals, writers, 
students and other non-affiliated individuals.  At the same time, it was pointed out 
that there had not been enough self-critical reflection on the part of the reversionists 
during the reversion campaign regarding relations between the ‘Okinawan’ identity 
— what it meant to be ‘Okinawan’, not just ‘Japanese’ — and their political struggle 
(Oguma 1998: 597).  These actors were part of the broader community of protest, 
despite their organisationally detached status. 
In the mid-1960s, the attraction to reversion to Japan as the solution to the US 
military presence in Okinawa was deteriorating.  As the possibility of Okinawa’s   165
reversion became real, critics and writers challenged the idea of Okinawans as 
‘Japanese’.  For example, Shimao Toshio, in his ‘Yaponesia’ writings, captured the 
transformation of ‘the historical trend toward assimilation … giving way to a 
movement toward dissimilation’ (Gabriel 1999: 183).  Shimao’s ‘Yaponesia’ 
writings suggested that islands such as Okinawa, Amami, Yaeyama and Miyako did 
not primarily belong to yamato, but formed a separate cultural sphere that yamato 
was a part of.
45 
Arakawa Akira was an ‘iconoclast’ (Molasky 2003), for those who promoted 
the idea of ‘anti-reversionism’ (han-fukki shisō).  His idea of anti-reversionism 
focused on the denial of the Okinawan tradition to promote assimilation with Japan.  
The assimilationist tradition, which dates back to the Japan–Ryūkyū Common 
Ancestry Theory (Nichiryū Dōso Ron) of a seventeenth-century aristocrat, Haneji 
Choushu (Shoujouken), and extended to the Okinawan Studies pioneered by Iha 
Fuyu, had an important influence on orthodox Okinawan political thought (see 
chapter 2).  The pro-reversion intellectuals, who approved of Okinawa’s re-
integration with Japan, tended to idealise Jahana’s movement as a predecessor of the 
reversion movement.
46   In particular, Arakawa criticised the tactic of relying on 
protection from Japan and political integration with the state, as illusionary, in the 
same lineage of struggles originating from Nichiryū DousoRon, succeeded by Jahana 
Noboru’s Liberty and Freedom struggle (see chapter 2). 
The idea of anti-reversion not only rejects the Okinawans’ tendency towards 
wanting assimilation with yamato, but also denies the acceptance of the ‘logic of a 
nation-state’ that had dominated all political forces of both left and right in Okinawa.  
Arakawa criticises the mental character that tends to be drawn towards integration 
with a nation-state, and the emotional attraction to a ‘good, complete Japanese’ 
(Arakawa 1996: 96).  He advocates the positive acceptance of the inevitable 
character of ‘Okinawan’ as ‘alien’ in relation to a nation-state.  The crux of his anti-
                                                             
45 Another term ‘Ryūkyū-Ko’ (the Ryūkyū Arc) was also used, to describe the significance of the 
Ryūkyū archipelago as an entity independent from mainland Japan. 
46 For example, the quote made by the Okinawan Human Rights Association at its opening ceremony 
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reversionism is that the Okinawans’ struggle against the state could only be sustained 
by recognising the ‘alien’ status within it (Arakawa 1999: 97).   
Arakawa’s thought puzzled the reversion protagonists.  First, it was identified 
with the politically conservative theory for the independence of the Ryūkyūs, which 
preceded the formation of the reversion movement in the early 1950s (chapter 3).  
The independence advocates in the 1950s then argued for the separation of Okinawa 
from Japan, to be affiliated with the US, to obtain economic benefits through aid and 
other funding.  This independence path was discarded as a ‘mistake’ as the 
oppressive methods of the US administration became the main target of opposition.  
Yet the main aim of ‘anti-reversionism’ in the 1960s did not endorse any political 
option for seeking patronage from another nation-state, and was qualitatively 
different from the earlier vision of Okinawa’s independence (Ota 1971: 118–9). 
Second, Arakawa’s anti-reversionism appeared to negate almost any political 
action by denying concrete political diagnosis.  Arakawa himself did not form any 
major anti-base organisations, nor was his thought specifically connected to 
opposition to the bases, which makes his idea susceptible to being criticised as 
nihilistic.  Even though he opposes the idea of seeking integration with the state, his 
anti-reversionism does not instigate independence or a secessionist movement 
(Arakawa 2000: 60–77).  For this reason, anti-reversionism drew emotional reactions 
from some pro-OPP intellectuals, who interpreted it as approval of the perpetuation 
of the US military administration.  Politically, Arakawa simply recommends building 
the sense of self, as an Okinawan, by maintaining the critical distance from the state 
system, at a spiritual level.  With his colleagues such as Kawamitsu Shinichi and 
student groups associated with the New Left ideas, Arakawa attempted a campaign 
to boycott the first national election of Okinawan Diet members in 1970, which was 
a very small movement, attracting about 50 members at the initial meeting 
(Kawamitsu Shinichi, Interview, February 2002). 
Kawamitsu, a Miyako-born poet, who joined the Isahama farmers’ struggle 
against the US forced land acquisition as a student at the University of the Ryūkyūs, 
is a retired journalist of the Okinawa Times, and has been equally influential as an   167
iconoclastic critic of Okinawa’s reversion.  Kawamitsu has constantly distanced 
himself from political organisations.  At 70 years old, he says that he has never voted 
in elections, his ‘Okinawa Struggle’ is to engage in debates against other Okinawan 
activists who believe in the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ (Interview, February 2002).  He 
expresses cynicism towards, and detachment from, the ‘progressive’ parties and 
unions, prevalent among the Okinawan community of protest.
47  Today, Kawamitsu 
concentrates on his artistic activities, apart from supporting the famous Okinawan 
musician Kina Shōkichi’s international peace movement,
 48 which is also unaffiliated 
to political parties or unions. 
The anti-reversionist critique was a warning against what was seen as the 
coalition’s detachment from what was really at stake for the Okinawans, in favour of 
the tendency to give in to the pressure to assimilate with the state and its policies.  
Arakawa was never entirely clear on what exactly was at stake for the political 
struggles of the Okinawans.  Yet anti-reversionism appealed to those whose main 
concern was the historical narrative of Okinawa’s marginalisation that perpetuated 
further struggles, especially pertaining to Okinawans’ rights to safety and property.   
Discrimination within the Community of Protest 
Against the US military’s operations and further private property acquisitions in 
places such as Iejima, Konbu and Chibana, residents in local communities fought 
their own struggles.
49  More than one-fifth of the farmland — much more in the 
                                                             
47 Among his colleagues who are similarly distanced from organisational opposition is Takara Ben, a 
high school chemistry teacher and a poet, who publishes widely in local newspapers and books 
(Takara 1996).  He promotes the idea of Okinawa’s independence more vocally in a journal 
Urumanesia.  He has also organised solidarity-building events with a group of Ainu activists. 
48 Kina Shōkichi is a prominent Okinawan folk-pop musician.  His 1997 album, ‘Change all the 
weapons into music instruments’ (subete no buki o gakki ni), is also a slogan of his wide range of 
collective actions, including overseas activities, such as the ‘White Ship of Peace’ trip to the Native 
American community in 1998, and local activities such as the Nirai Kanai Festivals (see 
http://www.champloose.co.jp).  In February 2002, Kawamitsu travelled to India with Kina and 
Takaesu Asao, who was also an activist who participated in the Shiraho struggle (see chapter 6), 
representing a non-government organisation, the Peacemakers’ Network, and met with the Indian 
Defence Minister, George Fernandes, who supported his project of collecting all the weapons in the 
world and replacing them with musical instruments, by sending a weapon to Okinawa, in order to 
build a Peace Monument (Kina Shōkichi, Interview, February 2002, see http://subeteno.ohah.net). 
49  After the 1956 island-wide land struggle — the first-wave ‘Okinawa Struggle’ — subsided, 
residents in local communities fought their own struggles against the US military’s operations and 
further private property acquisitions in places such as Iejima (Ahagon 1998), Konbu (Okinawa Times 
Sha 1997: 233–6) and Chibana (Jinmin 11 January 1969).  For example, the land struggle in Konbu is 
recorded in Gushikawa Shishi (Gushikawa Shiyakusho 1970: 908–10).     168
densely populated central region — had been acquired by the military since the early 
1950s, making Okinawan food supplies reliant on imported American foodstuffs 
(Selden 1974: 121).  The main alternative to starvation for the displaced farmers was 
employment in the US bases and the sex industry catering for the US military 
personnel.  Selden writes:  
 
As of 1970, one-sixth of the Okinawan workforce was directly employed 
by the US military (40,000 workers) and the colonial government (34,000).  
And this was but a fraction of those forced to live off the American 
presence, including an estimated 15,000 to 25,000 prostitutes and bar girls, 
and more than 10,000 maids employed by servicemen (all officers and 
many enlisted men have servants, a luxury made possible by the depressed 
Okinawan wage scale).  Tens of thousands of others work in the wide 
range of subsidiary industries and services which cater to American 
pleasures (Selden 1974: 288). 
The military provided the biggest market for locally manufactured products such as 
cement, steel, vegetable and fruit, clothes and boxes for packing and sending 
(Ryūkyū Shimpo Sha 1968: 120). 
For the farmers who had their land reduced or completely taken away by the 
military, the bases not only provided the labour market, but also were the source of 
money to be made in the catering or sex industries.  Revenues from prostitution, bars 
and other service industries for the US soldiers indeed supported the Okinawan 
economy until reversion.  The income generated by sexual labour was at least 
$50,400,000 in 1970.
50  This figure exceeded the $43,500,000 made annually from 
the sugar-cane industry, which was the largest industry in Okinawa at the time 
(Sturdevant & Stoltzfus 1993: 251–2).  As opposed to the base workers who had the 
power to jeopardise US military operations by strikes and boycotts, bar workers and 
prostitutes remained politically unorganised and vulnerable.  The people who made 
their living in ‘base towns’, including bartenders, waiters, bar hostesses and sex 
workers, were subject to, and dependent on, the hierarchical economic relations with 
US customers, and were constantly susceptible to the danger of violence and abuse. 
Following the Korean War, when sexual assault of women and girls by US 
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$20 per night.  The number of the prostitutes was estimated by the G.R.I. (Sturdevant & Stoltzfus 
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soldiers and officers in the community were common, ‘special restaurant districts’ 
(tokushu inshoku gai) designed for US military clientele were constructed voluntarily 
by community members to create a ‘sexual breakwater’, that is, an artificial disposal 
of potential sexual violence directed at ‘normal citizens’ (Tomiyama 1996: 27).
51  
Towns and cities surrounding major US bases such as Koza, Kin and Ginowan 
developed due to the incomes generated from the rest and recreation industries 
catering for US military personnel.  The US authorities imposed rigorous health and 
hygiene regulations on these industries, and obligated the bars, restaurants and clubs 
that were approved by US standards to display an ‘A’ (‘Approved’) sign. 
The ‘A’ sign businesses were particularly reluctant to support the campaign 
for reversion, or any political movements that offended the US authorities.  The ‘A’ 
sign districts were most vulnerable to the US military’s ‘off limits’ sanctions, which 
banned military personnel from local businesses, as a means to dampen local 
political opposition (see chapter 4).  Because of the ‘A’ sign industries’ vulnerability 
to the arbitrary ‘off limits’ sanctions of the US, uncertainty was rife about what 
would happen to the local economy if the reversion were achieved and the military 
bases disappeared.  An ‘A’ sign restaurant owner in Koza confessed: with so many 
people relying for their livelihood on the bases, ‘I cannot agree with the view that 
reversion should be achieved immediately, at any cost.’ (Ryūkyū Shimpo Sha 1968: 
127)  However, the Koza restaurant owner also admitted that the people engaged in 
base-related industries shared with other islanders a basic wish to ‘return to the home 
country’. 
The US soldiers behaved much more violently off base during the Vietnam 
War: their crime rate increased dramatically in the local community (Takazato 
1998).
52  In some cases, soldiers beat up Okinawan residents to invite arrest, just to 
avoid being sent to the war zone (Ryūkyū Shimpo Sha 1968: 141).  Murder and rape 
                                                             
51 This information was obtained from the survey conducted in Koza, by Professor Ishihara Masaie’s 
research team at the Okinawa International University (Tomiyama 1996: 30, n14) 
52A member of the Naha City Assembly, Takazato Suzuyo, recalls that the aggressive behaviour 
displayed by US soldiers in the local community was exceptional during the Vietnam War.   
Particularly in 1967, there were a series of robberies and murders of bar hostesses committed by 
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of the locals who worked in the ‘special districts’ and in US military bases were 
frequent, heinous and insufficiently prosecuted by the authorities (Ryūkyū Shimpo 
Sha 1968: 140).
  In 1966, for example, no investigation result was reported by the US 
military police on the killing of a local bar maid in the Kin Village.  Similarly, in 
1968 the search result of a housemaid who was found dead, naked and stabbed 
repetitively in a bathtub at a US soldier’s residency within a base in Urasoe village 
was never reported (Ryūkyū Shimpo Sha 1968: 140). 
However, the reversion activists and organisations tended not to address these 
cases as they represented the ‘innocent victims’ of the 1955 Yumiko-chan and 1962 
Kokuba-kun incidents.  Tomiyama explains that the US military’s violence inflicted 
on the women in ‘base towns’ was ignored, in effect, to protect the symbolical effect 
of the victimisation of normal, non-occupational ‘victims’ (Tomiyama 1996: 28).  
The making of innocent victims as a resource for mobilising collective action to 
demand reversion was predicated on the silence over violence and human rights 
abuses that occurred in ‘special districts’ like Koza.  This point is indicative of the 
divisions and discriminations internal to the community of protest, and the difficulty 
of constructing the struggle of one ‘Okinawa’. 
Reversion and Anti-Militarism Unbound: the ‘Second Wave’ Peaks 
The Anti-B52 General Strike Fizzles  
On 15 November 1967, Satō and US President Johnson officially announced in the 
US–Japan Joint Communiqué that Okinawa would be returned to Japan in a couple 
of years’ time, without affecting the US military forces crucial for maintaining 
regional security (Nakano 1969: 651–2).  Namely, it became clear that the 
administration of Okinawa would revert to Japan, leaving the US military bases as 
they were.  That is, the LDP leaders found a way to achieve Okinawa’s reversion, 
and keep the US forces in Okinawa intact (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 70–80, Nakano 
1969: 597–602). 
On 29 July 1968, 30 B-52s departed from Okinawa and attacked ‘Viet Cong 
concentrations 58 kilometres southeast of Saigon’ (Havens 1987: 76).  The Marine 
Corps stationed in central Okinawa departed for the combat zone, and aircraft loaded   171
with Hawk missiles were sent to bases in South Vietnam from the Kadena Air Base 
(Nakano & Arasaki 1970: 7).  Cases of plane crashes and accidents in Okinawa 
caused by the US military training increased, often hitting, hurting and killing the 
locals.
  Accidents caused by military training involved local casualties, for instance, 
in an accident in Yomitan village, in which a trailer fell from the sky and crushed a 
girl during a ‘drop’ exercise from an aircraft in June 1965. 
In the early morning of 19 November 1968, a B-52 crashed at the Kadena Air 
Base.  The Zengunrō leader, Uehara, was living within two kilometres of the Kadena 
base.  Though there were no casualties, the incident ‘sent the residents into an 
endless abyss of fear towards the B-52s’ (Uehara 1982: 269).  The fear was 
amplified by the existence of a nuclear arsenal 150 metres from the accident (Sokoku 
Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 483).  After the accident, on 7 December the 
Council  for Reversion, Zengunrō,  Kenrōkyō and other unions and organisations, 
including the OTA, formed another coalition consisting of almost the identical 
member organisations as the Council for Reversion, Inochi o Mamoru Kenmin Kyōtō 
(Okinawan Citizens’ Life Protection Coalition).  The Life Protection Coalition 
focused on protesting against B-52s, stopovers of US nuclear submarines, and all the 
nuclear weapons in Okinawan bases.  In January 1969, trade union members, 
students, and non-affiliated citizens agreed on a general strike, to request the removal 
of the B-52s.  The Council agreed to this proposal, and planned a ‘100,000 sit-in’ on 
the military roads within Kadena Air Base on 4 February.  The general strike was 
planned to take place in February 1969 (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 183, Sokoku Fukki 
Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 483). 
The participation of Zengunrō in the general strike was significant, in terms 
of the potential damage to the US forces.  On 24 April 1968, the base workers had 
been on a 24-hour strike called 10 Wari Nenkyū Tōsō (The Complete Annual Leave 
Struggle).
53  This strike was motivated by the emerging hope for reversion, as well as 
rage against all sorts of discrimination against the Okinawan base workers during the 
                                                             
53  Some 23,000 employees took annual leave, whereas there were 18,000 union members among 
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previous 23 years.  Officially, the strike was not directed at the removal of the bases.  
In fact, the organiser announced that the strike was totally unrelated to the anti-base 
movement (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 177).  The strike achieved monthly average 
payment raise from $15.60 to $18.72 (Arasaki 1976: 178), and temporarily paralysed 
the binding effect of USCAR Ordinance No. 116 that prohibited workers’ industrial 
actions on base (Uehara 1982: 248).
54   Zengunrō was among the most capable 
organisations at making effective demands on the US administration, successfully 
pressuring USCAR into suspending Ordinance No. 116 (Jinmin 18 January 1969).  
Other unions such as Zen Oki Rōren, Kankōrō, and Kenrōkyō also led a number of 
rallies and demonstrations in protest against B-52s and nuclear weapons (Jinmin 11 
January 1969, 25 January 1969). 
The Life Protection Coalition focused on protesting against anti-militarism, 
and the use of the US armed forces on Okinawa, in attacking Vietnam.  In Naha City, 
an association of central shopping centre businesses decided to participate in the 
general strike, by closing members’ businesses for 24 hours.  Some fishing people 
planned a demonstration on the ocean, and Chatan and Yomitan villages in central 
Okinawa prepared for the entire closure of the villages.  The workers’ unions 
engaged in last minute preparation for the prefectural rally, such as setting up 
medical facilities, transport to bring participants to Kadena, and mobile toilets.  On 
14 December, the progressive coalition organised a major anti-B-52 rally and 
demonstration surrounding the Kadena Air Base (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 183–5).   
The general strike exerted major pressure on the US and Japanese 
governments, more than the election of the progressive candidate Yara as Chief 
Executive in November 1968.  The Japanese government, which earlier had 
expressed its support for the US policy in Vietnam, therefore, persuaded the 
Okinawans to stop the general strike.  By this time, the Japanese government had 
built up political and economic influence on Okinawa, which grew bigger and bigger 
                                                             
54  The US military threatened the base workers with severe counter-action against those who 
participated.  The High Commissioner issued a ‘general labour ordinance’ as a substitute for 
Ordinance No. 116, which improved the wages and other working conditions, however, added severe 
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in comparison to that of USCAR.  The Japanese government communicated directly 
to Chief Executive Yara, using two political weapons: one, economic aid and, two, 
the promise of early reversion.  Chief Executive Yara had been building close 
relationships with Tokyo, to ask for a speedy completion of Okinawa’s reversion 
during the US and Japan negotiations summit, an increased amount of economic aid 
to Okinawa, and the removal of B-52s.  Prime Minister Satō and Yara met informally 
a number of times, during which Satō advised Yara to cancel the general strike, in 
order not to slow the process of reversion (Nakano & Arasaki 1970: 186).
55 
The mainland Japanese umbrella organisations of trade unions, Sohyō and 
Dōmei, were ambivalent towards the planned general strike in Okinawa.  They had 
the Okinawa Prefectural Labour Union Committee (kenrōkyō) registered as their 
subsidiary organisation, however, and were hesitant to involve Japanese trade unions 
in the anti-Ampo struggle, and opted for a moderate anti-militarist position.  Almost 
no mainland trade unions participated in any activities in support of the Okinawan 
general strike (Nakano & Arasaki 1970: 186).  On 31 January, Yara requested the 
Life Protection Coalition to give up the general strike.  The Okinawa Prefectural 
Labour Union Committee agreed to accept Yara’s request, in order to protect the new 
Yara administration, elected from the progressive coalition.  Thus, the general strike 
was aborted.  On 24 January, the Life Protection Coalition  mobilised 40,000 
participants to an Okinawan Citizens’ Rally (Kenmin Soukekki Taikai) prior to the 
general strike.  On 4 February, the day the general strike was planned for, another 
40,000 gathered in the rain for an anti-B-52 rally. 
Following the abortion of the general strike, the Council members lost their 
direction with respect to how to define the ‘home country’.  Critical views expanded 
against ‘reversion nationalism’ based on the Okinawans’ victim mentality, and many 
more started to disconnect themselves from the ‘Okinawan’ collective identity based 
on ‘Japaneseness’ (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 195).  This self-doubt contradicted the 
Council’s strategy to link with the mainland Japanese leftist organisations.  Also, 
                                                             
55 The Japanese government hinted at the possible removal of B-52s from Okinawa, after the June or 
July completion of the new military airport in Thailand, which had been under construction (Nakano 
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anti-reversionist thought gained popularity, combined with the newly emerging 
ambition for Okinawan independence. 
Nevertheless, Chief Executive Yara and other Council leaders attempted to 
maintain solidarity with mainland Japanese progressives, as well as reversion as their 
priority agenda.  However, to Yara’s bewilderment, the Council for Reversion 
announced its opposition to the second meeting between Satō and US President 
Nixon, scheduled to confirm Okinawa’s reversion in 1972.  Nakano and Arasaki 
note, ‘the prevailing consensus was the denial of the Japanese government’s 1972 
reversion policy.  The Council demanded the complete removal of US bases that the 
people had wished’, which was, instead of reversion, defined as ‘Okinawa’s 
liberation’ (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 195–6).  At this point, it was clear that 
reversion to Japan was no longer the goal of the ‘Okinawan struggle’. 
However, this change of perspective was damaging for the Council members 
in terms of integrity and confidence, and confusions prevailed as to its future 
direction.  The construction of a new nuclear arsenal near Camp Schwab in Henoko 
was added to the anti-military protest agenda, furthermore, it became obvious, in 
July 1969, that the bases in Okinawa stored poison gas — from the media report of 
its leakage — which led to a violent entry of students into USCAR headquarters, and 
another Okinawan Citizens’ Rally (kenmin taikai) (Okinawa Daihyakka Jiten Kanko 
Jimukyoku 1983: 184).   
After the Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué in November 1969, which 
confirmed Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, the Council’s Secretary General and other 
Council of Reversion members attempted to combine the slogan of ‘reversion’, with 
‘opposition to war’.  It was at around this time that the Council leaders started to use 
the term ‘Okinawa Struggle’ (Okinawa tōsō) in order to describe Okinawans’ own 
struggles against generic marginalisation of Okinawa (Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 
199), distinguished from the mainland Japanese usage of the term.  The combination 
of reversion and anti-militarism was unconvincing to Nakasone Isamu, a local 
magistrate, who was in his 20s at the time: ‘It was like adding a bamboo to a tree.  
Demanding anti-militarism could not be compatible with reversion to Japan’   175
(Takara, 1995: 191): Japan was supporting America’s war at the time. 
Zengunrō Strikes and the Koza Riot 
After the Satō and Nixon communiqué, the US military announced the dismissal of 
2,400 local base workers.  From 8 January 1970, Zengunrō engaged in strikes against 
the military’s redundancy policy.
56   Importantly, as Nakano and Arasaki note, 
Zengunrō’s struggle against the redundancy policy was not a demand for the US 
bases to remain a stable employment provider, but was a protest against the US 
military presence in Okinawa after reversion, under new, streamlined management 
(Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 202).  With a slogan of ‘no jobs, no base’ (kubi o kirunara 
kichi mo kaese), the desperate struggle of the base workers was extremely solid, 
well-organised and full of energy, despite the workers’ lack of economic resources.  
Some schoolteachers, public servants, anti-war university students and mainland 
Japanese supporters joined the picket lines at the military gates (Ishida 1993: 70–
84).
57    However, the Yara Administration, though sympathetic, did not express 
support for fear of delaying the intended 1972 reversion. 
Moreover, the US military responded to the Zengunrō strikes by declaring 
that the local business district was ‘off limits’ to US military personnel and their 
families..  On 20 January 1970, the ‘A’ sign business owners who feared bankruptcy 
surrounded the Zengunrō headquarters’ office, protesting against the base workers’ 
strikes against the US military (Okinawa Daihyakka Jiten Kanko Jimukyoku 1983: 
186).  A mainland Japanese supporter, Ishida, witnessed a debt-stricken female bar 
owner verbally abusing the picketers in Koza, and in return being sexually harassed 
by the workers ‘for interrupting the picket line’ (Ishida 1993: 85–7).  Local 
gangsters, hired by the entertainment industry, also attacked the picket line (Nakano 
& Arasaki 1976: 201).  Young business owners, bartenders and waiters, in the ‘base 
town’ districts, were critical of the progressive political organisations’ inability to 
                                                             
56 Zengunrō workers was on strike for 48 hours, 8–9 January, and for 120 hours from 19 January 
(Nakano & Arasaki 1976: 200). 
57 Various mainland Japanese individuals travelled to Okinawa to support the ‘Okinawa Struggle’, 
which had been isolated from mainland progressive political organisations.  These sympathisers 
included radical New Left sectarian activists, intellectuals and famous writers such as Ōe Kenzaburō, 
who questioned, ‘Is it possible to change myself into a Japanese that is not the Japanese we are?’ 
during his sojourn in Okinawa (Ōe 1970 [1994]).   176
fully address or stage collective action against the lightness with which the 
Okinawans’ human rights and lives were treated.  To these workers, Arakawa’s anti-
reversionist thought was particularly attractive.  In 1969, these workers established 
the Koza Livelihood Protection Society (Koza no seikatsu o mamoru kai) 
(Tomiyama 1996: 28–9), which found supporters among young ‘base town’ male 
workers (Ishida 1993: 86).
58   The Livelihood Protection Society was in severe 
conflict with the zengunrō, and other ‘progressive’ Okinawan activists, at the scene 
of picketing. 
On 20 December, just past midnight, a car driven by a US Army soldier hit a 
local man employed by the US military.  The crowd surrounding the site of the 
accident started to scream and shout, demanding the Military Police hand over the 
driver to the local police.  When the Military Police let the driver go, the witnesses 
were infuriated, for just seven days before, the military court acquitted a soldier, 
despite killing a woman in Itoman in a car accident.   The crowd set fire to vehicles 
with yellow license plates, which indicated ownership by the US military.   
According to a ‘Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report’ of 28 
December 1970, the riot involved more than 2,000 locals, about 100–200 of whom 
were involved in burning 82 cars, a military employment office and American 
children’s schools within the Kanda Air Base (Okinawa Shiyakusho Kikakubu Heiwa 
Bunka  Shinko-ka 1999: 96–101).
59    The Koza riot is the only spontaneous, 
unorganised incident of violence of this scale in Okinawa’s post-war history. 
The participants included union members, schoolteachers, base workers and 
other ordinary citizens who were drinking in Koza.
60  However, a public servants’ 
union member who joined the riot, stresses that there was no instruction or 
                                                             
58 The aforementioned female bar owner was clearly not associated with this Society (Ishida 1993: 
85). 
59 In total, 476 police officers from all over Okinawa Main Island were mobilised, and 21 people were 
arrested (Okinawa Shiyakusho Kikakubu Heiwa Bunka Shinko-ka 1999: 68).   
60 According to the ‘Summary Police Report on the Koza Riot of 20 December’, the occupations of 
arrested suspects included a Koza City Hall staff member, four military employees, a car company 
employee, a glass manufacturer employee, a construction worker, a university student, a high school 
student, a bartender, a taxi driver, a waterside worker, an electric retail owner, two unemployed, an 
upholsterer, a hotel worker, a milling company employee, a mechanic, and a company worker 
(Okinawa Shiyakusho Kikakubu Heiwa Bunka Shinko-ka 1999).     177
mobilisation from any union: the main instigators were youngsters who worked for 
the bars and restaurants in Koza catering to the US soldiers (Mainichi Shimbun 
(Seibu Honsha), 17 December, 2000).  Tomiyama explains the explosion of these 
bartenders and ‘base town’ workers’ anger was directed at the discrimination and 
human rights abuses in their daily contact with the US military and its people.  In the 
Koza riot, the ‘bar town’ workers who had been excluded from the definition of 
‘citizens’ in the reversion movement became the subject of a struggle, as 
‘Okinawans’ (Tomiyama 1996: 29, Aldous 2003).  The Koza riot gave voice to the 
‘bar town’ workers, at least to young male workers who were capable of violence, 
who had been irrelevant to the organisation or mobilisation of the progressive 
coalition.  The power of the Koza riot was ‘different from any rallies or protest 
‘movements’’ according to a New Left mainland Japanese student (Ryūkyū Shimpo 
20 December 2000).  The emergence of this riot, completely outside of the 
organisational and ideological spectrum of the Council for Reversion, was an 
indication of internal divisions among the community of protest and, importantly, the 
separation of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’, led by the progressive parties and unions, from 
the day-to-day issues which the Okinawan public was dealing with in relation to the 
US military presence. 
Conclusion 
Reversion to Japanese administration was a goal that dictated the strategic and 
ideological direction of the reversion movement.  Emotional attachment to the idea 
of returning to Japan as the ‘home country’ was at the heart of the ‘framing’ of the 
reversion movement, which coincided with the mainland conservative politicians’, 
and especially Prime Minister Satō’s, political agenda.  ‘Reversion nationalism’ and 
the progressive coalition consolidated the idea of ‘the Okinawa Struggle’ as a 
comprehensive people’s movement against Okinawa’s marginalisation.  During the 
reversion movement, leading political organisations were established, built a 
coalition, and also established a repertoire of protest, strategies and rituals.  The 
organisational structure and repertoire of protest under the Council formed the basis 
of a still influential anti-base protest sector, which Barrel and Tanaka call the ‘usual   178
suspects’ (see Introduction). 
However, the progressive coalition’s focus on reversion and the framing of 
‘reversion nationalism’ by no means spoke for the whole Okinawan community of 
protest, nor fully accommodated the locals’ strong rejection of involvement in 
another war, which stemmed directly from the residents’ experience in the Battle of 
Okinawa.  The Council also spoke for the ‘innocent victims’ of US military accidents 
and crimes, and mobilised collective action to demand reversion, however, the 
‘innocence’ of these victims was constructed on the silence over violence and human 
rights abuses which occurred daily, for example, in ‘special districts’ like Koza.   
Internal divisions and discriminations within Okinawa resisted the progressive 
coalition’s call for a unified demonstration of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’, that is, the 
struggle for one ‘Okinawa’.  The failure of the general strike and the Koza riot 
graphically highlighted this.  These fissures and divisions show that the idea of a 
unitary ‘Okinawan’ struggle was, and has been, a myth.   
However, reversion was achieved, and the idea of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ 
survived.  Okinawa became part of Japan in 1972 again, largely due to the favourable 
political opportunity, namely, the formation of new security alliance arrangements 
between the US and Japan.  The progressive coalition and its collective actions were 
rewarded by Okinawa’s repatriation to Japan, though without the withdrawal of US 
bases.  Although it was hardly the ideal result, reversion was quite an achievement, 
the reversion movement during the 27 years of US direct military rule finally 
resulted in a major political change.  Therefore, the imprint of the reversion 
movement has remained strong, as a cornerstone of the myth of the struggle of 
‘Okinawans’ as a unitary group of people.  The reversion movement provided 
organisationally and strategically lasting influences for the trajectory of an 
‘Okinawan’ struggle, and its outcome added another traumatic legacy to the 
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Many ‘Okinawas’, Many Protests:  
Groping for Peace in a Civil Society 
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Chapter Six  
 
The Anti-War Landowners and the Progressive Coalition:  
The ‘Constitutional’ Framing of Protest 
 
Introduction 
Reversion to Japan in 1972 represented a major turning point in the history of post-
war Okinawa, and for the community of protest.  During the first and second ‘waves’ 
of protest, the campaign for reversion enabled the building of a progressive coalition, 
which engaged in successive mass rallies and campaigns, and gave substance to the 
idea of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’.  As the ‘second wave’ Okinawans’ mass protest ran 
its cycle, the momentum for protest on a mass scale decreased and went into a 
sustained ‘low’ phase, which lasted for about a quarter of a century.  This preceded 
the third high point of the Okinawans’ protest against the US military bases, 
triggered by the rape of a 12-year-old girl in 1995.  This long ‘trough’ period (1972–
95) is an important phase prior to the next cycle of protest, a period when protest 
actors started to create different agendas and approaches to protest that became 
explicit in the post-1995 period.  This process involved re-defining why we protest, 
what is at stake, and who ‘we’ are, across various struggles in different regions and 
communities. 
The most striking characteristic of the Okinawan community of protest in this 
post-reversion period is fragmentation: in terms of organisation, strategy, collective 
identity and the framing of protest.  What stands out during this long ‘trough’ period 
is the burgeoning of diverse and differently defined struggles in Okinawa, leading to 
a splintering of protest groups and individual struggles.  As the credibility and appeal 
of ‘reversion nationalism’ deteriorated, the internal unity of the coalition weakened.  
Internal divisions and differences within the community of protest were not new.  
However, they were increasingly articulated in the protest organisations and 
strategies.  On the other hand, an island-wide — or even progressive — coalition 
towards one ‘Okinawan struggle’ was severely weakened.   181
However, the idea of an ‘Okinawan’ struggle as a ‘movement’ survived.  Part 
III examines how the myth was sustained, despite the increased splintering of the 
organisations, priorities and reform agendas.  To understand these differences in the 
community of protest, and what makes all of them still ‘Okinawan’ and somehow 
unified, I will, for convenience, distinguish three major ‘framings’ of protest: 
constitutional, environmentalist and gender.  Chapter 6 focuses on the first, 
represented by the struggle of the anti-war landowners’ and supporting political 
parties and workers’ unions after reversion.  Okinawa’s reversion — consolidated in 
the late 1960s and formalised in 1972 — propelled the community of protest into 
confusion: reversion was achieved but the US bases remained and, in addition, 
Japanese military forces were to be deployed.  It was clear that the struggle was to 
continue.  However, reversion was no longer the gathering point for protest.  Reform 
agendas, the goals of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’, and the basis for a coalition needed 
redefining.   
The anti-war landowners, together with the one-tsubo anti-war landowners 
and the supporting progressive parties and workers’ unions, had been given, and 
have played, the role of anchor to the progressive coalition, and the idea and tradition 
of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’.  Since the Council for Reversion no longer was able to 
lead the coalition, the anti-war landowners provided the ‘glue’ for building an anti-
base coalition among much more divided progressive, left-wing political parties, 
workers’ unions, teachers’ unions and other citizens’ organisations.  Through 
supporting the anti-war landowners, these progressive forces were able to continue 
the ‘Okinawa Struggle’.   
However, the role of the progressive coalition was limited to being the 
anchor.  The constitutional framing of protest of the anti-war landowners’ struggle 
and their supporting organisations provided avenues for protest for those inside the 
specific circle of the community of protest.  However, it could not expand as an 
‘Okinawan anti-base movement’ to involve new members and agendas for protest.  
Ironically, though, indirectly it contributed to the emergence of entirely new 
frameworks and perspectives from which to protest, created by those who went   182
separate ways from the traditional parties, unions, and anti-war landowners, as will 
be discussed in chapters 7 and 8.  In effect, the limitations of the established protest 
groups sowed the seeds of new approaches and expressions that were to develop 
elsewhere. 
This chapter first examines the re-organisation of the anti-base progressive 
coalition, as the anti-war landowners’ and their supporters.  An important implication 
of the anti-war landowners’ long-term struggles has been, despite the Japanese 
government’s various schemes and economic subsidies, keeping the locals’ anti-
military popular expression — and importantly, the myth of an ‘Okinawan 
struggle’— alive.  The second section examines the repertoire of collective action of 
the anti-war landowners and the progressive coalition.  In the 1980s, apart from the 
rejuvenating effect of the emergence of one-tsubo anti-war landowners, the nature of 
collective action became increasingly routine and technical, and the momentum for 
mass anti-base protest reduced significantly.  As far as the anti-base movement in 
Okinawa is concerned, institutional and legal methods to directly confront 
government policy have almost always been conducive to defeat.  The third section 
examines the ‘constitutionalist’ framing of protest. 
This chapter will look at some aspects of change and diversification in 
collective identity, strategy and organisational structure of protest of the progressive 
coalition, however, overall, ‘continuation’ has been the predominant characteristic of 
its protest.  While the landowners have existed as a symbolic foundation of the myth 
of an ‘‘Okinawan’ struggle’, in the ‘low’ phase in the post-reversion cycle of protest, 
the activities of the anti-base coalition of progressive organisations have become 
increasingly out of touch with and unable to represent other emerging groups and 
individuals engaged in protest.  The ‘trough’ period was thus important in that this is 
when ‘new social movements’ had their genesis in the community of protest.  This 
was as much a process through which existing and prospective protesters came to 
understand the limitations of existing organisations and techniques of protest as it 
was of the generation of new actors who would become the basis of new social 
movements.  It is the former that is the focus of this chapter.   183
The Anti-War Landowners and the Re-organised Coalition for the ‘Okinawa 
Struggle’ 
Who are the Anti-War Landowners? 
The ‘anti-war landowners’ are the owners of private properties occupied by the US 
and Japanese military in Okinawa, who ‘refuse to sign the lease contract, from the 
perspective of opposing war and aspiring for peace’ (Arasaki 1992a: 108).  They 
represent only about 100 of about 30,000 landowners, a majority of whom legally 
engaged in lease contracts with the state.  Some of the anti-war landowners do little 
more than refuse to sign the land lease contract, while others publicly participate in 
anti-base protest activities. 
Either immediately after the Battle of Okinawa, or in the early 1950s, the US 
forces occupied the land required for building military bases in the landowners’ 
absence (as examined in chapter 4).  As a result, in Okinawa about 33 per cent of the 
land occupied by the US military is privately owned.
1  Subsequent to the 1956 island-
wide protest (Shimagurumi tōsō, see chapter 4) against the US military’s lump-sum 
payment policy, the landowners obtained the right to receive rent each year.  Most of 
the landowners entered into lease contracts with the US forces (whom I call ‘contract 
landowners’).  Tochiren, the biggest and oldest interest group of landowners of 
military properties and a central actor in the land struggle in the 1950s, has 
represented the ‘contract landowners’.
2   
However, several hundred landowners, mostly farmers in villages such as 
Maja in Ie-jima, Oroku, Chatan and Yomitan, refused to sign their leases, to express 
their opposition to militarism and war.  This marked the birth of the anti-war 
landowners (‘non-contract landowners’ or ‘objectors’).  Since then, the contract 
landowners have received ‘rent’, and the non-contract landowners have received 
‘compensation’ from the US and, after 1972, the Japanese government.  Immediately 
                                                             
1 In other parts of Japan, the US forces and the Self Defense Forces reside in properties mostly owned 
by the state.  The state owns 23.5% of the land used by the US military bases on Okinawa, as opposed 
to 76.5% elsewhere (Okinawa Ken Sōmubu Chiji Koōshitsu Kichi Taisakushitsu 2000: 6). 
2 As a representative body of contract landowners, Tochiren has concentrated on negotiation with the 
state for better contract terms and higher rent on behalf of the landowners.  In 1995, Tochiren 
officially declared its opposition against the termination of military land leases, that is, against 
withdrawal of the US military from Okinawa (Kurima 1998: 279).   184
after Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in 1972, the Japanese government became the 
subcontractor of the Okinawan landowners’ lease to the US military, under Article V 
of the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty, which states it is Japan’s duty to provide 
facilities to the deployment of US forces within Japan (Arasaki 1995: 75). 
The rise of anti-militarism in the late 1960s in Okinawa expanded the number 
of non-contract landowners to 3,000.  In 1971, the Anti-War Landowners’ 
Organisation (Kenri to Zaisan o Mamoru Gunyō Jinushi-kai, usually called Hansen 
Jinushi-kai) was formed, financially supported by the Council for Reversion to the 
Home Country (Council for Reversion).  As a countermeasure, the Japanese 
government increased the rent 6.1 times, on average, higher than before reversion 
(Kurima 1998: 288).  Thus, the rent from the military came to form a sizable part of 
the Okinawan economy.  Together with a boost of Japanese subsidies into the 
Okinawa Prefecture, the Okinawan economy was transferred from a ‘base economy’ 
to a ‘subsidy economy’, dependent on the income granted by the government 
(Kurima 1998: 32–4), including the military property rent.
3   
The Japanese government used many methods ― mostly underhand ― to 
discourage objectors.
4  Over time, a majority of landowners succumbed and signed 
their lease contract.  Arasaki (cited in Zen’ei Staff 1996: 86) recalls an anti-war 
landowner, Uehara Taro’s, comment from Oroku village: ‘at least, the US military 
respected the landowners’ right to express their refusal and did not manipulate our 
psyche by inventing sources of conflicts between contract landowners and the 
objectors, as Japan did’.  
                                                             
3 The transfer of money from the US and Japan to the G.R.I. was 41.7 billion yen in 1969, in 1978, the 
Okinawa Prefecture received 637.6 billion yen from Japan’s state budget (Kurima 1998: 5).  An 
aggregate direct income from the US bases, which included US military personnel and their families’ 
spending, wages and salaries of the local base employers, and the rent paid for the land privately 
owned by the local landowners, declined drastically from 36.8% in 1970 to 14.6% in 1974 (Kurima 
1998: 32).   
4 The non-contract landowners’ properties were often returned to the objectors in small plots amidst 
the massive US bases — dreaded by the owners, for they could not be used for residence, farmland or 
any economic activities.  The government also returned contract landowners’ properties simply 
because they were located adjacent to non-contract properties.  Because the return of undesired 
military properties reduced regular income, bitter conflicts arose between some non-contract and 
contract landowners.  Some objectors were ostracised in their communities and workplaces, some 
were estranged by family members and relatives (Arasaki 1995: 78–82).   185
Re-Organisation of the Anti-Base Coalition  
Around 1970, it looked as if the Okinawans’ reversion movement was a failure, in 
terms of the goal to de-militarise the island through the end of US military rule.  
With the 1960 US–Japan Security Treaty renewed in 1970, the Japanese 
government’s imperative was to ensure that US military functions in Okinawa would 
remain intact.  The Council for Reversion protested in a public statement: since the 
Satō-Nixon joint Communiqué in 1969, Prime Minister Satō’s repeated slogan of ‘no 
nuke, mainland-standard’ (kaku-nuki, hondo-nami) had proved deceptive.  Apart 
from partial removal of nuclear warheads from the island, the existence of the base 
facilities of the US forces remained pretty much unchanged.  Okinawa’s reversion 
betrayed the expectation that the US military presence on Okinawa would be 
decreased to the level comparable to that of the mainland.
5  Not only was the US 
military presence maintained as heavily as in the pre-reversion period, but the 
Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) was also deployed in Okinawa (Sokoku Fukki 
Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 688).  In 1972, the Council for Reversion issued a 
number of resolutions and statements against the ‘Return of Okinawa Pact’ (Okinawa 
Henkan Kyōtei) signed in June 1971 between Sato and Nixon, in particular, 
loopholes for possible deployment of US nuclear weapons, continuing existence of 
the US military bases on Okinawa, and the new entry of the Japanese Self Defense 
Forces (Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 635).  The Council explained that 
the reversion achieved in 1972 was not what Okinawans expected:   
 
We, the citizens of Okinawa Prefecture (Okinawa kenmin), are firmly 
opposed to any military bases.  The majority of us wished for immediate, 
unconditional and total reversion under the pacifist Japanese 
Constitution, which is embodied by the 1968 election of the Chief 
Executive.  The ‘Return of Okinawa Pact’, however, made the reversion 
totally different from what the citizens of the Okinawa Prefecture really 
aspired for (Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 728–9). 
                                                             
5 The size of the land surface exclusively used by the US military bases on Okinawa, after reversion, 
was 24,000ha, 15 per cent less than before reversion, and 23,519 hectares in 2000 (Okinawa Ken 
Sōmubu Chiji Kōshitsu Kichi Taisakushitsu 2000: 1).     186
The ‘Okinawan’ identity, which had constantly oscillated between sameness with 
yamato and distinctiveness of uchina  (Okinawa), was swinging decisively towards 
distinctiveness at this point, in the community of protest.
6 
In its 1975 annual report, the Council for Reversion redefined the next stage 
of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ (Okinawa tōsō).  It first pointed out the shortcomings of 
‘reversion nationalism’, the dominant framing of protest in the 1960s: ‘under the 
extremely desperate situation (under US military rule), when Okinawa was all but 
completely forgotten as part of a Japanese-speaking people, it was ‘necessary’ to 
appeal to Okinawans’ ethnic ties with Japan, in order to turn Okinawa’s reversion 
into a national issue.  [Moreover,] … [w]e engaged in the reversion movement 
without any particular ideology, logic, or philosophy.  The focus was on dealing with 
the emergency situations at the time, [yet,] with time, the reversion movement 
evolved, from its initial stage of a simple ethnic movement, to the present state: a 
‘class-oriented’, ‘anti-establishment’ struggle’ (Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 
1982: 888–9). 
These statements are a re-definition of ‘reversion nationalism’ as a ‘simple 
sense of ethnic solidarity’ that, in retrospect, could not be an adequate basis to resist 
the US military presence on Okinawa.  The ‘evolved’ form of the reversion 
movement is defined as a ‘class struggle’ (kaikyū tōsō), which is a peculiar definition 
of ‘Okinawa’ as an oppressed class, subjected to the domination of Japan, the US, or 
capitalist invasion in general.
  In concrete terms, the next phase of the ‘Okinawa 
Struggle’ was broken down to (1) opposition against the SDF deployment in 
Okinawa, (2) support activities for the landowners’ refusal of land lease contract 
renewal with the Japanese government, (3) opposition to the construction of the CTS 
(Central Terminal Station), which was an inducement for pollution-creating industry 
in Okinawa.  The most important point to note is that the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ was 
                                                             
6 As seen most prominently in the emergence of ‘anti-reversionism’ (han-fukki) in the late 1960s, 
explorations were made towards a uniquely ‘Okinawan’ identity, defined by an historical, cultural and 
ethnic background separate from yamato.  Arakawa Akira, Takara Ben, Kawamitsu Shinichi and 
others contributed to the exploration of an independent Okinawa at the ‘mental’ level.  The critical 
and politically active Okinawans’ desire to express Okinawa’s distinctiveness arose in reaction to the 
decline of ‘reversion nationalism’ and disappointment with the 1972 reversion of Okinawa as a means 
to turn Okinawa into a fortress of the US–Japan Security Alliance.   187
redefined as a class struggle, that is, an extension or a part of the workers’ 
movement, derived from the member organisations’ close affiliations with socialism. 
However, the Council for Reversion lacked clear guidelines on what 
distinguished the ‘Okinawan’ political struggle from ‘Japanese’.  Many local 
political parties and trade unions, which were previously independent ‘Okinawan’, 
‘Yaeyama’ or ‘Miyako’ entities, all became incorporated into bigger mainland 
Japanese organisations.  The OPP (Jinminto), a locally bred communist party that 
fought against the US military regime, became the Okinawan branch of the Japan 
Communist Party (JCP).  The OSP became a branch of the Japan Socialist Party 
(JSP).  The Okinawa Teachers’ Association became integrated with the Japan 
Teachers’ Union (Nikkyō-so).  Amongst others, the integration of Zengunrō with 
Zenchūrō  (All Foreign Military Workers’ Union, Zenchūryūgun Rōdōkumiai), a 
Japan-based union of workers employed by the US military bases, in September 
1978, was regretted by many working Okinawans: it meant the ‘disappearance of the 
flag representing the Okinawan union of base workers from the Okinawan mass 
workers’ movement’ (Uehara 1982: 450).
7    Only the OSMP retained local 
headquarters and remained a purely ‘Okinawan’ political party.  This created 
difficulties in building consensus among various organisations because of divergent 
political positions determined by the organisational headquarters in mainland Japan, 
for example, forming policy against the LDP government and the US military forces 
(Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982: 891). 
Nevertheless, there was one agenda they all agreed on: support for the anti-
war landowners’ struggle.  Amongst different organisations, parties, sects and unions 
with different interests and priorities, the anti-war landowners were seen to represent 
the essence of ‘Okinawa’ and its protest.  The integrity and principles of the uniquely 
‘Okinawan’ anti-war landowners’ disobedience were consistent with the historical 
narrative of marginalisation of Okinawa, strongly related to the Battle of Okinawa 
experience.  For the progressive activists, these landowners provided a sense of who 
                                                             
7 As a result of the massive employment reductions the US military conducted before reversion, base 
workers had reduced from 21,000 in 1970 to 7,980 in 1978.  The zengunrō members were reduced to 
5,000 from more than 18,000 (Uehara 1982: 454).   188
‘we’ were, and perhaps the only basis for political coalition left for progressive 
Okinawan activists. 
In February 1976, 18 organisations — most of them former Council members 
— including three local political parties (the OSMP, Okinawa branches of the JCP 
and JSP), local trade unions (Kenrōkyō, Zen Oki Rōren, Jichirō Okinawa Branch, 
Zenchurō Okinawa Branch) as well as teachers’ unions (Okinawa Teachers’ Union 
(OTU), the High School Teachers’ Union, the Okinawa Retired Teachers’ 
Organisation and Okinawa Retired High School Teachers’ Organisation), Okinawan 
Youth Groups’ Association and League of Okinawan Women’s Groups formed a 
new anti-base coalition, the Iken Kyōtō  (Okinawa Gunyōchi Iken Soshō Shien 
Kenmin Kyōtō Kaigi, Okinawa Supporting Council for the Legal Actions against 
Unconstitutionality) (Arasaki 1995: 82).  The anti-war landowners and Iken Kyōtō 
offered an organisational framework for an anti-base coalition, holding together the 
municipal and national legislatures, influential anti-base political institutions and 
citizens’ organisations.  The Council for Reversion dissolved in 1977.  According to 
Arasaki, the Council for Reversion ‘gave birth to a legitimate successor from its own 
womb’ (Arasaki 1995: 76). 
Thus the anti-war landowners were given a symbolic role as the embodiment 
of solidarity and coalition among the ‘progressive’, left-wing political parties, 
workers’ unions, teachers’ unions and other citizens’ organisations against the 
continuing US military presence.  Nevertheless, this is an abstract image, and not 
necessarily reflective of a genuine broad front of a wider Okinawan population.  In 
fact, thoughts and actions of individual anti-war landowners did not necessarily 
synchronise with the progressive parties and unions’ official line, which I will 
elaborate below. 
Apart from providing an organisational gathering point that embodied the 
‘Okinawan’ anti-base coalition, Iken Kyōtō’s main function was limited to supporting 
the anti-war landowners’ struggle against the US military’s compulsory use of their 
land.  Iken Kyōtō was established as an unusually extensive organisation that   189
encompassed various parties and unions including those affiliated with the JCP and 
JSP.   
One-tsubo Anti-War Landowners 
The one-tsubo group which supported owners of private properties occupied by the 
US military, started as an opportunity for those Okinawans (and some in mainland 
Japan) who did not own substantial properties to join the protest against militarism.  
A group of initiators, including Arasaki Moriteru, 
8started a campaign for collective 
land ownership of a property located inside the Kadena Air Station, called the one-
tsubo (a tsubo is 3.3 square metres) movement.  A new organisation, the One-Tsubo 
Anti-Landowners’ Organisation (Hitotsubo Hansen Jinushi-Kai) was established in 
December 1982.  Each participant bought 10,000 yen worth (sometimes less than one 
tsubo) of property, which jointly consisted of a property of 418 tsubo (786 square 
metres), originally owned by a non-contract landowner.  According to the first issue 
of the organisation’s newsletter, Hitotsubo Hansen, at the time of the organisation’s 
establishment, 833 one-tsubo landowners had registered as property owners, and 
refused to sign the lease contract with the state and co-operate with the US military 
(Hitotsubo Hansen May 1983: 3).  ‘Return our land from the military to life and 
production!’ was chosen as the One-Tsubo Landowners’ Organisation’s slogan.  
The original participants in this one-tsubo movement were those who had 
already been engaged in various political and community activities, as well as trade 
unionists and intellectuals from all over the prefecture, including remote areas, such 
as the Miyako and Yaeyama island groups.  The one-tsubo membership provided 
avenues for anti-military and anti-base protest, and status for direct participants.  The 
members were often affiliated with other organisations or community groups.  For 
example, one veteran one-tsubo member was also involved with another anti-war 
movement, the Okinawa Historical Film Society (see chapter 3), as well as the Ainu 
Moshiri and Uruma Society (Ainu Moshiri to uruma o musubu kai), which is a 
communication-promoting movement with another of Japan’s minorities, the Ainu 
people (Personal Communication, May 1999). 
                                                             
8 See note 7 (Chapter 1).   190
Initially, members with diverse profiles were thought likely to contribute to a 
‘proliferation of an unprecedented approach to anti-base protest, different from the 
traditional-style progressive political organisations’ (Shin Okinawa Bungaku 30 
September 1982: 141).  Some novel attempts for breaking from the past style of 
protest were made.  For example, the organisation avoided a top-down organisational 
structure with a central headquarters.  The One-Tsubo Anti-War Landowners’ 
Organisation was a network of independent regional ‘blocs’ all across Okinawa, 
including Naha, Itoman, Urasoe, Northern Okinawa, Yaeyama and, later, Tokyo and 
Osaka.  This organisational structure promoted the idea that individual blocs engaged 
in their own activities as independent entities (Hitotsubo Hansen May 1983: 4).   
Nevertheless, a one-tsubo member explained that a majority of the members 
belonged to organised labour unions.  As a non-union worker, ‘it would be difficult 
to actively participate in a regional bloc, without many friends or [anti-base] 
movement experience’ (Hitotsubo Hansen May 1983: 10). In fact, initially, an 
electronic industry workers’ union owned 180 tsubo (595 square metres) of the total 
size of the 418 tsubo (786 square metres), collectively owned by the one-tsubo 
landowners (Hitotsubo Hansen May 1983: 8).  Indeed, original one-tsubo members 
were, predominantly, those who already owned land within the US military bases,
9 or 
locals who felt comfortable enough to go through the paperwork and the complicated 
registration process. 
An important contribution of the one-tsubo landowners’ movement has been 
to promote a network of progressive political parties and organisations in Okinawa, 
among the local legislatures and in the Japanese Diet.  There is a strong bond and 
organisational overlaps between the One-Tsubo Anti-war Landowners’ Organisation 
and other progressive political parties, unions and organisations in Okinawa.  The 
media have often depicted the anti-landowners and supporters as ‘radicals’, which 
has distanced the wider politically inexperienced Okinawan public from them 
                                                             
9 Some one-tsubo members are contract landowners who receive substantial incomes from their other 
properties within the bases, but in principle share with the anti-war landowners the will to oppose the 
US bases (Arasaki 1995: 152).     191
(Arasaki 1992b: 88–9).  One-tsubo landowners increased the number of total anti-
war landowners from just over 100 to more than 3,000. 
Most one-tsubo landowners do little more than deal with paperwork related to 
land registration and tax, subscribed to newsletters and attend annual rallies 
(Personal communication with a one-tsubo anti-war landowner, April 1999).   
According to Arasaki, the most important and meaningful character of both anti-war 
landowners and one-tsubo anti-war landowners is, essentially, ‘their existence and 
not their action’ (Arasaki 1995: 129). 
Nevertheless, a small number of active one-tsubo members contributed to 
anti-base protests in other communities as ‘supporters’.  In Naha, one-tsubo 
landowners conducted direct appeals and demonstrations at the Prefecture Municipal 
Office and the Naha Defense Facilities Bureau, against the construction of the P-3C 
base in Toyohara, on behalf of the Toyohara residents.  The Northern Bloc of the 
One-Tsubo Anti-War Landowners contributed to converting the lavatory of the 
‘surveillance hut’ of the Toyohara residents into a flush toilet (Hitotsubo Hansen 
April  1995: 16).  They also conducted ‘study trips’ to communicate with the 
residents who protested against the military in places such as Iejima, Aha (in 
Kunigami) and Onna (Hitotsubo Hansen 1990: 12).  Not only did the one-tsubo 
movement increase the number of anti-war landowners, it also provided 
opportunities to incorporate individual creativity.  This indicated a minor 
transformation of the post-reversion anti-base collective action of the progressives 
away from the old, traditional styles and techniques. 
Strategy and Main Activities of the Anti-War Landowners, the One-Tsubo Anti-
War Landowners and Iken Kyōtō 
The main activity of the anti-war landowners has been the struggle against a series of 
laws designed to legalise the de facto occupation of the military-occupied properties.  
The anti-war landowners claimed the forceful occupation of their land was 
unconstitutional, according to Article 29 (right of private ownership of assets) of the 
Constitution.  The regular players in this struggle have been a small group of non-
contract landowners, including one-tsubo landowners, core members of Iken Kyōto,   192
and expert attorneys, versus the officers at the Naha Defense Facility Bureau.  The 
long-term disobedience of the non-contract landowners has been a constant pressure 
on Japanese government officials. 
Japan is obligated to supply the US forces with facilities and land by the US–
Japan Mutual Security Treaty.  In order to keep the US occupation of properties 
owned by these non-contract landowners legal, the Japanese government has 
‘reformed’ relevant legislation, time and time again.  First, the Diet passed the Public 
Property Law, (Koyōchi hō) on 31 December 1971, which legalised the use of all 
privately owned properties hitherto occupied by the US military in Okinawa for five 
years from 1972.
10  Nevertheless, this law was only good for the five years, as a 
temporary measure necessary in the transition period.  In 1976, the landowners and 
Iken Kyōtō filed their first legal case against the Public Property Law. 
In order to maintain the US military’s use of the non-contract landowners’ 
properties, the government came up with manipulative and convoluted legislation in 
1977.  The Japanese Cabinet enacted the Land Registration Identification Law 
(chiseki meikakuka hō), which obligated the government to identify land registration 
within the military bases in Okinawa.
11  In a subject clause, the government extended 
the period of the Public Property Law for another five years (Arasaki 1995: 97).  
Before the passing of this bill, Uehara Kōsuke, former Zengurnō leader and then a 
JSP member representing the Okinawan electorate in the Lower House, pressured the 
JSP executives to resist a little longer in their negotiations with the LDP.  This stalled 
the bill for four days, making the military’s occupation of the anti-war landowners’ 
properties technically illegal for those days.  This endangered the lawfulness of the 
Japan–US Mutual Security Treaty.  As symbolic acts of protest, the members of Iken 
Kyōtō and anti-war landowners broke the gates into some of the bases, to return to 
                                                             
10 The G.R.I. led by Governor Yara, protested that this law was unconstitutional because it breached 
the right to private ownership (Article 29) and unjustly discriminated against Okinawa thereby 
breaching the principle of equality under the law (Article 14).  The law, furthermore, ignored the 
process required by Article 95, that a majority of residents’ votes in a referendum are necessary for 
setting a special law applied in one municipality (Arasaki 1995: 77–8). 
11 The new law responded to Governor Yara and the landowners’ demands to re-identify the land 
registrations lost in the processes of war evacuation and subsequent military occupation.   193
their previous homes for the first time since WWII.
12  During these four days, an anti-
war landowner Shimabukuro Zenyū and his family, accompanied by a lawyer, took 
their tractor into his former property in Camp Shields.  In front of the US military 
personnel, he released his ducks, ploughed the farmland and planted garlic 
(Shimabukuro & Miyazato 1997: 156–60).   
Consequently, the government re-activated the US Military Special Measures 
Law (beigun tokubetsu sochi hō) and the Land Expropriation Law (tochi shūyo hō), 
which restricted the right of private property ownership when deemed necessary for 
protecting the  ‘public interest’, with adequate compensation.
   This law considerably 
simplified the procedures for land expropriation.  The Naha Defence Facilities 
Bureau, a subsidiary of the Japanese Defense Agency, made an application regarding 
the expropriation of non-contract landowners’ properties to be used by the US forces.  
The application was processed by the Prefecture Land Expropriation Committee, 
which was a semi-judicial body attached to the prefectural government.  This 
Committee had the authority to decide whether or not the land expropriation was 
justified.  The US Military Special Measures Law made no provision for regulating 
this Land Expropriation Committee, and its selection processes were unclear 
(Arasaki 1995: 158–9).  Regarding the Bureau’s applications for compulsory land 
expropriation made in 1981 and 1986, the Land Expropriation Committee approved 
the state’s right to sublet the non-contract landowners’ properties for another five 
years. 
Since the enactment of this legislation, the public legal hearings in front of 
the Land Expropriation Committee have been the site of battles between the anti-war 
landowners and their supporting groups on the one hand and the Naha Defence 
Facility Bureau on the other.  They have provided rare opportunities for the anti-war 
landowners to express their arguments about the government’s unconstitutional use 
of private property, together with their moral stance against leasing their land for 
military use, recorded in the proceedings of the public legal hearings by Iken Kyōtō 
                                                             
12 Forceful entries into the military facilities happened in Ie-jima, Japanese Self Defense Air Force 
Base, and other bases such as Kadena Air Base.     194
(for example, Okinawa Gunyōchi Iken Soshō Shien Kenmin Kyōtō Kaigi 1998, 
Okinawa Kōyōchi Hō Iken Kyōtō Soshō Shien Kenmin Kyōtō Kaigi 1982). This battle 
has taken place every five years, since the first hearing in 1981.
13   The  Land 
Expropriation Committee approved the first application for land expropriation of 
non-contract landowners under the US Military Special Measures Law, made in 
August 1981, in February 1982. 
This decision sapped the morale of the anti-base movement within Okinawan 
society because a decade after Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, the ‘Okinawan’ judges 
on the Committee panel approved of the US military’s use of the anti-war 
landowners’ land.  A local citizens’ critical journal, Shin Okinawa Bungaku, 
lamented that the Okinawans themselves ‘sold off’ the anti-war landowners’ land to 
the government, which expressed the sense of helplessness and despair of the anti-
base Okinawans (Shin Okinawa Bungaku 1982: 141).  The decision perhaps marked 
the start of the ‘low’ phase of morale of the anti-base protest community.  Between 
1977 and 1982, the number of non-contract landowners (not one-tsubo landowners) 
shrank from about 500 to 120–130.   
For the next period of compulsory lease from 1987, the Bureau applied for 
occupation for another twenty years.  Arasaki argues that this was a counter measure 
against the increased non-contract landowners because of the one-tsubo movement, 
which had expanded its members to more than 2,000.  Article 14 of the US Military 
Special Measures Law obligates the Bureau to attach documented landowners’ 
comments to the application for the compulsory land appropriation.
14  About 800 
one-tsubo anti-war landowners submitted ‘landowners’ comments’ to be attached to 
the land documents, using a unique range of expression, taking advantage of 
                                                             
13 Each application requires about 11 public hearings until the Land Expropriation Committee’s final 
decision, the expropriation of non-contract landowners’ properties is a long process, which takes 
normally from six to twelve months. 
14 When the Prime Minister regards the application for land expropriation for the US military to be 
adequate, which is usually the case, the Bureau must prepare a document describing the topographical 
and geological details of the concerned land, with the landowners’ attendance on site (Land 
Expropriation Law, Section 2, Article 36, cited in Arasaki 1995: 165).  The submission of the signed 
documents to the Prefectural Land Exploration Committee is required to complete the application.  
Importantly, this document needs to be signed by the landowners (Arasaki 1995: 157–8).   
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individual attributes and occupations, breaking free from the traditional, standardised 
expression.  For example, a musician performed an original song, an architect 
demonstrated in drawing the ratio of military properties in Okinawa and mainland 
Japan, a builder built a concrete brick with a message, ‘Life is Treasure’ (Nuchi du 
Takara).  Some used red ink to imitate blood, to describe opposition against the 
military and its killings (Arasaki 1995: 160–1).  These ‘comments’ were a new form 
of the ‘Okinawan’ collective identity, expressed in artistic talents and individual 
creativity, distinct from the traditional, choreographed stereotype of anti-base protest. 
At the 1986 public legal hearings, the presence of several hundred one-tsubo 
anti-war landowners gave tremendous support to the anti-war landowners in court 
(Arasaki 1995: 172).  The aforementioned anti-war landowner, Shimabukuro Zenyū, 
recalls that at the 1981 hearings there were only 20–30 anti-war landowners, looking 
miserable and weak in court, while the opponent, the officials from the Naha 
Defence Facility Bureau, came in suits and ties, in a much larger number, on a 
chartered bus.  Most importantly, Shimabukuro says, the one-tsubo landowners 
immensely encouraged the anti-war landowners who had long been engaged in their 
solitary and painful struggle against the Japanese government and unsympathetic 
family members, relatives and other community members (Interview April 1999).  In 
February 1987, the Land Expropriation Committee approved the Bureau’s 
application for land expropriation for a period of ten years instead of twenty years.  
In 1990, of those who originally leased land to the military from 1972 with 
consent, 70 landowners refused to renew their contracts.
15   The number of non-
contract landowners expanded, with 500 new one-tsubo anti-war landowners (who 
bought a property in the Futenma Air Station,
  and three landowners who owned 
properties in the Naha Military Port.
16  For their properties, the Bureau applied for 
                                                             
15 The duration of the original land leases was twenty years, based on the longest lease regulated by 
Article 604 of the Civil Code. 
16 Of the military properties used by the US military, municipalities (cities, villages and towns) own 
29.2% (Okinawa Ken Sōmubu Chiji Kōshitsu Kichi Taisakushitsu 2000: 11).  Until a conservative 
mayor was elected in November 2001, Naha City had been the only anti-war landowner which owned 
2.6 % (1.5 ha) of the Naha Military Port (Okinawa Times 14 November 2000).     196
another ten years’ compulsory use on 27 November.
17   After only two public 
hearings, the Committee approved the compulsory use of the objectors’ properties, 
for a period of five years from May 1992 (Arasaki 1995: 197–9, 212).  The anti-war 
landowners and one-tsubo anti-war landowners took the Committee’s decision to 
court.  Anti-war landowners had initiated several similar court cases against the US 
military’s use of properties without the landowners’ consent in 1985, 1990, 1992 and 
1994.  Furthermore, in October 1998, seven anti-war landowners filed a case against 
the US Military Special Measures Law, claiming it was unconstitutional (Ryūkyū 
Shimpo 27 October 1998).  Most of these court cases took more than a decade each 
to settle, exhausting the energy and resources for anti-base protest (Hitotsubo Hansen 
1995: 7–10).   
The Anti-War Landowners’ Organisation, the One-Tsubo Anti-War 
Landowners’ Organisation, Iken Kyōtō, and two attorney groups have been the main 
initiators of the anti-war landowners’ struggle.  Over the years, the number of anti-
war landowners expanded dramatically, and the one-tsubo landowners provided 
support by observing the public legal hearings, organising rallies after the court 
cases, with funding, or simply by  and contributing to the numbers of anti-war 
landowners. 
Attorneys also have been significant players.  There is a group of local 
attorneys who regularly undertake soliciting anti-war landowners.  One of them, 
Maeshiro Yukio, has represented numerous residents’ and citizens’ movements in 
Okinawa after the reversion.
18  He explains that lawsuits are an important part of 
                                                             
17 On 17 November 1990, Ōta Masahide had been elected the new Governor, after the conservative 
OLDP Governor, Nishime Junji (1978–90).  One of the procedures required for the compulsory 
expropriation of non-contract landowners’ properties by the US Military Special Measures Law was 
the notification (kōkoku) of, and making the case for, public inspection (jūran) by the mayors of the 
municipalities where the properties in question were located.  As an expression of opposition to the 
US military occupation, the mayors of Naha city, Okinawa city, Ginowan city, Chatan town, and 
Yomitan village had rejected this procedure.  Then, the Governor had the responsibility to sign on 
behalf of the mayors, which was conducted by Governor Nishime of the OLDP regularly.  As a 
progressive governor, Ōta was committed to the removal of the US military bases, and was publicly 
opposed to the compulsory use of non-contract landowners’ land.  Ōta had an option to reject this 
responsibility.  However, after much consideration, Ōta agreed with the procedure, on condition that 
the central government increase its commitment to the necessary legalisation and financial assistance 
for future returns of the private properties currently occupied by the US bases (Arasaki 1995: 197–9).   
18 Residents’ movements normally refer to the collective action taken up by people who reside in 
particular communities regarding the issues that affect the living conditions in those communities.    197
collective action, under the democratic system, taking advantage of the legal rights 
entitled to the Japanese citizens.  At the same time, Maeshiro severely criticises 
Japan for being ‘anything but a democracy, or a law-abiding state’ (Interview May 
1999).  From his perspective, the Japanese government would engage in whatever 
legal manipulation it took to protect the US–Japan security alliance.  Moreover, the 
judicial system, especially the Supreme Court, has proven reluctant to judge against 
the state when residents take legal action against municipal and central government 
authorities as a form of protest.
19  In Maeshiro’s view, the Japanese public is not 
aware of its role enough to ensure democratic rule under the law — thereby allowing 
the LDP government its constant dictatorship — or to ensure the independence of the 
judiciary from the executive.  Nevertheless, Maeshiro has worked for Okinawan 
residents’ movements as a specialised, activist attorney, in the hope that the lawsuits 
may spread information about the issues through the media, and appeal to as great a 
part of the sympathetic population as possible (Interview May 1999). 
Maeshiro’s comments reflect the transformation in the characteristics of 
Okinawans’ protest, from desperate, sometimes violent, explosions of anger under an 
authoritarian dictatorship, to long-term, demanding battles of attrition that require the 
regular commitment of the participants under a formally democratic system.  Long-
term legal battles require participants with specialised skills, experience and money.  
They require activist attorneys and supporting organisations with financial and staff 
resources, usually linked with political parties, workers’ unions and other organised 
entities.  Using legal rights guaranteed by the Constitution has a special meaning in 
Okinawa, namely, using the constitutional rights earned by the reversion movement.  
However, during the low ‘period’ that followed the reversion, the struggle of unified 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Participants of citizens’ movements usually engage in collective action as citizens, without the 
emphasis on where they live.  According to Maeshiro, in Okinawa the relationship between residents’ 
movements and citizens’ movements is often complementary.  The former is usually the direct subject 
of collective action peculiar to their residential location, in which the latter plays a ‘supporting role’ 
(Maeshiro Interview, May 1999).   
19 Other cases Maeshiro has been involved include the Kadena Air Base Noise Case (kadena bakuon 
soshō), initiated by about 906 residents who lived around the base, and who suffered from the 
explosive noise, demanding to stop the night flight training from 7pm to 7am.  The case was first 
taken to court in February 1982, and closed in May 1998 with indemnity payment, but no flights 
stopped.  One of the plaintiffs, Matsuda Kame, notes that she lost interest in the case because the noise 
was getting worse and worse (Hiramatsu 2001: 154–5).      198
‘Okinawa’ — symbolised by the anti-war landowners — was mainly conducted by a 
specialised group of activists increasingly isolated from the rest of the society.  This 
meant the only progressive coalition that represented Okinawa no longer provided 
access to a majority of the population who felt the need to engage in protest in one 
way or another.  However, as witnessed by the groundswell of popular opposition 
against the US bases in 1995, it did not mean that the Okinawan people had totally 
lost motivation or the means to protest.  As chapter 7 and 8 demonstrate, the decline 
of the old styles and organisation of protest contributed to the development of 
alternative avenues of protest through the emergence of ‘new social movements’ in 
Okinawa.     
Related to this point, anti-base movements and protests are routinely 
conducted by a specialist peace sector, formed by ideological like-minded and 
organisationally closely affiliated unions and organisations.  The Okinawa Peace 
Movement Centre (Heiwa Undō Centre) is one such organisation.  It is the biggest 
coalition of any kind in Okinawa, specialising in peace movement activities specific 
to Okinawa, including opposition to the US military bases.  It is a coalition of 35 
Okinawan unions and parties, including the OSMP, the JSP (since January 1996, the 
Japan Social Democratic Party, JSDP) Okinawa Branch, the Zenchurō Okinawa 
Branch and the Okinawa Teachers Union, which are mostly associated with the 
mainland Japanese coalition of workers’ union, Rengō  (Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation)
20.  The Okinawa Peace Movement Centre is an Okinawan version of 
the Peace Movement Centres that exist in other prefectures all over Japan, for 
example, the Tokyo Peace Movement Centre and Ishikawa Peace Movement Centre, 
which support the basic platform of the JSDP, namely the ideological commitment to 
the pacifist clause of the Constitution.  The Okinawa Peace Movement Centre 
members are linked with other Japanese Peace Movement Centre members, for 
example, through ‘Okinawa tours’, which involve visits to the Battle of Okinawa 
                                                             
20 Rengō is the largest organisation in the Japanese labour movement.  It was formally inaugurated in 
November 1989 with 8 million members after Sōhyō (General Council of Japanese Trade Unions) 
dissolved (http://www.jtuc-rengo.org/htmls1/034Path.html).  In 2002, Rengō has 6,945,000 members.  
At 20.2 per cent, the union membership rate in Japan is decreasing (http://www.jtuc-
rengo.or.jp/new/iken/danwa/danwa20021219.html).   199
remains, major military bases and the ongoing anti-base residents’ movement, such 
as the anti-‘heliport’ struggle in Henoko (hence, the need for ‘struggle huts’). 
Other smaller coalitions of peace organisations affiliated with the JCP are the 
Okinawa Peace Committee (Okinawa Heiwa Iinkai) and the Okinawa Prefectre 
United Action Communication Conference (Okinawa Ken Toitsu Kōdō Renraku 
Kaigi, tōitsuren).  These JSP (JSDP) and JCP-affiliated organisations occasionally 
join together in Prefectural Citizens’ Rallies (Kenmin Taikai),
21 however,  usually 
they engage in peace movement activities separately, such as supporting residents’ 
anti-base demonstrations, election campaigns for anti-base candidates, and 
organising and mobilizing for the annual 15 May Peace Marches.
22  The internal 
division is indicative of decreasing influence of a progressive coalition representing 
one ‘Okinawa’. 
Furthermore, the principle actors of protest against the danger and 
inconveniences of military bases on Okinawa have predominantly been the residents 
of the respective cities, towns and villages or smaller community units such as 
hamlets and districts, where particular base or facilities have been located or were 
planned to be constructed.
23  Since the late 1980s, the Okinawa-based US forces and 
SDF kept growing in size and capacity, until the mid-1990s.  In 1989, 45 US bases 
and 35 SDF bases were located all over Okinawa (95.7 per cent of the US forces are 
located on Okinawa Main Island), scattered through more than 25 cities, towns and 
villages (Kurima 1998: 279, Okinawa  Ken Sōmubu Chiji Kōshitsu Kichi 
Taisakushitsu 2000: 8, 24).  The construction of a planned US training facility 
designed for urban guerilla fighting was stopped by the protests of the residents of 
                                                             
21 For example, in April 2002, the Okinawa Peace Movement Centre and toitsuren held a joint rally 
called ‘Mamorō Kenpo, Kōchōkai Hōkoku Shūkai’ (Protect the Constitution, a public hearing report), 
against the legislation related to attacks by other countries against Japan, which legalises the war 
preparation activities of the state, the US military and the SDF (Okinawa Times 23 April, 2003).   
22  Other major activities included making ‘human chains’ around the Futenma Marine Corps Air 
Station in 1995 and 1998 in protest against the US military presence and war.  There were similar 
protests against the Kadena Air Base in 1987, 1990 and 2000. 
23 One of the earliest examples was the residents’ opposition against a plan to construct a pad for the 
US Marine Corps’ ‘Harrier’ helicopters in Aha District in Kunigami village in 1987 (Okinawa Times 
Sha 1997: 257–9).     200
Onna village.
24   The protest succeeded because of the involvement of the whole 
village population, young and old, conservative and progressive, in a range of direct 
actions, from petitions to various US military and Japanese government authorities, 
the direct blockage of construction work and confrontations with riot police, to 
around-the-clock surveillance by the villagers from a ‘surveillance hut’ (Tokushu 
Butai Kensetsu oyobi Jitsudan Shageki Enshū Hantai Onna Son Jikko Iinkai 1990). 
In the early 1990s, residents of the Toyohara District of Motobu village also 
stopped the construction of an SDF communication facility and the deployment of P-
3C anti-submarine aircraft.
25  In Toyohara, too, the residents collected funds and built 
a ‘surveillance hut’ in front of the construction site, where the residents took turns 
being responsible not just for surveillance but also hosting visitors and supporters 
from outside, and preparing meals.  Supporters were mainly Okinawan activists 
outside Toyohara, such as members of workers’ unions and peace groups, among 
others, the Workers Unions’ Council, Northern Region Branch (Hokubu chikurō), the 
Okinawa Historical Film Society
26, and the one-tsubo anti-war landowners.  Similar 
residents’ movements against the US military bases and SDF have been repeated all 
over Okinawa, with similar strategies and experience.
27    These geographically 
scattered protest actors could not avoid being isolated from each other, and this has 
become an important trait of the community of protest.
   
The ‘Constitutional’ Framing  
The anti-war landowners’ struggle and the progressive coalition have developed into 
a solid, permanent, but routine, protest sector.  The anti-war landowners’ struggle is 
basically silent disobedience, that is, by definition, passive rather than active: by the  
                                                             
24 Onna village is located in the northern region of Okinawa Main Island.  Its 1989 population was 
8,840, who mainly engaged in farming.  In the late 1980s, tourism was the rising industry in this 
village.  Camp Hansen (US Marine Corps) occupied 29.6 per cent of the village.  The destruction of, 
and threat to, the natural and human environment caused by the US live fire training had been 
generating grievances, especially the destruction of Mount Onna (onna dake) (Tokushu Butai 
Kensetsu oyobi Jitsudan Shageki Enshū Hantai Onna Son Jikkō Iinkai 1990: 33)  
25 Only 159 people lived in Toyohara District in 1993.  It is located within Motobu village in the 
northern region.   
26Leader Nakamura Fumiko was from Motobu village (chapter 3). 
27 Other examples include opposition to the live firing training across Prefecture Road 104 (which 
would be closed during the training), in Kin town (Okinawa Times Sha 1997: 134–6).  The SACO 
agreement in 1996 decided to stop the live firing training except for those using 155mm bullets.  
These trainings were moved to Hijūdai Training Area in Ōita Prefecture.    201
steady continuation of long-term legal battles in the courts and through public 
hearings, the anti-war landowners have extended the tradition of the ‘Okinawa 
Struggle’ from the end of the reversion movement.  However, what explains the 
weakening momentum for a uniquely ‘Okinawan’ struggle that potentially involves a 
wider public, that is, not just the ‘usual suspects’ or professional activists?  With this 
question in mind, this section examines what has framed the anti-war landowners’ 
expressions of collective identity and strategy: how they define who they are and 
why they protest, and how this is reflected in their strategy to connect their struggle 
with the Japanese Constitution. 
Arime Masao, Chair of the Iken Kyōtō, had been a schoolteacher for nineteen 
years before he retired in 1994.  Arime is a landowner of a property inside the 
Kadena Air Base, where his family house used to be located.  Arime first became 
involved in the Okinawa Struggle in reversion campaigns during the US occupation, 
as a member of the Okinawa Youth Group Commission (Okinawa  Seinendan 
Kyōgikai), which was a member organisation of the Council for Reversion.  After the 
reversion, he has protested against the military bases in Okinawa as a member of the 
Anti-War Landowners’ Organisation and the Okinawa Teachers’ Union.  He 
participated in ‘almost all anti-base protest occasions against the US bases that are 
concentrated in the central region’, where he has resided and worked (Interview 
March 1999). 
Arime explains that 28 April in 1952 is still the most important anniversary 
for the Okinawans’ struggle (Okinawa no tatakai, the term ‘Okinawa Struggle’ was 
not used).  From 1952 until the reversion, the ‘4.28’ (28 April) anniversary was the 
most important date to hold big annual protests, at which Okinawan reversionists and 
mainland Japanese left-wing activists demonstrated solidarity.  Then, after reversion, 
Arime explained that the most important anniversary shifted to 15 May in 1972, the 
day of formal repatriation, which became another day of Okinawa’s humiliation.  In 
1971, the last rally-on-the-ocean was held on 28 April.  Since then, on 15 May (5.15) 
each year, the Okinawan activists join the peace march across the island, which 
continues today as one of the biggest annual Okinawan events.   202
This shift of anniversaries signifies a major transition in the nature of the 
reversion movement, and the struggle of the Okinawans.  The struggle associated 
with 28 April was a nationalist struggle, whereas the 15 May represents repudiation 
of the militarism that comes hand in hand with nationalism. The Okinawans’ struggle 
used to be primarily defined as resistance against foreign military rule and pursuit of 
nationhood by way of re-integration with yamato.  In contrast, the 15 May 
anniversary has been a reminder of the disillusionment with ‘reversion nationalism’: 
termination of the pursuit of nationhood, as a means of liberation from Okinawa’s 
predicament. 
Similarly, during the second-wave Okinawa Struggle, the hinomaru flag was 
a symbol of resistance against US military rule, and the home country to which the 
reversionists wished to return.  After reversion, the political meaning of the flag has 
significantly changed for the Okinawan community of protest.
28  In the post-reversion 
community of protest, the flag is associated with Japanese imperialism and the 
sufferings inflicted on locals during the Battle of Okinawa (see Chibana 1992, Field 
1993). 
Nevertheless, Iken Kyōtō members — Arime and his colleagues — continue 
to define 28 April as the most important day for the Okinawan struggle: they hold 
meetings, memorial lectures and speeches every year, though the events attract much 
fewer people than those on 15 May.  Arime says it has provided an opportunity to 
reflect on the humiliation of 4.28, when Okinawa was discarded, and it is a reminder 
that Okinawa was, and still is, a metaphorical first stone to be thrown in the water to 
save the imperial Japanese ship (Interview, March 1999).  (Interview March 1999).  
Today, the separation of Okinawa from Japan is still an important part of Okinawa’s 
historical narrative of marginalisation. 
                                                             
28  In 1987, Chibana Shoichi, a ‘peace guide’ resident of Yomitan village, and later an anti-war 
landowner, at a National Sport Meet event, burned the hinomaru flag in front of the crowd.  The flag 
had created a political controversy before the Sport Meet, about whether or not raising the flag at the 
venue in Okinawa was appropriate, yet the flag burning was sensational enough to make Chibana a 
celebrity, attracting both sympathisers and violent threats from right-wing thugs.  Chibana’s act 
represented the negative emotions of the Okinawans towards the flag (see Chibana 1992, Field 1993).   203
The older generation of Okinawan activists who know the reversion struggle 
often talk about the unfinished business of the ‘reflection and overhaul of the 
reversion movement’ (fukki undō no sōkatsu).  This frequent self-criticism indicates 
a deep sense of regret that the strategy of the reversion movement was unable to 
represent what the Okinawans’ struggle was really about.  This reflection and 
overhaul of the reversion movement is a difficult task, which requires identifying 
what was inadequate about the past struggle, and what remains essential.  The 28 
April anniversary is also meant for the re-examination of the implication of the 
reversion movement (Arime, Interview, March 1999).  The continuing importance 
attached to this day is indicative of the strength of the myth of an ‘Okinawan’ 
struggle and the recognition of a historical narrative of marginalisation that remains 
today: it indicates continuity. 
Another important element inherited from the reversion movement was the 
Okinawa-specific, passionate commitment to the Japanese Constitution.  For the anti-
war landowners, the Constitution provides the ground to justify the right to private 
ownership (Article 29: ‘Property rights shall not be violated’).  However, Article 9 
has been the most important section for anti-war activism in post-reversion 
Okinawa
29, which provides justification for refusing the land lease contract offered 
by the US military forces.  The anti-war landowners have customarily emphasised 
the importance of the non-belligerency clause in the Constitution at the Land 
Expropriation Committee public hearings.   
                                                             
29 Article 9 constitutes of two separate clauses: 
1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and 
the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.  
2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right 
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized (translated in Parisi, 2002) 
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In Japan, despite the fait accompli development of arms and troops and 
dispatches of SDF troops overseas, until today, Article 9 has not been amended.  This 
reflects the constant support for the optimistic vision of a non-belligerent Japanese 
society promised by the post-war Constitution among the Japanese progressive 
members and intellectuals, as well as the public (Parisi 2002).
30  In Okinawa, many 
anti-base activists interpret the US military presence as contradicting Article 9, 
because it involves Japan and Okinawa in belligerent activities.  The Constitution 
justifies and gives significance to the anti-base protest.  I call this dynamic a 
‘Constitutionalist’ framing of protest.  After the reversion, the anti-war landowners 
discarded the hinomaru flag, but held on to the Constitution, which still continues to 
provide them with an ideological base for collective action.   
Importantly, another anti-war landowners’ reason for anti-base protest — 
even more basic than the Constitution — is the experience of war in the Battle of 
Okinawa.  Recollections of the Battle often appear in the autobiographical accounts 
of anti-war landowners.  The graphic descriptions of killing and starvation and, 
particularly, the aggression and cruelty of mainland Japanese soldiers toward the 
Okinawan residents, never fail to inculcate strong compassion in the audience.   
Today, the existence of the anti-war landowners proves the continuation of 
Okinawa’s ‘war state’ as opposed to the ‘peace state’ elsewhere in Japan (Hook & 
McCormack 2001: 24).  For the protesters, this passion for peace is an expression of 
what it means to be ‘Okinawan’: it defines who ‘we’ are.  The war experience is also 
important for the landowners as a standpoint from which to critique the state’s 
structural marginalisation of the minority, which was difficult to express because it 
clashed with ‘reversion nationalism’.  Revealing the atrocities of the Japanese 
soldiers toward the local islanders during the battle is a political statement that has 
only become possible after the reversion (Takara 1995: 158). 
Zukeran Chōhō is former Chair of the OSMP and was a member of the 
Okinawan Prefectural Council for 12 years before he retired to become a farmer.  He 
                                                             
30 This constitutional support stemmed from the Japanese people’s will to turn the devastation of war 
and defeat into something positive, that is, illegalising the act of war, ahead of other countries in the 
world (Dower, 1998: 398).   205
is also a one-tsubo landowner of the Kadena Air Base, and one of the first members 
of the One-Tsubo Anti-War Landowners’ Organisation.  In an interview with the 
official JSP journal, Zen’ei, Zukeran explains the reason for becoming a one-tsubo 
landowner was his commitment to peace and anti-militarism as well as human rights, 
expressed in the Japanese Constitution.  Zukeran argues that the history and 
memories of the war are something commonly shared by all Okinawans.
31   This 
statement summarises the OSMP emphasis on being a ‘party of the Okinawan 
citizens’ (kenmin-tō), instead of being a regional branch of mainland Japanese 
parties, albeit its strong connection with the JSP.  The party’s strategy is also on 
appealing to the masses, without placing too much emphasis on political ideologies.
32   
Zukeran followed this statement with his personal memoirs of the Battle of 
Okinawa.  He was 13 years-old in 1945.  The highlight of his story was a description 
of the incident on Mabuni Hill, when he and his family, as well as other locals, were 
caught in a cul-de-sac trying to avoid the US bullets.  The American soldiers urged 
the locals to surrender.  When several Okinawan residents attempted to surrender, 
three Japanese soldiers beheaded them.  He also mentions that the same kind of 
cruelty to the Okinawans by the Japanese continued after WWII, for example, Article 
3 of the peace treaty which separated Okinawa from Japan and subjected Okinawans 
to US military rule.  He explains that the Okinawans, including himself, requested 
reversion to Japan, because they wanted peace and wished to be entitled to the peace 
constitution.  However, the military bases are still there and the Okinawans can never 
be free from the chance of getting involved in the battlefield again.  The Japanese 
government has ignored the Constitution as far as the Okinawans’ rights and security 
are concerned, for example, by admitting the unequal Status of Forces Agreement 
with the US that protects US soldiers from severe penalties when they commit crimes 
                                                             
31 According to Zukeran, the conservatives, such as Liberal Democratic Party members, often criticise 
the one-tsubo anti-war landowners as ‘a group influenced by an extreme ideological belief’ (1997: 
194).  He rejects this criticism by explaining ‘the respect [for the Constitution] is the collective feeling 
of all Okinawans, not an extreme ideological position’ (emphasis added 1997: 194).   
32 Political scientist Professor Egami Yoshinori, who teaches at Ryūkyū University, argues that the 
OSMP has been a local party supported by the population, who prefer not to identify themselves with 
either conservative or radical political ideas.  Politically, it is ‘progressive’ and anti-base, however, its 
populist appeal mainly drives from being the only local party without any affiliation with the 
mainland Japanese parties, unlike other parties (Interview April 1999).   206
against the locals.  The Japanese government’s machinations to legalise forceful 
military occupations of private properties despite the landowners’ disagreement 
embody the continuing marginalisation of Okinawa. Zukeran argues that these land 
laws are against the principles of the Constitution (Zukeran 1997: 194–201).   
However, the strategy of the Okinawan anti-war landowners and their 
supporters to refer to the Constitution fits comfortably with the post-war mainland 
Japanese left’s commitment to the principles of pacifism and democracy.  The 
distinctiveness in most stories of the Battle of Okinawa is that the Japanese soldiers 
are represented as the oppressor of the Okinawan islanders.  The division between 
the ‘Japanese’ aggressor and the ‘Okinawan’ victims overlaps with that between evil, 
fanatic militarists and the innocent general mainland Japanese public who were 
deceived into a horrific war.  According to the dominant post-war Japanese discourse 
on WWII, the mainland Japanese general public was also deceived into a horrific war 
by fanatic Japanese imperial militarists.  Dower explains that in the late 1940s, 
pacifism replaced militarism as a new form of nationalism in the immediate post-war 
Japanese society.  In Japan, too, the memory of the sufferings of WWII fuelled the 
enthusiasm for transformation of the entire society into a new, democratic, pacifist 
and wealthy one.  The peace Constitution has been a milestone for this collective 
determination of the war-weary mainland Japanese public.  The occupation period in 
mainland Japan converted the pressure for hard work and sacrifice of the pre-war era, 
this time to build a ‘peaceful’ nation focused on economic growth.  Pacifism from 
above is an important component of post-war Japanese nationalism.  Moreover, the 
emphasis was on the hardships endured by the Japanese themselves.  Air raids, 
atomic massacres in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the material scarcity after the war, 
as well as the post-war humiliation of Japanese soldiers in the winners’ verdict of the 
Tokyo war-crimes trial, became the collective memory of the nation (Dower 1999, 
Orr 2001, Yoneyama 1999).  The discourse of post-war nationalism stressed the 
Japanese war experience as victims, and underrepresented the hardships caused to 
other nations, including Okinawa, as a result of Japanese aggression.  Silence about   207
the different kind of war that the Okinawans experienced, including forced mass 
suicides, is part and parcel of this nationalist version of pacifism.   
The mainland Japanese left-wing political activists, among others, have been 
most loyal to this nationalist version of post-war pacifism.  Popular protest in post-
war Japan saw its highlight in the anti-Ampo protest in 1960.  Packard observes that 
the left-wing leaders of the mass movement, ‘in spite of a strong attachment to 
Marxist principles and proletarian internationalism, showed unmistakable signs of 
the new nationalism’ in Japan at the start of the 1960s (Packard 1966: 335).  The 
principal source of energy for the 1960 mass protest, led by the socialists, the Sōhyō 
unionists, the communists and the Zengakuren (students’ organisation) activists was 
the growing national pride based on economic progress following the WWII defeat.  
The progressive intellectuals, who contributed greatly to the mobilisation of the mass 
protest, ‘explored new foundations upon which to legitimise nationalism, such as the 
shared experience of the atomic bombing and postwar economic privations’ (Packard 
1966: 337).   
The Okinawan anti-war landowners have shared with the communists and 
socialists and other mainland Japanese left-wing peace activists the use of the 
Constitution as a vehicle of anti-militarism.  The former student activists who 
opposed the US–Japan Security Treaty, as well as the official party lines of the 
Japanese Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and a substantial part of the Japanese 
public have constantly supported Article 9 of the Constitution.  As Lummis argues, 
the ‘non-realistic’, non-belligerent principle of the Constitution has had an important 
‘realistic’ pacifist effect.  He argues that because of Article 9 of the Constitution, not 
a single Japanese person has been killed in actual warfare in the post-war era 
(Lummis 2000: 13).  However, it is also evident that Article 9 has had to live with 
the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty and the US military presence in Japan, heavily 
stationed on Okinawa Main Island.  The Constitution has failed to defend the 
Okinawan anti-war landowners’ rights from the conservative Japanese national 
interest, which relies on the stability of the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty.  The 
dispute on compulsory use of private property by the US military in Okinawa after   208
the reversion has demonstrated that the ‘public interest’ and the right to private 
landownership protected by the Constitution are in conflict.  The requirement of the 
US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty, that US troops be stationed in Japan, has 
constantly overruled the Constitutional right of Okinawan citizens (Nakachi & 
Mizushima 1998: 77).  Ironically, in effect, the anti-war landowners’ struggle can be 
interpreted as an ‘Okinawan’ version of post-war Japanese pacifism, which has been 
dependent on the stable security alliance with the US, and on discrimination against 
Okinawa. 
The belief in the post-war constitutional ideals, which supported the reversion 
struggle, has continued to be an important part of many progressive Okinawan anti-
base protesters’ definitions of who they are, and why they protest.  As examined in 
chapter 5, the Okinawan ‘absolute pacifism’ derived from the residents’ experience 
in the Battle of Okinawa criticised the ‘reversion nationalism’ strategy of seeking 
assimilation with Japan, which was dominant during the reversion movement.  The 
strategy relies on the democratic and pacifist post-war Constitution, consistent with 
the former reversionist Okinawans’ desire for a ‘true reversion to democratic Japan’.  
However, the demand that the Japanese government should ‘understand Okinawa’ 
and work towards achieving a ‘true reversion’, without the unequal burden of the US 
military presence exerted on Okinawa, reveals the basic trust attached to the state, to 
protect the minority’s interest.  This is not consistent with the basic distrust against 
the state, which is an important aspect of the ‘absolute pacifism’ derived from the 
residents’ experience in the Battle of Okinawa. 
Nevertheless, the resistance to being reduced to simply an Okinawan version 
of Japanese aversion to war is revealed in the stories of an anti-war landowner, 
Shimabukuro Zenyū.  Born in 1936 in the central region in Okinawa Main Island, he 
and his family survived the Battle of Okinawa and after his father’s death he 
inherited several plots of land occupied by the US military in central Okinawa.   
Shimabukuro never signed the land lease agreements.  He speaks as an Okinawan 
farmer.  Though he is a member of the Anti-War Landowners’ Organisation, he 
refuses to be affiliated to any political parties.  His style of speech is direct, free of   209
ambiguity and most loyal to his own feelings and experiences, rather than to any 
official lines of political parties or established ideological dogmas.  His anecdotes of 
the Battle of Okinawa centred on his father’s behaviour:   
 
My father was always critical towards the orders of the Japanese soldiers, 
and often used his ‘wit’ to escape them.  He did not, for example, follow 
the Japanese soldiers’ order to move south, when the Americans’ attacks 
grew intense.  Those locals who went with the Japanese soldiers, thinking 
they would be protected, all died: they were forced into suicide for the 
Emperor, or out of the bomb shelters to make room for the soldiers.  I 
believe my father’s ‘wit’ saved the whole family.  I wish more 
Okinawans had been like him.   
 
However, not everyone in my family was like my father.  My mother 
once insisted on committing collective suicide, following what the 
soldiers, village leaders and schoolteachers taught us was the right thing 
to do.  My brother, who was more educated than my father, was a public 
servant, working for the US military government after the war, and was 
ready to adjust to giving up his land, because, after all, ‘we lost the war’.   
 
After my father died in the 1950s, I saw my father’s spirit in the speeches 
of Senaga Kamejiro, founder of the Okinawa People’s Party.  I was 
especially inspired by Senaga’s speech, before the all-island land dispute 
in 1956, that said Okinawans had the right to charge rent on the US 
military, for using the ports, land, and even for breathing air in Okinawa.  
Everyone loved his speech and cheered loudly.
33  Senaga taught us that 
refusing to give up our land was a promising way to get rid of the US 
military presence.  
  
As a landowner who experienced the hell of the Battle of Okinawa, I 
never feel guilty for refusing the contract.  The origin of the landowners’ 
anti-militarism is quite simple: land is meant to plough and produce food.  
If you agree with the lease of the US military, you are agreeing with war 
and helping other people suffer from military attacks, instead of growing 
food.   
Shimabukuro’s act of dissent is individual-based, and void of a speaking style that 
represents specific political parties or organisations.  Furthermore, he is publicly 
critical of the reversion movement.  His hero, Senaga, was a leader of the reversion 
movement, however, interestingly, for Shimabukuro, anti-militarism and the 
reversion struggle seem to be clearly separate.  He does not hesitate to criticise the 
‘progressive’ party members, and emphatically stresses that at pre-1972 reversion 
                                                             
33 At the time, the US was trying to justify permanent use of Okinawan land with the Price Report, 
which recommended the purchase of the US land right for 99 years, which met the Okinawans’ 1956 
all-island resistance.    210
rallies, the reversion activists — presumably the Council members — held back from 
requesting the removal of all the military bases from Okinawa, for fear of delaying 
Okinawa’s reversion (Interview April 1999).  Furthermore, Shimabukuro makes 
strong but straightforward remarks such as, ‘Uchinanchū (Okinawans) never say this, 
but we all hate yamatonchū (the mainland Japanese) for starting that war and 
dumping the US military bases for 50 years on Okinawa, to keep the Americans at 
bay’ (Aihara 1996: 79) and ‘The Japanese people are the most hated group of people 
in the world’ (Interview April 1999).   
For Shimabukuro, ‘Okinawa’ is a separate political community from Japan.  
He is respected in the Okinawan community of protest because of his straightforward 
comments.  His personality expresses, on behalf of many others, what makes their 
struggle distinctively ‘Okinawan’.  At this level, his statements resonate nicely with 
the discourses of organisationally unaffiliated anti-reversionist thinkers such as 
Arakawa Akira and other ‘independent advocates’, rather than with those of the 
former reversion movement activists and today’s anti-base party and union leaders 
affiliated with the mainland Japanese organisations.  However, the public statements 
of the Anti-War Landowners’ Organisation and Iken Kyōtō that stress the formal 
democratic principles of the Japanese Constitution are somewhat distanced from the 
radical collective identity expressed by Shimabukuro.   
The anti-war landowners and their supporting organisations have publicly, 
and strategically, identified ‘Okinawanness’ with a strong attachment to the 
Constitution, which casts no major challenge to the post-war state pacifism that has 
co-existed with the US–Japan security alliance and discrimination of minorities, 
especially Okinawa.  However, if there is any radical potential to the anti-war 
landowners’ — and the progressive Okinawans’ — attachment to the constitutional 
principles, it is to reveal the hollowness of the Constitution and democracy currently 
in operation in Japan.  In the long-term, the only hope for this strategy of attrition is 
to generate mass mobilisation, not just in Okinawa but throughout Japan, against the 
emptiness of the Constitutional pacifism.   211
Conclusion  
The progressive coalition resuscitated itself for the project of supporting the anti-war 
landowners and continuing to protest against the US military presence in Okinawa.  
This chapter stressed the continuous elements of the past two ‘Okinawa Struggles’ 
that the anti-war landowners and Iken Kyōtō have kept.  The anniversary of 28 April, 
the passion to protect the constitutional principles, and representing Okinawan-
specific anti-militarism through the experience of the Battle of Okinawa are 
important constituents of the historical context of marginalisation that constructs who 
‘we’ are as Okinawan protesters, thereby keeping the myth of an ‘Okinawan’ 
struggle alive.  However, the existence of a unified protest actor against the US 
military bases that the anti-war landowners are supposed to represent has been 
strictly a myth.  Whereas traditional solidarity among left-wing political parties and 
labour unions has been upheld in a formal sense through the shared sympathy and 
support for the anti-war landowners as a symbol of the ‘Okinawan’ anti-militarist 
spirit, the Iken Kyōtō’s existence barely represents a token of the past legacy of an 
all-island struggle.  Since the reversion, the Okinawan protest community has 
increasingly grown fragmented geographically and organisationally.  The period 
sandwiched between the late 1960s ‘second wave’ and the mid-1990s ‘third wave’ 
mass protest was a long ‘trough’ cycle of protest.  During this period, there were 
many anti-base struggles at the community level, but the voice of one ‘Okinawa’ 
became weaker, albeit not entirely extinguished.   
The strategy and organisation of the anti-war landowners were strengthened 
by the birth of one-tsubo anti-war landowners, a movement led by the mostly 
middle-class, individual — and politically well-connected or experienced activist — 
citizens.  The one-tsubo landowners’ movement expanded the scope of the anti-war 
landowners’ struggle towards a citizens’ pacifist and anti-militarist movement.   
Although continuing expression of opposition itself has been the main goal of the 
struggle, this chapter also argues that the strategy to directly influence, and negotiate 
with, the formal political organisations through legal and judicial battles has 
constantly produced disappointing results.  This strategy has made the entire struggle   212
highly technical, limiting windows of wider popular participation.  The attachment to 
the constitutional principles of democracy and pacifism failed to empower the 
Okinawans in their battle, furthermore, it made the Okinawan progressives 
indistinguishable from the mainland Japanese left.  In July 2002, Iken Kyoto closed 
its office, because of the lack of funding and absence of major activities (Ryūkyū 
Shimpo 3 July 2002).  However, the decline of the old progressive movement has not 
projected an entirely bleak picture for the survival of the myth of an ‘Okinawan 
struggle’.  New types of protest organisations and strategies developed at the same 
time, and these ‘new social movements’ were no less ‘Okinawan’, and no less 
inclined to appeal to the myth of Okinawan marginalisation. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Kin Bay and Shiraho: 




During the ‘low’ phase of the mass protest cycle in post-reversion Okinawa, the idea 
of a continuous, unified ‘Okinawan’ struggle was redefined as an anti-base coalition, 
symbolised by a small number of landowners’ disobedience to the US military.  
While the pre-reversion coalition was maintained in a much more routine and limited 
anti-base movement, different types of protest were starting to take shape in the 
community of protest.  These new breeds of collective action were 
community-based and autonomous from party and union-based organisations.     
This chapter examines two cases of residents’ movements as important new 
variants of such protest in Okinawa after reversion in 1972.  The first case focuses on 
the residents’ opposition against the construction of the Central Terminal Station 
(CTS) in the Kin Bay area in central Okinawa (Map 7.1).   The second case examines 
the residents’ opposition campaign against the construction of the New Ishigaki 
Airport on Ishigaki Island (Map 7.2).  Arasaki maintains that the Kin Bay struggle 
(Kinwan tōsō) highlighted the emergence of a new type of residents’ movement, the 
first of its kind in Okinawa (Arasaki 1996: 50–2).  This chapter examines in what 
sense this particular movement — and perhaps even to a greater, extent, the Shiraho 
anti-airport movement — was a ‘new’ variant of protest, and what implications it, and 
the parallel movement, had for the community of protest and the myth of an 
‘Okinawan’ struggle.   
The first two sections of this chapter provide brief outlines of the two 
residents’ movements.  The third section elaborates on the emerging characteristics 
of the Kin Bay and Shiraho struggles in terms of collective identity, organisation and 
strategy.  The fourth section examines the influences, lessons and assets gained from   214
the experiences in these two struggles as part of the lineage and myth of an ‘Okinawan 
Struggle’ in the post-reversion period. 
Map 7.1   Kin Bay area, central Okinawa (Asato Seishin Umi wa Hito no Haha de Aru <The Ocean, 
Our Mother> Shōbunsha 1981: 10-11) 
 
 
Map 7.2   Ishigaki Island, (Ikehara Sadao and Kato Yuzo Okinawa no Shizen o Shiru <Getting to 
know nature in Okinawa>, Tsukiji Shokan 1997: 250) 
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The CTS Construction Dispute: A Brief Outline 
The economy in Okinawa after reversion continued its dependence on the bases and 
the central government’s security-oriented Okinawa policy.
1  With  massively 
increased inflows of Japanese subsidies, and inflation of the value of private properties 
occupied by the military bases, the Okinawan economy went through a fundamental 
change.  The achievement of income levels and a standard of living equivalent to 
mainland Japan (‘hondo-nami’) became the slogan of the Okinawan and central 
government officials and business sectors.  The Okinawa Development Agency 
(Okinawa kaihatsu chō) was set up within the Cabinet, and a Special Law for 
Okinawa’s Regeneration and Development (Okinawa shinkō kaihatsu tokubetsuhō) 
was enacted in 1971.  According to this Special Law, the Okinawa Development 
Agency designed the first Okinawa Regeneration and Development Plan (Okinawa 
shinkō kaihatsu keikaku),
2   starting from the year of reversion, 1972, to be 
implemented by the prefecture government, under the guidance of the Okinawa 
Development Agency.
3   
Former G.R.I. Chief Executive Yara Choōbyō was re-elected in 1972 as 
Governor (1972–6) of Okinawa Prefecture.  The Japanese government’s 
development policy, which specifically claimed to be designed to incorporate 
Okinawa into Japan’s rapid economic growth during the 1960s, had a significant 
appeal to the local population.   The new Okinawa prefecture government was under 
pressure to promote a ‘hondo-nami’ industrialisation, the strongest emphasis of Yara’s 
post-reversion policy.  Yara was concerned with his lack of experience in economic 
                                                             
1 The percentage of income generated directly from the US military in the prefecture’s gross 
expenditure was 15% at the time of reversion (1972) and gradually decreased to 5 per cent in 1987, and 
has remained stable ever since.  Direct income generated from the US military consist of local 
consumption made by the US military personnel and families, salaries paid to locally employed military 
workers, and rent paid to the landowners of the properties occupied by the US military.  (Kawase 2000: 
56)  
2 For this purpose, on the day of Okinawa’s reversion, May 15 1972, the Okinawa Development 
Stimulation Committee (Okinawa Shinkō Kaihatsu Shingi-kai) was established within the Okinawa 
Development  Agency.   
3   However, the central government shielded Okinawa effectively from multinationals’ direct 
investments and placed Okinawa under its immediate control, which eliminated the opportunity for 
Okinawa to become a thriving autonomous economic zone, attractive to foreign investments and 
business opportunities (Howell 2000).     216
matters.
4  The bureaucrats and academics defined the CTS construction, aimed at 
increasing storage capacity of crude oil, as strategically necessary for Okinawa’s 
industrialisation (Yara 1985: 218–21).   
The Okinawa Development Agency designated the oil and aluminium refinery 
as the most important industry in the 1971 Industrial Regeneration and Development 
Plan (Yara 1985: 224), which was the rationale for the CTS construction in the Kin 
Bay area.  Another more indirect reason for the concentration of CTS projects in Kin 
Bay was the mainland Japanese residents’ greater awareness of pollution in local 
communities, which was phenomenal in this period.  There were about 3,000 
residents’ organisations in Japan in 1972 (Kurihara 1999: 12), and environmental 
pollution was what these community groups typically protested against (Krauss & 
Simcock 1980: 187).  Residents’ victories in major litigations against big companies 
and the state had gained publicity, developed public consciousness about 
environmental problems, and demonstrated the capability of residents for political 
action (Broadbent 1998, Krauss & Simcock 1980, McKean 1981).
5  However, with 
the advent of the oil crisis in 1973, building the CTS was a priority for the 
multi-national oil industries.  
In the Kin Bay area, the pro-industry local political leaders clashed with the 
residents’ opposition groups, especially those who were reliant on fishing.  In the 
Yakena District, a municipality facing Kin Bay and directly connected to Henza Island 
by the ‘ocean road’, the mayor and commercial organisations were eager to attract 
petroleum industries.  However, repeated oil leakage incidents from the tankers had 
already been causing damage to the ocean and local fishery to an extent that was 
visually obvious to the local residents.  In October 1971, for example, at one of the 
Gulf facilities, more than 190 tons of crude oil leaked and polluted the entire Kin Bay 
                                                             
4 He refers to the uneasiness he felt at the time of the 1968 Chief Executive election when asked by the 
conservative camp, ‘the LDP is planning to induce the oil multinational, Gulf, which will lead to the 
construction of a power station and other industries such as aluminium.  What is your plan on industrial 
development?’ (Yara 1985: 266) 
5 Typical examples include the anti-konbinaatō (industrial complex) movement in Mishima, Shizuoka, 
and the ‘Big Four’ pollution incidents, including mercury poisoning which killed and permanently 
crippled many residents in Minamata, and Niigata, an extremely painful degeneration of human bones 
caused by cadmium-contaminated rice in Toyama, and asthma caused by air pollution in Yokkaichi.     217
area, killing white squid, seashells and other local fish, which threatened people who 
lived on fishing (Yoshida et al. 1975: 5).   
In the same month, residents of Miyagi Island (Map 7.1) formed the Miyagi 
Island Land Protection Society (Miyagijima Tochi o Mamoru Kai), and successfully 
fended off Arabia Sekiyu’s (Arabia Oil) CTS construction, despite the approval of the 
Miyagi Island’s economic development committee.
6    Subsequently, in nearby 
Yonagusuku village, the village council supported the landfill plan of the CTS 
construction by Mitsubishi Kaihatsu.  In September 1972, the Yara prefecture 
government authorised Mitsubishi’s land reclamation of 640,000 tsubo (2,136,347.18 
square kilometres) between Henza and Miyagi islands.  The landfill work started in 
the following month.   
In September 1973, the anti-CTS local residents of a mostly fishing population 
formed the Kin Bay Protection Society (Kinwan o Mamoru Kai).  The Kin Bay 
Protection Society repeatedly visited the prefecture government and Mitsubishi, 
demanding to stop the landfill work and protesting against the CTS construction in the 
area.  In September 1974, six village fishing people in Teruma District and the Kin 
Bay Protection Society brought the case to the Naha District Court, claiming that the 
Okinawa prefecture government’s authorisation of the land reclamation project was 
illegal.    
The defendant of the case was the progressive Yara prefecture government, 
whom the plaintiff had voted for, and was politically associated with.  The 
progressive political parties and unions constituted Governor Yara’s support base, his 
platform stressed ‘anti-militarism and peace in Okinawa’.  However, after the 
reversion, those who regarded the introduction of polluting industries as a new form of 
colonisation of Okinawa by mainland Japan grew critical of the Yara Administration.  
The member organisations of the progressive parties and unions that supported the 
Yara government, such as the Prefecture Workers’ Union (Kenshokurō), Okinawa 
Prefectural Labour Union Committee (Kenrōkyō), and the High School Teachers’ 
                                                             
6 In November 1972, the representative of the committee requested the Yara Government to facilitate 
Arabia Sekiyu’s (Arabia Oil) operations (Yara 1986: 269).   218
Union (Kōkyōso) all expressed their opposition to the CTS construction (Yara 1985: 
270).  Yara took this seriously and announced on 19 January 1974 his intention not to 
authorise petroleum industries’ quotas for CTS construction (Yara 1985: 278), as well 
as requesting Mitsubishi to introduce other industries than CTS, on the reclaimed land.  
In this ‘1.19 statement’, Yara emphasised the need for an accommodation of the 
popular feeling against environmental destruction (Yara 1985: 275).   
In May, Mitsubishi completed the land reclamation, and requested the local 
government to authorise the CTS construction.  The Kin Bay Protection Group 
members, banding together in a group of 40–50, frequently demanded direct 
negotiation with Yara, pressuring him to immediately refuse Mitsubishi’s application.  
A group of attorneys, who associated themselves with the ‘progressive’ political camp 
and called themselves the Progressive Attorneys’ Organisation (kakushin bengodan), 
submitted to Yara an opinion statement that demanded the rejection of Mitsubishi’s 
application.  Otherwise, the attorneys warned, they would publicise that the Yara 
Administration’s permission of landfill project was illegal in the first place, because 
the necessary procedures to compensate the locals for their fishing rights were not 
taken.  Yara, however, authorised Mitsubishi’s CTS construction, fearing litigation 
made by the company for inflicting financial damage of 50 billion yen, which would 
have far exceeded the prefecture’s annual budget of 20 billion yen (Yara 1985: 
278–9).
7  In court, the prefecture government argued that it was impossible to undo 
the land reclamation.  The case ended in the plaintiff’s defeat.  As a result, the 
construction of CTS tanks proceeded, making the Kin Bay area a major crude oil 
station.   
In terms of outcomes, the Kin Bay struggle was a defeat.  The recourse to 
legal action, thus far a common strategy of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’, failed again.  
However, an embryo of a ‘new social movement’ was germinating among the Kin Bay 
                                                             
7 The Kin Bay Protection Group tacitly obtained the opinion statement submitted to Yara from the 
attorneys, and sued the Yara government over the unconstitutional landfill authorisation.  However, the 
attorneys refused to fight against the progressive governor and did not participate in the court case 
(Kinwan o Mamoru Kai 1978: 3).     219
residents, which cannot be discerned in the superficial upshot of the CTS dispute.  
This will be elaborated further in the following sections. 
The New Ishigaki Airport Construction Dispute: a Brief Outline 
Shiraho is a small hamlet on the east coast of Ishigaki Island (Map 7.2).  In 1979, the 
prefecture government announced a plan to construct an airport on a coastal area next 
to the hamlet.  In the following decade, this hamlet, with a population of a mere 
2,000, became the centre of political activism that expanded into a well-known, 
exceptionally successful, movement that involved support from Okinawa Island, 
mainland Japan and overseas (see Suzuki & Oiwa 1996: 295–307).  
In July 1979, Ishigaki City and Okinawa prefecture governments announced a 
plan to construct a new airport on Ishigaki Island.  In support of this plan, 88 unions 
and organisations, most of them based in Ishigaki City, formed the New Ishigaki 
Airport Construction Promotion Organisation (Shin Ishigaki Kūkō Kensetsu 
Sokushin-Kyō).  The next day, the organisation designated the construction site as 
the coastal area next to Shiraho hamlet, without any preliminary investigation of the 
area.  The project for the new airport, which required a 2,500 metre runway and 
drastic landfill on the reef next to Shiraho, required the demolition of a mountain 
(locally called karadake) adjacent to Shiraho hamlet to obtain soil and sand.  The 
Japanese government guaranteed a special subsidy of almost 30 billion yen for the 
project.   
The local residents in Shiraho had not been consulted prior to the selection of 
the construction site.  Shocked by the news, residents had a general meeting at the 
Shiraho Community Centre (shiraho kōminkan) in December 1979.  The Shiraho 
Community Centre was the administrative body of the hamlet, in which important 
decisions were made.  Agreed by every single villager present at the meeting, the 
Community Centre decided to oppose the airport construction no matter what it took.  
In November 1980, the anti-airport villagers formed a local opposition group, Shin 
Ishigaki kūkō Shiraho Chiku Kensetsu Soshi Iinkai (the Shiraho District Opposition 
Committee Against the Construction of New Ishigaki Airport).     220
In Ishigaki Island, the Shiraho Community Centre was the only opposition 
force.    Late Shiraho fisherman Maedomari Shoei recalled that the mayor of Ishigaki 
City said, ‘The small number of Shiraho residents should ‘close their eyes’ and take 
the suffering for the benefit of the bigger, 40,000 Ishigaki citizens’ (Noike 1990: 66).  
It seemed as if the airport construction was going to be enforced, silencing the voice of 
the minority, in the little-known, southwest tip of the Ryūkyū archipelago.   
However, in the following decade, the anti-airport Shiraho activists and a wide 
network of external supporters turned around their predicament.  Even without the 
construction of the airport, red soil inflows from the Todoroki River had effectively 
damaged the beautiful and unique coral around Ishigaki Island.  Coral in Okinawa in 
general is severely endangered, especially since the intensive development of harbours 
and roads at the time of the Okinawa Marine Exposition in 1975.  In Ishigaki Island, a 
series of ‘land improvement schemes’ of the farmland, implemented by the Japanese 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, caused the red soil to flow into the 
ocean, and to kill the coral (McCormack 1998a: 27–8, World Wide Fund Nature for 
Japan 2001, Noike 1990: 24–33).  However, in the ocean adjacent to Shiraho hamlet 
remained more than 120 species of coral, including the blue coral, one of the oldest 
and most rare kinds in the world.  Public awareness about the importance of Shiraho’s 
coral reefs grew to a point that the politicians could no longer ignore it.  In May 1988, 
then Minister of Transport Ishihara Shintarō expressed his concern with the impact of 
the airport on the Shiraho marine environment (Mainichi Shinbun 28 June 1988).  
Influenced by criticisms from influential scientists against the airport construction 
from the perspective of preservation of the rare coral species, in August 1987 the 
Environment Agency of the Japanese government commented that the blue coral 
colonies in Shiraho would not be able to survive the new airport construction on the 
Shiraho reef.  Following this comment, Okinawan Governor Nishime (1978–90) 
announced a reduced length of the runway from 2,500 to 2,000 metres (Sugioka 1989: 
152–3).   
In 1991, Governor Ōta announced that the New Ishigaki Airport would not be 
built on Shiraho reef, in consideration of the extensive interest in coral conservation   221
from the locals and abroad.
  The power of the Shiraho residents’ movement in 
conjunction with a nation-wide and global network of citizens’ environmental 
movement presided and, thus far, the Shiraho struggle was a rare success.  Although 
this ‘success’ was temporary and the New Ishigaki Airport dispute is yet to be 
resolved,
8 Shiraho was a struggle that left a strong legacy in the community of protest 
in Okinawa that provided a model repertoire of protest — to gain support globally — 
thus constituting a distinctive part of the lineage of an ‘Okinawan struggle’.  The 
following sections delve further into how this has been the case. 
Kin Bay and Shiraho: Emergence of ‘New Social Movements’? 
Organisation and Participants 
Both Kin Bay and Shiraho represented cases of residents’ movements (jūmin undō), a 
type of collective action made by the people concerned with the issues that affect the 
living conditions of the communities they reside in.  The main actors of the Kin Bay 
and Shiraho struggles were residents and a network of sympathetic citizens who lived 
in other places.  The central instigators of protest were the residents in the 
community, rather than the traditional leading figures of the anti-establishment 
political activities in Okinawa, namely, progressive political parties, workers’ unions 
and teachers’ associations.   
It was not just in Okinawa that ‘residents’ were showing their presence as 
subjects of grass-root protest.  In mainland Japan, in the aftermath of the Ampo 
protest in 1960, large-scale, centralised and established organisations affiliated with 
the JCP and JSP were increasingly susceptible to internal conflicts and fragmentation.  
As the public disillusionment with the leftist organisations — preoccupied with 
                                                             
8 The construction site was moved to Miyara Makinaka, further inland from Shiraho (Map 7.2).  The 
Miyara residents, mostly farmers, firmly opposed the airport construction.  Even though the necessity 
of a new airport was general agreed in Ishigaki Island and Yaeyama region, the project came to a halt.  
In March 2000, a Prefecture committee, specifically set up by the Inamine prefecture government to 
solve the protracted New Ishigaki Airport problem, selected a new construction site in the Kara 
Mountain area, again, immediately next to Shiraho.  If built, the wall of the new airport would be right 
in front of the Shiraho reef, where the world heritage coral is.  The main opponents of this site, 
convinced of the destructive impact of the predicted red soil effluent on the coral reefs, have been 
non-governmental environmentalist organisations such as the World Wild Fund for Nature Japan 
(WWFJ) and the Japan Union for Nature Conservation (Zenkoku Shizen Hogo Rengō).
8  However, this 
time, the residents’ opposition movement that expanded globally in the 1980s was not to be repeated.  
Residents’ movements, in general, are an extremely difficult and exhausting business, which involve 
emotional conflicts, especially with other local residents.     222
organisational survival and sectarian struggles — prevailed, awareness of the 
importance of political participation of individual ‘citizens’ became increasingly 
prominent.  Sasaki-Uemura explains that ‘the notion of the citizen subject’ was a 
reaction against the dominance of the ‘Marxist framework’ and ‘the proletarian 
working class as the agent of social transformation’.  The Japanese word shimin 
(citizen) carried an expectation of enlightened individuals ‘as the agent of history’, and 
instilled a need for the ‘heart and spirit of democracy’ (Sasaki-Uemura 2001: 31–2).
9  
The citizen subject emphasised the significance of the spiritual element in political 
activism of the individual, which the 1947 Japanese Constitution promised.   
Emphasis on the independent individuals’ political participation was the most 
remarkable feature of the residents’ movements as a ‘new avenue of citizen 
participation and as a new political force in Japan’ (McKean 1981: 5–6).   
Citizens’ movements and residents’ movements are terms that are used 
interchangeably.   However, in the Okinawan context, an important difference exists 
between the direct subject vis-à-vis external ‘supporters’, who participate by 
supporting the residents’ movement in a community they do not live in, and those that 
do.  A particular status is attached to local residents of these protest communities, and 
the boundary between the ‘residents’ and ‘supporters’ is significant.
10 
The late Asato Seishin was a former schoolteacher and a resident of Yakena 
village near Kin Bay, a founder of the Kin Bay Life Protection Society and its most 
respected and vocal member.  Sakihara Seishū, a former schoolteacher and member 
of the Kin Bay Life Protection Society, recalls that Asato was openly critical of the 
left-wing political parties, trade unions and the coalition.  In his opinion, in order to 
really represent the interests of the local residents, local residents needed to ‘organise 
                                                             
9 This expectation often results in disappointment with the ignorant and unenlightened ‘mass’, as 
witnessed in the lament of leading activists such as Ikemiyagi and Yonemori towards the immaturity of 
the Japanese masses when it comes to their apathy towards participating in collective action to enhance 
the public good as ‘citizens’ (Yonemori, Interview April 1999, see Ikemiyagi’s interview in chapter 6).   
10 McKean notes, accurately, ‘The Japanese refer to any protest movement consisting of residents of a 
particular locality as ‘residents’ movements’ (jūmin undō), but sometimes reserve the term ‘citizens’ 
movements’ (shimin undō) for the most experienced groups, those which use the most sophisticated 
political tools and which become principally concerned with the issue of citizen participation (McKean 
1981: 6).  The most often used example of a citizens’ movement, in this sense, is the Beheiren 
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and do things themselves’ (Sakihara, Interview April 1999).  Asato stresses the need 
for the local residents to separate their struggle from external organisations, which 
participated in the Kin Bay struggle from the mainland and other parts of Okinawa, 
through activities such as demonstrations and court cases.  In his oral record of the 
Kin Bay struggle, Umi wa Hito no Haha de aru (Ocean, Our Mother), he points out 
that the external supporters often tried to be ‘movement instructors’, told the residents 
what to do, and took the struggle away from the locals (Asato 1981: 141).  
 
We have seen Kakushin (progressive) political figures, who have 
expressed opposition to the military bases and CTS construction, in the 
end give in to the state and big companies.  Even progressive governors 
Yara and Taira (in office from 1976–8) did not make any difference.  
Being left-wing or right-wing is irrelevant.  We, the locals, must fight our 
own struggle to protect our ways of living (Asato 1981: 44).   
Asato stresses that the Kin Bay Life Protection Society does not have representatives 
or leaders.  In his words, ‘each one of the residents is the representative of the 
movement’(Asato 1981: 42).  According to Asato, this organisational principle 
derives from the most important aim of the Kin Bay Life Protection Society, which 
was to establish and to transform jiko (self), that is, to enhance awareness of the 
autonomy based on the pride in one’s own distinctive lifestyle rooted in the particular 
local environment.  Only in this way does one develop the ability to reject the 
government’s policy that destroys such a lifestyle (Asato 1981: 41–2).  
The receding presence of progressive parties and unions as protest actors was a 
more definitive characteristic in the Shiraho struggle than the Kin Bay struggle.  In 
the initial stage of the Shiraho anti-airport struggle, progressive parties and unions — 
the ‘usual suspects’ who normally participated in peace movements and anti-state 
movements — were not the main actors.  For example, the Yaeyama District of the 
Workers Unions’ Council (Yaeyama Chikurō)
11 initially joined the New Ishigaki 
Airport Construction Promotion Organisation, supporting the construction of the new 
airport.  Other progressive Yaeyama divisions of the Okinawa Teachers’ Union and 
Highschool Teachers’ Union, as well as the Yaeyama Public Workers’ Union (jichirō) 
followed suit.  The anti-airport Shiraho residents’ organisation, the Shiraho District 
                                                             
11 Yaeyama Chikurō is affiliated with other District Union Councils in Okinawa and the Okinawa Peace 
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Opposition Committee, was the only organisation that represented opposition against 
the airport.  Ishigaki City’s mayor was a progressive OSMP member, and one of the 
most important supporters of the new airport.   
Ishigaki public opinion generally strongly supported the new airport.  Since 
the reversion, local villages and cities were losing economic self-sufficiency and 
increasing their dependence on public works and projects funded by the government.  
In Ishigaki City, many people expected from the new airport construction a booming 
construction industry, which would have created instant income and lots of temporary 
jobs.  Some farmers expected the new airport, with the capacity to accommodate 
bigger aeroplanes, would enable them to transport by air and sell more off-season 
agricultural products grown in a much warmer climate than elsewhere in mainland 
Japan.  In Shiraho, too, there were residents who supported the airport, mainly those 
engaged in local construction and sand mining companies.  These people distanced 
themselves from the Shiraho Community Centre and formed a separate administrative 
body, the Shiraho First Community Centre.  Thus, the airport plan divided the small 
Shiraho community into two camps, building up antagonism among friends, families 
and relatives (Yonemori Yūji, Interview 13 April 1999).   
Because isolation made it extremely difficult for the Shiraho residents to 
sustain sole opposition to the airport project within Ishigaki Island — both financially 
and psychologically — external support from the environmentally concerned and 
nature-loving population, often dwelling in urban areas, became a crucial element.  
Mukaezato Kiyoshi, then leader of the Committee, flew to Naha and sought help from 
Yonemori Yūji, a Shiraho-born university philosophy professor.  Yonemori 
organised the Volunteer Association of Shiraho-Born Residents against the New 
Ishigaki Ariport (Shin Ishigaki Kūkō ni Hantai suru Okinawa Zaijū Shiraho Kyoyū 
Yushikai) in 1981.  Yonemori formed this group with other schoolteachers and 
university lecturers living in Okinawa from Shiraho to support the local protest.   
In 1983, Yonemori and his colleagues advertised a message, to appeal against 
the construction of the New Ishigaki Airport in Shiraho, in a local newspaper, Ryūkyū 
Shimpo, using a vivid photograph of the colourful Shiraho reef taken by a professional   225
photographer for a commercial purpose.
12  Yonemori and his fellow members made 
posters with this picture and an anti-airport message, which were distributed 
everywhere in Okinawa.  The posters and the advertisement raised a high level of 
interest from the people living in other parts of Okinawa and in mainland Japan.  A 
lot of people told Yonemori how they could not believe such a beautiful ocean and 
coral existed (Yonemori, Interview 13 April 1999).   
In July 1983, members who lived in the Yaeyama region (such as Ishigaki 
City) other than Shiraho formed the Concerned Citizens’ Group against the Airport 
(Kūkō Mondai o Kangaeru Shimin no Kai).  Yonemori formed a new group called the 
Okinawa, Yaeyama and Shiraho Ocean and Life Protection Group (Okinawa, 
Yaeyama, Shiraho no Umi to Kurashi o Mamoru Kai), based in Naha, with other 
concerned Okinawan citizens.  In Tokyo, some 50 people who had visited the region 
and held strong attachments to the ocean in Shiraho formed the Yaeyama and Shiraho 
Ocean Protection Group (Yaeyama Shiraho no Umi o Mamoru Kai).  The Protection 
Group in Tokyo included a member of the Upper House, Minobe Ryōkichi, which 
helped attract publicity (Ryūkyū Shimpo 17 May 1984).  In Osaka, sympathisers 
formed an anti-airport group (Ishigaki, Shiraho no Umi ni Kūkō o Tsukurasenai Osaka 
no Kai).  In Kobe and Kyoto, similar groups were formed.   
Thus, the Shiraho coral conservation movement involved numerous small 
groups with usually not more than 100–150 members each, which expanded into a 
loose network that transcended the local community and extended worldwide.  
However, this also meant that many different groups with different capabilities and 
characteristics were involved in the same struggle.  The engagement of many actors 
and supporting activists with different goals, motivations and preferred strategies 
subtly different from each other, at times contradicted those of the Shiraho residents 
and threatened the autonomy of the Shiraho District Opposition Committee 
(Anonymous activist, Interview 1999).  
                                                             
12 The photograph was given to the local fisher folk who guided the photographer on a boat, and was 
passed on to Yonemori (Yonemori, Interview 13 April 1999).     226
In order to minimise inter-group conflicts, Yonemori explains, ‘We (Shiraho 
struggle supporters) deliberately distanced our activities from political parties and 
workers’ unions, which tended to allow the organisations’ interests and priorities to 
control the direction of the movement’ (Interview April 1999).  Activist lawyer 
Maeshiro considers that the Shiraho struggle was successful, partly because ‘Shiraho 
residents and non-resident participants made it clear that the political parties were not 
welcome, they brought in their own egos, policies and strategies.  There was a clear 
consensus that the centre of the movement was the Shiraho District Opposition 
Committee.  External organisations and sympathisers, including the Okinawa, 
Yaeyama and Shiraho’s Ocean and Life Protection Group, based in Naha, were 
‘supporters’’ (Maeshiro, Interview May 1999).  The main concern of the actors was 
to prevent their local residents’ opposition cause being diluted by external parties’ 
vested interests.   
Yonemori observes that the Shiraho residents and activists learned from the 
Kin Bay struggle, that supporters from outside at times disturbed the residents’ 
involvement in anti-CTS activities by bringing their own internal conflicts and 
creating divisions and tensions among the participants.  A member of the Kin Bay 
Life Protection Society observed that the Kin Bay struggle relied on the Okinawa 
Prefectural Labour Union Committee, the Central Branch (Chūbu Chikurō), for 
financial support and mobilising demonstrations and rallies (Haemi 1984: 21), with 
supporters from mainland Japan and the students’ New Left organisations
13.  The 
residents who joined the Kin Bay Protection Society learned the hard way that 
progressive political parties and unions’ participation tended to interfere with 
resident-centred collective action (Yonemori, Interview April 1999).   
Collective Identity and a Framing of Protest 
As the agency of protest expanded from established political parties and unions to 
conscious citizens acting as individuals, collective identity — defining who ‘we’ are 
                                                             
13 These organisations are often called ‘sects’, or factions, such as Chūkaku and Kakumaru, ‘both 
directed by the parent organisation Kakkyōdo’, which is a nation-wide students’ movement faction.  
These groups are often in conflict with each other (Steinhoff, 1984: 182).  On students’ movements and 
sects, see, for example, (Kelman 2001, Steinhoff 1984, Takazawa 1996, Wheeler 1979)     227
and why ‘we’ protest — also went through a significant shift.  In the process of 
collective action to protect the natural environment, the resident participants in the 
protest came to realise and emphasise the value of a distinctive lifestyle specific to 
their localities.  This emphasis was quite different from the ‘Okinawan’ collective 
identity of protest against the US military administration, motivated by ‘reversion 
nationalism’.  Rather than demanding Okinawa’s inclusion as part of Japan, residents 
who protested against CTS and the New Ishigaki Airport defined themselves in their 
own words — rather than according to official party lines or slogans — positively 
approving their ‘local’ characteristics in defining who they were.  The meanings 
attached to the act of protest also derived from this fortified emphasis on ‘localness’ as 
a source of collective identity. 
The emphasis was on autonomy, rather than assimilation to Japan.   This was 
underpinned by the repudiation of dependency on immediate incomes gained by 
accepting environmentally hazardous industries and military bases.  Thus, the Kin 
Bay struggle sent messages that appealed to many anti-base Okinawans, who were 
aware of the local economy’s increasing loss of autonomy to the Japanese 
government’s subsidies.  This message was an expression of a particular ethical 
position about the meaning of life, especially the meaning of ‘affluence’.  One of the 
expressions of this collective identity based on local pride was an attempt to develop 
locally specific industries to acquire the means of living.  In the case of the Kin Bay 
struggle, the importance of local industry, such as mozuku seaweed growing, was 
stressed as a potentially lucrative alternative source of income to accepting the CTS.  
During the anti-CTS struggle, ‘I would rather eat sweet potatoes under the blue sky, 
than steaks in a big house’ was a favourite saying among the local CTS opponents 
(Sakihara, Interview April 1999). 
Similarly in Shiraho, it was the coral and the ocean that defined the residents’ 
collective identity in the anti-airport protest.  In Shiraho, residents were mostly 
content with the old-fashioned, slow lifestyle based on part-time farming and   228
fishing.
14  However, Yonemori explains that it was not easy for most of the Shiraho 
residents to see the special value of the ocean that they saw every day.  Some local 
residents saw the ocean as something common, not particularly special.  Initially, 
noise and disruption of serenity were the locals’ main argument against the airport.  
Yonemori was frustrated that the locals could not fathom at first the value of the 
Shiraho coral reefs, though that was stressed by the conservationists who lived in big 
cities.  He contended to the Shiraho residents, ‘We can’t win by complaining about 
the noise.  We really need to stress the coral conservation, in order to stop the airport’ 
(Yonemori, Interview 13 April).  Journalists and divers came from outside, and 
reported in various media the unique lifestyle of Shiraho closely attached to the natural 
environment, with colourful photographs of the reef and marine life (For example 
Yoshimine 1991).  
Gradually, many locals came to express pride in their ocean.  They started to 
see the lifestyle in Shiraho epitomised a different kind of ‘affluence’ from that defined 
by advanced infrastructure and abundant cash.  Shiraho was an ideal place to live for 
someone who wanted a calm, relaxed life listening to the sound of the ocean, away 
from automobiles and karaoke noise.  Many older Shiraho residents particularly 
enjoyed the lifestyle of going to the ocean collecting food during the day and watching 
the ocean waves lapping in and out in the evenings.  A comment made by an elderly 
anti-airport Shiraho resident, ‘If you don’t have lots of cash, does it mean you are 
poor?’ appealed to many supporters (Yonemori, Interview 13 April 1999).   
Indeed, seeing themselves as residents of a unique and wonderful place, rather 
than a small, impoverished region, enhanced the protesters’ confidence in themselves.  
Residents in Kin Bay lived in multiple villages and districts around Kin Bay, including 
Yakena, Yonagusuku, Gushikawa, Henza, and islands such as Tsuken and Miyagi 
(Map 7.1).  Even though closely located near to each other, each of the small villages 
and districts formed a distinctive community, with its own social and cultural 
                                                             
14In Shiraho, one does not need to be a trained professional fisher to obtain fish, seashells and sea 
grasses.  Farmers, housewives, old people and children obtained their daily food supplies and pocket 
money by collecting fish and sea grasses (Aosa is one of the typical kinds).  In 1979 a local newspaper 
reported a farming Shiraho woman commented, ‘I can make 10,000–15,000 yen a day, by collecting 
aosa’ (Yaeyama Mainichi Shinbun 31 January 1979).     229
traditions, as well as political problems and inter-community rivalries.  For the 
residents, participation in community events was part of their daily lives, participating 
in protest was integrated into these events.  During the six years of the Kin Bay 
struggle, traditional festivals and rituals specific to central and east coast Okinawa — 
the annual dragon boat races, tug-of-war rope competitions, dancing festivals
15 and 
farming product expositions — occurred as this area provided a venue to enjoy and 
live the traditional lifestyle and culture of the community.
16  These community events 
and cultural revivalism were part of protest activities against the CTS construction.
17  
Asato Seishin considered it necessary for the residents’ movements to ‘clearly express 
who we are, in the process of opposition, in order to demonstrate why we would not 
live according to the state policy, and why we are right’ (Asato 1981: 41–2).   
For the anti-CTS Kin Bay residents, Ryūkyū poetry provided a powerful way 
of expressing oneself.  Ōshiro Fumi, a 79-year-old female Yakena resident, 
participated in rallies and demonstrations against CTS with her colleagues at her local 
seniors’ club (Interview May 1999).  Ōshiro was particularly skilled in expressing the 
villagers’ feelings in her Ryūkyū poetry.  She started reading out her poetry at a 
protest one day when the riot police stopped the villagers from demonstrating against 
Mitsubishi.  Ōshiro found that the poem she read out, which ‘made fun of the 
arrogance of the police’, had the effect of intimidating the riot police mentally, 
encouraged, she started making more protest poems, which she read to everyone at 
rallies and demonstrations (cited in Asato 1981: 168–70).
18  Her poems were capable 
of energising the protest when the participants were intimidated by pressure from the 
state, police and Mitsubishi.  Sakihara recalls Ōshiro was like a ‘goddess’ to the 
struggle (Interview May 1999). 
                                                             
15 In particular, in this region, traditionally, female dance meetings (usudēku) and youth dancing 
festivals (eisah) are performed annually. 
16 However, bringing in bipartisan political issues has created internal conflicts among villagers in 
Yakena, for example (Ōshiro Fumi, Interview May 1999). 
17 Since the anti-CTS protest activities in the 1970s, Ōshiro, with other villagers, for example, engage in 
researching classical songs and dances in usudeku. (Interview May 1999). 
18 Quoting the local newspapers’ report that a police officer had committed trespass, sexual assault and 
murder of a female university student, Ōshiro’s poetry read, ‘Junsa gwa nukurenu, Kenri fuimawachi, 
Yuruya innai, Inagu sagute’ (An authoritative police officer during the day is a dog at night going after 
women) (Ōshiro cited in Asato 1981: 168).   230
Elderly women and housewives constituted the major participants in the 
protest and were also given special roles in the Kin Bay struggle.  Sasaki-Uemura 
comments that the ‘numerical dominance’ of women came to be regarded as ‘a 
defining characteristic’ of residents’ movements in mainland Japan (Sasaki-Uemura 
2001: 146).
  While men were increasingly detached from the communities they lived 
in,
19 women predominantly engaged in community activities especially related to 
domestic, reproductive life matters, such as consumers’ rights, education, health, and 
protection of the environment.  For example, women played a leading role in 
initiating the anti-cement factory protest in Kazanashi hamlet in Usuki, Ōita 
Prefecture, where men tended to be absent from home on long-distance fishing trips 
(Matsushita 1999).  In Okinawa, too, female-specific features were emphasised in 
residents’ movements, which were absent in traditionally dominant labour movement 
organisations with connections to established political parties and unions, driven by 
Marxist dogmas and ideologies.   
Throughout Okinawa’s history, women have been associated with a spiritual 
role as shamans, connecting the people to gods specific to the local communities.  A 
photographer, Higa Yasuo, from central Okinawa, summarises the female features that 
are important for the collective identity of the residents’ movement in Okinawa, 
defined in terms of attachment to the place they lived:  
 
The centre of shima society was women.
20   We can see the traces of that 
time in many of the rituals we still have on remote islands.  The sacred 
places, called utaki, are still found all over the islands.  To me these are 
what is left of the sacred forests where women-gods lived.  So today men 
are still forbidden to enter many of the utaki, and the gods who appear in 
the rituals are women.  It is clear that in the ritualistic tradition the people 
have believed they are worshipping women and the matrilineal order 
(Higa cited in Suzuki & Oiwa 1996: 95) .   
                                                             
19 Sasaki-Uemura explains a general factor that constrained participation in residents’ movements in the 
1960s and 1970s, with regards to mainland Japanese men: 
They generally had to commute farther to and from work, and they increasingly were 
expected to engage in after-hours activities with their co-workers.  They were thus for 
the most part physically absent from the places they lived.  Hence, few men felt free 
enough from work-related constraints to become involved in these movements 
(Sasaki-Uemura, 2001: 145–6).     
20 The direct translation of shima society is ‘island society’, but ‘closed, small community’ is a more 
accurate meaning of the term.     231
Asato and his colleague from Amami went to speak to a local shaman (called yuta in 
the local language) about their protest against the CTS (Asato 1981: 59–60), not to a 
professional union or party activists in Naha.
21  Irei Takashi, a non-resident supporter 
who used to be an avid campaigner for reversion, observed in a protest camp in 
Yakena in October 1981, that central events were tasting local foods and enjoying 
traditional singing and dancing, which required the local elderly women’s contribution 
(CTS Soshi Toso o Hirogeru Kai 1981: 234–7).   
Nevertheless, numerical expansion of women’s participation did not 
necessarily mean that residents’ movements were less male-centric.  Traditional 
‘female’ roles, which enhanced the connection with the local-specific identity, were 
‘rediscovered’ by the male organisers of the residents’ movement, and incorporated by 
them into their struggle.  Women were often collectively referred to as ‘mothers’ 
(anma tachi), without names (perhaps except for the poet Ōshiro Fumi).  The use of 
the ‘female’ was, therefore, strategic to some extent. 
The struggles in Kin Bay and Shiraho marked the importance of 
post-materialist views of ‘affluence’ that became part of the slogan and emphasis of 
the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ after the reversion.  Following the reversion, attachment to 
the traditional lifestyle embraced in the local-specific natural environment, away from 
the mainland-style industrialisation and development, continued to define who ‘we’ 
were, and gave meaning to locally oriented protest.  I call this a ‘localist’ framing of 
protest.  During the long ‘low’ period between the second and third island-wide 
post-war collective actions of the Okinawan people that followed the reversion, this 
‘localist’ framing of protest emerged and developed, and continues to define much of 
what the Okinawans’ protest is about.  
Strategy and Repertoire of Protest 
One of the elements that worked for the residents’ movements in the Shiraho 
struggle was support from scientists, intellectuals, celebrities and sympathetic 
outsiders, which extended to the international community of environmentalist and 
                                                             
21 They also discovered that one of the utaki was contained within the CTS site, which provided another 
incentive to fire up opposition (Asato 1981: 60).   232
conservationist movements.  Seeking and accepting support from specialists and 
activists from other parts of the world became part of the repertoire of the community 
of protest in Okinawa. Support from external experts has become a common 
repertoire of protest among many of the Okinawan ‘new social movements’. 
In March 1986, the Okinawa prefecture government appointed fourteen 
members to form the New Ishigaki Airport Discussion Committee (Shin Ishigaki Kūko 
Mondai Konwa-kai). 
22    Based on an advisory statement of the Discussion 
Committee, in July the prefectural government issued the Environmental Impact 
Assessment of the New Ishigaki Airport construction plan, and made it public.
23  The 
Assessment basically approved the prefecture’s evaluation that Shiraho was the most 
suitable site for the new airport and the landfill was compatible with coral 
preservation.  Ui Jun pointed out the advisory statement was based on insufficient and 
unidentified data, and argued that the information related to the environmental effects 
of the airport was largely kept confidential.
24   
About 70 researchers and professionals in Okinawa and mainland Japan, who 
similarly questioned the official data on the airport construction project, formed the 
New Ishigaki Airport Construction Examination Group (Shin Ishigaki Kuko Kensetsu 
o Kangaeru Kai).
25  In their publications,
26 the scholars in the Examination Group 
                                                             
22 The members included nine mostly senior professors of biology, marine biology, economics, 
transport engineering, and social policy from the University of the Ryūkyūs, which was the only state 
university in Okinawa, and the members were regarded as the most authoritative in their fields.  This 
added weight to the influence of the Committee’s opinion on the legitimacy of the landfill project. 
23 However, Ui witnessed limited public access to the report: the report was put on a small table in the 
corner of a floor corridor of the Prefecture Hall, blocked by busy office workers passing by.  The 
planners of the airport had a strict policy of secrecy, which gave the impression of dishonesty, and no 
respect was given to the citizens’ right to access information on public projects (Ui 1986). 
24 Ui Jun is a scientist and environmental activist, specialising in pollution and environmental 
engineering.  His study of the Minamata disease contributed greatly to the Minamata residents’ 
movement and raised public awareness on the political aspects of industrial pollution (Ui 1968).  Ui 
has also contributed to the development of public education on pollution and environmental issues in 
Japan by conducting ‘pollution study’ lectures at Tokyo University after hours, which are open to the 
general public (Ui 1971 [1990]).  When he was concerned with the airport construction in Shiraho, he 
had just moved to Okinawa from Tokyo University to concentrate on the devastating effects of the 
post-reversion industrialisation policies on Okinawa’s environment (Interview March 1999).  
25 The Examination Group included 27 academic staff from Ryūkyū University and a majority of staff 
from Okinawa University joined the Examination Group (Sugioka 1989: 146).   233
systematically overhauled the inadequacy and insufficiency of the content of the 
government’s Environmental Impact Assessment on Shiraho’s marine resources and 
the socio-economic effects of the new airport.  However, the audience for their 
publications was mostly limited to already interested parties in Okinawa and mainland 
Japan.  
The support of an American marine biologist, Katherine Muzik, played a key 
role with the opposition groups in raising concerns overseas on the political issues 
threatening the coral reefs in Shiraho.  Muzik was living in Okinawa, researching the 
coral around the islands.  In Ishigaki City she made a speech at the first meeting of a 
citizens’ opposition group against the new airport based in the pro-airport Ishigaki 
City, stressing the value of the rare Shiraho coral reefs and the destructive effect the 
airport construction would have, from a scientist’s perspective (Yaeyama Nippo 11 
July 1983).  Muzik’s research was motivated by her personal distress over the coral 
that used to decorate the islands of Okinawa in a necklace shape, of which about 95% 
was killed by the government-funded post-reversion industrialisation projects since 
the Okinawa Marine Exposition in 1975 in northeastern Okinawa (Muzik 1983, 1992).   
In April 1984, the Naha-based Okinawa Yaeyama and Shiraho’s Ocean and 
Life Protection Group asked Muzik and Richard Murphy from the Jacque Cousteau 
Society to investigate the coral reefs in Shiraho (Yaeyama Mainichi Shinbun: 21 April, 
1984).  The aim of the investigation was to disprove the officials’ statement that the 
coral in Shiraho was in worse shape than other areas around Ishigaki.  After 
comparative investigation in Ishigaki waters, Muzik, Murphy and Takaesu Asao, 
representative of the Okinawa, Yaeyama and Shiraho’s Ocean and Life Protection 
Group, reported that the coral in Shiraho was exceptionally lively and healthy, 
compared to other areas (Yaeyama Mainichi Shinbun 24 April 1984).   
                                                                                                                                                                        
26 The members of the Examination Group based in Naha — Ukai Teruki, Tabeta Masahiro, Fukunaka 
Ken, Ui Jun and architect Makishi Yoshikazu — issued two booklets: Problems of the New Ishigaki 
Airport Construction Plan (shin Ishigaki kūkō kensetsu keikaku no mondaiten) and Problems of the New 
Ishigaki Airport Construction Plan Part II.  The first booklet scrutinised the government’s 
environmental evaluation report of the airport construction (Shin Ishigaki Kuko Kensetsu o Kangaeru 
Kai 1986).   234
In 1985, Muzik reported the rare value of the coral reefs in Shiraho at the 5
th 
International Coral Reefs Conference held in Tahiti, as well as the airport issue that 
potentially endangered them (Makishi 1997: 215).  In November 1987, a delegation 
from the World Conservation Union (IUCN) came to Shiraho to investigate the coral 
reefs.  Based on this investigation, the 17th General Meeting of the IUCN in San José, 
Costa Rica in February 1988 passed a resolution on the Shiraho coral reefs.  The 
IUCN urged the Japanese government to reconsider the airport construction project 
and to form a policy to protect coral in Shiraho, which the Union regarded as world 
heritage.  The Environment Agency representatives joined the meeting, but abstained 
from the IUCN resolution on Shiraho.  Muzik, Takaesu and a Shiraho resident, 
Yamazato Setsuko, travelled to Costa Rica to attend the meeting.  At the meeting, the 
three lobbied for the resolution by distributing pamphlets, titled The Heart Dyed in 
Ocean Colour (Chimu ni Umi Sumiri), to the attendees from all over the world.  
Muzik translated the pamphlet text into English.  The pamphlet included colourful 
photographs of the Shiraho coral and explained the airport construction project and the 
need to stop it.  Makishi Yoshikazu, an architect and member of the Naha-based 
Okinawa, Yaeyama and Shiraho Ocean and Life Protection Group, who was 
responsible for making the pamphlet, was told by the three Okinawa delegates that the 
conservation campaign targeting local delegates with hand-made pamphlets was a 
novel introduction to the IUCN meeting, with a potent visual appeal (Makishi, 
Interview 20 April 1999).  
The IUCN resolution in Costa Rica had the decisive effect of undermining the 
legitimacy of the airport construction plan in Shiraho.  The government moved the 
construction site four kilometres to the north of Shiraho, to the east of karadake 
mountain.  However, the opponents in Shiraho and external supporting organisations 
continued the protest against the airport project.  In August 1990, an IUCN delegation 
conducted another investigation on the coral reef ecosystem of the newly proposed 
airport construction site and visited the prefecture government to request another 
change of the construction site (Ryūkyū Shimpo, 30 August 1990).  Consequently, 
another IUCN resolution on Shiraho coral was made at the 18
th General Assembly in   235
Perth, Australia, in 1990.  This resolution recommended the prefecture government 
‘find an alternative solution to the problem, including extension of the present airport 
to ensure optimal conservation of the coral reef ecosystem at Shiraho’ (IUCN — The 
World Conservation Union 1990: 51). 
Later in 1992, the president of the WWF (World Wildlife Fund) and the Duke 
of Edinburgh visited Shiraho, as part of the campaign to protect the Shiraho coral.  
The support from intellectuals and a British royal put pressure on the Okinawa 
prefecture government to respond with the official Environmental Impact Assessment, 
and finally, to give up the airport construction in Shiraho.   
Litigation was another common and more traditional strategy of protest of the 
Shiraho struggle.
27  As activists rather than as lawyers, the attorneys specialising in 
residents’ protests against the government undertook these cases.  One of the 
Naha-based lawyers who represented the Shiraho fishers was Maeshiro Toshio, also 
involved in other court cases of the Kin Bay Life Protection Group, then for the 
anti-war landowners on the Public Property Law, and for the Kadena residents against 
the US aircraft training noise.  Court cases are part of the ‘anti-base movements, just 
like other protest activities such as demonstrations and handing out flyers.  Struggles 
in courts and other protest activities against the bases and the Japanese government are 
like two wheels of a cart’ (Maeshiro, Interview May 1999).   
Compared to other activities, however, the court cases did not result in 
revitalising the momentum of protest, and the role of the local residents tended to be 
much smaller because of the highly technical and time-consuming specialisation 
required in the court cases.  Similarly to the anti-war landowners’ lawsuits, the 
Attorneys’ Organisation (bengo-dan), based in Naha, and a group of Osaka lawyers 
                                                             
27Legally, the airport construction required the local fishing population’s consensus to cancel their 
allocated fishing right in the area where the landfill was planned.  In June 1980, the Yaeyama Fishing 
Co-operative agreed to sell the fishing right of the Shiraho marine district to the government, despite the 
opposition of the Shiraho Co-op members, who belonged to the Shiraho Community Centre.  The 
Shiaraho fishers filed a court case against the state and the prefecture government.  In March 1984, 33 
Shirahoans (Fishing Co-op members) made a complaint against the Yaeyama Fishing Co-operative and 
the prefecture government, on the grounds that the decision was made in a meeting that was not 
attended by more than half of the union members, and was therefore invalid.  The Shiraho residents 
were confident of victory.  However, on 24 December 1985, the Naha Local Court found in favour of 
the prefecture government and the Co-operative’s argument.   236
were amongst the supporting organisations of the Shiraho struggle.
28  Furthermore, 
the chances of winning court cases against the state were extremely low.
29  Litigation, 
apart from being a routine publicity-enhancing activity, did not highlight the ‘localist’ 
characteristic or strength, which rather resided in the resident-centrism and connection 
to the local-specific lifestyle.   
 
Kin Bay and Shiraho in the Lineage of the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ 
Collective action based on regional communities (towns, villages and hamlets) had 
previously existed in Okinawa, such as, most notably, the farmers’ non-violent 
resistance against the US military since the 1950s in Ie-jima.  Arasaki explains the 
farmers’ anti-base resistance in the Ie-jima struggle, which led to the island-wide 
demonstrations in the mid-1950s, as a precursor of the residents’ movements.  
Similarly, the Expand the Anti-CTS Struggle Society (the Naha-based citizens’ 
‘supporter’ organisation of the Kin Bay struggle) regarded the farmers’ anti-base 
struggle in Ie-jima as ‘the origin of residents’ movements’ (jumin undo no genten) in 
post-war Okinawa (CTS Soshi Toso o Hirogeru Kai 1981: 20).  However, the Kin 
Bay struggle demonstrated many characteristics that had not been seen in the 1950s 
Ie-jima struggle (or in similar land struggles in Isahama or Konbu).   
Some resident participants in the anti-CTS struggles and Naha-based 
intellectuals promoted the use of the term ‘Ryūkyūko’ (Ryūkyū arc) to describe islands 
of the Ryūkyū region plus islands south of Amami, which demarcated the new sphere 
of solidarity.  Writer Shimao Toshio originally developed the term Ryūkyūko from his 
writings on ‘Yaponesia’.  Yaponesia challenges the idea that the group of islands 
located to the south of Japan (nantō), including Amami and Okinawa and other remote 
islands, constituted a ‘peripheral’ region or a margin of Japan.  Yaponesia is a refusal 
to see Japan as a monolithic cultural sphere, and provokes the image of the Japanese 
archipelago as a group of many islands, integrated with the South Pacific islands, 
                                                             
28 The Attorney Group based in Osaka with 372 members, since 1988 supported the Shiraho struggle by 
submitting petitions and providing legal support for the court cases (Shiraho o Kangaeru Osaka 
Bengoshi no Kai 1989).   
29 The Shiraho court cases were mostly cancelled in the middle, in the course of development of the 
airport issue.     237
sharing the common cultural diversity of the islands of Polynesia, Micronesia, 
Melanesia and Indonesia (Gabriel 1999, Kawamitsu 1987, Okamoto 1990, Shimao 
1970, 1977b, 1977c, 1981-3).  The political utility of the concept of Yaponesia for 
Okinawans was taken up by anti-reversionists, who emphasised the importance of 
Okinawa as an independent entity, from which to resist the post-1972 assimilation 
process into a monolithic and homogenous entity, ‘Japan’ (Gabriel 1996: 214–17).   
The concept of Ryūkyūko allowed the Okinawan activists to cultivate solidarity 
with Amami activists.
30  Projects of CTS construction were planned in locations 
across Ryūkyūko, such as Yonaguni Island in the southwestern end of the Ryūkyū 
archipelago, Tarama Island and Edateku Island near Amami Island.  Residents in 
communities near these areas engaged in protests similar to the Kin Bay Protection 
Group.
31  Despite the geographical and historical closeness,
32 there had been a general 
sense of distance between activists in the Amami islands and Okinawa.  This was 
mainly because the former returned to Japan in 1954 from US military rule, and had 
been integrated into the Japanese socio-economic system to a much greater extent than 
the other islands in Okinawa (CTS Soshi Toso o Hirogeru Kai 1981: 12–14).    
Ryūkyūko was a particularly important term in the construction of the myth of 
an ‘Okinawan’ movement.  Seeing ‘Okinawa’ as part of Ryūkyūko allowed the 
activists to recognise themselves as an autonomous equal entity vis-à-vis Japan with a 
distinctive identity, thus overcoming ‘reversion nationalism’.  The term Ryūkyūko 
was used by Shimao to signify the geographical region placed in the southern margin 
of Yaponesia, together with the Tōhoku (the northeastern) region in mainland Japan, 
as an entity with independent cultural coherence, representing ‘Japan’ in its own ways.  
                                                             
30 Shimao focused on aspects of lifestyle in Amami Island in his works as a window that reveals 
‘simple’, ‘straightforward’ ‘pre-modern’ elements that are existent but hidden in many places within 
Yaponesia suppressed under the ‘modern’ and ‘stagnant’, ‘intellect-driven’ face (Gabriel 1996: 211–12).  
See (Gabriel 1999, Shimao 1977a). 
31 There were residents’ groups in each area, including CTS Hantai Yonaguni Jūmin no Kai (Yonaguni 
CTS Opposition Residents’ Organisation) and Uken Mura Edateku Jima Sekiyu Kigyō Yūchi Hantai 
Sonmin Kaigi (Uken Village Edateku Island Villagers’ Council against Oil Companies). 
32 Amami and surrounding islands, administratively under the Kagoshima Prefecture, used to be part of 
the Ryūkyū Kingdom, until being separated early in the seventeenth century by Shimazu’s colonisation.  
In this sense, islands of Amami and Okinawa have basic cultural and linguistic commonalities.     238
Ryūkyūko was thus a strategically applied concept, which conceptually established a 
community of protest among the resident activists with similar local problems. 
Residents’ movements in Ryūkyūko entailed much more than opposition 
against the CTS construction.  Issues of concern included opposition to the 
construction of nuclear waste disposal sites and campaigns to use soap, instead of 
chemically manufactured detergent, to protect local waters.  These groups held joint 
meetings, lectures, camps, field trips, and repeatedly held debates with other groups 
within the Ryūkyūko region, which were recorded in a seasonal newsletter, Ryūkyūko 
no Jūmin Undō, published by the Expand the Anti-CTS Struggle Society (CTS Soshi 
Tōsō o Hirogeru Kai).  During its active years, the Society attracted new members 
such as Asato Eiko, Yamakado Kenichi, Morii Yoshikatsu and Abe Ryoichi, who 
organised, joined and reported on the joint activities of local groups in the region.
33  
From the anti-CTS struggles emerged the concept of Ryūkyūko as a concept that 
represented uniqueness and positive values, instead of marginality and backwardness.   
As the centres of protest in Okinawa became regionalised and fragmented, 
activists were simultaneously involved in many different protest activities concerning 
different issues, overlapping memberships in more than one organisation became 
increasingly common.  Furthermore, supporters of the residents’ movements were 
often engaged in other protest activities in Okinawa.  Ex-Kin Bay activist Sakihara 
‘witnessed the forced land acquisition of the US military in the early 1950s in 
Isahama’, and as a student and schoolteacher, participated in campaigns for reversion 
to Japan.  Sakihara is also a one-tsubo anti-war landowner (Interview April 1999).   
Arasaki Moriteru, the main instigator of the network of one-tsubo anti-war 
landowners, advocated building solidarity between the anti-war military landowners 
and the anti-CTS activists.  Arasaki organised the Expand the Anti-CTS Struggle 
Society (CTS Soshi Tōsō o Hirogeru Kai) in 1974, together with a veteran activist Irei 
Takashi, Arakawa Akira and an academic, Okamoto Keitoku, who were both deeply 
immersed in consideration of Okinawa’s future after the demise of the reversion 
movement.  The main purpose of the Society was ‘supporting the Kin Bay Protection 
                                                             
33 In total, 25 issues of this newsletter were published from July 1977 to September 1984.    239
Group’ (CTS Soshi Toso o Hirogeru Kai 1981: 20–1).  It was an attempt to ‘establish 
a legitimate status of the residents’ movements in the Ryūkyūko  region in the 
traditional lineage of the Okinawa struggle since the land struggle in the 1950s, 
represented by the traditional progressive organisations such as Iken Kyōtō’.
34  The 
intention was to diminish the distance between the residents’ movements and the 
progressive political organisations based in Naha.  At the same time, the Society 
aimed to ‘set up the venues for flexible and loose solidarity based on communications 
for various residents’ and citizens’ movements in the region, which tended to confine 
themselves in respective communities’ (CTS Soshi Tōsō o Hirogeru Kai 1981: 20–1).  
The Ryūkyūko concept integrated many, independently unique island societies into 
one community of protest — whether called ‘Okinawa’ or not — through shared 
activities of protest. 
Importantly, the anti-CTS movement created an opportunity to critically 
reflect on the reversion movement, and the new direction of the ‘Okinawan’ protest: as 
a unified concept.  This activity was extremely important in creating a sense of 
continuity for the ‘Okinawa Struggle’, connecting past struggles to the present.  In 
particular, the emotional attachment to yamato as ‘the home country’ was criticised as 
a remnant from the campaign for reversion.  Sakihara recalls that his participation in 
the reversion movement was not motivated by any political awareness other than 
wishful thinking that a return to Japan would free Okinawans from US military 
oppression, particularly the forced US land acquisition of the 1950s.  After this hope 
was betrayed, like many other reversion activists, Sakihara ‘questioned the meaning 
and the outcomes of the reversion movement’, and quit the OTA in 1968.  He was 
also influenced by Arakawa Akira’s anti-reversion thoughts and his anti-state 
perspective.  For Sakihara, the introduction of a polluting industry by the CTS 
construction project was a clear indication of the ‘colonial subjugation of Okinawa to 
the mainland Japanese capital, contrary to the principle of self-determination’ that the 
reversionists aspired for (Interview April 1999).   
                                                             
34 Seven years later, the Society wrote, ‘The concept of the Ryūkyūko region as a sphere of residents’ 
movements was now established amongst the movement activists across the region’ (CTS Soshi Toso o 
Hirogeru Kai 1981: 20–2).     240
Local protest in Shiraho had much in common with that of the residents in the 
Kin Bay area, against the CTS construction.  Former anti-CTS activists had many 
insights to offer from their experiences, which encouraged the Shiraho resident 
opponents.   Both cases involved major land reclamation projects over the ocean, and 
disputes with locals who lived on fishing.  The Shiraho struggle went through the 
stages that the Kin Bay Protection Group had experienced.  Some of the members of 
the Okinawa, Yaeyama and Shiraho Ocean and Life Protection Group (based in Naha) 
were also involved in the anti-CTS protest activities (Yonemori Interview April 
1999).   
In 1984, five members of the Kin Bay Protection Group visited Shiraho ‘to 
encourage the local airport opponents not to repeat the fate of Kin Bay’, during which 
visit they dove into the ocean and saw the coral reefs in Shiraho.  They said Shiraho 
coral looked like what the colonies of coral around Ikei and Tsuken Islands near Kin 
Bay used to be, which had mostly been killed as a result of CTS construction under the 
state and prefecture government’s propaganda of promoting ‘development’ and 
‘progress’ (Hanashiro 1984).  A Kin Bay activist, Hanashiro Seihan, commented: 
‘Compared to the reefs here (Shiraho), coral reefs in Kin Bay today look like a coral 
cemetery’ (Yaeyama Nippo 4 May 1984).  Apart from providing psychological 
encouragement, the inter-regional support network integrated the Shiraho struggle as 
part of the residents’ movements in the Ryūkyūko region with the ‘Okinawan’ struggle. 
In August 1984, a Ryūkyūko Residents’ Movements Communication Camp 
(Ryūkyūko no Jūmin Undō K ōryū Gasshuku) was held in Shiraho.  Originally, 
Arasaki Moriteru and Asato Seishin started this camp in 1979.  In the camp held in 
Shiraho, about 160 members joined from the Kin Bay Life Protection Society, the 
Expand the Anti-CTS Struggle Society, and from other residents’ and citizens’ 
movements in the Ryūkyūko region, and from mainland Japan.  The Shiraho camp 
was the fifth of the series of annual camps that started in 1979, held every year in 
Amami Ōshima, Iriomote Island, Yakena in Kin Bay and Miyako Island.  Some of 
the participants wrote articles describing the beauty of the ocean and the coral reefs, 
the abundance of fish and seafood, and the hospitality of the local Shiraho Community   241
Centre members (Miyagi 1983, Ōshiro 1983).  This camp contributed to establishing 
solidarity between the Shiraho anti-airport struggle and other residents’ movements in 
the Ryūkyūko region. 
Another dimension of the Shiraho anti-airport campaign that similarly inspired 
the struggles in Okinawa was the locals’ war experience.  Before the Battle of 
Okinawa in 1945, a Japanese Army airbase was built in Shiraho, and was used as the 
launching base of the tokko-tai (kamikaze) air fighters that flew to the battlefield.  
The local residents provided labour for the construction of the Japanese airbase, just as 
happened in Ie-jima, Yomitan and other villages before the Battle of Okinawa.  The 
Shiraho hamlet was raided regularly, and the residents had to evacuate to the nearby 
mountain without proper food and clothing, and many died of malaria, far more than in 
air raids and shipwrecks.
35   
In these crises, Shiraho elders often described the ocean as their ‘lifeline’ 
(Noike 1990: 14–5).  That is, no matter how much the social situation changed, one 
could always rely on the ocean to sustain one’s life as long as the ocean was kept in a 
healthy state.  During the war, the ocean was the only thing they could rely on.  They 
faced starvation because their potatoes and other crops in the farmlands were raided or 
taken by Japanese soldiers.  But, as a seventy-four-year-old Shiraho woman says, 
‘Our family survived because we could eat fish and sea grasses.  We lived on the stuff 
coming from the ocean.  The ocean is life.  I cannot stand it to be buried 
underground.  That’s why I joined the protest against the plan to build an airport’ 
(quoted in Noike 1990: 22–3). 
Residents’ experiences during WWII, and their caution toward the possibility 
that the new airport might be used for military purposes, added further ground for 
protest.  Anti-airport residents and supporters emphasised the danger of the possible 
military use of the New Ishigaki Airport.  The 1979 airport construction plan was to 
extend the size of the runway to 2,500 metres long and 65 metres wide, from 1,500 
metres and 45 metres respectively.  For example, the group of Shiraho-born residents 
                                                             
35 Out of 34,936 people in Yaeyama region, 54 per cent had malaria and 10.5 per cent died (Noike 1990: 
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in Okinawa Island who protested against the New Ishigaki Airport construction issued 
a protest statement emphasising the ‘danger of military use of the airport’ (Shin 
Ishigaki Kūkō ni Hantai suru Okinawa Zaijū Shiraho Kyōyū Yūshikai 1982: 17–9).  
Shiraho residents’ negative reaction against the fear of another airport construction 
was connected to the locals’ memory of involvement in war (Noike 1990: 134). 
Yamazato Setsuko, a female Shiraho resident and a local opponent to the 
airport, thinks that the Shiraho struggle against the airport was also a struggle against 
militarism (Interview May 1999).  She is originally from Ishigaki City, and was a 
member of the Concerned Citizens’ Group, based in Ishigaki City.  As a teenager, 
she worked as a guide and an assistant for an American scholar who was conducting a 
geological survey of Ishigaki Island.  The survey was conducted under the US 
military government of the time, to provide detailed knowledge about the strategic 
environment of the island.  Yamazato agreed to work for her because she ‘wanted to 
learn the English language’.  Later, using her English-speaking skills, she worked for 
a US airline company as their first airline hostess from Okinawa.  However, she has 
always felt guilty for collaborating with the US military, mainly because she 
experienced war, in which she lost her family members.  Her determination to act 
against war in the island again motivated Yamazato to move to Shiraho in 1983, and to 
engage in the protest activities against the new airport plan (Interview May 1999). 
In the Shiraho struggle, the environmental concerns criss-crossed with the 
pacifist, anti-base concerns, which extends to the struggle against the US bases today.  
The anti-militarist motivation of the Shiraho struggle was based on the war experience 
specific to the locality and the idea of the ‘lifeline ocean’, which provided the residents 
with security that armaments and military bases could not provide.  Only 0.2 per cent 
of the Yaeyama region is occupied by the US military, compared to about one-fifth of 
Okinawa Main Island (Okinawa Ken Soumubu Chiji Koushitsu Kichi Taisakushitsu 
2000: 5).  However, ‘absolute pacifism’, rooted in the residents’ experience in the 
Battle of Okinawa, existed in the Shiraho struggle too.  Anti-militarism and war 
experience constitute the unifying fabric running across many struggles in the 
community of protest in Okinawa, together with the new concept of a Ryūkyūko region   243
as an amalgam of individually unique island societies.  In this sense, the Shiraho 
struggle, just as the Kin Bay struggle did, contributed to the continuation of the lineage 
of the Okinawa Struggle, in a different direction from that led by ‘reversion 
nationalism’. 
As it expanded into a larger citizens’ movement from a regional conflict 
confined within Ishigaki Island, the Shiraho struggle drew sympathy from and 
participation by many left-wing, anti-militarist and progressive Okinawans.   
Workers’ unions — ‘usual suspects’ in the ‘Okinawa Struggle’ — were initially 
disengaged, but gradually started to show support for the Shiraho anti-airport residents 
and their struggle.  External organisations were in a more capable position for stating 
their views in support of the world heritage natural asset, without heeding the 
economic interests many locals attached to the airport, which prevented the 
progressive unions and organisations in Yaeyama from participating in the opposition.
  
However, in 1981, Yaeyama District Workers’ Union, which included the Yaeyama 
Teachers’ Union and High School Teachers’ Union, withdrew from the New Ishigaki 
Airport Construction Promotion Organisation, after careful internal discussions 
(Yaeyama Mainichi Shinbun 26 August 1981).  In 1984, public workers’ unions 
elsewhere in Okinawa, such as the Municipal Council Workers Unions of Yonabaru 
Town, Nago City and Naha City, publicly supported the Shiraho anti-airport struggle 
(Haemi 1984: 21), the Public Workers’ Union (jichirō) Okinawa Prefecture 
Headquarters directly negotiated with the Ishigaki mayor and requested respect for the 
Shiraho residents’ opposition (Yaeyama Nippō 14 April 1984). 
Organisations and individuals based in other places participated in the 
anti-airport protest as ‘supporters’ as environmentalist and anti-militarist ‘citizens’.  
However, regardless of the degree of influence the ‘support’ had, the subject of protest 
ultimately rested in the residents within the community where the movement was 
generated.  Similar dynamics existed in the relationship between anti-war landowners 
and one-tsubo landowners, also, between residents and external supporters, with 
regard to the anti-‘heliport’ struggle in Nago.   244
Conclusion  
The case studies of the anti-CTS residents’ movements in the Kin Bay area and the 
Shiraho anti-airport struggle marked a new horizon of collective action, which centred 
around the local: residents in individual communities were the central actors, no 
matter how remote or small.  The centre of gravity of protest tipped towards the 
residents and a loose network of non-resident supporters, away from the left-wing 
political parties and workers’ unions.  As discussed in chapter 6, the coalition of 
left-wing parties and unions had made an effort to maintain organisational coherence 
of one ‘Okinawan’ protest.  In contrast, this chapter has examined a different 
dynamic within the community of protest towards fragmentation, in terms of 
organisation and collective identities of protest.  Although government-led 
industrialisation and the continued presence of US military bases in Okinawa was the 
common target of the community of protest, actual protest was motivated by many 
local identities with different experiences of everyday life, involving a wider range of 
people who lived primarily as residents in the localities of protest, rather than as 
subscribers to particular ideologies or established parties and unions.  In the process 
of interaction and solidarity building, the residents intentionally stressed the autonomy 
and uniqueness of individual communities.  External ‘supporters’ — in particular, 
from political parties and unions from big cities and mainland Japan — played an 
important role, but respecting the boundaries between outsiders (supporters) and 
insiders (residents) became the major tenet of the ‘local’ framing of protest, which 
continues today. 
However, the emerging awareness of ‘local’ framing did not terminate — but 
transformed the nature of — the myth of one ‘Okinawan’ struggle throughout the 
post-war era.  A sense of solidarity within the community of protest was maintained 
through a shared repertoire of protest, in particular, sharing strategies of protest.  As 
the centres of protest multiplied, communication and knowledge sharing among 
different actors across distant geographical regions increased, facilitated by the 
concept of residents’ movements of the Ryūkyūko region.  Furthermore, the memory 
of the Battle of Okinawa was also shared, as an important motivation for the residents’   245
movements, which indicated a common identification with the historical narrative of 
‘Okinawan’ marginalisation. 
The emphasis on the ‘local’ has also expanded the scope of activity and the 
supporting network, to the global civil society.  It seems paradoxical that a focus on 
micro-community promotes international interest and activity.  Representation in 
domestic politics, through parties, politics and municipal and national legislatures 
tends to promote assimilation into the existing Japanese system, especially, full rights 
as promised under the Japanese Constitution.  In contrast, expression of regional 
distinctiveness has proven advantageous in expanding direct connections with 
informal global networks of social movements.  The cases in this chapter 
demonstrate that localism provides a strong basis from which to relate to global social 
movements, in particular, the environmental movements whose activities permeate 
national borders. 
The emergence of ‘local’ framing in the Okinawan community of protest is 
most relevant to the ‘new social movement’ theory and the increasing importance of 
post-materialist values, discussed in the introductory chapter.  At a time when the 
high growth economy was coming to an end, and the horrifying environmental effects 
of blind enthusiasm for industrialisation were a major social concern, the Kin Bay and 
Shiraho struggles convincingly suggested that the traditional lifestyle in rural Okinawa 
— even in a remote community in Ishigaki Island — offered an attractive, alternative 
‘Okinawan’ collective identity.  Activists redirected their preferences from 
assimilation to positively re-defining ‘Okinawan’ distinctiveness, through discovering 
values in rural community and traditional lifestyle connected with nature, as an 
antithesis to the mainland Japanese-style obsession with industrial development.  The 
Kin Bay Life Protection Society’s protest and the Shiraho struggle both articulated the 
issue that came to occupy the heart of many Okinawans’ protest in the post-reversion 
era: Okinawa’s dependence on state-endorsed industrialisation, which exhausts local 
natural resources.   
The Kin Bay and Shiraho struggles represent the ‘low’ cycle of protest in 
Okinawa: in this period, perhaps due to the political structure that favoured increasing   246
flows of subsidies from mainland Japan through the promotion of industrialisation, 
local residents’ movements did not result in the formation of a big wave of 
Okinawa-wide protest.  Together with the ‘constitutionalist’ anti-war landowners and 
the progressive coalition, the ‘localist’ residents’ movements laid the groundwork for 
constructing a new collective identity of an ‘Okinawan’ movement, involving many 
local identities and wider sectors of the population.  ‘Okinawa’ was becoming 
internally splintered, divided and chaotic, but still represented a unitary community 





The Third Wave in the ‘Okinawan Struggle’: 
‘Gender’ Framing, the ‘Usual Suspects’ and Local 
Residents Against the Heliport 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in previous chapters, the ‘Okinawan Struggle’ has been constantly 
internally divided, in terms of collective identity, organisation and strategy.  Some 
activists have had greater representation as the actors of the ‘Okinawan Struggle’ than 
others.  Nevertheless a unified ‘all-island’ mass protest of the ‘Okinawans’ occurred 
for a third time in post-war Okinawan history, following the rape of a twelve-year old 
schoolgirl in September 1995 by three US marine soldiers.    This was a quarter of a 
century since the peak of the previous cycle of protest.  This rape case and the 
islanders’ expression of opposition to the US bases cast a temporary crisis upon the 
US–Japan security alliance. 
Continuing from chapter 7, this chapter examines the complexion of the 
community of protest after the ‘third wave’ and beyond that is more chaotic and 
multi-faceted than ever before.  It introduces the emergence of the ‘gender’ framing 
of protest of a group of Okinawan women who took the earliest political action 
against the rape case.    The rape case turned into a political opportunity for locals to 
express opposition to the continuing heavy burden of the US military bases — long 
bottled up under the guise of acceptance and perseverance — thus temporarily 
challenging the US and Japanese security policy.  The women’s concerns to do with 
the military and its violence against women provided a different frame of protest from 
the traditionally dominant ‘constitutional’ framing, discussed in chapter 6.  The first 
section of this chapter examines the organisation, strategy and collective identity of 
the women’s movement in Okinawa that came to the fore in 1995.  The Okinawan 
women’s collective action provided a new dimension to the ‘Okinawan struggle’, 
promoting and appealing to personal day-to-day issues, and ‘protection of human  
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rights, peace and universal human values’ (Arasaki 1997: 166). 
For the first time after a long ‘low’ period of anti-base protest, anti-war 
landowners, all Okinawan political parties (including the conservatives), workers’ 
unions, women’s organisations and citizens’ organisations, as well as former 
Governor Ōta, clearly and firmly expressed Okinawans’ grievances against the US 
military bases at the October 21 rally in 1995, which reverberated worldwide.  
However, the apparent unity of the powerful all-island protest was only temporary, 
and deceptive. 
This chapter also examines a series of anti-base actions taken by the 
‘constitutionalist’ protesters, including the anti-war landowners, workers’ unions, 
political parties, and Governor Ōta.  Basically, the anti-war landowners and local 
anti-base parties and unions continued with the struggle they had engaged in since 
reversion.  The feminist perspective, and focus on women’s issues, has made 
Okinawan civil society a little more inclusive of the previously disengaged population.   
However, the ‘gender’ framing did not replace the dominance of the ‘constitutional’ 
framing of protest, organisation and strategy of the ‘usual suspects’.  Thus, more 
perspectives and styles of protest in the community of protest came into parallel 
existence, which made the unity of the ‘Okinawan protest’ more tenuous.  However, 
the myth of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ sustained itself, by embracing the growing 
diversity within the community of protest as they were.  The protest actors were 
tackling many agendas from many perspectives, taking different avenues of protest, 
which are all located in the common ‘Okinawan’ historical narrative of 
marginalisation. 
In response to the temporary crisis cast by the rape case, the Japanese and US 
governments set up a new policy on Okinawa and the bases, with a special budget for 
economic regeneration and ‘reintegration and rearrangement’ of the existing US 
bases.  This included the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Nago, that is, the 
construction of a new, upgraded off-shore base, euphemistically called ‘the heliport’.   
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Henceforth, the protest became conspicuously localised.
1  The temporary united front 
of Okinawan people’s protest disintegrated into plural residents’ movements in 
different communities in Nago and ‘external’ anti-base groups and organisations 
elsewhere in Okinawa.
2 
The third section of this chapter examines the anti-base organisations in Nago, 
their collective action towards a plebiscite in December 1997, in which the diversity 
within the community of protest and the difficulty of maintaining a unified coalition 
became clearer.  In the anti-relocation struggle in Nago, women and residents’ groups 
increased their presence in the community of protest.  These actors in Okinawa have 
become increasingly capable of transnational activities, with organisations composed 
of loose and individual-based networks, and a greater focus on informal political 
activities.  These characteristics demonstrate the greater presence of ‘new social 
movements’ in the community of protest.  However, the anti-base parties and unions’ 
roles still remain prominent and important in terms of representing an anti-base 
agenda in the formal political arena.   
Okinawan anti-base groups mostly recognise and accept their differences, 
rather than engage in open internecine conflicts with each other. Furthermore, the 
division of labour signifies a greater depth and distinctive repertoires of protest, in 
which protesters can stage their own protest in a diverse, but still coherent ‘Okinawan’ 
civil society.  The idea of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ has survived, as a flexible, 
expansive concept, which accommodates many forms of self-expression as part of the 
‘Okinawan’ struggle.  However, the emerging strengths of ‘new social movements’ 
have yet to result in an effective coalition building by merging with those of traditional 
unions and parties in a way that would increase the power of the ‘anti-base movement’ 
through unified action.   
                                                             
1 With regards to other US military facilities across the island, to which the SACO ‘reintegration and 
reduction’ plan applied, similar local residents’ protest movements occurred, for example, in Urasoe 
City, where the SACO report suggested the Naha Military Port be relocated. 
2 It is possible to consider that the Okinawans’ all-island protest fractured into localised NIMBY 
politics.  Indeed, in each local protest against the US bases relocation, the opposition groups had to 
compete with pro-base residents who argued for the need for, and benefits of, increased government 
funding expected from accepting the US military facilities, regardless of their stance against militarism.  
The most important focus of this chapter, however, remains the dynamics within the opposition camp, 
namely, the diversity of protest actors in terms of organisation, strategy and collective identity.  
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The Okinawan Women’s Movement and the Rise of the Third-Wave ‘Okinawan 
struggle’ 
Beijing, the 1995 ‘Girl’s Incident’ and the ‘O21’ Rally 
September 1995 was the year the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in 
Beijing.  A team of Okinawan women, which called itself the ‘NGO Beijing 95 
Forum Okinawa Action Committee’, represented Okinawa.  The team participated in 
11 workshops, and gave presentations on Okinawan-specific topics: ‘The environment 
and women’, ‘Ūji zome’ (traditional dying as a sustainable local-oriented industry, 
using sugar cane), ‘The structural violence of the military against women’, ‘Comfort 
women (during WWII) in Okinawa’, ‘Action against nuclear weapons’, ‘War and 
malaria’ (during WWII, especially in the Yaeyama region), ‘Women and peace panel 
exhibition’, ‘Traditional culture and gender discrimination’ ‘Aging society and 
welfare’, ‘Women and labour’, ‘The unai (Okinawan sister) network’ (NGO Forum 
Beijing 95 Okinawa Jikko Iinkai 1996).    
These women were in Beijing when a girl was abducted and sexually assaulted 
near Camp Hansen.  The local newspapers only reported the rape, in a tiny article, 
four days later, when the US military refused to hand over the soldiers to the local 
police.
3  L e a d e r  o f  Okifuren (the League of Okinawan Women’s Groups), Toguchi 
Sumiko, recalls even local political parties and anti-base organisations (who routinely 
make protest statements) were quiet on the topic, as if making a silent agreement not 
to speak about the rape in public.  ‘The anti-base activists (the “usual suspects”) 
were silent about the incident as if not knowing what to do’ (Toguchi Sumiko, 
Interview April 1999).  This hesitation was out of consideration of the strong sense 
of shame attached to the rape victim.  However, Toguchi phoned the president of 
the Federation of Okinawan Women’s Organisations and prepared a draft statement 
of protest (Toguchi, Interview April 1999).  She took some local newspaper clippings 
of the incident to the local airport when she met the Okinawan delegate returning from 
Beijing who arrived home on 11 September, at around 10pm. 
                                                             
3 For example, see Ryukyu Shimpo Sha 1995: 19.  
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My colleagues from the NGO Beijing 95 Forum Okinawa Action 
Committee got off the plane saying, ‘We had a great time!’  I had to 
dampen their exuberance: ‘Something serious happened’.  I showed the 
article from the local newspaper.  Their reaction was, ‘We need to do 
something about this’. Several days later, we had the press conference.  
After we held a press conference, other prominent citizens’ organisations, 
unions and parties all started to publicly speak against the rape (Interview, 
April 1999).   
Takazato Suzuyo, chair of the Beijing Forum recalls: 
I got off the plane, feeling rejuvenated by the discussions and workshops 
with NGO women from Africa, Cambodia and many other places about 
military violence towards women.  We talked about breaking silence, 
and confirmed to each other that violence towards women should be 
treated as human rights abuse.  I was determined to keep working to 
make the Okinawan situation widely known.  Toguchi-san came to see 
me at the airport, which was odd because my house was near the airport.   
‘Something serious has been going on here.’  She showed me the local 
newspaper articles.  I suddenly thought, what was I doing in Beijing?  I 
had neglected what I should have done here’ (Takazato, Interview, April 
1999).   
The NGO Forum 95 Beijing Executive Committee and Okifuren held a press 
conference the next day at 10:30am.  In contrast with the silence in Okinawa, major 
TV networks such as NHK, BBC and about 30 other media companies already knew 
about the incident and the press conference was widely reported to the world.  
Takazato Suzuyo, chair of the Beijing Committee, appealed that this rape case must be 
understood as organisational violence of the military against local women that has 
always existed in Okinawa, rather than as an exceptional crime committed by 
individual soldiers.  The women’s group attacked the sexism and contempt against 
local women, revealed by the Commander of US forces in the Pacific, Admiral 
Richard Macke, who commented in an interview that, ‘The three servicemen accused 
of raping a 12-year-old Okinawan girl had been stupid, because they could have used 
the money paid for the rental car to hire a prostitute’ (Purves 2003).
4 
Immediately after attending the Beijing conference, and presenting various 
aspects of Okinawan women’s lives to the participants from all over the world, the 
members were particularly inspired and full of energy to convert into collective action.  
The members of the Beijing forum had just consolidated their commitment to take 
more active roles in addressing the problems to do with military and gendered violence 
in their community.  On 18 November, the Beijing delegation renamed itself the 
                                                             
4 After this comment, he resigned (Purves 2003).  
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Okinawan Women Act Against the Military and Violence. 
The women’s delegation to Beijing was the first among Okinawan anti-base 
organisations to take public action on this rape case.  Governor Ōta followed suit, by 
requesting the Japanese government review the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 
originally set in 1960.  On 20 September, Ōta went to Tokyo to directly negotiate 
with the Foreign Minister for the revision of SOFA and a correction of the 
disproportionate military presence on Okinawan soil compared to the Japanese 
mainland.  In particular, the focus was on Article 17, Section 5 (c) of the current 
SOFA, which prevented local police holding Marine soldiers in custody.  This 
symbolised the power imbalance between the US military and the local residents, 
unchanged since the period of direct US military rule. 
An estimated 85,000 citizens gathered in Ginowan Marine Park, adjacent to 
the Futenma Air Station on 21 October, where the Okinawa Kenmin Sōkekki Taikai 
(Okinawa Prefecture Citizens’ Mass Rally) was held.  Local newspaper Okinawa 
Times reported: 
‘This is the biggest opportunity ever to speak up for ourselves’, said the 
body language of the participants at the 21 October Rally… Since the 
All-Island Struggle in 1955–6 and the reversion movement in the 
1960s, we are standing at the third turning point of Okinawan post-war 
history (Okinawa Times 22 October 1995).  
The report also commented that the number and the diversity of participants did not 
match any of the mass rallies held during the reversion movement.  The ‘O21’ 
Okinawa Prefecture Citizens’ Mass Rally was exceptional in post-war Okinawan 
history because, for the first time since 1956, major political parties and unions formed 
a united effort to protest against the US military bases.  Members of the conservative, 
pro-industry LDP Okinawa Division and the Okinawa Management Organisation, 
who had never joined an anti-base collective action since the reversion, co-operated 
with the anti-base unions and parties, and made speeches on stage.
5  All major 
citizens’ groups such as the Okinawa Youths’ Organisation, Okifuren, the Okinawan 
Consumers’ Cooperatives, and representing the business sector, the Okinawa 
                                                             
5 The managing director of the executive committee of the mass rally was an LDP member of the 
Prefectural Assembly, Kakazu Chiken (Okinawa Mondai Henshu Iinkai 1995: 26).    
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Management Organisation, joined in organising the rally, except for Tochiren.
6   
The rape incident was connected with the concern and frustration of the 
Okinawan public at the time towards the new ‘post-Cold War’ framework of the 
continued and enforced US military forces deployment on Okinawa.  The ‘Nye 
Report’,
7 issued in February 1995, by the US Department of Defence justified the 
status quo presence of the US forces on Okinawa  (Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Region) 1995).  
Secretariat of the Executive Committee, Tamaki Yoshikazu, a socialist member of the 
Okinawa Prefecture Legislature, summarised the feelings of the citizens against the 
bases: ‘The Cold War ended; the role of US forces in foreign countries has changed.  
Why only in Okinawa do the US forces remain the same?  Every political party in 
Okinawa shares the frustration against the US bases’ (Okinawa Mondai Henshu Iinkai 
1995: 26).  The locals were aware that the forces deployed in Okinawa were 
responsible for regions of security that were no longer confined to the Asia–Pacific 
region, as they had already been extended to the Persian Gulf (Arasaki 1996: 175–6). 
On 28 September 1995, Governor Ōta announced that he would not sign the 
documents on behalf of the landowners who had refused to consent with the inspection 
and official documentation of their properties required for further compulsory lease to 
the US military.
8  His signature was necessary to authorise the state’s compulsory 
                                                             
6 The All-Okinawa Landowners Association (Tochiren), an influential interest group of landowners who 
contract with the Japanese government for military land use, boasts 28,000 members.  The Association 
made an organisational decision to abstain from the rally because of a ‘grave concern for the return of 
private land currently occupied by the US military bases, without sound substitute plans for income’ 
(Okinawa Times 22 October 1995). 
7 The report was written by a Harvard professor, Joseph Nye, employed by the Pentagon to ‘study ‘new 
threats’ to national security that might justify its expensive presence in other people’s countries’ 
(Johnson 2000: 47).  On Okinawa, the report writes, ‘we will continue to station a Marine 
Expeditionary Force on Okinawa, and will also continue to forward deploy an aircraft carrier battle 
group, and an amphibious ready group’ (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Region 1995: 25). 
8 One of the procedures required for the public compulsory use of non-contract landowners’ properties 
by the US Military Special Measures Law was the notification (kōkoku) and making the cases for public 
inspection (jūran) by the mayors of the municipalities where the properties in question were located.  
As an expression of opposition to the US military occupation, mayors of Naha City, Okinawa City, 
Ginowan City, Chatan town, and Yomitan village had rejected this procedure.  Then, the Governor had 
the responsibility to sign on behalf of the mayors, which was conducted by Governor Nishime of the 
Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party regularly.  In 1990, Ōta had an option to reject this responsibility.  
However, after much considerations, Ōta agreed to authorise the procedure, on the condition that the 
central government increase its commitment to the necessary legalisation and financial assistance for 
future returns of the private properties currently occupied by the US bases (Arasaki 1995: 197–9).    
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lease of the anti-war landowners’ properties to the US military for the terms that were 
about to expire in May 1997 and March 1996.
9  It was the first case of a Governor’s 
denial to authorise leases for the anti-war landowners’ land for military use. 
Ōta denies that the 1995 rape case was the direct reason for the refusal to 
authorise the anti-war landowners’ properties’ leases.  Ōta was a history professor at 
the University of Ryukyus, elected governor in 1990, supported by the progressive 
coalition of the local anti-base political parties and workers’ unions on the grounds of 
his anti-military stance.  Since the Cold War ceased, ‘realignment and reduction’ 
(seiri shukushou) of the US bases in Okinawa had been a public request of the Ōta 
Administration.  Ōta’s refusal to authorise the leases was consistent with his anti-base 
policy thus far (Ōta Masahide, Interview April 1999)
10.  However, the internationally 
well-publicised rape incident and the subsequent rise of the Okinawan people’s 
anti-base sentiment did create a favourable climate for the Governor to refuse the lease 
authorisation, something that did not exist in 1990. 
Funabashi (1997) explains that the post-Cold War security alliance between 
the US and Japan had been far from a steady relationship: after the Soviet Union 
lowered its profile as an immediate military threat, the rationale for the security 
alliance had reduced to regional, remote, hypothetical military threats, namely, China 
and North Korea.  In the context of a ‘drifting’ alliance that needed constant 
redefinition of its reason to exist, the 1995 rape case of a girl and the anti-base 
sentiment in Okinawa almost created a crisis (Funabashi 1997).  A mass rally 
                                                             
9 As discussed in chapter 6, over a third of the land occupied and used by the US military and the 
Japanese Self Defence Force is privately-owned properties.  After Okinawa’s reversion, landowners of 
these properties received rent from the Japanese government based on legal lease contracts.  An 
estimated 30,000 landowners received annual rents, whereas those who refused to contract received 
indemnities.  Under the US Military Special Measures Law, the US military continued to legally 
occupy and use these properties owned by the dissenting landowners.  Before a crucial legal change in 
1997, the Local Autonomy Law required that the mayors of the villages and towns where the properties 
were located to sign the lease contract of the properties owned by the disagreeing landowners.  If the 
mayors refuse to contract, the responsibility to authorise leases shifted to the governors.  According to 
this rule, in 1990, Ōta had already authorised non-contract landowners’ leases. 
10 During his term in office, Ōta travelled to the US every year to directly negotiate with government 
officials, congress members and state leaders to reduce the military presence on the island.  As well as 
visiting Washington DC every year, the Governor invited members of the US lower house and the 
Security Committee, journalists, and military advisers to show people’s life in Okinawa, crowded 
amidst the US military facilities.  In particular, Ōta argued for the reduction of the US forces in 
Okinawa, especially the Marines (Ōta & Ikezawa 1998: 53–5).    
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attended by more than 85,000 locals and the governor’s refusal to sign the lease 
contracts were powerful reminders of the level of Okinawans’ antipathy against the 
US military’s crimes and accidents, which had been barely contained by the Japanese 
government’s generous financial compensation.  At the ‘O21’ rally, the Okinawan 
people’s voices were crystallised into two demands: a review of the SOFA (Status of 
Forces Agreement) with regards to the local police’s right to arrest and to take into 
custody US military personnel who committed crimes against the local population, 
and a reduction of the bases in Okinawa.  On this day, Okinawans’ simmering 
grievances against humiliation, daily pressure, inconvenience, danger and incursions 
caused by the US military presence was expressed as one ‘Okinawan’ voice. 
‘Gender’ Framing of Protest in the ‘Okinawan struggle’ 
The girl’s rape first seemed to be interpreted as one of the unfortunate but not 
uncommon incidents that the locals encountered in their daily lives.  However, it was 
turned into a political opportunity to reveal the vulnerability of the US–Japan security 
alliance and the need for a new rationale to justify the foreign bases’ presence in the 
Cold War era.  It was the women’s collective action inspired by the Beijing 
conference that sparked this political opportunity by spearheading the third ‘wave’ of 
mass protests.  Who were these women, how did they engage in protest, and what was 
the impact of this female presence in the community of protest?  
The most prominent figure in the group of Okinawan women who addressed 
Okinawan military bases from the feminist perspective is Takazato Suzuyo, who led 
the Okinawan women’s delegate to the Beijing conference.  Born in Taiwan to a 
father who worked for the Japanese colonial government, Takazato returned to 
Okinawa after the war and joined the Girl Scouts, which was introduced to Okinawa 
by the Americans in the early 1950s and contributed to reconstructing the social 
infrastructure in Okinawa that had been completely destroyed by the Battle.  Through 
the Girl Scouts connections she obtained a chance to study in The Philippines for two 
years from 1961.  In the Philippines, Takazato learned about the Japanese military 
aggression and killings experienced by the Philippine people during WWII, similar in 
many ways to what Okinawans experienced.  After coming back from the  
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Philippines, Takazato started working for a Christian organisation (Takazato, 
Interview April 1999).   
Since the mid-1960s, Takazato investigated the burgeoning prostitution 
industry around the US bases and its abusive effects on local women.  In the war-torn 
island where everything was destroyed, prostitution was often the only way to survive 
for many girls and women who had their husbands and parents killed in war.  In fact, 
prostitution and the sex industry for the US military personnel in Okinawa was a core 
industrial sector in the local economy.  At the same time, the society nurtured 
persistent contempt towards women who sold sex to the foreign military for a living.  
Many Okinawan men — who could live and go to school because of the incomes 
earned by their families’ labour in the sex industry — associated the memory of local 
women flocking around American soldiers with the shame and misery of ‘Okinawa’ 
occupied by the US forces.
11  Regardless of the social and economic change following 
the reversion, discrimination and contempt against women — considered to be ‘sexual 
breakwaters’ between the US soldiers and ‘normal’ society — had not changed.
12    
Okinawan woman activists continue to understand and define the problems of 
US military bases in Okinawa as part of global and local gender issues.  As shown by 
recent studies on gender and militarism, the everyday functions of foreign military 
service rely on the abuse of women’s human rights through prostitution and the sex 
industry that specifically caters for military personnel, as well as on domestic violence 
and sexual harassment within the military (for example Enloe 1990, Moon 1997).  
Before the well-publicised rape in 1995, a small group of well-educated, socially 
active women had been addressing the problem of military bases in Okinawa, the 
culture that degrades women’s safety and status, and also the patriarchal culture that is 
lenient to men’s involvement in prostitution but marginalises women engaged in 
prostitution and ignores their well-being at the community level.  For these Okinawan 
                                                             
11 Easy access to Okinawan women’s bodies by the foreign military symbolised Okinawa’s body politic 
humiliated by the US military (see Molasky 1999). 
12 With Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, legislation against prostitution was introduced.  The sex 
industry around the bases continued with migrant workers predominantly from The Philippines, who 
were often trafficked into Okinawa illegally through underground crime syndicates (Sturdevant & 
Stoltzfus 1993).    
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women, protest against the violence specifically related to the US military bases is 
integral to the women’s movement, defined as a social movement that ‘highlight[s] 
women’s specific oppression in relation to men, preventing this from being 
submerged, amid all the other unequal relationships existing in society’ (Rowbotham 
1992: 6).  I call this perspective of the Okinawan women anti-base activists a ‘gender’ 
framing of protest. 
Since the reversion in 1972, Takazato, Toguchi and their friends who share 
similar concerns, started to develop public space to discuss gender issues in Okinawa 
at the community level (Toguchi, Interview April 1999).  At the same time, they 
brought the Okinawan women’s movement to an international audience.  They sent 
delegates to a number of international conferences on women, gender and war and 
militarism, such as the 1985 International Women’s Conference in Nairobi.  These 
were separate from mainland Japanese delegates.  International conferences provided 
opportunities to tell other concerned citizens overseas about the militarised 
environment in Okinawa and its impacts on women, particularly issues to do with rape 
of local women by US military staff, and issues relating to the sex industry catering for 
military personnel.  They also talked about the ‘comfort stations’ in Okinawa during 
WWII, which accommodated the women recruited from all over former Japanese 
colonies who were enslaved for forced prostitution (Takazato, Interview April 1999).   
Connecting with feminism in the transnational sphere, Okinawan feminists 
have been particularly skilled at integrating with global civil society.  This repertoire 
of collective action is similar to the strategy taken by the Okinawan activists who 
communicated with the global environmental movements during the Shiraho struggle.  
Okinawan women’s appearances at various international conferences have obtained 
sympathisers among internationally renowned academics and have contributed to an 
increased international profile of the Okinawans’ anti-base protest.  As for the 
residents’ movement in Okinawa driven by the ‘local’ framing, the strength of the 
‘gender’ framing of Okinawan women activists is the ability to represent themselves 
to the international community of protest by stressing their ‘Okinawanness’.  The 
development of the local-specific collective identity as Okinawan women is based on  
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the accumulation of conscious collective action. 
In 1985, a female director of a local radio network, Minamoto Hiromi, was 
recommended by her boss to report on the Okinawan women’s attendance at the 
Nairobi Conference.  Minamoto declined this recommendation and, in turn, asked 
him to give her a 12-hour slot of broadcasting and budget to make a special 
programme on women, produced by female-only staff.  The radio network has since 
given a 12 hour-slot to the Unai Festival, each year, in which Minamoto’s colleagues 
and friends, including Takazato and women from all sectors of the community, 
produced forums on ‘women’s issues’ (Production Yui 1986).  The issues they 
discussed were concrete life matters related to the political conditions of Okinawa, 
namely, food safety, pollution, clothing, health, childbirth, childcare, education, and 
discrimination.  She named the event the ‘Unai Festival’ after the Ryukyuan word, 
unai, which stands for the ‘female sibling gods’ who, according to folk belief, protect 
male siblings from misfortunes and accidents, which embodies the traditional position 
given to Okinawan women in patriarchal family and society.  Okinawan men joined 
and contributed to these events, however, women intentionally placed themselves in a 
privileged position in order to reverse and expose the ‘normal’ gender relations in 
which females are in underprivileged positions compared to males in every aspect of 
the social order.  Over the years, the participants called this strategy the ‘Unai 
method’ (Minamoto Interview May 1999).  Furthermore, Okinawan women have 
developed a strategy of creating solidarity among different women who are facing 
varying kinds of gender issues within ‘Okinawa’ through the Unai festivals.   
Similarly, they have linked with ‘global feminism’; indeed, the strength of the 
Okinawan women is the ability to connect the local-centred approach to international 
action. 
Takazato, Carolyn Francis,
13 and others developed a communication network 
with feminist activists in The Philippines, Korea and the US, who were concerned with 
problems related to gender and military bases (for example Kirk et al. 1997).   In 1987, 
                                                             
13 Francis has lived in Japan since 1968, as a Christian missionary, and had worked for women’s rights 
in Japan.  Since 1989, she has lived in Okinawa and engaged in activities for peace, writing about base 
issues and women’s issues in Okinawa (Francis, Interview May 1999).  Also see note 6 in chapter 1.  
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they held an international conference on military bases and women in Naha.  Their 
long-term contacts include Korean members of My Sisters’ Place, a self-help 
institution for local women engaged in prostitution and service industries for 
American military personnel, many of whom had children fathered by US soldiers but 
who were denied US citizenship.  Similarly, Takazato, Francis and others developed 
ties with Philippine women in the Buklod Centre in The Philippines, whom they 
visited several times, including when Mount Pinatubo erupted in 1991 (Takazato 
1996: 168–9).
14     
In February 1996, 13 members of the Okinawa Women Act Against Military 
and Violence made a two-week trip to the US.  This trip was called ‘the Okinawan 
Women’s Peace Caravan in America’.  The members visited 28 NGO groups and 
several universities in San Francisco, Washington DC, New York and Hawaii, where 
they gave talks, discussion sessions and seminars, as well as making appeals to state 
and federal senators and representatives (The Oakland Tribune 13 February 1996, San 
Francisco Chronicle 5 February 1996).  They also met feminist academics, such as 
Gwen Kirk,
15 Margo Okazawa-Rey and Betty Reardon,
16 who shared the Okinawan 
members’ intellectual ground from which they argued against the military: they 
questioned the priority placed on national security, above the security of individuals, 
particularly that of women.  In the trip, members focused on making the Okinawan 
situation known as widely as possible, by talking directly with as many US citizens as 
possible (Okinawan Women Act Against Military and Violence 1996: 1).  In the 
second ‘peace caravan’ during October 1998, they visited San Diego, where they saw 
the US navy and air force facilities, met local environmental groups and Chalmers 
Johnson, the chief editor of the Japan Policy Research Institute and a keen supporter of 
the Okinawan women.  This trip was enabled by the networks between Okinawan 
women and American NGOs expanded through long-term personal contacts, 
                                                             
14 The Buklod Center supports the living conditions of women who work near the US Subic Naval Base 
in Olongapo City, where Takazato had visited as a student and which she thought was similar to Koza 
City.  See http://www.geocities.com/wari9/philippines.htm. 
15 Kirk is a member of the San Francisco Bay Area Okinawa Peace Network (Kirk et al. 1997: 17) 
16 Professor Betty Reardon at Colombia University who teaches peace education visited Okinawa in 
September 1997, gave talks on militarism and women and studied the situation of US bases on the 
island (Yui [Okinawan Women Act Against Military and Violence Newsletter] 10 January 1997).   
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campaigning techniques and information about the military bases in the US. 
Attending international forums, Takazato and her colleagues found common 
ground with women in many other parts of the world.  For example, just as violence 
towards women is commonly treated as an issue marginal to the US–Japan security 
alliance and Okinawa’s sovereignty, in many other countries women’s agendas are 
sidelined by ‘national’ goals, such as independence from colonial rule and economic 
development (Takazato, Interview April 1999).
17  These informal, international 
activities have provided first-hand opportunities for Okinawan women to elevate the 
representation of their struggles as a global gender issue.  This has helped them 
overcome the isolation and containment of Okinawan women in the private realm.   
Distance between Women’s Struggle and the ‘Okinawan struggle’ 
In September 1995, Takazato and more than 200 women protested against violence 
against women’s human rights and marched to the gate of the Kadena Air Base: 
At the rally, one man spotted me and yelled, ‘Don’t try to trivialise 
things by making this all into a “violation of women’s human rights”; 
the important issue here is the Security Treaty!’  He only understood 
half the problem.  Yes, the treaty is problematic, but the threat of 
structural violence against women by military bases is the issue 
(Takazato 1995a: 3).   
Importantly, the women’s struggle has been mostly placed outside the discourses of 
the ‘Okinawan struggle’.  Takazato says: 
In the past, reversion activists used to say, ‘Pain in the little finger hurts 
the entire body’, in order to demand the mainland Japanese feel the 
suffering of Okinawans.  But I have always wondered, in that ‘pain in 
the little finger’, how much of it was women’s pain?  It is difficult for 
people to understand that women’s human rights is a political issue, 
because there are always ‘bigger’ ‘more important’ issues.   
Prostitution has always been a social issue, but not presented to the 
public in the same way as the compulsory military occupation of land, 
or accidental explosions in the bases (Takazato, Interview March 
1999).   
Indeed, it has been difficult to get this point across to the rest of the community of 
protest.   
The conflict within the community of protest revealed at the rally reflects the 
different order of priority placed among the list of problems generated from the US 
military bases in Okinawa: repatriation of Okinawan landowners’ property; the 
                                                             
17 See for example Takazato, Interview March 1999, Kandiyoti 1991,Yuval-Davis 1997.  
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unequal Status of Forces Agreement attached to the US–Japan security treaty that 
infringes Okinawans’ sovereignty by the US military personnel’s behaviour and mere 
presence; the environmental degradation introduced by the double economic structure 
of dependency on public works and the base-related subsidies from the government. 
This difficulty highlights the nature of the male-female relationship in 
Okinawan society.  Those Okinawan activists engaged in anti-base protest who do 
not subscribe to or see the need to change traditional gender relationships in Okinawa 
and the ‘feminist’ activists are usually engaged in separate struggles, except in 
occasional larger events that are not women-specific, such as the Okinawa Prefecture 
Citizens’ Mass Rallies.  However, in September 1995, it was the women who 
represented the anger of the entire ‘Okinawan’ people, being at the forefront of the 
‘Okinawan struggle’, albeit temporarily.  This is because Takazato and the Beijing 
team’s accusations about the rape case and the US military’s violations of Okinawan 
women’s rights escalated into a violation against ‘Okinawa’ in general.  The 
escalation of rape from a women’s issue to the rape of Okinawa’s sovereignty 
enabled the women and the ‘usual suspects’ to work together, albeit temporarily.   
In the context of racial/national/ethnic conflict, rape often has a political 
meaning of transforming bodily violence against women and girls into mental 
violation against sovereignty over land, nation and territory. 
Rape is a good place to start thinking about democratic space, the 
creative space between differences.  Because rape, like other forms of 
torture, is outrageous bodily closeness, violent touching, a travesty of 
intimacy.  And the word ‘rape’ is used metaphorically to convey that 
feeling of abuse, as when someone or some group penetrates, invades 
and damages the space (the land, perhaps, or culture, or thoughts) in 
which another or others dwell (Cockburn 1998: 223–4). 
Angst (2001) points out, however, that precisely because of this effect of elevating the 
physical event into the abstract, the Okinawans’ outrage following the rape case also 
demoted the importance of the arguments made by the Okinawan women’s group; 
their protest against gendered violence of the military was sidelined by the importance 
given to Okinawan sovereignty.  At the October 1995 rally, Ōta and other Okinawan 
activists described the rape of the twelve-year-old girl in September 1995 as the 
sacrifice of an ‘innocent girl’, which transformed rape into a symbolic violation of  
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Okinawa’s body politic.  The image of the sacrifice of ‘an innocent girl’ toned down 
the gruesome physical details and obscured the connection of rape and various gender 
discriminations in society, instead emphasising an abstract victimisation of 
‘Okinawa’.  This is problematic for feminists, because the purified image of a girl 
victim is predicated on discrimination against other local women — in particular, 
against those engaged in prostitution — who were similarly raped and assaulted, but 
who were not twelve-year-old virgins (Angst 2001).   
Takazato and her colleagues were committed to changing gender relations in 
Okinawan society, including women’s position in the family and workplace, and, 
particularly, ‘the culture that is tolerant to prostitution but intolerant to the prostitutes’ 
(Takazato 1996: 106–11).
18  Members of the Okinawan Women Act Against Military 
Violence have argued that it is necessary to address not just the existence of the US 
military bases, but also the complementary relations of war, militarism, patriarchy and 
oppression against women (for example Miyagi 2000, Yuimaru Seminar 1997).  
However, Takazato also relies on a metaphor of the Okinawan predicament as a 
‘daughter of Japan’ sold as a prostitute to the US forces in order to sustain Japan’s 
post-war economic prosperity, which relies on a purified image of the daughter in 
patriarchal order (Angst 2001: 251, Takazato 1996: 29).  Here, Takazato is speaking 
as an ‘Okinawan’ activist.  The Okinawan women’s struggle is bound by double 
collective identities as ‘women’ and as ‘Okinawans’. 
When the Okinawan women’s movement and mainstream local anti-base 
activists cooperate, however, the most important dimension of Okinawan women’s 
struggle — the struggle against patriarchy — becomes suspended.  Furthermore, 
there is a solid division of labour between the ‘feminist’ anti-base activists who ‘do 
women’s issues’ and other, predominantly male activists in the community of protest 
who focus on  repatriation of land and the meaning of the US–Japan security treaty.  
With both parties occupying different territories, peace is maintained within the 
                                                             
18 For this reason, changing a still influential Okinawan patriarchal family inheritance system tōtōme (a 
paternalistic family order that limits family asset inheritance to male offspring, this not only 
disadvantages the social and economic status of women but also discriminates against women who 
cannot produce sons) is important (Takazato 1995b).  
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community of protest.  The conflict between the ‘gender’ framing of the Okinawan 
feminists and the ‘usual suspects’ — most of whom are coming from the 
‘constitutional’ framing — is perhaps not as pronounced as it could be, precisely 
because of the marginalisation of the women’s struggle within the ‘Okinawan 
struggle’.  The division of labour, however, does not necessarily indicate an equal 
relationship but the recognition of the women’s movement as part of the community 
of protest, on the condition of its marginalised position. 
Nevertheless, the Okinawan women have been accepted as important players 
in the ‘Okinawan Struggle’ because the strengths of Okinawan woman activists 
demonstrated in 1995 after the rape incident ‘energised’ the community of protest as 
well as advancing the international profile of the ‘Okinawan’ — not women’s — 
problem.  At the 8
th Public Hearing before the Land Expropriation Committee in 
October 1997, a female one-tsubo anti-war landowner specifically referred for the first 
time to the marginalisation and disempowerment of women, children and the disabled, 
as the reason for refusing the land lease to the US military.  At the hearing, she 
mentioned the ‘comfort women’ and the more than 131 ‘comfort stations’ which 
existed in Okinawa during the war (Okinawa Times Sha 1998: 106).  This is an 
example of the ‘mainstreaming’ of women’s rights in the community of protest.  The 
need to protect ‘women and children’s human rights’ started to constitute part of the 
discourse of protest against the US forces in Okinawa in general.
19 
The ‘gender’ framing of protest has not upset the male-centred order in the 
community of protest in a revolutionary way.  Importantly, Okinawan women 
contributed to sustaining the myth of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ by adapting the narrative 
of marginalisation expressed in the metaphor of Okinawa as ‘a daughter sold to the 
US’. However, as the ‘local’ framing has done, the ‘gender’ framing has increased 
alternative channels of protest — manifest in the ‘Unai method’ — beyond the party 
and union-based ‘constitutional’ frame, and made the perspective of an ‘Okinawan 
                                                             
19 One of the concrete changes during the Ōta administration was the establishment of a ‘women’s 
affairs section’ ‘within the implementation headquarters on August 22’ (Eldridge 1997).  However, this 
section was significantly reduced in status, from a section (ka) to a room (shitsu) and in funding, after 
Inamine took over the administration.   
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protest’ more complex and inclusive of a formerly disenfranchised population.   The 
‘local’ and the ‘gender’ framing reflect the emerging ‘new social movements’, which 
are increasingly tolerated and enjoy some acknowledgement by the traditional actors, 
albeit on the condition that their organisations, strategies and ideas remain 
subordinate to those of the traditional constitutionalists. 
‘Constitutionalist’ Framing Revisited 
Meanwhile,  Rengō Okinawa, a regional branch of the biggest workers’ unions’ 
coalition in Japan, with 48,000 members, started a campaign in February 1996 for a 
prefecture-wide referendum.  Although a referendum at the prefecture level was a 
formal political exercise with no binding power on the state, it was the first attempt in 
Japan ever.  The main instigators of this referendum were the progressive OSDP, the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the JCP Prefectural Assembly members, who had 
won the majority of seats in the mid-1996 Prefectural Assembly election after 16 years 
in opposition, and their various supporting citizen groups, including members of 
Rengō, Kenrōkyō, and a majority of Zenchūrō.
20   
It was the commitment to the Constitution that defined the aim of the 
referendum: ‘To reform the current conditions of the US military bases, which 
prevent Okinawan citizens from enjoying the rights guaranteed by the Constitution’ 
(Article 1 of the Prefectural Citizens’ Referendum Ordinance, quoted in Rengō 
Okinawa 2001: 3): more specifically, to increase civic involvement and participation 
in decision-making processes, discussion, education, and checks on public 
administration (Rengō  Okinawa 2001: 7).  The referendum, scheduled for 8 
September 1996, was promoted under the top-down organisational structure and 
union-based style of collective action, which exemplified ‘the stale and 
choreographed nature of much anti-base activism’ (Siddle 1998: 205), still influential 
in the community of protest.   Rengō and the prefecture government mobilised union 
members, prefectural and municipal workers, who collected mandatory signatures 
from a fifth of all eligible voters, to request the Prefectural Citizens’ Referendum 
                                                             
20 The Okinawa prefecture government set up the Coordination Committee for the Promotion of the 
Prefectural Referendum (Kenmin Tohyō Suishin Kyōgikai), and allocated a budget of approximately 480 
million (Eldridge, 1997).  
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Ordinance.  With each union member assigned to obtain 10 signatures, more than 
41,000 signatures were collected by May (Rengō Okinawa 2001: 5).  The referendum 
was an attempt by the constitutionalists to represent Okinawan citizens’ opposition to 
the US military bases — dramatically expressed in the citizens’ protest rally in 
October 1995 — within the democratic, institutional framework. 
Another important product of the ‘third wave’ was that the anti-war 
landowners finally gained wide recognition for their long-term battle, following the 
Governor’s refusal to authorise land leases.    On 1 April 1996, the US military’s legal 
occupation of a plot of land in Yomitan village, owned by an anti-war landowner, 
expired.  A supermarket owner and part-time peace guide, Chibana Shōichi, (see 
chapter 3), who had been arrested and jailed for burning a hinomaru flag at a national 
sporting event (see Chibana 1992, Field 1993), had also become an anti-war 
landowner of property in a US military facility, the Sobe Communications Site.
21  In 
May, Chibana and 30 family members and friends, including a famous Okinawan folk 
music star, Kina Shōkichi, entered the property in the Site where entrance had been 
forbidden since the end of the Battle of Okinawa.  They had a picnic, and 
spontaneously performed music and dance, whereby they publicly demonstrated the 
US military’s illegal use of dissenting landowners’ properties (Okinawa Times 
Weekly, Monday Evening Edition 20 May 1996,  22 April 1996, 2 April 1996). 
Furthermore, the ten-year lease period for those properties owned by the 
anti-war landowners and one-tsubo landowners was coming to an end on 15 May, 
1997.  The land committee was appointed, and public hearings started in February 
1997.  However, the committee was unlikely to reach a final decision as to whether 
and how many years the lease would be granted before 15 May.  The Japanese 
government’s illegal occupation of 43.3 hectares (owned by 2,068 landowners) and 
11.5 hectares (owned by 575 landowners) was imminent (Okinawa Gunyōchi Iken 
                                                             
21 Since reversion, Chibana’s father owned the property in Yomitan and refused the contract as an 
anti-war landowner, however, in April 1976 he was pressured into signing the contract by the Japanese 
government’s strategy to return anti-war landowners’ properties together with those of other contract 
landowners in the community who were receiving rent.  After 20 years, in 1992, Chibana senior 
decided to pass on the property to his son, who was an adamant and famous anti-war and anti-military 
Okinawan activist (Chibana 2000).  
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Soshō Shien Kenmin Kyōtō Kaigi 1998: 9).  Arasaki observes:  
The landowners had been generally regarded as morally respectable, 
but exceptionally stubborn, ‘weird’ people, generally with a negative 
connotation.  Since last year, however, I have strongly felt that the 
Okinawan general public’s attitude towards the anti-war landowners 
changed drastically, in a more positive way.  I am convinced that the 
anti-war landowners themselves are feeling that way, too, and also, 
finally, they must have felt proud of being anti-war landowners.  Their 
battles have been rewarded marginally, if not entirely (Zen’ei Staff, 
1996: 97). 
A long-time anti-war landowner, Shimabukuro, (see chapter 6) also notes:   
Many people who participated in the 1995 October mass rally 
shamelessly became sympathetic towards us,
22 including those who 
had been receiving money from the government for co-operating with 
the US bases.  Some apologised to me for not having been more 
understanding in the past, and said, ‘We have thought you (the anti-war 
landowners) were a very intimidating bunch of people’ (Interview, 
April 1999). 
In April, the lower house passed the US Special Measures Law reform bill, which 
allowed the US military to use privately owned land without landowners’ consent, 
after the lease expired, until the land committee granted another lease (Okinawa Times 
6 April 1997).  According to this reformed law, if the land committee rejected or 
delayed lease authorisation, the lease was still legal, merely by virtue of the matter 
being forwarded for the Construction Minister’s consideration.  Furthermore, with a 
major reform of the Local Autonomy Law, which passed the Diet in July 1999, the 
authorisation of land expropriation for the US military’s use shifted from the mayors 
and governors to the state (Imidas 2002: 324, Sasaki 2000: 26–8). 
On 25 March 1996, the Fukuoka High Court issued a verdict supporting the 
government’s claim against the Governor, regarding the charge laid by Prime Minister 
Murayama of the Social Democratic Party
23  against  Ōta, for neglecting his 
administration duty by refusing to authorise the leases on behalf of the anti-war 
landowners.  At the Supreme Court, the Governor appealed, citing Okinawans’ rights 
for ‘constitutionally guaranteed property rights, people’s rights to a life in peace, and 
[the prefecture’s] right to home rule’ (Ōta 2000: 213).  Furthermore, 
                                                             
22 Shimabukuro critically describes the lack of integrity of the Okinawan general public: ‘At the rally 
they think they are protesting, but quickly change their minds when the supermarkets go on sale because 
of the US bases’ (Interview, April 1999). 
23 In forming an anti-LDP coalition, the Socialist Democratic Party (formerly Japanese Socialist Party) 
temporarily suspended their basic opposition to the security alliance with the US, which was regarded 
as ‘not an imminent agenda’ at the time (Arasaki, 1996: 60–1).  
 
267
if the Mutual Security Treaty is important for Japan … responsibility 
and burdens under the treaty should be assumed by all Japanese 
citizens.  If not, many of my people point out that the outcome is 
discriminatory and goes counter to [the principle of] equality under the 
law (Ōta 2000: 212). 
Immediately before the reversion, Ōta (1969: 72–4) expressed his limited reservation 
against turning to the Japanese Constitution as a basis of Okinawa’s liberation, taking 
into account critical opinion within Okinawa, especially those of anti-reversionists 
such as Arakawa Akira.  Nevertheless, his position in the ‘Okinawan struggle’ has 
basically been consistent with ‘’constitutional’ framing: although the principles of the 
Constitution are not fully realised even in mainland Japan, they are the most important 
foundation not only for Okinawa and Japan but for humanity in general (Ōta 1969: 
100).  Ōta has consistently argued for viewing Okinawa’s predicament as Japan’s 
predicament, using the Constitution as a common guideline.  The Supreme Court, 
however, dismissed Ōta’s appeal on 28 August, 1996.  At the same time, the Japanese 
government set up the ‘Okinawa Policy Committee’ and a ‘special adjustment budget’ 
of 5 billion yen to reinvigorate the Okinawan economy.  In early September, Ōta 
agreed to authorise the leases.  This decision disappointed many anti-base 
Okinawans, which reduced the momentum of the anti-base opposition. 
Ōta’s agreement to authorise the leases was immediately followed by a low 
voting rate (59.53%) at the prefectural referendum, which took place on 8 September, 
1996, even though 89% of those who voted agreed with the reduction of US forces and 
revision of SOFA.  The LDP members called for boycotting the referendum, for fear 
of damaging Okinawa’s relationships with Tokyo and its policy of favouring the 
Okinawan economy (Okinawa Times 27 August 1996, Eldridge 1997).  The 
referendum was thus not a collective action that involved a united coalition of all 
political sectors; it revealed the familiar internal opposition among conservative and 
progressive political forces.
24  The referendum asked the Okinawan population 
whether the US military presence should be cut down; however, no concrete level of 
reduction was suggested.  Moreover, if the question was limited to ‘reduction’, Prime 
                                                             
24 A small faction which split from Zenchūrō, as well as restaurants, bars and small business owners in 
‘base towns’ especially Kin Town, the All-Okinawan Rental Housing Committee and Tochiren with an 
estimated 28,000 members, also opposed the referendum for their specific interests (Ryūkyū Shimpō 18 
August 1996, Okinawa Times 21 August 1996, Eldridge 1997).    
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Minister Hashimoto had been undertaking negotiations with the US to ‘reduce’ US 
military presence under SACO, albeit insufficiently reflecting Okinawans’ level of 
expectation.  The expected outcomes of the referendum were unclear to the general 
public, other than to the anti-base ‘usual suspects’, to whom the rationale was clear: 
Okinawa’s inclusion within Japan, in terms of equal entitlement to constitutional 
rights is an unaccomplished goal since the reversion movement. 
The third-wave ‘Okinawan struggle’ started with a group of women who spoke 
out against the rape case.  The central agenda then shifted to anti-base Governor Ōta, 
the anti-war landowners and the ‘usual suspects’, who had gained the political 
opportunity to enhance their position from which to make demands vis-à-vis the 
Japanese government.  The strategy of their protest was to rely on the formal 
procedures of democracy, justified by the ‘constitutional’ framing.  The requests the 
anti-war landowners, union members and the progressive governor were basically the 
same with those they made before 1995: Okinawans’ opposition to the US military is 
based on the principles of democracy, equality, local autonomy and protection of basic 
human rights, guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution, which Okinawans are 
supposed to be entitled to since the 1972 reversion.  However, their consistent request 
was countered by the Japanese government’s equally consistent strategy of bringing in 
more money, bending the constitutional principles, and prioritising the needs of the 
US military bases on Okinawa, considered crucial for maintaining the US–Japan 
Security Treaty. 
Uneven Complexion of the Community of Protest after the Third-Wave 
Okinawan struggle 
SACO and Futenma’s Relocation to Nago 
In April 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto announced that the US and Japanese 
governments agreed to return the Futenma Air Station, located in the middle of 
Ginowan City for more than fifty years.  The news about Futenma Air Station created 
a brief euphoria among anti-base Okinawans, which soon disappeared after the 
government announced its condition: the construction of an alternative airbase on 
Okinawa.  The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), comprising US and  
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Japanese diplomats and high-ranking officials, reported plans to return 11 US military 
sites, including Futenma Air Station.
  The plan included the relocation of the live fire 
training across Road 104 in Kin Town, the ‘drop’ trainings using parachutes in 
Yomitan village and the Naha Military Port.
25  Most of the ‘returns’ in this plan, 
however, were ‘replacements’ of old facilities with new, updated ones within 
Okinawa, funded by the Japanese government’s ‘sympathy budget’.
26    The 
establishment of SACO was an important milestone that indicated the effect of the 
anti-base mass rally in October 1995.  On 2 December 1996, SACO released a final 
report, which summarised the ‘reorganisation and reduction’ plan (see Appendix 1). 
In September 1996, immediately after the referendum, Prime Minister 
Hashimoto came to Okinawa, and announced a plan to construct a ‘sea-based 
heliport’, that had been suggested by the US state officials, as an alternative facility to 
Futenma (Okinawa Times Sha 1998: 11).  The word ‘heliport’ belied the scale of the 
new base, which would be a major US Marine Corps air base with a mile-long runway, 
newly accommodating accident-prone Osprey helicopters (Bureau of East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs 1997).  The condition of the return was construction of the alternative 
air base (‘heliport’), maintaining the equivalent facilities to current functions capable 
in Futenma, plus upgraded facilities somewhere in Okinawa.  The question was, 
where? 
In the ‘reintegration and reduction’ plan, presented with the SACO final report 
(Appendix 1), return of the Futenma Air Station, a long-time base used by the US 
                                                             
25 These particularly hazardous facilities for the locals had been considered urgently in need of some 
kind of resolution.  In April 1994, the director general of the Japanese Defense Agency demanded the 
US Secretary State work for resolution.  However, no progress had been made, ‘until the Secretary of 
State Perry received a wake-up call by the 1995 rape incident’ (Funabashi 1997: 351). 
26 In November 1995, the state elites such as State Secretary Perry, Prime Minister Hashimoto, State 
Department Undersecretary Campbell and US Ambassador to Japan Mondale set up the Special Action 
Committee on Okinawa (SACO), and introduced a ‘reduction and realignment’ plan of the military 
bases in Okinawa, as a means to soothe the locals’ sentiment against the US military presence on the 
island.  Specifically committed to ‘recommend ways to reorganise and reduce the impact of US 
military operations and training on the people of Okinawa (http://www.jpri.org/public/op14.html)’, 
SACO was the first comprehensive official setting, in which Japanese and US high-ranking officials 
representing the US State Department, US Department of Defence, Japanese Foreign Ministry and 
Japanese Defense Agency plus the Prime Minister and the US Ambassador to Japan sat together to 
specifically discuss the reduction of the military presence on Okinawa (Okinawa Times Sha 1998: 17).  
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Marines since the end of WWII, was the most significant item.
27  Futenma epitomises 
the unwanted US military presence.  It resides in the middle of crowded residential 
districts of Ginowan City where 84,000 people live.  Combat helicopters train and fly 
over this city, where up to 50 aircraft crashes had been recorded by September 1996.  
There are sixteen schools including a university around the bases, where the noise of 
helicopters and planes regularly interrupt classes (Fukuchi 1996: 21–2, 52–4).
28   
In December 1996, the SACO final report designated the east coast of Nago, 
next to Camp Schwab as the desirable location for a new sea-based air station (Bureau 
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 1997). On this decision, Prime Minister Hashimoto 
commented, ‘the government would not force the issue, but try to solicit the consensus 
of local municipalities’ (Okinawa Times Weekly, Monday Evening Edition 9 
December 1996, italic added).  Since the SACO final report, the Japanese 
government has explicitly promised bringing quick and visible material benefits for 
the local economy where the US base facilities are planned to be relocated to.  Camp 
Schwab in Henoko District, near the east coast of Nago City, was the last remaining 
candidate.
29 (Map 8.1).   
 
 
                                                             
27 The final report stresses that the US and Japan have responded to the Okinawans’ anti-US base 
feelings, by making dramatic change in the US military presence: ‘approximately 21 per cent of the total 
acreage of the US facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002 
ha/12,361 acres) will be returned’ (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 1997). 
28   For more general impacts of US air bases on Okinawan residents’ health and life, see 
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/okinawa_kankyo/souon/english.html 
29 There were three major candidate locations.  To the first possibility, the Kadena Ammunition 
Storage area, three local assemblies of Chatan town, Kadena town, and Okinawa City jointly opposed 
(Ryukyu Shimpo 17 September 1996).  Another candidate was Nakagusuku Bay, adjacent to a US navy 
port (known as White Beach).  Likewise, residents in Katsuren town and Tsuken Island next to White 
Beach expressed clear opposition to the plan, due to anticipated effects of the ‘heliport’ on the local 
fishing industry (Ryukyu Shimpo 25 September 1996).  These two possibilities were scrapped for 
various reasons, including these staunch residents’ opposition (Funabashi 1997: 194–200, Okinawa 
Times Sha 1998:11).  
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First, Nago Mayor Higa Tetsuya was clearly opposed to the relocation.
30  In July and 
November 1996, the mayor organised citizens’ rallies opposing the relocation, with 
4,100 and 2,600 residents attending respectively against the construction of an 
alternative sea-base facility.  Apart from the mayor, the executive committee of the 
rally included all major organisations in Nago City, including the Nago City 
Assembly, District Mayors’ Associations, City Education Committee, City Chamber 
of Commerce, City Women’s Association, City Elderly Citizens’ Association, 
All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers’ Union Northern Branch (Jichirō 
Hokubu Sōshibu), Okinawa Prefectural Labour Union Committee, Northern Branch 
(Hokubu Chikurō), and Rengō Northern Regional Branch (Nago  Shimin  Tōhyō 
                                                             
30 In January 1997, he criticised the Japanese government’s ‘base rotation’ (Kichi no tarai Mawashi) 
policy, that is, ‘passing unwanted US military facilities over to the northern region, without obtaining 
consent from the local residents’ (Okinawa Times 22 January 1997).  Higa also attacked Governor Ōta 
for giving silent agreement on relocations to the northern region, in contrast with the prefecture’s firm 




Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999: 46).
31  The Naha Defence Facility Bureau sent 
delegations to Nago in order to proceed with the preliminary site investigation for the 
new base construction.  On every visit, Mayor Higa refused to co-operate with the 
investigation (Okinawa Times Sha 1998: 31–3). 
Splintered Anti-‘Heliport’ Organisations   
Thus, Nago became the major location of anti-base opposition in the phase after the 
SACO report.  Chapter 7 examined the residents’ movements originating from the 
local environment and lifestyle unique to individual communities, rather than from 
established organisations and ideologies of the workers’ movement, which have been 
traditionally dominant in the community of protest in Okinawa.  Likewise, residents’ 
movements inspired by the local unique natural environment and lifestyle, with ever 
greater female participation, characterised the anti-heliport struggle in Nago.  The 
examination below highlights the influence of the ‘local’ frame of protest that had 
been developed after the reversion in 1972, discussed in chapter 7. 
Henoko Residents 
The planned site of the offshore base was adjacent to Camp Schwab, located in 
Henoko hamlet on the east side of Nago City (Map 8.1).  Henoko is one of the 13 
districts in the Kushi Region, all of which suffer from declining agriculture, and a 
shrinking, aging population.  Residents in these districts still abide by centuries-old 
traditional rules and customs, such as annual spiritual rituals, as well as those to do 
with production and consumption.
32  However, all of these communities receive 
abundant special government funding, awarded to the municipalities located around 
military bases (Takahashi 2000: 241–55). 
Since 1956, Henoko has hosted Camp Schwab, a US Marine Corps base, and a 
                                                             
31 Furthermore, Nago City Assembly made resolutions to oppose the relocation of Futenma facilities to 
Nago twice, one in June, one in November 1996.  The Nago Chamber of Commerce later dropped out 
from the opposition, due to its decision to approve the construction of the alternative base, following the 
Northern Region Construction Union’s decision to support the alternative sea-based facility 
construction in the suggested area (Nago Shimin Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999: 46)   
32 For example, in some communities, until several decades ago, marrying outside the hamlet was 
banned, for fear of losing the labour force.  Also, in some communities, villagers who violated the code 
of behaviour of the community had to pay certain amounts of money to the community, until someone 
else did the same.  Inheritance of family estates and assets with tōtōme (a family ancestry card) to the 
eldest sons is still preferred (Takahashi 2000: 244–51).   
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major ammunition storage area.  The construction of the major Marine base required 
the acquisition of mountains and forests, as well as some residential areas and 
farmlands of Henoko, Kushi, and Toyohara districts.  The residents were at first 
opposed to the base construction. However, after being warned they would be 
removed by force with no compensation, and having seen the tragedy and struggles 
following the US forced land acquisition in Isahama and Ie village in the early 1950s 
(see chapter 4), they agreed to the construction of Camp Schwab.  In return, they 
received special benefits, in addition to the lease contracts and compensation, such as 
preferential employment of residents at the base, introduction of electricity and water 
system for the residents, dam construction, responsibility for securing residents’ 
housing, and permits for continued farming in the military property.  Camp Schwab 
has provided job opportunities for the local economy in construction, restaurants and 
bars, and other businesses.  During the Vietnam War, US dollars flowed into the 
Henoko commercial area (Okinawa Times Sha 1998: 49).  Job seekers came from 
outside and migrated to the hamlet, which transformed the dynamics of traditional 
hamlet life (Inoue 1999: 194–212), and Henoko has become, and still is, the biggest 
hamlet in the Kushi Region, with 1,444 residents (Nago Shimin Tōhyō Hōkokushū 
Kankō Iinkai 1999: 38).  Today, the bars and restaurants in the Henoko entertainment 
area next to the main road, which thrived once in the Vietnam War days with throngs 
of US soldiers, are mostly closed.  Still, there are not enough jobs for young people, 
who increasingly emigrate (Okinawa Times Sha 1998: 49–51).  Agriculture has 
declined, due to dwindling of the under-60 years of age population.  Only the 
construction industry has grown steadily, which has provided jobs (mostly temporary 
or part-time) for the remaining working population (Takahashi 2000: 265). 
The Henoko community has generally constructed amicable relationships with 
the American soldiers and officers through communal efforts such as annual festivals, 
sport meetings and markets.  At the same time, it has maintained traditional social 
elements such as the power structure in community rule according to male seniority 
and traditionally prominent families.  Inoue explains that in Henoko the ability to be 
friendly and open to outsiders (the US military) and visitors co-exists with tenacious  
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traditional rigidity of kinship rule that excludes outside influence from the core power 
structure, which is believed to keep the community together.  These contradictory 
elements make up a distinct Henoko identity different from any other ‘Okinawan’ 
identities (Inoue 1999: 298–314). 
The head of the Henoko Community Centre represents the major 
administrative institutions of Henoko.
33  The Henoko Administration Committee and 
the Head of District are the central controlling body within the Community Centre.  
Institutionally, most residents are virtually excluded from decision-making at the level 
of District administration, and are uninformed about the details regarding the District 
budget (Takahashi 1998: 262).
34  Importantly, Henoko obtains more than Y100 
million rent from the government for land used by Camp Schwab, as well as various 
other funds related to hosting military facilities.
35  In Henoko, the community 
decision-making system is closed to the public.  The socio-economic situations 
reinforce dependence on the military, making it difficult for the residents to talk about 
the heliport construction.
36   
Nevertheless, Higa Seijun, 57, a farmer from the Henoko hamlet, was one of 
the first residents who openly opposed the ‘heliport’ plan: he wrote ‘No Heliport 
Relocation! Stand Up, Henoko and Kushi Residents’ on two flags, and stood them at 
the main entrance to the Henoko hamlet (Takahashi 2000: 131). 
                                                             
33 The Henoko Community Centre (kōminkan) ‘historically has been the heart of social, cultural, and 
political activities since the age of the Ryukyu Kingdom’ (Inoue 1999: 228).  As in Shiraho (chapter 7), 
the Community Centre ‘has been owned and run by the community, at the same time functioning as an 
intermediary organization between residents on the one hand and different levels of administration’, 
vertically connected to Nago City, and the Japanese government (Inoue 1999: 331). 
34 The Heads of District are employed by Nago City Council, and are usually selected by ‘verbal 
consensus’, without formal election processes.  The 12 members each represent a neighbourhood 
group called han, and other locally based organisations including the local agricultural co-operative, 
youth group, women’s group, senior citizens’ club, students’ association, and the association and 
commercial and entertainment businesses in Henoko.  The Administrative Committee is composed of 
‘twelve relatively older male residents (the average age is 53.8)’ (Inoue 1999: 232), and there is no 
obligation for the Committee to inform citizens of the Committee’s decisions regarding District affairs.  
Most crucial agenda items are decided by the Committee and the Head. 
35Nago municipalities received Y261,869,000 in 1998 (Okinawa Ken Soumubu Chiji Koushitsu Kichi 
Taisakushitsu 2000: 46–7).  Henoko also receives Y120,000,000 in compensation for access to the 
forest area occupied by Camp Schwab (Okinawa Times Sha 1998: 51).  Thanks to the government 
subsidies, Henoko holds numerous community events, sometimes spending a few million yen on one 
event (Okinawa Times Sha 1998: 50).  
36 Villagers rarely express anti-base opinions, given that many community members work for the base 
or live on rent (Okinawa Times Sha 1998: 37).  
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In January 1997, the Japanese Communist Party Northern Okinawa Branch 
organised discussion forums in three districts (Henoko, Toyohara and Sedake) on the 
‘heliport’ and its impacts on the communities.  These communities have traditionally 
been politically conservative; residents were generally fearful of the 
Communist-influenced, informally referred to as ‘red’ (‘aka’), organisation (Inoue 
1999: 248).  Because any political activities of the villagers were highly transparent 
to each other, it would not have been easy for them to participate in a Communist-led 
forum.  Usually, because of the communities’ dependence on base-related incomes, 
villagers are reluctant to express any form of opposition to military bases (Okinawa 
Times Sha 1998: 50).  However, at this stage, opposition was predominant amongst 
the residents, most of whom did not express opposition to the existing Camp Schwab.  
Fifty Henoko residents participated in the discussion forum,  some of whom said, 
‘Why don’t they build it in Nago Bay (on the west side of Nago)?’ (Okinawa Times 
Sha 1998: 37, Takahashi 2000: 160–1)  
On 27 January, 27 Henoko residents formed the Henoko Heliport Construction 
Opposition Committee (Henoko Helipoto Kensetsu Soshi Kyōgikai), later known as 
the Henoko Life Protection Society (Henoko Inochi o Mamoru Kai) (Takahashi 2000: 
160).  The Henoko Life Protection Society became the first organisation against the 
‘heliport’.  The Society is solely based on the identity of ‘Henoko residents’, and 
stresses its non-affiliation to any political organisations or ideologies.  Distinguished 
from unions and party-affiliated opposition, the residents’ bodies against the ‘heliport’ 
construction is often described as a ‘shimin (citizens)’ movement (shimin undō, see 
chapter 7) (Nago Shimin Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999: 77).  The anti-heliport 
‘struggle hut’ stands in front of the planned construction site, where the Life 
Protection Society members accept visitors from outside. 
The most stubborn and dedicated members of the Life Protection Society have 
been the elderly residents, who have lived through the Battle of Okinawa (Ishikawa 
1998: 223–4).  The importance of keeping the beautiful ocean is their main reason for 
opposing the heliport construction; they know their lives have been protected by the  
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endowments from nature in northern Okinawa.
37  Just as for the war survivors in 
Shiraho, they survived food shortages during and after the war by catching fish from 
the ocean
38.  One elderly woman raised nine children by catching fish and selling 
them at the Nago market: ‘I wonder why people in the south don’t oppose the 
construction; their drinking water comes from yanbaru’ (Higa et al. 2000: 40).  The 
strong attachment to the ocean, related to the wartime experience, is a common trait 
that also motivated the Kin Bay and Shiraho struggles. 
The anti-‘heliport’ protest in Henoko and other regional communities are 
strongly influenced by the ‘local’ frame of protest.  Organisations express strong 
collective identity as ‘residents’, which is distinguished from the established parties 
and unions in Naha and Tokyo.  The main motivation of their protest is the wish to 
protect local-specific natural assets and lifestyles from the heliport construction. 
Nago: Workers’ Unions  
As elsewhere in Okinawa, labour unions have been prominent actors in anti-base 
protests and the building of anti-base coalitions in northern Okinawa.  Along with 
demanding better working conditions and pay, it has been a central commitment of the 
Okinawan labour union movement to pursue ‘anti-base’ and ‘anti-war’ activities (see 
chapter 4).    Tamanaha Koushin is a veteran anti-base activist and executive member 
of two regional workers’ unions.  In the 1960s during the reversion movement, he 
was ‘a student activist wearing a helmet’, and ‘believed we could go back to Japan and 
get rid of the bases’ (Interview February 2002).  Tamanaha sees the ‘Okinawan 
struggle’ as a continuation of the reversion movement, still trying to come to sense 
with the question, ‘What was reversion all about?’; daily struggles in Okinawa are 
struggles against the continuing marginalisation of Okinawa caused by the US–Japan 
Mutual Security Treaty, despite Okinawa’s reversion to Japan and its Constitution 
(Interview February 2002). 
                                                             
37 After the US forces landed on the island in 1945, people in the central and southern regions escaped 
to yanbaru and avoided gunfire.  
38 Some Henoko residents still make a living by fishing in the ocean next to Camp Schwab, watching 
the US amphibious tanks coming in and out of the ocean.  In the reef area, because of the red soil 
contamination, fish have disappeared (Ishikawa 1998).  
 
277
In April 1997, the mayor of Nago dramatically reversed his opposition and 
agreed with the preliminary survey of the planned heliport construction site.  The 
night before the mayor’s announcement, anti-base Nago residents, mainly members of 
the Okinawa Prefectural Labour Union Committee (Hokubu Chikurō), held a rally at 
the Workers’ Centre in Nago City.  Local opposition groups interpreted the mayor’s 
decision as a ‘betrayal’ of Nago residents (Heli Kichi Hantai-kyo 1999: 44).  The 
members of these organisations felt that the central government’s intention to ‘solicit’ 
the locals’ agreement, written in the SACO final report, really meant ‘solicit 
agreement from the local authority (mayor), not the local residents’ (Heliport Iranai 
Nago Shimin no Kai: 100).  At the rally, union members suggested a plebiscite as a 
means to stop the construction of the heliport (Okinawa Times Sha 1998: 48). 
In Nago District, local labour unions gathered and formed the Five Party 
Coalition (Goshakyō) in February 1997.  Participant organisations included the 
Okinawa Prefectural Labour Union Committee, (Hokubu chikurō), Japanese Trade 
Union Confederation Northern Regional Council (Rengō Okinawa Hokubu Chiiki 
Kyōgikai), All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers’ Union Northern Branch 
(Jichirō Hokubu Soshibu), Nago City Municipal Workers’ Union (Nago Shishokurō) 
and the Okinawa Peace Centre.
39  The aim of the Five Party Coalition was ‘to form 
solidarity with the Henoko Life Protection Society and to recruit [external] support to 
stop the heliport construction, prefecture-wide and nation-wide’ (Hokubu Chiku Rōdō 
Kumiai Kyōgikai 1999: 87). 
In May, for the first time, the Naha Defense Facilities Bureau (Naha Bōei 
Shisetsu Kyoku) conducted a preliminary inspections
40 of the planned offshore 
heliport construction site.  The Five Party Coalition initiated locals’ ‘surveillance’ 
activities to stop the inspections by organising a rally
41 at the Henoko Fishing Port 
                                                             
39 The Okinawa Peace Centre, a loose Okinawan-wide coalition of labour unions for anti-base and 
anti-war activities, joined this coalition in order to bring the support of other trade unions from Naha 
and other areas in Okinawa into opposition activities against the Futenma relocation in Nago 
(Hokubuchiku Rōdō Kumiai Kyōgikai 1999: 87). 
40The inspection conducted surveys on fishing activities and transport, took aerial photographs, and 
inspected coral and seagrass habitats, and current general situation of the targeted area (Okinawa Times 
Evening Edition 9 May 1997) 
41 The rally was called ‘Heliport Kensetsu, Jizen Chousa Danko Soshi Shūkai’ (Rally to Stop the 
Heliport Construction and Preliminary Inspection).  
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(Ryukyu Shimpo Evening Edition 6 May 1997).  Some of the locals and union 
members got on small boats and physically clashed with the Bureau’s inspection 
vessels.  About 280 locals gathered mainly from Henoko, which was reported by the 
local media, and created a sense of emergency in the community of protest in Okinawa 
Main Island.
42  The Five Party Coalition, with the Henoko Life Protection Society 
members, set up picket fences and a ‘surveillance tent’, and protest placards with 
anti-heliport messages such as ‘Do Not Disturb Our Sleep, Peace of Mind and Rights’, 
‘Nature, Life and Health: Our Treasure’ (Okinawa Times Evening Edition 7 May 
1997).  Daily ‘surveillance mobilisation’ (kanshi douin) of the Five Party Coalition 
continued from May to September (Hokubu Chiku Rōdō Kumiai Kyōgikai 1999: 87). 
Organising a rally, making placards, and sit-ins have constituted standard 
repertoires of collective action of the anti-base labour unions.  It is the organisational 
strength of the unions to mobilise union members’ presence at the scene of protest, and 
to use media reports to publicise their opposition, although the audience is often 
restricted within Okinawa.  In sum, the trade unions played an important role in 
igniting local opposition through their trademark mobilising capacities. 
Nago: Residents 
Residents on the west side of Nago City also gathered in support of the Henoko Life 
Protection Society.  In late April, the Society of Nago Citizens Opposed to the 
Heliport (Heliport Iranai Nago Shimin no Kai) emerged out of the ‘Absolutely No to 
Heliport: Informal Discussion Forum’ (Chashin Naran Heliport Yuntau Forum in 
NAGO), held at the Nago City Community Centre, to discuss the Futenma relocation 
and its consequences, attended by 240 people from Nago and elsewhere.  At this 
forum, attendees discussed the possibility of demanding the mayor’s resignation and 
the Nago residents’ plebiscite on relocation of Futenma to Nago.  At the forum, an 
anti-base union member from the City Council Union of Ginowan, where Futenma is 
located, reported what it was like living next to the Futenma Air Station.  A young 
female illustrator appealed, ‘We are only temporary tenants of this earth, renting it 
                                                             
42 Usually this type of local anti-base collective action is rarely reported in the mainstream mainland 
Japanese media.  
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from the future generation; we have an obligation and right to express our concern 
towards the implication of construction of a new base on the ocean, and make a 
decision’ (Ryukyu Shimpo 21 April 1997).
43  She became a representative of the 
Society of Nago Citizens Opposed to the Heliport, despite having no previous 
experience of anti-base activities. 
On 28 April 1997, another group of anti-base Nago residents organised a 
lecture on plebiscites.  They invited Imai Hajime, a journalist who had written a book 
on plebiscites (1997).  Imai talked about an example of the victory of the opposition 
to the construction of an industrial waste disposal facility in Mitake town, Gifu 
Prefecture.  At the end of the lecture, the attendees and organisers launched the 
All-Nago Citizens’ Group against the Heliport (Heliport Kichi o Yurusanai Min-na no 
Kai).  Its 115 members emphasised a commitment to the principle of citizen-centred 
decision-making, which was summarised in a slogan, ‘Everyone should participate in 
important decision-making’ (daiji na koto wa min-na de kimeyō) (Heliport Kichi o 
Yurusanai Min-na no Kai 1999: 85)   
In June 1997, the Society of Nago Citizens Opposed to the Heliport suggested 
forming a coalition, the Nago Citizens Plebiscite Promotion Council, to campaign for 
a plebiscite in Nago City, composed of 21 Nago-based anti-base groups and 
organisations.
44    Other member organisations included the Nago Democratic 
Association of Commerce (Nago Minshu Shōkō Kai),
45 an association of local small 
businesses, clearly expressing their opposition to the new base construction. The 
members were mainly business owners in the central business district in the west side 
                                                             
43 Most of the attendees at the forum, about 230, became ‘supporters’ of the Society, however, active 
members are only a small number of them, and no official leader or office were set up at that point (21 
April 1997). 
44 At the beginning, organising members of the Council invited the pro-base organisations, such as the 
Nago City Chamber of Commerce, to join the coalition, none of them responded positively.   The mayor 
and the pro-base sectors obviously wished, in negotiation with the government, to keep a bargaining 
chip of possibly accepting the heliport, therefore, were reluctant to hold the plebiscite (Nago Shimin 
Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999 46).  Clearly, only those who refused to deal with the central 
government’s attempt to ‘solicit’ the locals into accepting the new base, by way of promising economic 
benefits that conducted the plebiscite campaign.  
45 This organisation is the Nago branch of the National Business Organisation Union (Zenkoku Shōkō 
Dantai Rengōkai), a cooperative of small businesses in Japan.  The Nago Democratic Association of 
Commerce had 516 members at the time of joining the Council (Nago Shimin Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō 
Iinkai, 1999 83).  
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of Nago City, which was in severe recession and full of vacant buildings.  Many 
business owners were reluctant to express opposition, influenced by the Nago 
Chamber of Commerce’s decision to support the base.  They were also inclined to 
believe the rumour that the new heliport would bring a new high-rise building and 
renew the shopping arcade.  Nevertheless, about 100 members of the Association 
appealed to the Nago residents to vote against the base, arguing, ‘for invigorating 
business, we need peace’ (Nago Shimin Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999: 83).  
As is very common in the Okinawan community of protest, membership of these small 
groups was non-exclusive; activists often belonging to more than one anti-base 
organisation at the same time.  For example, a member of the Society of Nago 
Citizens Opposed to the Heliport was also a member of the Northern Bloc of the 
One-Tsubo Anti-Landowners’ Organisation.   
These relatively new local anti-base groups joined forces with the branches of 
socialist and communist political parties, and workers’ unions.
46  The Plebiscite 
Promotion Council became the official initiator of the Plebiscite Regulation (Shimin 
Tōhyō Jorei), and started collecting signatures on 9 July.  The minimum requirement 
was 757 signatures from Nago residents, according to the one-fiftieth of the population 
mark; however, the Council set a goal to collect 12,616 signatures, one-third of the 
                                                             
46Member organisations were the Socialist Mass Party Nago Branch (Shadai-to Nago Shibu), Social 
Democratic Party Nago Branch (Shamin-to Nago Shibu), Japan Communist Party Northern Regional 
Committee (Nihon Kyosanto Hokubu Chiku Iinkai), Komei Party Nago Branch (Komei Nago Shibu), 
union-based organisations such as the Okinawa Prefectural Labour Union Committee Northern Branch, 
(Hokubu Chikurō), Rengō Northern Co-operation (Rengō Hokubu Chikyo), Jichirō Hokubu So Shibu 
(All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers’ Union Northern Headquarters), Jichirō Nago City Hall 
Workers’ Union (Jichirō Nago Shishokurō), All-Medical Doctors’ Union Okinawa Airakuen Branch 
(Zen-I Ro Okinawa Airakuen Shibu), Okinawa Peace Movement Centre Northern Branch (Okinawa 
Heiwa Undo Centre Hokubu Shibu), and the One-tsubo Anti-War Landowners’ Organisation Northern 
Bloc.  Other members included the Nago City Peace Committee (Nagoshi Heiwa Iinkai), a branch of a 
nation-wide franchise and an off-shoot of the Japan Communist Party, the New Japan Women’s 
Association Nago Shibu (NJWA) (Shin Nippon Fujin no Kai Nago Branch), and 11 Nago City 
Assembly’s anti-base members representing ‘progressive’ political parties (Nago Shimin Tōhyō 




47  Thus, with modifications agreed at the City Assembly,
48 the Plebiscite 
Regulation was passed.   
The Council, a collection of different organisations and groups, emphasised a 
citizens’ movement (shimin undō) character, and intentionally stressed the importance 
of solidarity among parties and unions and the three resident-based organisations, 
namely, the Henoko Life Protection Society, the Society of Nago Citizens Opposed to 
the Heliport, and the All-Nago Citizens’ Group against the Heliport (Nago Shimin 
Tōhyō H ōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999: 87).  Shimin in this context carries an 
implication of ordinariness, non-affiliation to any political organisation, and a 
non-ideological position.  The self-definition of an organisation as a ‘citizens’ 
movement’ indicates the belief that opposition and protest of citizens’ organisations 
are more genuine, for not being dominated by the interests of the established, 
professional organisations.  From the Society of Nago Citizens Opposed to the 
Heliport, Miyagi Yasuhiro was chosen as representative of the Council.  The choice 
of Miyagi, only 37 years-old at the time, politically non-affiliated and 
non-experienced, indicated the intentional emphasis on the shimin character. 
On the other hand, the unions and parties are basically branches of centralised 
organisations in mainland Japan.  They have been leaders of the anti-base or other 
protest in Okinawa throughout the first and the second waves of protest, and have their 
own established organisational structures and headquarters elsewhere, either in Naha 
                                                             
47 Signatures from one-third of the population were enough to request the mayor’s resignation, ‘This 
was a warning towards the mayor: it showed our capacity to collect signatures for his resignation’ (Nago 
Shimin Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999: 46).  In August, the Council submitted a request for the 
plebiscite regulation with 19,735 signatures.  Even though the Election Management Committee 
effectively allowed only 46% of them, the number of signatures amounted to 52% of the eligible voters.  
There were 18 ruling party members of Nago City Assembly who were against the plebiscite before the 
signature collection, as opposed to 11 who supported it.  However, given the number of the people who 
demonstrated approval, both the mayor and the ruling party members were pressured to pass the 
regulation (Nago Shimin Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999: 46–7). 
48 As a counter-measure, the LDP party members of the City Assembly submitted a modified draft for 
the Plebiscite Regulation: instead of asking the voters whether they ‘approve’ or ‘object’ the 
construction of the offshore heliport in Nago, the modified plebiscite question was a choice from four 
answers: 1) I agree with the construction plan, 2) I agree because environmental measures and 
economic improvement can be expected, 3) I oppose the construction plan, 4) I oppose because 
environmental and economic improvements cannot be expected.  This modified regulation was passed 
17 versus 11 at the City Assembly.
   According to the perception of the anti-base residents, inserting 
‘environmental and economic improvements’ was a manipulation of the pro-base LDP members to 
make it easier for the Nago residents to vote ‘yes’ to the heliport construction (Nago Shimin Tōhyō 
Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999: 49).  
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or Tokyo, as well as a distinctive and ideological character. 
In contrast, a major characteristic of newly formed, local, anti-base 
organisations was that the members were inexperienced in anti-base or any protest 
activities.  The Society of Nago Citizens Opposed to the Heliport, which defined 
itself as a ‘citizens’ movement body’ (shimin undōtai) of free-willed individuals, 
requested that the anti-base organisations run by trade unions and political parties 
‘step back and restrain themselves’ (Heliport Iranai Nago Shimin no Kai 1999: 100).  
This is a clear sign that these Okinawan anti-base activists were conscious of the 
distinguishing characteristics between more experienced, established, and hierarchical 
political organisations and shimin groups.
49   
The Society of Nago Citizens Opposed to the Heliport played a central role in 
the campaign to request a plebiscite and the formation of the Nago City Plebiscite 
Promotion Council (Nago Shimin Tōhyō Suishin-kyō).  During the period leading up 
to the plebiscite, the Society members chose many kinds of methods campaigning for 
‘no’ votes, including fundraising activities by advertising in various media, such as 
Shūkan Kinyōbi,  a left-wing magazine in mainland Japan.  Core members also 
travelled and explained the situation in Nago at various peace movement and left-wing 
organisations’ meetings and forums, for example, those held by the Japan Coalition on 
the US Military Bases (a mainland Japanese anti-base group in Oita), and the Japan 
Labor Party.  The members also sold fundraising bandanas and postcards featuring 
spectacular ocean views seen from Henoko (Heliport Iranai Nago Shimin no Kai 
1999: 101). 
The de-politicised image attached to the ‘citizens’ was portrayed as the new 
type of desirable main actor of the anti-base movement.  Aragaki Shigeo, Secretariat 
                                                             
49 The All-Nago Citizens’ Group against the Heliport stressed having a shimin character, too.  Yet their 
style of collective action was closer to that of unions and parties, compared to the Society of Nago 
Citizens Opposed to the Heliport. For example, during the plebiscite campaign, the members 
demonstrated a great degree of commitment to physical effort in necessary, routine work such as 
building signboards and collecting as many signatures as possible.  Strength in these kinds of activities 
is a basic requirement for winning elections, however, it comes with less emphasis on inventive, 
original activities of free-willed individuals.  Furthermore, the group placed its headquarters in the 
Social Democratic Party and Prefectural Assembly member Tamaki Yoshikazu’s office, which signified 
strong links with an anti-base political party.  With study groups and lectures, this group emphasised 




of the Okinawan Socialist Masses’ Party, witnessed and endorsed the changing role of 
political parties and trade unions in the Okinawan community of protest: 
The role of progressive political organisations that have long led 
struggles of the Okinawan people since the 1950s land dispute and the 
1960s reversion movement is changing.  Political parties and trade 
unions should no longer be leaders of the movement.  The main 
players are now individual citizens with their own motivations to 
participate in the process of decision-making about an important 
matter.  We need to be careful not to dominate the movement and to 
focus on a supporting role (Aragaki Interview May 1999).   
The changing self-definition of veteran anti-base unions and political party actors of 
the ‘Okinawan struggle’ signifies a nascent development of tolerance towards 
diversity in the community of protest.  It also suggests the formation of a new 
definition of idealistic relationships between ‘citizens’ movements’ and party 
politics/organisational interests, which posits the latter in a ‘supportive’ position. 
However, internal relations among the ‘citizens’ movements’ are not as 
harmonious as they are supposed to be by the picture drawn by the ‘supportive’ unions 
and parties.  The aforementioned union member and anti-base activist Tamanaha 
explains that the role of the workers’ unions and political parties should be 
‘supportive’, in the community-based struggles such as the anti-CTS struggle and the 
anti-‘heliport’ struggle in Nago.  ‘The most important actors are the (non-affiliated) 
residents in the community’.  On the other hand, he also says, ‘The unions are still the 
main actor in the citizens’ movements (shimin undō) in Okinawa’ (Interview, 
February 2002).  This contradiction indicates the difficult relationship among unions, 
parties and non-affiliated residents.  As is the case with the women’s group, beneath 
the surface of tolerance and mutually supportive relationships, there are tensions and 
even irreconcilable differences at times between the older, established parties and 
unions, and the relatively inexperienced ‘residents’.  
Residents in Other Kushi Districts 
Other micro-communities within the Kushi Region on the eastern side of Nago, 
closest to the planned off-shore ‘heliport’ construction site, faced similar problems.  
Henoko, Toyohara and Kushi Districts within the Kushi Region have received 
substantial incomes from being adjacent to Camp Schwab.  Another ten districts,  
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however, benefited significantly less than these three districts, although located close 
to the base.  The planned site for the new offshore base is only five kilometres from 
Sedake District.  Sedake is located only two kilometres from Henoko, Camp Schwab 
and the Henoko ammunition storage area across Oura Bay.  The new base would also 
affect Sedake residents’ lives significantly, with noise and effluent into the ocean.  
Sedake’s population is declining — even more significantly than Henoko — with 
shrinking agriculture and the younger population moving away (see Table 8.2).  It 
took much longer for the residents in these districts to organise an anti-‘heliport’ 
group.  Residents in these groups had never been involved in residents’ movements 
before; furthermore, the opposition was even more difficult because of the 
community’s dependence on government subsidies in the name of ‘special funding’ 
every year.   
Despite the adversary climate, on 12 October 1997, the Society Against the 
Heliport 10 Districts North of Futami was established (Heli Kichi Iranai Futami Ihoku 
10 Ku no Kai). (Nago Shimin Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999: 78). 
 
Table 8.2 Populations of 13 Districts in the Kushi Region 
Kushi Toyohara  Henoko  Futami Ōura  Ōkawa Sedake 
626 436  1,444 88  104  74  527 
Teima Mihara  Sokoniya  Teniya   Abe  Kayou 
245 328  189  87  160  137 
(Nago Shimin Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai,1999: 38) 
 
There is a significant rift between these ten districts north of Camp Schwab and the 
three in the south.  In 1997, 58 per cent of the rent from the US military that Nago 
City received came from the Kushi Region.  However, as opposed to the Y120 
million that Henoko and Kushi districts each received for ‘compensation for access to 
forest and mountains (prohibited by the base)’, Futami received only Y1 million.  In 
addition to this north-south division, there is a significant east-west socio-economic 
difference in Nago City.  In August 1970, Nago town and four nearby villages, Kushi,  
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Yagaji, Haneji, and Yabe, merged into Nago City.
50  In Mihara District, a rubbish 
disposal plant was built immediately following the merger, which later moved to 
Kayou District.  One resident says, ‘Nago dumps rubbish to the east; same with the 
‘heliport’.  Build it on the west side’ (Okinawa Times Sha 1998: 52). 
The Women and the Environmentalists: New Social Movements after the ‘Third Wave’ 
Expansion of Female Participants 
The plebiscite was held on 21 December 1997, and 53.8 per cent voted against the 
heliport construction.
51 The local plebiscite was a victory for the opposition camp.  
However, Nago Mayor Higa Tetsuya officially ignored the majority ‘no’ votes, and 
approved the relocation in Nago on the condition that the state provide special 
assistance for the local economy, and then resigned on 24 December.  The victory in 
the plebiscite, if only judged by the fate of the heliport construction, clearly did not 
help the anti-base opposition.  Subsequently, the anti-‘heliport’ coalition dissolved;
52 
nevertheless, the battle of groups and individuals continued. 
The opposition to the ‘heliport’ has been often described as a ‘citizens’ 
movement’.  The idea of ‘ordinary citizens’ has been stressed elsewhere in Japan, 
especially by the Beheiren movement, as subjects of the movements different from the 
Marxist, Old Left movement (Morris-Suzuki 2002, Sasaki-Uemura 2001: 31–2).  
However, the unitary description of ‘ordinary citizens’ often obscured the 
ethnic/gender discrimination that existed within (Morris-Suzuki 2002).  The concept 
of a ‘citizens’ movement’ that insidiously represents the identity and interests of one 
hegemonic group often creates another internal marginalisation similar to those of 
women and ethnic minorities.  The women-only groups against the ‘heliport’ had 
emerged as a protest — albeit mostly a non-intentional one –—against the dictatorial, 
unifying operating system of the ‘citizens’ movements’ that flatten out individualities 
                                                             
50 The names of previous towns and villages stand for the districts of the city today. 
51 In total, 82.45 per cent (31,477 votes) of the eligible voters cast their votes.  The breakdown of the 
votes was: 1) I agree with the construction plan … 8 per cent, 2) I agree because the environmental 
measures and economic improvement can be expected … 37 per cent, 3) I oppose the construction plan 
… 52 per cent, 4) I oppose because environmental measures and economic improvements cannot be 
expected … 1 per cent, 5) Invalid … 1 per cent. 
52 The Plebiscite Promotion Council ceased its organisational existence after the plebiscite, and 
renamed itself the Anti-Heliport Coalition (Heliport Hantai Kyōgikai).  
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and differences under the influence of male-seniority rule. 
Women had always been present in the ‘Okinawan struggle’, during the 1950s 
land struggle and the reversion movement.  Female members in conventional 
anti-base unions and organisations have usually been allocated the role of kitchen 
workers and maids who washed men’s clothes, and have often been objects of sexual 
harassment.  The internal gendered power relations and the role of women in 
subordinate positions within anti-base organisations had not become a major, public 
issue.  However, the example of the Okinawan Women Act Against Military and 
Violence (OWAAMV) cultivated the ‘gender’ framing of anti-base protest in the 
‘Okinawan struggle’.  In the following phase of the anti-heliport struggle with a 
strong regional focus on Nago, many new women’s groups, organisations and 
informal networks emerged all over Okinawa in protest against the heliport 
construction.  Unlike the predominantly professional and educated membership of 
OWAAMV that is more cross-regional and international, the new women’s groups are 
much more focused on the issues and collective identity defined by specific localities 
and specific dimensions of anti-base protest at the time, for example, the plebiscite.  
The groups have been instantaneous, and short-lived. 
A number of female individuals in Okinawa became concerned with the 
consequences of the construction of the heliport and ventured into voluntary political 
action.  Some of them had experience in collective action.
53  However, many had 
never experienced collective action to do with politics before the heliport issue came 
up, and did not know how to start a ‘protest movement’.  These newcomers mostly 
did not wish to visit the offices of established anti-base organisations; political parties 
and trade unions or any ‘anti-military’, ‘peace’, ‘anti-Ampo’, ‘anti-war’ organisations, 
which sounded unapproachable.  Some concerned female individuals with no 
experience in political action were more attracted to ‘approachable’ groups close to 
where they lived, such as the Society of Nago Citizens Opposed to the Heliport, and 
helped collect signatures or distributed pamphlets.  In the process of trying out new 
                                                             
53They have been members of women’s divisions of workers’ unions, local women’s associations or 
other social movements organisations such as Okifuren and New Japan Women’s Association (NJWA).  
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experiences in political activities, female locals separately formed female-only 
anti-base groups. 
Higa Shima is a long-term resident in Ginowan City.  She lives immediately 
next to the Futenma Air Station, sees and hears the helicopters and combat aircrafts’ 
training, and hears English conversations from the other side of the fence.  The 
explosive engine noises, and neighbours’ physical and psychological problems, have 
been part of her life, and of those close to her. 
When I heard the news that the Futenma would eventually close and 
might be relocated off Henoko, I was really angry.  I was also 
frightened to think about the possibility that the citizens’ plebiscite 
result might support the heliport construction, because of the local 
industrial sector’s commitment to it.  I felt the need to inform the local 
people about what it was like to live next to the US Air Force.  I asked 
around others, to do something about it together.  The ones who said 
yes were all women, around ten of them to start with.  We had no 
representatives, or rules.  The name of the group was the Gathering of 
Kamadhu ( Kamadhu-gua no Tsudoi), representing a traditional, 
common female name given to Okinawan women (after a big pot to 
prepare food).  We did not want to use the word ‘kai’ (organisation or 
group).  We started from making fliers called Koe, Koe, Koe (Voice, 
Voice Voice) (Higa, Interview, May 1999). 
The members of the Gathering of Kamadhu were all female, without intending to 
make it such, when they first started.   
We did not know anyone in Nago; we started by knocking on people’s 
doors and explained how noisy it is to live next to the air base.  The 
people we talked to had no idea.  It was my impression that men more 
often than not did not have time for us.  Many of them did not take us 
seriously and said, ‘Well, it’s our turn, isn’t it?  In Ginowan, you have 
tolerated Futenma for more than fifty years.  If the marine heliport is 
built, money will come in and the city will become richer.  That’s how 
it works.  There is nothing we can do about the new base,’ which was 
understandable because the boost in construction industry would affect 
their work.  Women seemed to be ready to listen to us more carefully 
and to tell us they were worried, too. 
 
One day we had an exchange meeting between Kamadhu and residents 
in Kushi, north of Futami.  The attendees were all women.  They said, 
‘We have been embarrassed to see that women from Ginowan were 
working so hard in our community, while we haven’t been doing 
anything’ (Higa Interview, May 1999). 
Those in Kushi, 10 Districts north of Futami, formed a small local group, Jannukai 
(Jan is a local word for ‘dugongs’) against the heliport.
54 
                                                             
54 On members and activities of Jannukai, see (Mashiki et al. 1999).   
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On the western side of Nago, during the summer of 1997, about 20 women 
who were campaigning for the plebiscite organised their own group, ‘Nuchi du Takara 
(Life is Treasure), Woman’s Powers, Yarukies’.  A leading member, Akita Lisa, a 
Nago resident, joined the plebiscite campaign in the summer of 1997.  It was her first 
experience in joining any protest activity against the US military bases.  As she 
started working with the Plebiscite Council members, she noticed that the campaign 
activities were conducted strictly under the instructions given by senior male 
members.  In leaflets, posters, and speeches to address the locals, the veteran activists 
who experienced the reversion movement in the 1960s and 1970s preferred to use 
certain internal language popular amongst left-wing activists — such as ‘solidarity’, 
‘anti-war’, ‘a sacred battle’ — that sounded intimidating and off-putting to younger 
generations.  Being an articulate woman, Akita made a suggestion: 
Using this kind of language (Solidarity, Protest, Our Supreme Struggle) 
may scare youngsters who may be thinking about the implications of 
the heliport issue in their own way, and may be interested in joining 
some kind of collective action.  Why don’t we try using normal 
language as in daily conversation, for example, no-one will find out 
whether you voted for or against the heliport? 
 
However, the veterans told me to keep quiet, because I was only a 
novice activist, and should ask, and pay respect to the instructions of 
the more experienced members.  In response to my concern that 
younger, inexperienced potential participants might feel discouraged 
by the language and outdated style of protest, they would say, ‘We 
don’t want those who get easily discouraged.  We only want the young 
ones with high motivation and awareness.’  
 
In the midst of the plebiscite campaign, with about 20 other 
like-minded members, seven or eight students, some local NJWA 
members, mothers in their 30s and 40s and some hippy travelers from 
mainland Japan, who were feeling the same way about the suffocating 
environment for collective action, organised our own group, Nuchi du 
Takara (Life is Treasure) Woman’s Powers, Yarukies (Yaruki means 
energy or motivation) and decided to go our own way.   
 
Elite members of the Council welcomed the formation of a newly 
sprouted women’s group, positively evaluating it as a vibrant new 
move that could contribute to the momentum for the plebiscite.  The 
Council even spared campaign funding for the new group, and 
encouraged us to do whatever we wanted for the campaign, such as 
making pamphlets with cartoon characters and daily conversational 
language that looked drastically different from the familiar, 
‘progressive’ style that people were used to looking at in various phases 
of the ‘Okinawan struggle’ (Interview, February 2001).  
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During the pre-plebiscite campaign, the women from Ginowan, Kushi and Nago 
paired up in a team, and made door-to-door visits.  Women’s participation in the 
campaign was a decisive contribution to the result of the plebiscite (Nago Shimin 
Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999: 59). 
As a strategy to enliven their spirit by doing something unusual,
55 mainly 
female members invented a special kind of demonstration called michi-junay that 
looked like a traditional Okinawan eisah performance on the street.  At this 
michi-junay in Nago, a greater solidarity among women elsewhere in Okinawa 
developed.  Members of the Okinawa Women Act Against the Military and Violence 
in Naha, Yarukies, Jannukai, and Kamadhu formed the ‘Reach to the Heart Women’s 
Voice (Kokoro ni Todoke Onna-tachi no Koe) Network’. 
In February 1998, the Reach to the Heart Women’s Voice Network tried to 
arrange a petition meeting with Ōta, and caught the Governor at the lobby of the 
Prefecture Hall.  This was a spectacular event, with the lobby filled up with 300 
women (Higa Interview May 1999).  Governor Ōta had signed the land leases on 
behalf of the refusing landowners.  He had also made difficult decisions to mend 
relationships with Tokyo, to save the local economy from its subsidies drying up, by 
being more moderate on the base issues.  Soon after the women’s petition at the 
lobby, Governor Ōta readjusted his position on the heliport, and expressed his 
opposition officially, even though he denied a direct connection with the Network’s 
appeal (Ōta Interview April 1999). 
Why were these all-women groups, not specifically involved in feminist 
purposes, a convenient and accessible form of anti-base collective action?  Higa 
explained that communications and building teamwork were easier in women-only 
groups because they had much in common.  For example, their schedule similarly 
centred around children, annual rituals and family affairs.  Their hand-made fliers 
(Voice, Voice, Voice) were informal, unsophisticated, but different from the 
stereotypical, usual anti-base campaigns of the traditional organisations seen 
                                                             
55 Towards the end of the plebiscite campaign, people in the anti-base camp were feeling intense 
pressure from the pro-base campaign, which did not hesitate to distribute cash to local households.  
Many of them felt there was no chance of winning.  
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everywhere in Okinawa.  Importantly, their style of collective action particularly 
appealed to those who silently felt fearful of the new heliport and its effects, but did 
not have access to traditional anti-base protest organisations, or knew exactly how to 
express their concerns.   
Tamaki Hiroko, a female coffee shop manager and a keen member of the 
Reach to the Heart Women’s Voice Network, living in the southern region of 
Okinawa, also says, ‘I could not just watch these women.  They really sounded like 
they were personally addressing me, “Let’s do this together”’ (Interview, May 1999).  
She contacted her mostly female friends in Okinawa and in mainland Japan, formed 
the Women Say No to the Heliport Base (Helikichi No! Onnatachi no Kai) Network, 
and raised funds to advertise in a newspaper women’s opposition to the heliport 
construction.  Tamaki has continued informal anti-base activities through a local 
radio program and by selling T-shirts with dugongs and a message ‘No Need for a 
Base in Our Future’. 
It was groundbreaking that ‘ordinary, inexperienced women’ became the 
subject of collective action.  In the Okinawan community of anti-base protest, apart 
from veteran feminists such as Takazato, women were usually not protestors per se: a 
majority of women played supportive roles as wives and secretaries of male protesters.  
Typically, it is women who make tea in the protest offices, for example, and the wives 
of activists contribute to their husbands’ ‘citizens’ movement’ by undertaking 
housework and part-time work so that their husbands could focus on their protest 
activities until late at night.  Most women accepted such roles and did not consider 
otherwise.
56  Higa comments that Kamadhus’ collective identity as a small group of 
‘ordinary’ women not accustomed to political action was effective: the first step of 
obviously novice protesters sent a significant vibration to change the usual ways of 
collective action in the community of protest (Interview, May 1999).
 
These newfound, female-only anti-relocation groups have not explicitly 
expressed a feminist message, apart from saying ‘we are concerned with the 
                                                             




construction of a new base from a woman’s perspective, as mothers, for our children’, 
which exudes an essentialist image of woman as mothers or as a caring subject.  
When they are given a public presence, Okinawan women activists are often 
represented as ‘mothers’, or romanticised carriers of a primordial religious aspect of 
life who are closer to nature and antithetical to war and military bases.  During the 
campaign against the bases, women’s messages as mothers against the new base 
construction were used by male members against the heliport, and were one of the 
most oft-used expressions during the plebiscite campaign.  One member, who also 
joined the plebiscite campaign as an ‘ordinary, inexperienced activist’ and a mother, 
says, ‘These days, when I hear the word ‘mother’ in relation to the base issue, I feel 
instantly exhausted; I feel my ‘motherhood’ is being used’ (Interview, February 2002).  
Furthermore, the celebration of a ‘women’s anti-base movement’ was temporary.  
After Mayor Higa ignored the plebiscite result against the heliport construction and 
resigned, the election of a anti-heliport Mayor became the next important goal for the 
campaigners.  Then, their general attitude changed completely: tolerance towards 
new attempts and refreshing ideas gave way to traditional, hierarchical, 
choreographed, top-down manners of campaigning (Interview, February 2001). 
During the anti-heliport struggle, the anti-base women stepped into a new type 
of collective action, which is to change, or be aware of, the gender dynamics within the 
community of protest, though often expressed in casual, humorous comments such as, 
‘We cannot leave this to the men any more’.  Forming female-only groups separately 
was an act of ‘saying sayonara’ to a male and seniority-dominated anti-base 
organisation, without explicitly engaging confrontation with specific individuals, 
namely, experienced male activists in their 40s and 50s who were limiting the 
expansion and improvement of the protest movement.  This implicit attempt is deeply 
relevant to, but a separate political action from, protest against the US bases in 
Okinawa as a regional depot of the global patriarchal system of military violence from 
a feminist perspective, as the OWAAMV did. 
Organising female-only collective action separately from male counterparts 
itself was a political statement that questioned the internal unity of ‘citizens’  
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movements’, and a lack of recognition and tolerance towards diversity, that has caused 
stagnation in the community of protest in Okinawa. 
Dugongs and the Environmentalists 
Dugongs are endangered, large marine mammals, still occasionally found off the 
coasts of northern Okinawa.
57  Nakamura Shūhei has campaigned for dugong 
conservation as part of the protest against the heliport construction.  He was born and 
grew up in a farmer family in a small farming village in Kushi Region.  After working 
in Naha for a construction consultant company, he returned to the village. 
When I heard a dugong was witnessed off the coast of northeastern 
Okinawa during the state’s preliminary inspection of the planned 
‘heliport’ construction site in April 1997, I thought there would be more 
dugongs.  About ten Sedake and other 10 District north of Futami 
residents met with other environmentalists from Naha and other places in 
Okinawa, including Takaesu and Makishi, who were experienced 
environmental campaigners in the Shiraho struggle.   About 30 of us 
started a small group, LOVE Dugong Network and started diving.  We 
found traces of dugongs’ sea grass grazing. 
Nakamura, Miyagi Yasuhiro (former representative of the Plebiscite Promotion 
Council) and others established Save the Dugong Campaign Centre (SDCC) in 
October 1999, as an organisational base with branches in Tokyo and Osaka.
58   
 
I thought simply repeating the mantra of removing the bases could not 
stop the ‘heliport’.  Okinawans had been saying the same thing for 
decades, but the bases were never removed.  We needed something 
different, more interesting and closer to life” (Interview, February 2002). 
With the support of WWFJ, the Centre sent delegates to the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN) Conference held in Amman, Jordan, in October 2001.  It 
was Nakamura’s first overseas trip.  He demonstrated traditional Okinawan eisah at 
the conference, to advertise Okinawan dugongs.  Even though most of them did not 
speak English, the delegates prepared about 5,000 leaflets written in English, T-shirts 
and other dugong paraphernalia and appealed to the attendees at the conference 
(Interview, February 2002, Tamaki Hiroko, Interview February 2002), just as Takaesu 
                                                             
57 ‘The World Conservation Union (IUCN) lists the dugong as an endangered species that needs 
protection.  Dugongs used to live throughout the Okinawa region.  Disappeared from elsewhere in 
Okinawa, the current distribution of the dugongs is only along the northeastern coast of the main island 
of Okinawa, and the number is thought to be very small, possibly less than 50 animals’ (Save the 
Dugong Campaign Centre, 2003b). 
58 With the support of National Assembly of Peace and Democracy (ZENKO), a mainland Japanese 
labour union-based peace organisation (see http://www.zenko-peace.com/index.html), SDCC 
established widespread support in mainland Japan.  
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Asao, Katherine Muzik and Yamazato Setsuko did at the Costa Rica 1988 session, for 
Shiraho coral conservation (chapter 7).  They also submitted a petition with 50,000 
supporting citizens’ signatures to the IUCN, and with the support of other 
English-speaking environmental NGOs,
59 succeeded in inducing an IUCN resolution, 
which recommended the US and Japanese governments introduce steps to protect 
dugongs (Save the Dugong Campaign Centre 2002, 2003a, World Conservation Union 
(IUCN) 2001). 
The SDCC has been engaged in regular activities: seminars by marine 
biologists specialising in dugongs;
60 conducting research to provide alternative (to the 
government’s) environmental assessments on the destructive effect the new ‘heliport’ 
would have on the local ecosystem; also building a ‘dugong home’ (dugong no sato) to 
host high school students on fieldtrips or other visitors and take on tours to show them 
the local, abundant, natural resources on the eastern coast of Nago for developing a 
sustainable local industry not dependent on subsidies from the government that favor 
the temporary construction business. 
For the protesters against the ‘heliport’ construction, the campaign for 
protection of the local dugongs has opened doors to a network of global environmental 
and conservation movements in the informal political arena.  In the anti-relocation 
struggle, dugongs have played a role in creating a different kind of ‘Okinawan’ 
identity: the natural environment was the marker of the identity of the ‘Yanbaru’ 
region, which is different from other regions within Okinawa.  Pride in natural 
resources unique to the local areas in Okinawa was the basis of the ‘localist’ framing 
of the residents’ movements exemplified in the anti-CTS struggle (chapter 7) and the 
                                                             
59 Since the IUCN meeting, Miyagi Yasuhiro of SDCC and Onishi Masayuki, professor in Humanities 
at Meio University in Nago, have developed a support network with the Natural Resource Defense 
Council (NRDC) (see http://www.nrdc.org/) and the Centre for Marine Conservation 
(http://www.oceanconservancy.org/).  Also, they have developed contacts with the influential Marine 
Mammal Commission, an independent administrative body that monitors US government activities and 
advises Washington on the protection of ocean mammals such as manatees.  Miyagi and Onishi have 
traveled to Washington to talk to the president and vice president of the US Marine Mammal 
Commission who planned to investigate and write reports about the dugongs (Onishi Masayuki, 
Interview, November 2000). 
60 Helen Marsh at James Cook University in Queensland, Australia, who has visited Okinawa and given 




Shiraho struggle.  This ‘localist’ framing continues in the campaign for dugong 
conservation. 
To my question, ‘Does the ‘Okinawan struggle’ still exist’?’  Nakamura’s 
answer was negative: 
Some of the people who have engaged in the anti-base struggle for a 
long time have said to me, ‘whatever happens, we will continue our 
movement’.  We want to end the movement as soon as possible by 
achieving our goals.  This is the biggest difference in our points of 
departure.  There have been countless occasions when quick 
decision-making was prohibited due to organisational reasons (need to 
have proper organisational meetings, need to discuss with other 
members. etc).  This is why we end up working separately.  This is 
why another ‘all-island struggle’ (shimagurumi tōsō) will be very 
difficult.   
The progressive coalition has been demanding, complete and 
immediate removal of the bases, according to the pacifist principle and 
anti-Ampo ideology.  This message has not changed for decades, but 
the bases are still there, almost unchanged.  Nowadays, Okinawans, 
including the LDP leaders, are moving towards demanding gradual, 
minimal reduction of existing US bases, even if it means constructing a 
new base in Okinawa. 
That is why I think it’s important to appeal to everyone about the need 
to protect the local environment, and residents’ human rights, rather 
than repeating the anti-base mantra. 
Most people, even Nago citizens on the west side, have never seen what 
the ocean looks like and how beautiful it is, where the new US air base 
is planned to be constructed.  It is more effective to have people visit 
the east coast of Nago, and ask them, ‘What do you think?  Are you 
going to let them build the new base here?’  It is important to start here 
[eastern Nago].  The Shiraho struggle has been very important because 
we were able to persuade the state to admit it would be wrong to build 
an airport on the world heritage coral reef.  If we can make Nago home 
to lots of dugongs, the next struggle will be much easier. 
 
Conclusion 
The October 21 protest in 1995 marked the third peak of the post-war mass protest in 
Okinawa, preceded by the 1956 All-Island Struggle, and a series of mass rallies in the 
1960s requesting reversion (Arasaki 2000).  This chapter examined the dynamics of 
community of protest in the third-wave ‘Okinawan struggle’ and subsequent internal 
diversity in organisations, collective identities and strategies. 
Women’s political activism in Okinawa, as elsewhere, has provided a critique 
of the political arena from the private realm of individual life where women have 
traditionally been located.  The Okinawan women’s movement has simultaneously  
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addressed the US military presence and its violence against women along with 
women’s status and well-being in Okinawan society.  They have shown strength in 
developing networks with women in other places, classes and nationalities.  The 
strategy of the women’s movement embodies greater ability to connect with global 
civil society, and reflects characteristics of ‘new social movements’. 
The new direction and repertoire of protest that the women’s movement 
showed, however, mostly remained separate from the traditional actors inspired 
mainly by the ‘constitutionalist’ framing of protest.  In the subsequent anti-‘heliport’ 
struggle in Nago, many smaller citizens’ (shimin) groups not affiliated to political 
parties and trade unions were formed, with collective identity and organisation of 
protest inspired by pride in one’s local environment, as well as past war experience.  
In Nago, these movement groups inspired by ‘local’ framing were, at the same time, 
engaged in a struggle towards more individual freedom and equality within the 
community of protest, rather than uncritically obeying the organisation and strategy 
based on the male-seniority rule and the legacy of the ‘Okinawan struggle’.  The 
growing ‘new social movements’ and the ‘usual suspect’ parties and unions in the 
community of protest have so far failed to merge effectively, maintaining their divided 
territories of informal and formal political activities.  These qualitatively different 
actors refuse to enter a relationship in which one is subordinate to the other, which has 
kept the autonomy of the actor organisations but has hindered the development of a 
united and effective coalition-based movement.  This chapter has tried to show that, 
the emerging ‘new social movement’ actors have been tolerated and enjoy some 
acknowledgement by the older, more traditional actors.  However, underneath the 
appearance of an expanded and complementary relationship, the relationship is 
volatile, filled with differences, tensions and conflicts. 
Nevertheless, this chapter observed important continuity in these ‘new social 
movements’, including the women’s group’s activities and the ‘local’ groups from 
the past ‘Okinawan struggle’.  The historical narrative of marginalisation — past 
war experience and the victimised image of ‘Okinawa’ as a sacrificed daughter — 
are resurrected in today’s anti-base protest.    In this sense, the myth of an ‘Okinawan  
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struggle’ is as alive as ever.    Today, however, different actors exploit it for different 
agendas using different techniques:  there is no single Okinawan ‘movement’, as 
there was temporarily in approximate form during the first and the second waves.  
The idea of a singular ‘Okinawan struggle’ continues to function.    It is an idea that 
is compatible with many definitions of who ‘we’ are and what is at stake for varying 
constituencies within the community of protest.  Indeed, the increasing 
diversification of that community shows no signs of diminishing the power of that 
idea.   297
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has examined the development of a community of protest in 
Okinawa, and the survival of the myth of the ‘Okinawan struggle’.  It has analysed 
the changes of dynamics within the community of protest in the three major cycles — 
described as the ‘three waves’ — of protest.  As discussed in this thesis, since the 
immediate post-war years, the community of protest in Okinawa is characterised by 
internally diverse actors with different organisations and reform agendas, which 
betrays the often homogenous representation of Okinawans’ protest or ‘anti-base 
movements’.  However, the diversification has intensified with time, and a coalition 
of protest organisations has been increasingly a tenuous and difficult proposition.  
Disagreements and divisions in viewpoints among protest actors have always existed 
in the Okinawan community of protest.  After the reversion, internal differences have 
compounded over the desired reform agendas, organisations, strategies and 
interpretations of who they are, and what the protest is ultimately for.  The 
overarching question of this dissertation has been: what does this intensification of 
pluralism mean for the strength, form and orientation of collective protest and the 
prospects of a successful ‘Okinawan struggle’?  The main points of this dissertation 
in response to this question are distilled below.  They underline that, while the 
expansion in the number and range of protest groups over time may not have been an 
unambiguous boost for the realisation of the shared essential goals of the protesters, 
none of this appears to have dented the powerful myth of an ‘Okinawan struggle’.  
Rather, and paradoxically, its veracity appears only to have gathered momentum and 
is likely to continue to endure.  The myth has proved an adaptable one that is 
attractive to many, varied protest groups across history. 
The first major point to emphasise is the diversification and change of 
‘Okinawan’ identity, expressed by collective action and protest in the post-war period.  
To start with, how to interpret ‘Okinawan’ identity has always been a terrain of 
contention among the locals.  As discussed in chapter 2, the ‘Okinawan’ identity has 
constantly oscillated in the interpretation of how ‘Japanese’ it is, since annexation in   298
the late nineteenth century.  In the context of collective action, strong identification 
with mainland Japan — explained as the ‘assimilationist’ position — has manifested 
in the orientation for institutional integration with the Japanese democratic system and 
enthusiasm for the principles of the Japanese Constitution.  During the first and 
second waves of protest examined in Part II, the progressive coalition employed the 
‘assimilationist’ orientation to the extreme, motivated by the most prominent political 
goal at the time, reversion.  However, as soon as the reversion was achieved and the 
aim of protest became more focused on opposition to the US military presence, the 
former reversion activists replaced the slogan of assimilation with emphasis on 
Okinawa’s historical narrative of marginalisation.  The re-interpretation of the 
memory of the Battle of Okinawa played an important role in the establishment of 
Okinawan-specific pacifism, as discussed in chapter 3.  The swing of ‘Okinawan’ 
identity away from ‘sameness’ with mainland Japan has been a prevalent reaction to 
the disappointing result of the reversion for the anti-military Okinawans.  On the 
surface, identification of the ‘Okinawan’ identity with Japanese nationalism, inspired 
by ‘reversion nationalism’ discussed in Part II, has definitely subsided. 
However, the ‘assimilationist’ tendency of the reversion movement survived, 
in the strategies and organisations of the anti-base coalition, Iken Kyōtō, the anti-war 
landowners and their supporters: this tendency was underpinned by the strong 
attachment to, and belief in, the democratic process: representation through election, 
the rule of law and separation of the court and the government, endorsed by the 
post-war Japanese Constitution, which was a product of the US occupation.  As 
discussed in chapter 6, the ‘constitutional’ framing of protest has inherited the basic 
backbone of the reversion movement, as a relentless pursuit for Okinawa’s ‘true’ 
reversion to Japan, that is, fair and equal treatment.  Overall, the protest motivated by 
the ‘constitutional’ framing is directed at the Japanese government, and its scope is 
mostly limited to the domestic arena.  Furthermore, mainland affiliation with 
Okinawan parties, unions and organisations has furthered the absorption of the 
‘Okinawan struggle’ by the leftist anti-Ampo movement in Japan.  In this sense, the 
‘assimilationist’ tendency of the progressive political forces in Okinawa is not dead.    299
Most importantly, the ‘constitutional’ framing symbolically and ideologically 
re-defined and succeeded the myth of an ‘Okinawan struggle’, as a continuous project 
from the land struggle and the reversion movement. 
Meanwhile, the actors of emerging ‘new social movements’ in Okinawa have 
expressed the distinctiveness of ‘Okinawan’ identity in different ways, through their 
collective action.  Chapter 7 explained that the participants in the community-based 
environmental movements identified themselves as ‘residents’ of the communities in 
which they lived, rather than as members of political parties or unions, thus expanding 
the scope of protest from traditional organisations and strategy.  I described the 
framework of protest of Okinawan residents’ movements as a ‘local’ framing of 
protest: the ‘Okinawan’ identity was expressed not in terms of its relation with 
mainland Japan — whether Okinawa was part of Japan or not — but rather an 
expression of traditional lifestyle, culture and history specific to the community, with 
pride in its uniqueness.  The expansion of these residents’ movements involved the 
female population that was previously not organised into collective action.  Chapter 8 
discussed the development of Okinawan women’s protest against the US military 
presence from the distinctive Okinawan feminist perspective.  Okinawan women 
have directly appealed to the issue of gender and military violence, which has global 
relevance, rather than appealing to mainland Japan. 
This newfound expression of ‘Okinawan’ identity, recognised in its own right, 
has reached out to the larger audience of international civil society, away from the 
domestic confines of Japanese democracy.  Interestingly, many Okinawan protesters 
with this strong ‘local’ pride have expanded connections with global social 
movements, especially environmentalist, and also, feminist.  The Shiraho struggle, 
discussed in chapter 7, was particularly remarkable in this respect.  In particular, the 
Okinawan women’s movement has demonstrated exceptional skills in obtaining an 
overseas audience on the issue of gendered violence of the military in the private 
sphere that Okinawan women are facing, presented as a universal gender issue, as 
discussed in chapter 8.  For these Okinawans, the scope of the ‘Okinawan struggle’ is 
not limited to protesting against the US–Japan security alliance, or rectifying the   300
unsatisfactory conditions under which Okinawa reverted to Japan.  In this sense, the 
‘new social movements’ in Okinawa have expressed Okinawan distinctiveness and 
separation from Japan, not by claiming political ‘independence’, but by their 
expression of Okinawa as a unique community of protest, with a direct networked link 
to global civil society.  Arakawa Akira’s anti-reversionalism (see chapter 5) — which 
sees Okinawa as a distinctive community that resists belonging to the framework of 
the nation-state — has been indirectly put into action without apparent recognition of 
his idea.  
However, this dissertation has emphasised that the historical narrative of 
Okinawa’s marginalisation remains very important across the board.  Interestingly, 
whether emphasising distinctiveness of, or the sameness between, Okinawa and 
yamato, protest actors — as long as they are ‘Okinawan’ — see themselves as part of 
many Okinawans’ struggles against a long history of marginalisation, that is, a 
consistent and historical ‘Okinawan struggle’.  Almost universal reference to the 
experience of the Battle of Okinawa, the history of the all-island land struggle in the 
1950s, and Okinawans as a unitary and marginalised entity throughout the post-war 
period indicate the importance of the myth. 
Second, this dissertation has examined the impacts of diversifying protest on 
coalition-building, and on the effectiveness of the Okinawans’ protest to bring about 
the reduction and eventual removal of the US military bases on Okinawa.  At the 
basic level, Okinawan protest actors agree that they all want removal of the bases.  
What they disagree on is how to achieve that.  These disagreements derive from the 
different perspectives on the most important reform agendas — constitutionality of the 
US bases, violence towards women, and the protection of the local-specific 
environment and lifestyle, or opposition to the US security alliance — and, at a deeper 
level, on what being ‘Okinawan’ means.  However, it is the contention of this 
dissertation that this has not necessarily been all negative.  It has been helpful not 
only for realising a more open civil society that respects differences, but also for 
building depth in the idea of an ‘Okinawan struggle’.     301
During the first- and second-wave mass protests, coalition-building was 
relatively successful, albeit temporary: in this period, ‘reversion’ functioned as a goal 
that was capable of being a dominant goal of the community, and unified 
heterogeneous groups and organisations into an umbrella organisation.  Part I 
described how the central actors of the ‘Okinawan struggle’ were mainly unionised 
workers, landowners, teachers, and communist/socialist party members.  These 
traditional actors were good at synthesising their activities, and organisations; they 
formed a united progressive coalition.  Also, the slogan of ‘reversion nationalism’ 
was capable of mobilising the Okinawan public, temporarily creating one ‘Okinawan’ 
voice for reintegration with Japan.  In the sense of achieving a goal with a clear 
slogan and a united coalition, the reversion movement was effective.  However, in the 
end, the reversion — achieved without any major change in the US military presence 
— was not what the Okinawans had wanted.  In the process of the reversion 
movement, the Council of Reversion and its campaign became detached from 
Okinawans’ day-to-day humiliation and danger inflicted upon those in proximity to 
the US military dictatorship in Okinawa.  As discussed in chapter 5, the Council’s 
campaign did not fully address the grievances of workers in and around the bases who 
wished for an anti-US base general strike: in order to achieve early reversion, the 
Council called off the planned general strike, which would have seriously 
inconvenienced the US military and damaged the Japanese government.   
Furthermore, the spontaneous and mob-ruled Koza riot revealed that the voices of base 
town workers and victims of crimes and accidents caused by the US military were 
neglected in the process of the reversion movement.  The plight of those involved in 
prostitution was not even represented. 
After the reversion, coalition-building became more and more difficult in the 
community of protest.  Increasingly, protest became geographically sub-divided 
within the Okinawan archipelago.  Organisations became much more fragmented, 
smaller, and more scattered in different regions.  Okinawan protest disintegrated from 
one ‘reversion movement’ to many residents’ movements: anti-base activities (in 
villages such as Onna, Ie, Toyohara, Kunigami and Kin) and anti-pollution residents’   302
movements in countless communities, represented by those in the Kin Bay area and 
Shiraho hamlet, discussed in chapter 7.  It was as if the post-reversion community of 
protest had developed a silent consensus to resist a centralised, binding organisation 
with the power to suppress individual collective actions for the sake of achieving one 
goal.  As in mainland Japan, the influence of communist and socialist political 
parties, the New Left sects and factions, and the workers’ unions has deteriorated and 
given way to the residents’ voluntary associations and women’s groups, in organising 
protest (Sasaki-Uemura 2001). 
The pluralisation within the community of protest — in terms of protest 
organisations, strategies and reform agendas ― has made the coalition building of the 
protest actors increasingly difficult: it has become almost impossible to form a united 
social movement, that is, an ‘Okinawan movement’.  A result has been that the 
effectiveness of the Okinawans’ opposition against the US military bases has been 
sacrificed, indicated by the ‘low’ period between the second and the third waves of 
post-war Okinawans’ mass protests.  However, in this period, multi-faceted social 
grievances in Okinawan society demonstrated by those inspired by the ‘local’ and 
‘gender’ framings, which had been previously excluded from the community of 
protest, found their own voices for collective action.  Another result of pluralisation, 
therefore, has been that individual protest actors more genuinely represent what their 
protests are for, and are less likely to lose sight of it under the pressure of one, 
hegemonic organisation and reform agenda. 
This is not to say that all the protest actors’ concerns are represented equally as 
the ‘Okinawan’ collective will in the formal political arena.  Collective action of 
women spearheaded the temporary prominence of Okinawan anti-base sentiment 
following the 1995 rape case, and created a rare political opportunity which induced 
the SACO plan to remove the Futenma Air Base.  However, the reform agendas 
staged by the ‘gender’ framing of these women activists — elimination of gendered 
violence and discrimination — quickly disappeared from the realm of political 
representation (Angst 2001).  Progressive political parties, anti-war landowners and 
union-based peace organisations reasserted Okinawa’s sovereignty against foreign   303
military rule and re-emphasised fair and equal treatment of Okinawa within Japan as 
the issue.  The focus of the Okinawan community of protest and the public came back 
to the question of Okinawa’s marginalisation in Japan measured against the central 
government’s priority to maintain US–Japan security alliance at Okinawa’s expense.   
Consequently, the ‘third-wave’ mass protest that rose in October 1995 settled 
down, as the government assuaged the local anti-base sentiment with its old 
instrument, compensation politics.  The protest in Okinawa has been decentralised 
into multiple regional centres of military facility locations, the most crucial of which is 
the anti-heliport protest in Nago city, as discussed in chapter 8.  In Nago, the base 
issue was transformed into an economic issue: whether Nago citizens can do without 
the construction industry supported by government funding, which has been crucial to 
the survival of the small local economy.  The terrain of contest shifted to the localised 
confrontation between the pro-base and anti-base camps in the form of collecting 
votes for the referendum and mayoral elections.  The power of subsidies and 
developmental projects as the central government’s instrument has revealed that 
materialism is still the dominant consideration not only in Nago but also in Urasoe and 
other regional communities in Okinawa.  Nevertheless, within the community of 
protest, post-materialist values and reform agendas have become increasingly 
influential.  Not surprisingly, then, the development of a plural and open civil society 
in Okinawa has not resulted in a successful campaign against the US military 
presence.  The community of protest has remained fragmented, sub-divided and 
resisted a unified, hegemonic coalition.   
The main focus of this dissertation has been the internal dimensions of protest, 
such as organisation, strategy, collective identity and framings of protest.  It is 
obvious that the effectiveness of protest actors also depends on the external political 
environment, explained by Tarrow as political opportunity structure (Tarrow 1994).  
The trajectory of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ suggests that each of the three ‘waves’ of 
mass protest was remarkable, in the sense that the popular protests were able to take 
advantage of, and contributed to, creating a major political opportunity for pivotal 
changes in the tripartite US–Japan–Okinawa relationship, such as reversion of   304
Okinawa, the relocation of the Futenma Air Station and rearrangement of the 
US–Japan security treaty.  Yet these occasions are few and far between.  The timing 
and consequences of protest ‘waves’, that is, ascendance and decline of a cycle of 
protest, have not been completely under the protest actors’ control.  The three waves, 
which all resulted in the continuation of US military presence in Okinawa, may have 
taught a lesson to the individual protest actors to remain faithful to their different 
causes as Okinawan residents, rather than losing sight of what they really wanted, in 
the cause of a unified ‘movement’. 
The third important point in response to the overall question of this dissertation 
is how relevant and powerful the myth of a unitary ‘Okinawan struggle’ has been and 
still is, whilst the actors become increasingly splintered.  In its investigation, this 
dissertation has attempted to conceptualise the protests and popular struggles in 
post-war Okinawa as examples of social movements.  It has found that concepts of 
social movements, among others, the ‘new social movements’ theory and the concept 
of collective identity, have been particularly relevant for Okinawan protest actors.  
The trajectory of Okinawan protest demonstrates that despite the divisions and 
diversification, an idea of an Okinawan ‘struggle’, based on a sense of a community 
and tradition of protest, has been maintained.    Out of internal diversity and conflicting 
positions within social movements, participants and observers recognise a coherent 
collective identity: 
 
Collective identity takes the form of a field containing a system of vectors in 
tension [that] seek to establish an equilibrium between the various axes of 
collective action and between identification that an actor declares and the 
identification given by the rest of the society (adversaries, allies, third 
parties) … At any given moment both actors and observers can give an 
account of this field through a unified, delimited, and static definition of the 
‘we’ (Melucci 1995: 50). 
The recognition of a tradition of struggle against marginalisation of Okinawa itself has 
been an important common ideological resource for different actors vying for 
contrasting reform agendas, because it enables them to delimit who ‘we’ are.  This 
dissertation has stressed that, despite the growing differences among the protest actors, 
the idea of a unitary, coherent Okinawans’ struggle has survived, and is still powerful.  
Different organisations and groups have supported, relied on and exploited this idea   305
through the three cycles of protest, because it has been useful and beneficial for their 
particular protest. 
The endurance of the idea of the ‘Okinawan struggle’ as a unified struggle is at 
odds with the increasingly obvious coexistence of different social movements in 
Okinawa. It also explains the generally harmonious relationship between different 
groups (especially new and more traditional actors) on the surface, despite the 
divisions and seeds of conflict underneath: even though they may disagree on 
priorities and what is really at stake, the internal differences have never intensified into 
the type and degree of conflict that could damage the myth of a unified struggle.  In 
this dissertation, I have argued that the continuous interactions, tensions and mutual 
learning among different actors have produced a community of protest — which is 
similar to the concept of the ‘field’ explained above by Melucci — and the idea of an 
‘Okinawan’ struggle itself constitutes the collective identity of Okinawan protest.  
The historical narrative of Okinawa’s marginalisation that extended from the 
annexation of the Ryūkyū kingdom and the Battle of Okinawa has been maintained 
and is as strong as ever across the board in the community of protest.  The emergence 
of ‘new social movements’ have altered the nature of the community of protest, and 
produced a more flexible and all-encompassing, holistic idea of an ‘Okinawan 
struggle’, rather than the ‘Okinawa Struggle’: the term that signifies an offshoot of the 
mainland Japanese leftist movement.
1  
Sharing common ideas is an extremely important element that sustains the 
loose, invisible, non-binding fabric that connects different protest actors in Okinawa.  
The common historical narrative of marginalisation represents the important common 
element that connects different protest actors, and is an important element in 
sustaining the myth of the ‘Okinawan struggle’.  As discussed in chapter 3, Okinawan 
citizens’ movements for representing residents’ memories of war have been a 
                                                             
1 The ‘Okinawa Struggle’, as defined by Arasaki, stresses the link between the Okinawan predicament 
with the current US–Japan security alliance that structurally discriminates Okinawa (Arasaki 1997: 
246).  His idea may be most consistent with the ‘constitutionalist’ framing of protest because of its 
definition of the problem as mainly the government’s placing priority on security over principles of 
democracy, peace and equality.     306
particularly important element of how Okinawans understand who ‘we’ are today, and 
what the present anti-base protest is about. 
The dissertation has also emphasised the importance of a common ‘repertoire 
of protest’ accumulated and shared in the Okinawan community of protest, in forming 
and maintaining a sense of unity among heterogeneous actors.  The clear content of 
this ‘Okinawan struggle’ is not defined or written out anywhere.  It is akin to a myth 
that resides in an abstract world, which different Okinawan activists can rely on, in 
their own terms in their respective struggles.  The undefined nature of an ‘Okinawan 
struggle’ — but whose connotation everyone understands the moment it is uttered — 
works positively, because it leaves the idea or myth open to be used or exploited with 
unrestricted possibilities.  It is also the contention of this dissertation that what 
continued the lineage of an ‘Okinawan struggle’ has been the repeated reflection on 
past experience and passing on of new lessons to the struggles that have followed.   
The tradition of protest in Okinawa predates and will outlive the ‘anti-base 
movements’.  Popular opposition to the presence of US military bases has been the 
most prominent protest in post-war Okinawa.  However, Okinawans have been 
engaged in protest before the US military occupied the island; among the earliest 
examples being the petition of Miyako farmers to mainland Japan to abolish the Shuri 
Court’s toll tax.  The myth of the ‘Okinawan struggle’ has a power to connect 
marginalisation of different forms: military bases, poverty, economic dependency, and 
violence towards the environment and women.  In the near future, the US 
re-examination of global security interests may result in the transfer of US forces from 
Okinawa to Korea, The Philippines, Australia, or somewhere in Southeast Asia.
2  
However, this is unlikely to mean the end of the ‘Okinawan struggle’ against 
marginalisation. 
This thesis examined the numerous past and present struggles in Okinawa, 
drawing on the concepts and theories of ‘social movements’, and explained the 
dynamics of increasing internal plurality within the community of protest, and the 
                                                             
2O’Hanlon and Mochizuki analyse that it would be ‘preferable’ for the US to spread part of the Marine 
forces concentrated on Okinawa to these regions (O’Hanlon & Mochizuki 2003: 165).     307
enduring myth of unity.  A question that invites further examination is if the 
Okinawan case has implications for the study of ‘people’s movements’ in other places.  
The complex problems related to Okinawan identity, and the historical narrative of 
marginalisation that this study has examined, do not allow simple uprooting and 
transplantation to other studies.  Yet the internal complexity, divisions and 
differences that are often disguised under a united front may not be a problem only in 
Okinawa.  In the Okinawan case, the heterogeneity and differences are left intact by 
an increasingly less rigid, but nevertheless persistent, myth of one unified people that 
can instantly expand the community of protest when needed, for instance, when a 
12-year-old girl was raped.  What are the myths that keep providing the basis of a 
seemingly united ‘movement’?  Which social movements are represented, and 
silenced in the process?  How do these myths help the coalition building among 
different groups, with different reform agendas and identity?  These questions could 
indeed be instructive for investigations into other experiences of anti-US base 
movements in the Philippines, or the ongoing struggles of the people in South Korea 
and Puerto Rico against US bases, and indeed social movements in general.  
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SACO final Report’s Plan on Reintegration and Reduction 
of US Military Bases on Okinawa  (2 December 1996)  
 




1. Land Return 





Land to be 
Returned (ha) 
Year of Return 
(Aim) 
Preconditions and other items 
Futenma Air 
Station 
All  ４８１  ４８１ 
(within 5 or 7 
years) 
Pursue the construction of a sea-
based facility  
(1,500m long) 
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to 
Iwakuni 
Develop additional facilities at 





７，５１３  ３，９８７ 
(end of Financial 
Year 2002) 
Provide approx. 38 ha land area and 
approx. 121 ha of water area for 
ocean access 
Relocate helicopter landing zone 
from the areas to be returned to the 
remaining area inside this site. 
Aha Training 
Area 
All  （４８０）          (４８０）  
(end of FY1997) 
(*Release U.S. joint use of facility)
(water area 7,895 ha) 
Ginbaru Training 
Area 
All  ６０  ６０ 
（end of 
FY1997） 
Relocate the helicopter landing zone 
to Kin Blue Beach Training Area 





All  ５３  ５３ 
（end of 
FY2000） 
Relocate antenna facilities and 





All  １９１  １９１ 
（end of 
FY2000） 
Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield 
after 
The parachute drop training is 
relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary and 
Sobe Communication Site is 
returned 
Camp Kuwae  Large 
Portion 
１０７  ９９ 
（end of 
FY2000） 
Relocate the Naval Hospital to 
Camp Zukeran 
(This figure, 99ha, includes the 
northern portion which was  
  309





６１  ６１ 
（end of 
FY2000） 
Relocate the antenna facilities, and 
the other facilities to Torii 
Communication Site 
Retain the land area where 





Portion  ２７５  ３ 
(in order to widen 
the road) 
Relocate the facilities that will be 
effected by the return within the 
remaining Makiminato Service Area 
Naha Port  All  ５７  ５７  Jointly continue best efforts to 
accelerate the return in connection 
to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier 
area (approx. 35 ha) 
Housing 
Consolida-tion 
  ６４８  ８３ 
（end of 
FY2007） 
Consolidate U.S. housing areas in 
Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran 
Sub-total    ９，４４６  ５，０７５   
New provision      ▲７３  （Naha Port 35 ha, Northern 
Training 
Area 38 ha） 
Total    11 facilities  ５，００２  Total area (ha) of the U.S. facilities 
and areas in 




２．Implementation of Noise Reduction Initiative 
 
Items  Outline 
Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 
operations at Kadena Air Base 
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and 
supporting facilities to the other side of the 
major runways. 
Move the MC-130s to the northwest corner of 
the major runways 
Construction of noise reduction baffles at 
Kadena Air Base 
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north 
side of Kadena Air Base 
 